IC ON THE RECORD (original) (raw)

IC ON THE RECORD POSTS TAGGED: "declassified"

Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

June 25, 2021

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence submitted to Congress a preliminary report regarding Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) that relays the progress the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force has made in understanding UAP.

Download the report

ODNI Releases Intelligence Community Assessment of Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Elections

March 16, 2021

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) today released the declassified Intelligence Community (IC) assessment of foreign threats to the 2020 U.S. federal elections. The document is a declassified version of a classified report that the IC provided to the President, senior Executive Branch officials, and Congressional leadership and intelligence oversight committees on January 7, 2021.

“Foreign malign influence is an enduring challenge facing our country,” said Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines. “These efforts by U.S. adversaries seek to exacerbate divisions and undermine confidence in our democratic institutions. Addressing this ongoing challenge requires a whole-of-government approach grounded in an accurate understanding of the problem, which the Intelligence Community, through assessments such as this one, endeavors to provide.”

Coordinated across the IC, the assessment addresses the intentions and efforts of key foreign actors to influence or interfere with the 2020 U.S. elections and undermine public confidence in the U.S. election process. The assessment builds on the analysis the IC provided to the public and policymakers throughout the 2020 election cycle.

Additionally, pursuant to Executive Order 13848(1)(b), the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security today issued an unclassified summary that evaluates the impact of foreign influence or interference efforts on the security and integrity of U.S. election infrastructure.

Read the report:

Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections

View the original press statement via DNI.gov

Assessing the Saudi Government’s Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi

Declassified by Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines

February 25, 2021

Consistent with Sections 1277 and 5714 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92) and with the commitment made during her January 20, 2021, nomination hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Security Avril Haines today declassified an Intelligence Community assessment regarding the Saudi Government’s role in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

Download the report

ODNI Releases ODNI-Attorney General Procedures for Conducting Intelligence Activities

January 14, 2021

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released new procedures approved by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General governing the conduct of ODNI intelligence activities.

As required by Executive Order 12333, these procedures, commonly referred to as the “Attorney General (AG) Guidelines,” provide the core protections for ODNI’s collection and handling of information concerning U.S. persons in the conduct of lawful intelligence activities. ODNI’s AG Guidelines also prescribe the limited circumstances in which ODNI personnel may participate in a U.S. organization without disclosing their ODNI affiliation.

Until the effective date of the new ODNI AG Guidelines on March 23, ODNI will continue to conduct intelligence activities within established National Counterterrorism Center or CIA AG Guidelines.

“As intelligence professionals, our first duty is to the American people,” said Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe. “We must continue to ensure that we always conduct our intelligence activities lawfully, appropriately integrate intelligence in support of national security, and protect the privacy and civil liberties of every American. ODNI’s AG Guidelines provide the framework for executing that mission.”

The new ODNI AG Guidelines are part of a multi-year effort to update comparable sets of procedures across the Intelligence Community (IC). They ensure the IC takes a consistent approach to protecting privacy and civil liberties while integrating intelligence information across many different intelligence elements and disciplines.

Consistent with the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the IC, the ODNI’s AG Guidelines are unclassified and proactively released in their entirety here. In addition, a narrative document describing key provisions of the Guidelines, including the authorities and restrictions that govern ODNI’s collection, evaluation, retention and dissemination of information, as well as the oversight mechanisms that ODNI will use to ensure compliance with these protections, is available here.

ODNI AG Guidelines

ODNI AG Guidelines Procedure Summary

Release of FISA Opinion Regarding Electronic Surveillance Technique

September 23, 2020

Today the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Department of Justice, releases a March 5, 2020, opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).

Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) requires that prior to issuing an order authorizing electronic surveillance, the FISC must determine, among other things, that there is probable cause to believe (A) that the target of the collection is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and (B) that “each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is to be directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.” 50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(2).

In the course of analyzing a novel, classified surveillance technique, the FISC’s March 2020 opinion examined each portion of the second half of these required findings, interpreting FISA with respect to what constitutes a “facility” at which surveillance may be directed, as well as whether the proposed surveillance was in fact “directed” at an appropriate facility. The FISC further addressed whether FISA requires the FISC to make a probable cause finding regarding the targeted facilities in their totality, or whether the FISC instead should make probable cause findings for “each” facility individually. The FISC appointed both legal and technical amici curiae to assist in its analysis of the complex surveillance technique.

