TORTURE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS BY CUBAN AGENTS (original) (raw)
[House Hearing, 106 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CUBAN PROGRAM: TORTURE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS BY CUBAN AGENTS=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-118
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International RelationsAvailable via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE65-278 cc WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, ChairmanWILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff Caleb C. McCarry, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel Marilyn C. Owen, Staff Associate C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
PageColonel Jack W. Bomar, United States Air Force, Retired.......... 7 Andres F. Garcia, Vice President, Cuban American Veterans Association.................................................... 16 Captain Raymond Vohden, United States Navy, Retired.............. 10 Michael D. Benge, civilian Economic Development Officer and Prisoner of War Historian...................................... 13 Robert L. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs, Department of Defense........ 28 Robert J. Destatte, Chief Analyst, Research and Analysis Directorate, Defence Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office, Department of Defense.................................. 30 The Honorable Mark Foley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida............................................... 19
APPENDIXPrepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 50
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen a Representative in Congress
from Florida................................................... 51
Colonel Jack W. Bomar............................................ 54
Col. Jack W. Bomar supplement: A definitive history of
American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964-1973,
entitled P.O.W.'' by John G. Hubbell..................... 58 Andres F. Garcia................................................. 95 Raymond Vohden................................................... 107 Michael D. Benge................................................. 114 Michael D. Benge supplementary research on Cuban War Crimes
Against American POW's During the Vietnam War''............ 121
Robert L. Jones.................................................. 140
Robert J. Destatte............................................... 143
Additional material submitted for the record:
Letter to Honorable Lewis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, dated September 24, 1999, from the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen..... 148 Letter to Honorable Doris Meissner, Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated October 6, 1999, from the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen......................... 149 Letter to Honorable Douglas B. Peterson, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, dated October 6, 1999, from the Honorable Ileana Ros- Lehtinen....................................................... 151 Letter to Honorable William J. Clinton, President, dated October 26, 1999, from David Monson, President of Paralyzed Veterans Association of Florida, Inc.................................... 153 Letter to Honorable Lewis Freeh, Director, FBI, dated November 1, 1999 from Benjamin A. Gilman................................... 154 Letter to Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen dated November 4, 1999, from Pete Peterson, Ambassador, Embassy of the United States, Hanoi.......................................................... 156 Letter to Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman dated November 22, 1999, from Robert L. Jones, with attachment concerning Aircraft Losses......................................................... 157 Letter to Honorable Robert L. Jones dated December 15, 1999, from Benjamin A. Gilman............................................. 159 Letter to Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman dated January 10, 2000 from Robert L. Jones........................................... 160
THE CUBAN PROGRAM: TORTURE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS BY CUBAN AGENTS
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Thursday, November 4, 19994House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A.
Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) Presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order. Members
please take their seats.
Between July 1967 and August 1968 a team of interrogators,
believed to be Cubans, brutally beat and tortured 19 American
airmen, killing one in the prisoner of war camp known as The Zoo.'' I want to thank Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, our distinguished Chairman of our Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade for her leadership in pursuing this issue. I served on the Select Committee that initially investigated the fate of American prisoners of war and those missing in action, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. This morning, we will hear testimony from two distinguished panels. On our first panel, we are honored to have three former prisoners of war, including two who were subjected to the so- called Cuban Program'': Captain Raymond Vohden, who later
served with the Defense Department's POW-Missing Personnel
office, and Air Force Colonel Jack Bomar, of Arizona. Our other
witnesses include Michael Benge, a foreign service officer who
was a prisoner of war in Vietnam for 5 years; and Andres
Garcia, the Vice President of the Cuban American Veterans
Association.
On our second panel, we will be joined by Robert Jones,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War and
Missing Personnel Affairs; and Robert Destatte of the Defense
Department's Prisoner of War-Missing Personnel office.
Recent press reports have revived interest in this terrible
chapter of the Vietnam War and raised hopes that those
responsible for those crimes can be identified. In that regard,
we have written to FBI Director Louis Freeh to ask the Bureau
for its assistance in pursuing information in the files of
former Soviet Bloc countries regarding the Cuban program.
Those who murdered or tortured our American servicemen are
still at large somewhere, possibly in Cuba. There is no statute
of limitations on the crimes committed against these American
servicemen. Neither shall there be a statute of limitations on
our commitment to discovering the true identity of those
responsible for such crimes, so that they may be brought to
justice. Our Nation owes this to the courageous men and women
who served us so loyally in Vietnam.
Before we begin with our first panel, let me ask our
Ranking Member, Congressman--Judge Hastings, if he would like
to make any opening remarks.
Mr. Hastings. In the interest of time I will ask that any
comment that I make be inserted in the record.
I would like to thank Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her
leadership in this effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Dr. Cooksey has asked to be recognized.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My request, Mr. Chairman is that we minimize opening
statements as much as possible. I am particularly interested in
this issue. I want the facts out. I would like to have the
maximum amount of time with these witnesses. Due to a counter-
request, I am not going to demand that we have a total limit of
time. But I hope we can get to the witnesses.
