What Is Speciesism? (original) (raw)
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Speciesism as a Variety of Anthropocentrism
In what follows I shall argue that speciesism is in fact a variety of anthropocentric prejudice. But appeals to the important bond that we share with other humans ('our shared humanity' in terms familiar from Raimond Gaita) need not always involve such prejudice. Such appeals can function as part of a rejection of practices such as intrusive animal experimentation on the grounds that we humans have (in all sorts of ways) misused and mistreated non-humans to such an extent that we have now lost any moral authority to sacrifice their interests in the name of some greater overall good. And what is appealed to here, as well as our shared humanity, is a history of our human mistreatment and its connection to the moral authority to harm for a reason. An argument constructed along these lines might not work if we regard our connection to a shared and abusive human history as an insufficiently weighty consideration when set against the utilitarian advantages of the experimental system. I do not happen to think that it is insufficiently weighty, but others might disagree. Either way, the more importance that we accord to a connection to harm that is established through our shared humanity, the weightier a consideration this connection will become.
Anthropocentrism and speciesism: conceptual and normative issues
Revista de Bioética y Derecho 32, 2014: 82-90
In this article, we will challenge two common assumptions regarding the relation between anthropocentrism and speciesism. The first assumption is that anthropocentrism and speciesism are equivalent concepts. However, there are clear counterexamples of non-anthropocentric speciesism, that is, cases in which there is a preferential consideration of members of a certain nonhuman species over the members of other nonhuman species. The second assumption is the inevitability of anthropocentrism, which would supposedly justify speciesism. Nevertheless, this justificatory attempt is based on a fatal ambiguity between epistemic and moral anthropocentrism. Once this ambiguity is dissolved we will show how moral anthropocentrism does not follow from epistemic anthropocentrism and that any attempt to justify speciesism from epistemic anthropocentrism is deeply unwarranted. Finally, we will conclude that both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric forms of speciesism are unjustified.
Does Being Human Matter Morally? Five Correctives to the Speciesism Debate
This article argues for five correctives to the current ethical debate about speciesism, and proposes normative, conceptual, methodological and experimental avenues to move this debate forward. Firstly, it clarifies the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests and points out limitations of its scope. Secondly, it disambiguates between ‘favouritist’ and ‘species-relative’ views about moral treatment. Thirdly, it argues that not all moral intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. Fourthly, it emphasizes the importance of empirical research to corroborate statements about ‘folk speciesism’. Fifthly, it disambiguates between the moral significance of species and the moral status of their individual members. For each of these issues, it is shown that they have either been overlooked, or been given inapt treatment, in recent contributions to the debate. Building on the correctives, new directions are proposed for ethical inquiry into the moral relevance of species and...
Anthropocentrism and the Issues Facing Nonhuman Animals
~This paper is a chapter in the book 'Animals in Human Society: Amazing Creatures who Share our Planet' edited by Daniel Moorehead~ - - - Within ‘animal ethics’, and indeed with most debates concerning nonhumans, speciesism is often cited as the prejudice which most human-people (often unknowingly) hold and which ultimately lies as the underlying justification for (i) all of the arguments in support of factory farming, experimentation, hunting, and so on, and (ii) the lesser status and consideration that is given to nonhuman animals in ethical, political, legal, and social deliberations. Despite this, scholars have increasingly argued that ‘human chauvinism’, not speciesism in general, is a more accurate description of this prejudice, as speciesism can apply to any arbitrary species-preference whereas human chauvinism applies specifically to arbitrary preferences in favour of humans. Whichever term one uses, the aim of identifying whether a position rests solely on speciesism or human chauvinism is to see whether the argument put forward has a justifiable basis or is founded merely on a prejudice. The intention of this is usually an aim to demonstrate that the underlying problem that gives rise to the issues in ‘animal ethics’ is speciesism or human chauvinism, and thus that it is either of these that we must understand and eradicate before approaching the issues. In this paper I argue that while this attempt to resolve the issues has generally been a correct philosophical strategy, and largely convincing, it is anthropocentrism that is not only a greater problem for nonhuman animals but that is also the ultimate cause of most of the issues arising in ‘animal ethics’. I begin by considering what anthropocentrism is and how it is distinct from, yet related to, speciesism and human chauvinism. I argue that anthropocentrism is similar to androcentrism, in that it can include a chauvinism but can also involve unintentional world-views and systems of belief that goes beyond this. These additional elements, I argue, bias investigation and any positions put forward in the debates, while also creating new – and often unnoticed – difficulties for nonhumans. I explain why anthropocentrism as thus-defined is problematic for nonhuman animals, emphasizing the additional ways in which anthropocentrism raises difficulties for them, before explaining how anthropocentrism is related to (and likely causes) most of the issues relating to nonhumans; such as questions relating to culture, afterlife, property, intervention, hunting, entertainment, experimentation, consumption, activism, and so on. I finally point out how anthropocentrism is even involved within ‘animal ethics’, including those positions that reject speciesism and human chauvinism, and thus conclude that even while attempting to aid nonhumans these positions do not, and perhaps cannot, do as much as they could due to their implicit anthropocentrism. I then attempt to show how this situation may be resolved by recognizing, and removing (or at least limiting) as much anthropocentrism as possible when approaching the issues. I argue that this can be achieved by (truly) considering humans just as another animal that is no more special than any other, and attempting to consider all nonhuman points of view as of equal relevance in any issue. This, I claim, would have a profound effect not only for nonhumans and for the proposed resolutions made for each issue, but also for ‘animal ethics’, and more importantly for humanity and human society at large.
