(original) (raw)

On Oct 23, 2018, at 7:56 AM, Antoine Pitrou <antoine@python.org> wrote:

Le 23/10/2018 à 13:55, Donald Stufft a écrit :

We’re using IRV and I accept that, but I just want to point out that IRV
still has a form vote splitting (in electoral parlance, vote splitting
is the “favorite betrayal criterion”
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ. IRV only protects against
vote splitting when you have a very weak or a very strong candidate
ranked first.

Do you have a non-video link to an explanation?

If some form of tactical voting is possible, as a voter I'd like to know
about it.

To be clear, \*all\* voting systems have some form of tactical voting as part of them, so this isn’t unique to IRV. I was mostly just pointing out that IRV isn’t a panacea, you can still get a vote splitting like effect. Interestingly, IRV also has the property that sometimes the simple act of voting your true preference \*at all\* can cause your true preference to lose, and sometimes you would have been better off not voting at all.

I’m struggling to find a resource besides that doesn’t also include shilling for another voting system or isn’t a lengthy paper but https://rangevoting.org/IRVpartic.html gives an example and https://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html is a more complex example.