Chairman Gilman. We will get to the witnesses as quickly as
possible. I would like to recognize the distinguished Chairman
of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade,
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, the gentle lady from Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I would like to thank
you, Chairman Gilman, for convening this hearing and for your
leadership and commitment. This issue is particularly important
to me for various reasons; but most importantly, as I read
through the accounts of what our men and women in uniform have
endured throughout this century of war, I think of my husband,
Dexter Lehtinen, who served in the Special Forces in Vietnam
and was injured in combat--he was relatively fortunate, but so
many were not.
I look at our POW's who are here today, many in our
audience especially, and I am humbled by their sacrifices and
honored to know them. I thank them for sharing their stories
with us. I know that it is difficult, but their presence is
indicative of their caliber as human beings and as citizens in
the service of our country.
The Geneva Convention prohibits violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture and outrages upon personal dignity and particular humiliating and degrading treatment.'' This is exactly what took place at a prison camp in North Vietnam known as The Zoo,'' seen there in a declassified aerial photograph
during the period of August 1967 to August 1968, where 19 of
our courageous servicemen were psychologically tortured, some
brutally beaten by interrogators assessed to be Cuban agents
working under orders from Hanoi.
Described by some to be a psychological experiment, the
goals of the Cuba Program,'' as the torture project has been labeled by our Defense Department and our intelligence agencies, has been described in different ways as an attempt to test interrogation methods, to obtain absolute compliance and submission to captor demands, and ultimately to be used as propaganda by the international Communist effort, as Mike Benge will elaborate upon during today's session. Some POW's were tortured and then instructed to copy a series of questions and answers given to them by their interrogators. These excerpts on most occasions included statements declaring that the United States was waging an illegal, immoral, and unjust war. Prisoners were tortured--again, some psychologically, others physically--to ensure cooperation in appearances they were forced to make before visiting delegations. Refusal to comply with the captor's demands usually meant that Fidel,''
Chico,'' and Pancho''--as the torturers were called by our
POW's--would be called in for more intense beatings of the
prisoners.
In a chapter of P.O.W.,'' a book published by Reader's Digest Press in 1976, Colonel Bomar describes different incidents where attempts were made to break the prisoners so they would recite the Communist Vietnam script before visiting groups. One of these occurred on July 3, 1968, when the camp medic entered the cell of Air Force Major James Kasler to bandage his draining leg. Having defied the camp commander the day before, telling him he would not tow the line before a delegation which as to visit The Zoo,'' Kasler knew that this visit meant that
it was done, as he says, prior to torture to keep the blood and
the pus from staining the interrogation room.
Within an hour he was in torture. Enter Fidel.'' Fidel'' reached down, grabbed Jim by the neck of his shirt,
and shook him like a rag doll. Fidel'' seemed beside himself with rage. Then he slammed the heel of his boot down in the center of Kasler's chest. Jim gasped, fought for air. Kasler would not cooperate, and after a while, Fidel''
shifted psychological gears, offering a drink of water, a
cigarette, turning a small table fan on Kasler. Unable to get
him to surrender, Fidel'' administered another beating, and another and another. Jim's thumbs were wired together describes Bomar, ropes were tied around his elbows. The flogging went on and on. After 36 lashes Kasler's lower back and legs hung in shreds. This skin had been entirely whipped away and the area was a bluish, purplish, greenish mass of bloody raw meat. Unable to get Kasler to surrender, Fidel'' promised to
return the next day for more.
The ruthless nature of the interrogators and the severity
of their actions led prisoners such as Captain Raymond Vohden
and Colonel Jack Bomar, as well as Lieutenant Carpenter, who is
in the audience today, to question how human beings could so
batter another human being. They stood firm in the face of
unrestrained brutality, intimidation, and humiliation 30 years
ago.
They are demonstrating their courage here again today by
working with us to ensure that the sacrifices made in defense
of freedom and democracy are not forgotten; to ensure that the
life and death of one of their fellow POW's and victims of the
Cuba Program,'' Air Force pilot Earl Cobeil, who is pictured in one of the posters there, is not ignored; to ensure that justice is indeed served. Captain Vohden and Colonel Bomar will offer compelling and detailed testimony describing the actions committed against them by Cuban agents at The Zoo,'' acts which are in direct
violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. To
violate the provisions enshrined in this document runs against
the grain of civilized society and undermines the integrity of
our international community as a whole. Humanity is one; when
one suffers, we all suffer. Violations of this protocol are not
just crimes against one individual, but against all of
humanity.
That is the message that one of our witnesses, Andres
Garcia, of my congressional district, a Vietnam veteran and the
Vice President of the Cuban American Veterans Association, will
underscore today.
Survivors of the Cuba Program'' have been eager to identify and trace the Cuba agents who systematically interrogated them and tortured their fellow Americans. Yet despite their efforts, a successful resolution of this matter has not been achieved. This hearing is the first of many steps aimed at changing that outcome. We hope to accomplish three goals today. The first is to get leads that could take us closer to an identification of the Cuban torturers. Could Fidel'' be Fernando Vecino Alegret, or
is he Luis Perez Jaen, as a 1974 CIA report alleged? Is
Chico'' a man by the name of Veiga, as our intelligence agencies suggested in this same document? Is Gustavo Robreno Dolz the man our POW's called Pancho?'' The answer to these
should be our first priority.