Journal of Value Inquiry
The prevalent view in animal ethics is that speciesism is wrong: we should weigh the interests of humans and non-humans equally. Shelly Kagan has recently questioned this claim, defending speciesism against Peter Singer’s seminal argument based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. This critique is most charitably construed as a dilemma. The principle of equal consideration can be interpreted in either of two ways. While it faces counterexamples on the first reading, it makes Singer’s argument question-begging on the second. In response, Singer has grasped the first horn of this dilemma and tried to accommodate Kagan’s apparent counterexamples. In my opinion, this attempt is unpersuasive: the principle of equal consideration is inconsistent with common-sense intuitions on Kagan’s cases. Worse, Singer’s argument begs the question anyway. It therefore faces two serious objections. This is not to say that there is nothing wrong with speciesism, however. In the second half of the paper, I propose another, better argument against speciesism, which I argue is immune to both objections. According to this other argument, speciesism is wrong because it involves discriminating on the basis of a merely biological property.
THE HUMAN AND THE BEAST. Exploring the Systemic Dimension of Speciesism.
THE HUMAN AND THE BEAST. Exploring the Systemic Dimension of Speciesism., 2019
Animal welfare and the question of animal rights have lately become an unavoidable societal, cultural and political issue in many countries. The term speciesism constitutes a useful conceptual framework in the analysis of the problems related to the way most societies exclude nonhuman animals from their moral circle. However, the concept still needs further theoretical development, and no consensus has been reached yet when it comes to the definition of speciesism. This thesis contributes to the academic discussion by providing an exploration of speciesism as a system. It will argue that the dominant definitions have mostly relied on an individually-based understanding of speciesism, therefore often omitting its systemic dimension that transcends individual responsibility. After having emphasized the influence of a deeply culturally rooted speciesist value system, it demonstrates the extent to which speciesism also operates as a system nourished, supported and legitimized by cultural, institutional, and economic subsystems. The research leads to the working definition of speciesism as a system of advantage based on the species and invites to rethink the solutions against speciesism. Indeed, it will make obvious the fact that fighting against speciesism requires holistic, systemic solutions, tackling not only individual beliefs and behaviors but also the cultural, political and economic forms of speciesism.