The FISC ultimately determined that the proposed surveillance technique was consistent with the statutory terms and that there was probable cause to assess that the targets used each of the specified facilities. The FISC further ordered the Government to report on whether the technique resulted in the acquisition of non-target communications.

While redactions have been made to protect the classified and sensitive surveillance method discussed in this opinion, ODNI is making this opinion publicly available to the greatest extent practicable, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1872.

FISC’s March 2020 Opinion (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1872)

September 11, 2020

Today, the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, releases a June 25, 2020, opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) evaluating and approving limited circumstances under which the Government may temporarily retain, use, or disclose information that was unlawfully acquired pursuant to a FISC order.

On December 9, 2019, the Government advised the FISC that it was sequestering collection associated with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) applications targeting Carter W. Page (Page) based upon its determination that at least the third and fourth FISA applications targeting Page lacked sufficient predication to establish probable cause that Page was acting as an agent of a foreign power. This action was taken following a Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) review that identified material errors and omissions with respect to applications concerning Mr. Page.

While the Government strictly limited access to the Page FISA collection, the Government sought to temporarily retain this collection for the sole purposes of reviewing and remediating the issues revealed by the OIG report, as well as for any related investigations or litigation regarding the Government’s conduct. On January 7, 2020, the FISC ordered the Government to explain why any retention, use, or disclosure of information collected under the Page FISA applications was necessary and lawful.

Specifically, 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2) and 1827(a)(2) criminalizes the intentional use and disclosure of information acquired by unauthorized electronic surveillance or physical search that was conducted under the color of a FISA authorization. In prior opinions, however, the FISC recognized a limited exception to the language of 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(2), for “actions that are necessary to mitigate or prevent the very harms at which [this section] is addressed,” such as instances where use or disclosure may be “necessary to avoid similar instances of overcollections.” ODNI previously reviewed and released to the public these earlier FISC decisions, which are available here and here .

In its June 25, 2020, opinion, the FISC set parameters for the temporary retention, use, and disclosure of information acquired pursuant to the Page FISA applications with respect to: (1) ongoing Freedom of Information Act litigation with third-parties, (2) ongoing and potential civil litigation initiated by Mr. Page, (3) a review of FBI personnel’s conduct in the Page investigation, (4) Department of Justice Office of Inspector General monitoring of implementation of recommendations from its report, and (5) review of the conduct of government personnel in the Page investigation and the broader “Crossfire Hurricane” investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. The Government did not seek nor did the FISC authorize the retention, use, or disclosure of the relevant FISA information for intelligence purposes.

The FISC’s June 25, 2020 opinion is available at the link below and also in full-text searchable format on Intelligence.gov.

June 2020 FISC Opinion (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1872)

September 4, 2020

Today the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, releases documents related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC) approval of the 2019 Certifications under Section 702 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

On December 6, 2019, the FISC issued a classified Memorandum Opinion and Order approving the 2019 Certifications and the associated targeting, minimization, and querying procedures (linked below). In the Memorandum Opinion, the Court examined the proposed procedures and found that they satisfy the requirements of FISA and the Fourth Amendment.

Additionally, the Court examined the implementation of and compliance with prior Section 702 procedures, including the FBI’s progress in implementing the recordkeeping and documentation requirements contained within FBI’s querying procedures. The Court concluded that the procedures, as implemented, also comport with statutory and Fourth Amendment requirements.

As it pertained to FBI’s querying procedures, the Court revisited its analysis of the 2018 Section 702 certifications in its September 2019 Opinion , finding that the FBI continued to follow its previously described implementation schedule to complete training and systems modifications necessary to meet query recordkeeping and documentation requirements.

In addition to releasing the FISC opinion, ODNI is releasing the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures related to the 2019 Certifications. Links to these documents are provided below.

The documents are also posted in full-text searchable format on Intel.gov.

FISC’s December 2019 Opinion

2019 Targeting Procedures (released pursuant to the IC’s Principles of Transparency):

2019 Minimization and Querying Procedures (released pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)).

Background on Section 702:

Section 702 was enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) and most recently reauthorized by the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. Section 702 permits the Attorney General and the DNI to jointly authorize, through certifications, the targeting of (i) non-U.S. persons (ii) who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States (iii) to acquire foreign intelligence information. These certifications are accompanied by targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and querying procedures that are each designed to ensure that the Government’s collection is appropriately targeted against non-United States persons located overseas who may possess or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence information and that any such collection is appropriately handled in a manner that protects privacy and civil liberties.