Our second goal is to provide the basis for an ensuing
interagency investigation of new evidence, including a search
of pertinent data and sources previously unavailable under Cold
War parameters. We are fully cognizant of the mission of DOD's
Office of POW/Missing Personnel who will be testifying today,
and while they are most familiar with the Cuba Program,'' they have completed their mission successfully by accounting for and bringing back all 20 of our servicemen who were part of the Cuba Program.'' We want the State Department, CIA, FBI,
INS, and the Defense Intelligence Agency to coordinate the
comprehensive approach to this case.
Last, this hearing will begin to establish the foundation
for future action against the torturers.
On a broader scale, this investigation will serve to
highlight the brutal nature of the Castro regime and the
historic and ongoing threat it poses to the American people.
Ultimately, our hope is that this hearing will serve to honor
those POW's who were willing to give life and limb so that we
may all be free.
Mr. Chairman, as part of our preliminary investigation on
this issue, I requested information from INS, FBI, and the
Vietnamese Government through our embassy in Hanoi. I ask that
these letters be included in the record of today's proceedings.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Mr. Ros-Lehtinen. Just this morning I received a letter
from Ambassador Peterson in Hanoi which I would like also to be
included in the record.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
[The letters appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. In the letter he states, I have personally presented your request to the appropriate Vietnamese officials.'' He further states that, Given my personal
experience, I share and deeply appreciate your abhorrence for
the inhumane treatment of POW's by any country.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Chair lady Ros-Lehtinen.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, at the
outset, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving your attention to
this issue in the crowded agenda of the Committee's schedule
and for agreeing to hold a hearing before the Committee.
Let me also recognize the leadership of my colleague from
Florida, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for pursuing what others would
clearly want to have be a closed door on a sad chapter in our
relationships. Let me salute all of those whose testimony today
will relive some painful memories, but whom we appreciate in
our effort to ultimately get to the truth.
While it has been more than 30 years since the Cuba Program'' ended for the 19 American POW's who suffered the daily beatings and interrogations of their Cuban torturers, the Cuba Program'' remains for them a vivid memory, and for some,
an everyday nightmare.
Today, we are here to announce that the search for
Fidel,'' Chico,'' and Pancho'' Garcia is not over. The atrocities committed by these Cuban agents constitute clear violations of the Geneva Convention, which has no statute of limitations. It is our intent to reinvigorate the investigation, uncover the identities of these men and bring them to trial for their crimes. I have read the information provided by the Department of Defense, which provides detailed accounts of the Cuban program. Unfortunately, the Department has been unable to definitively identify the Cuban perpetrators, but I believe our search does not end here. The clues we need to positively identify the three Cuban torturers may very well lie in the further review and declassification of documents from that time period, which I will join my colleague in pursuing. We have encouraged the Department to renew its effort so that we can find these men before it is too late to bring them to trial or too late for their victims to see them brought to justice. We should also fully investigate Fernando Vecino Alegret, the man identified by retired Air Force Colonel Ed Hubbard as Fidel.'' It seems quite feasible that the man who
has claimed to be Cuba's Minister of Higher Education for more
than 20 years was part of the Cuba Program.'' Alegret's contention that he doesn't, have the face of a torturer'' is
hardly a satisfactory response.
The allegation against Vecino Alegret is not a recent one.
A Washington Post article of March 5, 1981, indicates that not
only did he take part in the Cuba Program,'' but that he was one of the most-watched people in Latin America by U.S. Intelligence services. He has been linked to Cuba's Cold War activities in Central America and Africa and served as Cuba's military attache to Vietnam during the time of the Cuba
Program.''
Now, personally, I can't tell you that he is Fidel,'' but certainly his past should tell us that he is not above scrutiny. As former Chilean Dictator Pinochet has discovered, the passage of years has increased, not decreased, the likelihood of prosecution in cases involving violations of international law. I welcome that reality. I would hate to think that in the world we would send the message that those who think that through the passage of time they can escape the violations of international law and the consequences that one should receive for those violations. That would send a very wrong message. Castro's tyranny continues today in Cuba, not against American POW's, but against his own people. Pinochet's trial sends a message to all individuals who violate human rights that they, too, can and will be held accountable for their crimes. I look forward to the testimony. I will be going back and forth, Mr. Chairman. I have a hearing across the hall, unfortunately, at the same time. But I have read the testimony that has been submitted to the Committee. I think it is rather compelling and gives us a strong foundation to move forward in the future, and I thank you. Chairman Gilman. We will now proceed with the statement of Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Rohrabacher. I will be very quick, because I know Mr. Cooksey wants to get right to the testimony, and so I do. Let me just say that Ileana has done a terrific job here. We all owe her a debt of gratitude. It is about time we set the record straight about Fidel Castro; and there are just so many misconceptions and so many false images created about this monster. I mean, Fidel Castro is portrayed by so many on the left as being some nationalist just opposed to American domination, but you take a look at the picture a little closer and you are going to find that that man is a ghoul. He is a criminal, he is the worst type of gangster and ran a gangster regime for all these years in Cuba. He was, from the very beginning, a fanatic Communist who put his own people, thousands of them, in harm's way throughout the world, as cannon fodder for the Communist movement in Africa; and he sent his people--he hated the United States so much that he sent his people over to torture Americans in Vietnam. We need to know these facts. I am very pleased that you are here with us today to alert the American people about Fidel Castro--that his past crimes shouldn't be just sloughed off and taken lightly. This man is as evil a war criminal and is as committed to crimes against humanity as have ever been committed in this century. We need to remember that and make sure we put it on the record. So thank you for helping set the record straight and being with us today. Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We will now proceed with testimony from our witnesses. Chairman Gilman. United States Air Force Colonel Jack Bomar was born in Michigan in 1926. After refusing a transplant to correct a kidney disorder, Colonel Bomar was grounded, but was later granted a waiver at his request and assigned to the 41st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron in Thailand. Colonel Bomar was shot down over North Vietnam on February 4, 1967. During his captivity, Colonel Bomar was tortured by the Cuban known as Fidel.'' Colonel Bomar retired from the Air Force in 1974.
