Knowledge How - Bibliography - PhilPapers (original) (raw)

Summary People know many facts, for instance, that Antarctica is a continent, that the cello is a string instrument, or that swimming is a sport. This is often called ‘knowledge that’, since it is knowledge that such and such is true. There is also 'knowledge how': for example, Ann Bancroft knows how to traverse Antarctica, Yo-Yo Ma knows how to play the cello, and I know how to swim. What is knowledge how? How is it related to knowledge that, or to other epistemic achievements (e.g., understanding, intelligence, rationality)? What is the role of knowledge how in action and practical achievement? These and other questions about knowledge how have received diverse answers. The answers are relevant to a wide range of debates in philosophy and other fields (e.g., cognitive science).
Key works Gilbert Ryle's original paper on knowledge how is Ryle 1946; Ryle elaborates in chapter two of Ryle 1949. Both works argue against the 'intellectualist' view that understands knowledge how in terms of knowledge that. Fodor 1968 contains a now-classic response to Ryle's argument. Stanley & Willlamson 2001 present what is widely regarded as an important linguistic argument for intellectualism. A recent collection of essays is Bengson & Moffett 2011.
Introductions Fantl 2012 and Bengson 2013 provide overviews of some of the main philosophical issues. Fantl 2008 surveys recent developments. Bengson & Moffett 2011 trace philosophical work on knowledge how from Ryle's original treatment to contemporary discussion, outlining central themes and noting a wide range of debates in philosophy and cognitive science in which knowledge how has been claimed to play a central role.

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