Under Section 702, the FISC reviews the certifications and accompanying documents to ensure that they meet all the requirements of Section 702 and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s review is not limited to the procedures as written, but also includes an examination of how the procedures have been and will be implemented. Accordingly, as part of its review, the FISC considers the compliance incidents reported to it by the Government through notices and reports.

For additional background information, please refer to the 2020 Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities for CY2019 posted on Intel.gov and IC on the Record.

ODNI Releases Annual Intelligence Community Transparency Report

April 30, 2020

Today, consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)), and the Intelligence Community’s (IC) Principles of Intelligence Transparency, we are releasing our seventh annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authoritiespresenting statistics on how often the government uses certain national security authorities.

Providing these statistics allows for an additional way to track the use of FISA authorities, National Security Letters (NSLs), and the dissemination of information within the government when required. The statistics also add further context regarding the IC’s rigorous and multi-layered oversight framework that safeguards the privacy of United States persons’ information and non-U.S. persons’ information acquired pursuant to these national security authorities. This report goes beyond the government’s statutory duty of releasing statistics by further providing the public with detailed explanations as to how the IC uses its national security authorities.

“While secrecy is necessary for many aspects of intelligence, it is our obligation to provide the public with appropriate and effective transparency to allow individuals to make their own judgments on how the Intelligence Community uses the authorities that have been granted by the American people,” said Ben Huebner, Chief, ODNI Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency Office. “We are therefore pleased to publish our seventh annual statistical transparency report. More than a list of figures, this report provides explanations and context regarding how the Intelligence Community uses key authorities. As with past reports, the information contained in today’s report will allow the public to continue a fact-based discussion on how we achieve both national security and the protection of our privacy and our liberty.”

Additional public information on national security authorities is available on the ODNI website, www.dni.gov, the IC’s public website, www.intel.gov, and ODNI’s public Tumblr site, IC on the Record at IContheRecord.tumblr.com.

Statistical Transparency Report Regarding National Security Authorities Calendar Year 2019

IC Elements’ Procedures on Requests for U.S. Person Identities in Disseminated Intelligence Reports

April 30, 2020

Today, we are releasing individual Intelligence Community element’s procedures (or summary of such procedures) for implementing Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 107.1, “Requests for Identities of US Persons in Disseminated Intelligence Reports.” Such requests are commonly referred to as “unmasking.”

ICPG 107.1 directs each IC element to develop and maintain procedure to respond to requests for unmasking. After the elements developed their respective procedures, they began implementing their procedures in January 2019. These procedures are provided below.

Additionally, ICPG 107.1 requires the IC elements to annually report, to the Director of National Intelligence and to Congress, the number of unmasking requests each element received as well as the number of requests it approved or denied.

ICPG 107.1 also requires the DNI to publicly report the total number of unmasking request for the IC in the annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities.

The unmasking request numbers for calendar year 2019 will be reported in the IC’s statistical transparency report for calendar year 2019, which will be published on April 30, 2020 at DNI.gov, as well as posted here.

IC Element ICPG 107.1 Procedures

NOTE: FBI ICPG 107.1 unmasking guidelines had been implemented at the time of this posting and became available for publication in April 2021, at which time they were added to the index above.

October 8, 2019

Today the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Justice, is releasing documents, in redacted form, related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approval of the 2018 Certifications under Section 702 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Initially, the FISC approved most aspects of the 2018 Certifications but found that certain parts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) procedures concerning the querying of United States persons were not sufficient. The Government appealed this decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISC-R), which affirmed the FISC’s decision in part. The Government subsequently submitted amended FBI querying procedures to address the issues, and the FISC found that the amended procedures were sufficient.

In addition to releasing the FISC and FISC-R opinions and to provide greater transparency to the public, we are also releasing all the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures related to the 2018 Certifications. Links to these documents, along with descriptions on the court decisions and background information on Section 702, are provided below. The documents are also posted in full-text searchable format on Intel.gov.

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