Colonel Bomar, you may proceed with your testimony. We will
put your full statement in the record and you may summarize,
whichever you deem appropriate.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL JACK BOMAR, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RETIRED
Mr. Bomar. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. My testimony is a summary of a lengthier, more detailed statement.
Chairman Gilman. Do you want to put the full statement in
the record at this time?
Mr. Bomar. I ask that it be included in its entirety in the
record.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection. Please proceed.
Mr. Bomar. Good morning. My name is Jack Bomar, retired Air
Force Colonel. I am a graduate of the Fidel'' Program, Class of 1968. I wish to thank the Members of this panel for their interest in uncovering the truth about a subject that has been buried for 31 years--especially you, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida. When I was shot down in 1967, we were flying an ECM aircraft out of Takhli, Thailand. It is kind of amazing that a SAM suppression aircraft can get knocked down by a SAM. But that is what happened. There were six of us on the aircraft; three of us survived. One was captured by the Chinese and turned over to the North Vietnamese. I went through the initial torture of peasants on the ground trying to spear me with spears as I came toward the ground. I kicked one of them aside and in doing that, I think I ruptured a disc in my back, and broke an ankle. I got a big chunk of shrapnel through my left leg before bailing out. So when I arrived in North Vietnam, I was not in the mood for games. I was tired, I just wanted a drink of water and to be allowed to lay down. The peasants tortured me all day. Finally I got into Hanoi that night, and went into some real torture by the North Vietnamese. They didn't need our Fidel'' to teach them how to torture
people. The Vietnamese were experts at this. I went through
what we call the Rope Trick.'' Your arms are tied behind your back, wrists in manacles and the pressure is slowly applied to the upper arms with straps. Eventually I was hung from a hook because I would not reveal the names of my crew. Finally after three days with no food or water, constant interrogation, the camp commander was suddenly there, then gone. The torture guy--we call him Straps and Bars''--applied
the pressure again. Finally, they showed me a list of my crew
members, so they had been working on one of the other three of
us pretty harshly.
I was sent to The Zoo'' and put in a camp where I met a delegation from the United States. There were three men in this delegation. One was a doctor, I think from France, one was a lawyer from Denmark or someplace, and the other was an anti war type from Berkeley, California, named Neilands, a professor from Berkeley. He and I immediately hit it off by him sticking out his hand--I was on crutches, had bandages from here to here to cover up all the wounds on my hands. I asked him, What the
hell are you doing in North Vietnam?'' He said, Dean Rusk, the son of a bitch, will not tell me where I can go and when I can be there.'' So my purpose, primarily, was to get a letter to my family, which got my name out in public. We felt that if you were known to be a POW, your survival chances were much greater than those that were not known. After that interrogation, I was tortured several more times by the Vietnamese and thrown into solitary. I was in solitary confinement in June. After the delegation visit, there was no more treatment for the hole in my leg. I dug the shrapnel out with my fingers. I was on crutches when I saw the delegation; but now the crutches were long gone. Because of my attitude at the delegation, I was stashed in solitary. Suddenly they came in and wanted me to meet several of my
countrymen''. I think they said, When you go to Quiz at night, it is a pretty scary thing; you are not sure what is coming.'' I wasn't sure when I walked in the room with Dum Dum and there were two Caucasians sitting at this table, and the one in the center was quite tall, spoke good English, had a Latin accent, offered me a cigarette, which I refused; and then I took it after a few words of encouragement from him. On his side was another gentleman--smaller, lighter hair, I believe-- and they said, Where do you think we are from?'' I said I think you are from Romania.'' It was obvious that they were Latin Americans. He said he was there to help me with my defense. I was to be tried by the war crimes tribunal, the Bertrand Russell Tribunal for War Crimes against the Vietnamese people, and he would work on my defense for me. Then he sent me back to the room. I didn't know what to make of these two guys, but they weren't the normal delegation like the one I had just seen. They were a little scarier; they were a little more intense. They were sitting with the camp commander to his right, which is a position of authority. I was called back a couple of days later after he told me now we must fill out a sheet of paper and you will describe your aircraft, 20 pages written there. I left it lying on my bunk. Being in solitary, I had a bunk there, a platform of boards, and I left it blank. Finally, at the last minute, I scratched in a crude sketch of the aircraft. This is a wing, this is a window, this is a door--this is the top, this is the bottom, pure nonsense. The next day I gathered up my stuff, and I met with two other POW's. Ray Vohden was one of them, on crutches. He was badly hurt; he had also met Fidel.'' The other one was a gentleman named
Dave Duart; I think he was an Air Force captain flying a 105.
