Counter-IED efforts are done primarily by military and law enforcement (led by intelligence efforts) with the assistance of the diplomatic and financial communities. It involves a comprehensive approach of countering the threat networks that employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), defeating the devices themselves, and training others. Counter-IED, or C-IED, is usually part of a broader counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, or law enforcement effort. Because IEDs are a subset of a number of forms of asymmetric warfare used by insurgents and terrorists, C-IED activities are principally against adversaries and not only against IEDs. C-IED treats the IED as a systemic problem and aims to defeat the IED threat networks themselves. This IED threat network requires multiple actions and resources in order to stage an IED Event. The IED threat network may be either hierarchical or non-hierarchical but it will contain nodes such as personnel, resources and other actions that are linked. The importance of these nodes and the linkages between them will vary. Identifying the critical vulnerabilities within the IED threat network is an important C-IED activity. Some IED threat networks may be part of large, international terrorist organizations and some may be state sponsored. Some may work completely independently, while others may extend from theater down to village level. This span of possibilities increases the complexity of military and law enforcement operations and requires a comprehensive approach to C-IED potentially involving close cooperation and coordination between the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational levers of power. The complexity of the IED threat network is increased since mobile phones and the internet provide a low-cost and easily accessible medium for information sharing and the swift promulgation of tactical ideas and practices, thereby facilitating the efficient operation of these diverse systems. IED network members also have the ability to operate part-time and can blend back into the civilian population when their actions are completed. Such systems can be extremely resilient, invariably hard to target and are, therefore, survivable. Also, adversary targets can range from the specific such as host nation security force bases and recruiting events to the indiscriminate such as concentrations of people in public places. However, IEDs are not only found within the land environment; other targets may include maritime choke points and ships alongside, as well as aircraft in flight or on the ground. The first organization to tackle IED's on a large scale was the Joint IED Defeat Organization or JIEDDO of the U.S. Department of Defense on 14 February 2006. NATO later adopted JIEDDO's tactics, techniques and procedures. The C-IED approach used by NATO involves 3 mutually supporting and complementary pillars of activity which are: attack the network, defeat the device, and prepare the force. These are all underpinned by understanding and intelligence. (Counter-IED efforts can also be broken up into 6 key operational activities: predict, prevent, detect, neutralize, mitigate, and exploit.) (en)
Counter-IED efforts are done primarily by military and law enforcement (led by intelligence efforts) with the assistance of the diplomatic and financial communities. It involves a comprehensive approach of countering the threat networks that employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), defeating the devices themselves, and training others. Counter-IED, or C-IED, is usually part of a broader counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, or law enforcement effort. Because IEDs are a subset of a number of forms of asymmetric warfare used by insurgents and terrorists, C-IED activities are principally against adversaries and not only against IEDs. C-IED treats the IED as a systemic problem and aims to defeat the IED threat networks themselves. (en)