Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention | Behavioral and Brain Sciences | Cambridge Core (original) (raw)

Abstract

We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.

Type

Open Peer Commentary

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