There we sat in this room looking at each other, wondering,
what is going on here. Ray Vohden made the--I will not repeat
the statement he made, but it was, I think, that we are in deep
you-know-what. and we were.
We were in that position maybe three or four weeks. We
would go to Quiz, he would threaten us; Fidel'' would threaten us. His entire program to me, I felt was, you will surrender. He didn't say surrender to what, he didn't say what he wanted you to do, he said surrender. I think he was running a surrender program up there and could get maybe 10 or 15 POW's to surrender to anything that came up. That's a bad position to be in. I was badly tortured by him when I refused to surrender, or as he said, choose the match box or choose the cigarette case. The match box I chose and went through the straps again. It was just as bad the second time with the manacles that tore up my hands. I was just off crutches, I didn't walk that well right then. So he got my attention after a guard came running toward me and grabbed me by the throat and tried to crush my windpipe. That got my attention. So I nodded, I surrender.'' There was some histrionics of
knocking me around the room, and I was sent back to solitary
confinement with some leg irons. We were finally joined in a
large group, either nine or ten POW's, and some of them are
right here. Jim Kasler was not in our group, as such.
I felt that we were being held in limbo there. He would
threaten us. He would send us to Quiz. We would go back there,
back and forth. He sounded like a Cuban revolutionary to me--
Che Guevara. I made a big mistake one day; when Che Guevara
died, I said something like Good riddance''--really a bright statement at the time--and that got me in real big trouble, as if I could get in any more. We were joined eventually by a fellow prisoner, Earl Cobeil. Cobeil was a complete physical disaster when we saw him. He had been tortured for days and days and days. I went down to clean him up. When Fidel'' dragged us down there, he
said, Clean him up; and if anything happens to this man you,
Bomar, are responsible. Then he hit him right in the face,
knocked him down again.
His hands were almost severed from the manacles. He had
bamboo in his shins. All kinds of welts up and down all over;
his face was bloody. He was a complete mess. They brought him
into the room and as far as we could tell, Captain Cobeil was
totally mentally out of it. He did not know where he was. I
don't think he knew where he had been or where he was going. He
was just there.
Fidel'' began to beat him with a fan belt. I call it a fan belt but it wasn't really a fan belt. I think it was the side of a Russian truck tire, a very, very painful experience to be hit by this length of fan belt. I saw Cobeil hit as many as 12 or 13 times directly in the face. He never blinked his eyes. He never opened his mouth. He just stood there. We had him in our cell for I would say 8 months or so. He refused to eat. He refused to bow to the guards. You must understand when the door opened, the guards demanded you will bow, all criminals will bow. We were always a criminal in North Vietnam. We were never a POW. We were governed by the camp regulations, not the U.S. code of conduct for military personnel. We took care of Cobeil for about a year. We force-fed him by holding him down, putting a stick in his mouth, and pushing the food down his throat. In all that time he never recognized anything that was going on. Finally he was removed from the room for electrical shock treatments, and then finally was gone. I understand he died a couple of years later there at the Hanoi Hilton. I don't believe Fidel'' was in Hanoi just to torture
American POW's. I think that events controlled him that he had
no control over. I think the Tet Offensive of 1968 was
involved. I think when Johnson halted the bombing in 1968, that
involved what Fidel'' was doing up there. I believe a conference that was taking place in Hanoi--Havana in 1968 had something to do with Fidel'' being up there. I think we were
being prepared for some selective release that would enhance
the Vietnam image of lenient and humane treatment worldwide. We
were almost waiting for something to trigger this release.
Fidel'' used torture not for direct propaganda or anti war statement as the Vietnamese did. He used torture to break us initially, and to control us and keep us right under his thumb so we would do what he wanted done. His brutal torture of Cobeil and Kasler was due mostly to his frustration and his inability to force his will on others. When he lost his temper, he was a complete madman. He would get red in the face; he just exploded with rage. So if you refused to bow to him like Cobeil refused to do or if I refused to take the cigarette case instead of the deal, his temper just went out of control. The North Vietnamese knew exactly what Fidel'' was doing
up there. They may tell you that he was there to teach English
to the guards. I don't think that had any part in it
whatsoever. He was allowed to do to Cobeil, Kasler and others
what was unjustifiable in any society, even a Communist
society.
Perhaps one day we will positively identify and locate this
man. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much, Colonel Bomar.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Bomar appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Our next witness is Captain Raymond
Vohden. Captain Vohden was shot down over Vietnam. He was held
as a prisoner of war from April, 1965 through February 12,
1973. During his captivity, he was tortured by the Cuban known
as ``Fidel.'' From 1975 to 1978, he served as a principal
adviser to the Secretary of Defense on POW/MIA matters.
Captain, you may put your full statement in the record or
summarize, whichever you may deem appropriate. Please proceed.