Speciesism, anti-speciesism and animal rights
European Federation of Animal Science Newsletter, 2019
Introduced by Ryder in 1970 1 , "speciesism" is defined as a form of discrimination based on species. This concept echoes racism and sexism. First formulated to show the superiority (i.e., the superior rights) that humans attribute to themselves compared to other animals, speciesism then took on board the differences that people attribute to other species. These species differences are based on multiple criteria such as body size, culture, proximity, utility. Whilst we mostly do not like invertebrates compared to vertebrates, we still have preferences inside this taxon, as we love bees but hate wasps 2. Another instance is based on food culture. It is difficult, and even impossible, for Europeans to eat dogs, yet they eat pork. However, these two species are comparable at multiple levels such as body size, longevity or intelligence. Developing these ideas, Peter Singer 3 questions the consideration humans should give to animals as well as the criteria that could assess whether one species should prevail over another one. Peter Singer stipulated that "all animals are equal". This is not a factual equality between animals, human included, but an equality based on rights. Indeed, humans are not factual equals among themselves, they differ in several ways, but we treat them in the same way and give them the same rights. Peter Singer is not only talking here about skin color, sexual orientation or cultural difference and body size between humans, he is talking about real human differences, for example handicapped or injured persons. These persons, despite lacking sensory awareness and consciousness, and no longer suffering continue to have the same rights as other humans. Peter Singer then asks why humans should not behave in the same way with other animals. Peter Singer's views on equal consideration Even if Peter Singer argues for an animal equality, he differentiates between equal consideration based on interests and equality of treatment or equality of lives. Indeed, animals do not all have the same interests. It is a Simple fact that a bird has an interest in flying whilst a fish has an interest in swimming. However, all animals, or at least all vertebrates, have an interest in not suffering. Following this principle, if a mouse suffers or feels pain as strongly as a human feels it, why should we make painful biomedical experiments on this mouse whilst we would not use humans for the same purpose? This is how Peter Singer defines equal consideration of interests. Equal consideration of interests (such as not suffering) is not the same as equality of lives for animal philosophers. Peter Singer suggests that the life of an animal which is self-aware, capable of complex thinking, of a theory of mind (the ability to attribute mental states-beliefs, intents, emotions, knowledge-to oneself and to others), to think about the future and to communicate, etc., is more valuable than the life of an animal without all these capacities. Peter Singer gives the argument of marginal cases. Think about a comatose human, who will never regain consciousness, who feels no pain and who unfortunately will do nothing more in his or her lifetime: why should one not do biomedical experiments on this person instead of on a conscious and sensitive macaque? Here Peter Singer does not encourage biomedical experiments on comatose humans but wants to illustrate the moral schizophrenia of humankind and to define
Animal Welfare and Individual Characteristics: A Conversation Against Speciesism
Ethics & Behavior, 1993
It seems impossible for a human being not to have some point of view concerning nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) welfare. Many people make decisions about how humans are permitted to treat animals using speciesist criteria, basing their decisions on an individual's species membership rather than on that animal's individual characteristics. Although speciesism provides a convenient way for making difficult decisions about who should be used in different types of research, we argue that such decisions should rely on an analysis of individual characteristics and should not be based merely on species membership. We do not argue that the concept of species is never useful or important. To make our points, we present a conversation among a skeptic, an agnostic, and a proponent of the view that our moral obligations to an animal must be based on an analysis of that individual's characteristics. In the course of the discussion, concepts such as personhood, consciousness, cognitive ability, harm, and pain are presented, because one's understanding of these concepts informs his or her ethical decisions about the use of animals by humans.
CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research - Zenodo, 2018
Human interference to the environment is increasing day by day. As a result, the environment is facing complete destruction. Each member has an important role in the environment, they form a beautiful environment in harmony with each other. But human oppression destroyed and affected the other species of the environment. That's why the environment stand at the crucial point of the destruction today. Now we feel the urgency of analyzing it, when the environmental crises, like the exhaustion of natural resources and greenery, climate catastrophe, animal killings etc. are at doorstep. Human civilization has achieved significant progress in scientific, technological, industrial and economic fields, but all developments in these fields have been pursued, and are being pursued, at the high cost of exploitation and exhaustion of environment. Man cannot survive as a completely separate entity from the environment. Because the members of the environment are interdependent in relation to each other. So the environment must be protected. We have to protect other members of the environment as well as animals and to create a healthy and beautiful environment. Human are the most intelligent being of this world, who are capable of moral conduct. So they have responsibility to protect all members of the environment. We should overcome the narrowness of anthropocentric morality and to extend the circle of moral considerations to the ecocentic morality. The result will be a beautiful and healthy environment. In this paper, I will address the shortcomings of the anthropocentric approach to the moral consideration and try to show how the non-human beings can be included in moral consideration. That is, we will try to find a way to extend the circle of moral consideration from human-centric to leaving beings, where all living beings to be given respect. Finally, I will try to find out a guideline of on creating a healthy and peaceful environment through human friendly behavior towards animals by eliminating aggression and violence in society and environment.
Speciesism like racism and sexism: A faulty analogy?
2023
This essay is the first assignment for the "Applied Ethics" course of the "Philosophy and Religion" master programme at the University of Wales Trinity Saint David. In this assignment, I discuss the claim: "Speciesism is morally wrong in the same way that racism and sexism is morally wrong".