Mr. Chabot. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. There is a vote on the
floor.
Chairman Gilman. We are going to continue. Mr. Rohrabacher
has gone over; he'll come back and preside while we go over to
vote. Please do it quickly if you are going over, because we
have so many witnesses we want to hear.
Chairman Gilman. Please proceed, Captain Vohden.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN RAYMOND VOHDEN, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED
Mr. Vohden. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my testimony is a summary of a lengthier, more detailed statement.
I ask that it be included in its entirety in the record.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Mr. Vohden. In August 1964, I was assigned to Attack
Squadron 216 as the operations officer flying in the A4C
Skyhawk off the USS Hancock. Our carrier was in the South China
Sea in early 1965 when the war against North Vietnam began to
escalate.
On my fifth mission, I was shot down bombing a bridge in
North Vietnam. I broke both bones above the ankle when I
landed. I was then taken to the camp known as the Hanoi Hilton,
where I was in complete solitary and was never moved off a
wooden board for four months except to go to the hospital for
two hours one night.
For the next 2\1/2\ years I was moved from camp to camp,
until being sent to The Zoo'' in November 1965. In the early part of 1967, September 1967, I was looking forward to the end of the war and my homecoming, when one night I was taken to an interrogation. To my astonishment, the man sitting across from me was a Caucasian. One of the Vietnamese camp officers sat next to him. We talked about the war for the next half hour. He had an excellent command of English and appeared to be very knowledgeable about the U.S. and the war. Several days later, I was moved to another room with Jack Bomar and another Air Force officer. They both had recently been shot down and had also talked to the Caucasian. One of us named him Fidel'' because we guessed he might be Cuban.
Individually, we met with him daily. The war was essentially
the main topic.
One day I was taken to Quiz. The Elf,'' one of the other Vietnamese officers, was there. The Elf asked me four or five times, what orders did I give. I said, none. He left and came back with six or seven guards who forced me onto floor, put manacles on my wrists behind me and strapped my elbows together behind me. After some time he finally gave me a clue what the order was, it was about throwing food away. I had ordered--I was an SRO in a building one time before, and I told the guys to throw away some food because some of the younger people didn't get enough, so they thought it would be better if we didn't turn back food. Five minutes later, as they were taking the manacles and straps off, the door burst open. In comes Fidel,'' ranting
and raving like a madman, pointing his finger at me and telling
me that I better have a good attitude now and do everything he
says. He slapped me 10 or 15 times. I then had to write on a
piece of notebook paper that I surrendered to the Vietnamese
people and would do everything they wanted me to do. He told me
other things to write and then told me to sign it and then eat
it to prove I would do everything he told me to do. Eating
paper is interesting.
I went back to the room with Bomar, but Bomar and Duart
were gone. For the next two weeks, I was beaten 3 or 4 times a
day until I became demoralized and depressed and started to
lose my appetite. I finally gave up eating anything. After
failing to eat several meals, Fidel'' came in yelling and screaming at me that I was trying to cheat him again and that he would kill me if I didn't eat. I had reached bottom. I didn't care if I lived or died. Fidel'' just stood there and
watched. Without a word, he left.
A week later, the tactic shifted; the treatment improved.
Fidel'' responded if we didn't use what he gave us we would be very sorry. One by one, more POW's joined us; all had been forced to surrender. At Quiz, Fidel'' tried every argument in
the book to convince us that the U.S. was wrong in its war of
aggression. Every day he reminded us not to become reactionary
or we would suffer.
One morning in early 1968, one of the camp officers came to
the outside of our room and disconnected the wires to our
speaker. Later that day we heard from guys in another building
who had heard the radio program that the first three U.S.
prisoners had been released by the Vietnamese. I felt very
relieved and proud of myself and the others who served with me
in the Fidel'' program because, although I can't say for sure what the original purpose of Fidel's presence was, I believe, the way the program was run, that its purpose was to find someone who could be of value to the North Vietnamese if released. Some found it hard to believe that Fidel'' expected
us to adopt the enemy views on the war and talk about good
treatment after we were tortured and forced to surrender; but
after getting to know Fidel,'' I could see how this was his goal and how he believed it was possible. After Fidel'' failed in having any of his group released,
the Cuba Program'' continued without any real purpose or meaning. Two weeks later I moved to another room with Paul Schultz. I rarely saw Fidel'' again, except on one or two
occasions. Fidel'' had been working with some other men and it appeared that one of them, Earl Cobeil, was resisting Fidel'' to the maximum. Of course, Fidel'' was retaliating. Several days after I was moved, Earl Cobeil was moved in with Don Waltman into the room next to mine. Waltman said Earl was all mixed up in his mind. On one occasion, one of the guards, Grimsey, came to the shower area and took us back to our room. Fidel'' was
standing at the door. All three of us lined up. I had moved
into this room with Waltman and Cobeil. We went to the shower,
then we came back. So Waltman and I bowed, but Cobeil just
stood there again. I said, Hey, Cobeil, bow.'' Nothing happened. Suddenly Grimsey raised his leg and pushed his foot against Cobeil's body, who went tumbling over toward the back of the room. Fidel'' yelled loudly at Cobeil to stop cheating
him or he would teach him a lesson he would never forget. The
door closed.
After having seen Fidel'' for almost every day for six months, I knew that Fidel'' was going to get his way. He was
not going to let the Vietnamese see him fail in any endeavor. I
was convinced that he would take a man to any length to get
what he wanted. In addition, the difference between the
Vietnamese and Fidel'' was that more or less once the Vietnamese got what they wanted they let up at least for awhile. Not so with Fidel.'' There wasn't a day that went by
that there weren't threats or warnings to all of us.
I was in this room with Cobeil and Waltman now; and for the
rest of the quiet hour, Waltman and I tried everything
imaginable to get Cobeil to come down to earth, but we were
unsuccessful. Shortly after the gong sounded ending the quiet
hour, Fidel'' came to the door and told me to come outside. Fidel'' asked me if Cobeil was squared away. I told him that
in my honest opinion, Cobeil was not at all rational; if he
continued working Cobeil over, Cobeil would never make it. I
was hopeful that he would believe me about Cobeil.
He accused me of trying to help Cobeil cheat him. The door
was closed, locked, and bolted. I started to talk to Cobeil
again for a few minutes, when all of a sudden, Fidel'' jumped up in the window, holding the bars, screaming in his loud voice, I caught you, I caught you cheating me.'' Seconds
later the door slammed open. Fidel'' screamed to me, get out, get out. A few minutes later Fidel'' returned with what
looked like a fan belt of a car, but cut so it was like a whip.
As Fidel'' passed by he looked at me with a glaze in his eyes of an enraged madman. Fidel'' went in after Cobeil with Grimsey and Cedric. I
could hear the thud of the belt against Cobeil's body again and
again as Fidel'' screamed. I guess Cobeil was hit around 20 or 30 times. It was hard to listen, as I did, to Fidel'' beating
Cobeil, a frail, diminutive man, his wrists swollen three times
the normal size, a vacant stare in his eyes already pushed by
torture beyond the limit for which he might have a chance to
regain his sanity. It had been far easier for me to endure the
straps than to have to go through this.
The guards all stood around talking loudly, laughing and
yelling in Vietnamese. When I saw Fidel'' with the fan belt, I was surprised, because up to that time I had never heard of anyone getting hit like that. As I stood there with my crutches, my heart and mind overflowed with emotion. It was the most sickening feeling to hear what was going on and know there was nothing I could do about it. That was the last day I saw Cobeil. Fidel'' unmercifully
beat a mentally defenseless, sick man to death. He, as well as
the North Vietnamese Communists, must bear full responsibility
for that and other acts.
There have been considerable efforts to locate Fidel'' in Cuba, but without success. I have often wondered what we would do if we found him. Try him as a war criminal? No mention was ever made to try the North Vietnamese leaders as criminals. Thus, I question whether trying to locate Fidel'' would be a wasted effort. Maybe this hearing and the
interest shown by Congressman Gilman and Congresswoman Ros-
Lehtinen to investigate will mean some justice will be served.
[The prepared statement of Captain Vohden appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Cooksey. [Presiding.] Thank you, Captain, that was very
moving testimony, and I appreciate your remarks.
Mr. Benge, you are going to be the next witness. I am
sitting in because I am going to skip this vote. To me, your
testimony is more important than voting on the Journal. You
will notice, as long as I am here, there is no time limit. We
have a lot of politicians that need a time limit, but you men
are heroes and you can testify as long as you want.
STATEMENT OF MIKE BENGE, FORMER POW AND POW HISTORIAN
Mr. Benge. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Madam Chair Lady, Members of the Committee, fellow former POW's, our Cuban
friends and distinguished guests. My testimony is a summary of
a lengthy, more detailed statement that I am presenting here
today, and also of my research report and references on the
Cuba Program.'' I ask that these be included in their entirety in the record. Mr. Cooksey. So ordered. Mr. Benge. My name is Michael Benge, and while serving as a civilian economic development officer in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam, I was captured by the North Vietnamese during the Tet Offensive on January 28, 1968. I was held in numerous camps in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. I was a POW for over five years spent 27 months in solitary confinement, one year in a black box, and 1 year in a cage in Cambodia. I served for over 11 years in Vietnam. I was released during Operation Homecoming in 1973. I am a board member of the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen, and I am a POW activist; that is, I am one who is actively seeking the truth regarding the fate of our prisoners of war and missing in action. I was not tortured by the Cubans nor was I part of the Cuba Program.'' There were 19 American POW's that I know of
who were tortured by the Cubans in Hanoi during the Vietnam
War. These brave men include Colonel Bomar, Captain Ray Vohden,
and Commander Al Carpenter, who is in the audience. They named
the torturers Fidel,'' Chico,'' and Pancho.'' The torture took place in The Zoo''. It was run by a Vietnamese camp
commander call The Lump.'' He was called that because of the presence of a large fatty tumor in the middle of his forehead. I was not tortured by the Cubans in Vietnam, but I was interrogated by The Lump and a person who appeared to be a Latino who spoke a few words of Spanish to The Lump during my interrogation in the early part of 1970. Upon my return to the U.S., I was shown a picture taken in Cuba of The Lump, which was taken with an American anti war group. Yes, it was the same one who had interrogated me in 1970. I was told by a congressional investigator that he was the man who was in charge of funneling Soviet KGB money to the American anti war groups and activists, such as Jane Fonda. After researching my paper, this made more sense, for who would be better suited to liaison with the Cubans then The Lump? This was my first piece of the puzzle. I decided to research the Cuba Program'' after repeated
claims by the Administration, Senators John McCain and John
Kerry, Ambassador Pete Peterson and members of the Department
of Defense that the Vietnamese Government was cooperating fully
in resolving the POW/MIA issue. This is far from the truth. If
the Vietnamese Communists were fully cooperating, as purported,
they would have told us the true fate of the 173 U.S.
servicemen who are still missing, who were last known to be
alive and in the hands of North Vietnamese Communists. They
would have helped us resolve the fate of over 600 American
servicemen who were lost in Laos, of which over 80 percent were
lost in areas totally under the control of the North
Vietnamese. If the Vietnamese were fully cooperating, we would
not be here today, for they would have revealed the names of
the Cubans--Fidel'', Chico,'' and Pancho''--who were responsible for the torture of 19 POW's, beating one so severely that it resulted in his death. Upon their return to the U.S., the POW's were told by the U.S. Government not to talk about the Cuba Program.'' Some of
them resisted as they had resisted Fidel'', and they broke silence. Regardless, the Cuba Program'' was swept under the
rug by the U.S. Government. I began researching the Cuba Program'' and had a draft paper in 1996 for presentation at the annual meeting of the National Alliance of Families. After this, former Congressman Bob Dornan held hearings on it, and it forced the Department of Defense's Office for POW/ MIA Affairs to do an analysis and a compilation which was submitted to Congress. I reassessed the information in the DPMO compilation and, nevertheless, from my reading the documents in this compilation, I found a profile. Regardless of what was testified, I read through these documents and I found the profile of a man that seemed to match almost perfectly the POW's description of the Cuban called Chico.'' However, this
profile also partially fit the POW's characterization of
Fidel.'' The profile was that of Major Fernando Vecino Alegret. Last August 22nd, the Miami Herald published an article on the Cuba Program,'' based partially on my report; however, it
was misreported that I had identified a man named Raul Valdes
Vivo as Fidel.'' That was wrong. However, it produced out of the Cuban exile community a photograph and a report that indeed the man who was suspected to be Fidel'' was Alegret.
Alegret is now Cuba's Minister of Education, and Fidel
Castro has issued a denial that Alegret was ever in Vietnam.
However, there was evidence compiled by the DIA, documented and
the report submitted to Congress, that he was in Vietnam.
Mr. Bob Destatte of the DPMO office made this report to
Congress. However, he says that he was not responsible for the
analysis of the Cuba Program;'' and I find it very hard, after reading this evidence, which was very poorly analyzed, that the Administration, Department of Defense, the POW/Missing Personnel Office have mastered the art of obfuscation. I grew up on a farm in the West, and I used to try to catch greased pigs at the county fair; and I can assure you that trying to pin down DPMO to truthful facts oftentimes is much more difficult than catching a greased pig. Mr. Destatte testified to DPMO's conclusions that the Cuba Program'' was nothing more than a plan to provide
instruction in basic English to the North Vietnamese army
personnel working with American prison POW's. I have taught
English to the Vietnamese, and I have been tortured by the
Vietnamese, and I can tell the difference between the two. One
might conclude from Mr. Destatte's testimony that neither he
nor his associate, Mr. Tarabochia, knew the difference between
torture and teaching English. I can also read English and
understand what I read. From reading that report, it is very
evident that the profile fits Alegret, and that perhaps they
could take some English lessons from the Cubans.
Mr. Destatte had the audacity to testify that the high
command was unaware that the Cubans were torturing American
POW's. I find this incomprehensible. I ask, how did Mr.
Destatte reach this conclusion? He questioned a North
Vietnamese colonel, Colonel Pham Teo, who told Destatte that he
was in South Vietnam in 1967 and 1968 during the Cuban torture
program. He knew nothing of the Cuba Program;'' however, he had heard rumors that it was an English language instruction program that had gone awry. Mr. Destatte testified that the Vietnamese explanation is fully consistent with what we know about the conduct of the Cubans. I find this deplorable. Mr. Destatte chose to believe a Vietnamese Communist colonel over American POW's who were tortured by the Cubans. I find this incomprehensible. What bewilders me, as it should you, is that Destatte's superiors at DPMO had the audacity to let him testify before Congress to this foolishness. This exemplifies the quality of DPMO's investigation and analysis of the Cuba Program.''
My analysis, from what I read over and from what was very
evident within the documentation provided by DPMO to Congress,
was that it was a program to gain the complete submission of
American POW's, and it was in preparation for an October 18 to
21, 1968, Communist International Second Symposium Against
Yankee Genocide in Vietnam, held in Cuba. This symposium was in
continuum of the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, a
kangaroo court and dog-and-pony show held in Denmark the
previous year.
My research paper is based partially on what DPMO gave to
Congress, as well as other documents I have obtained through
the Freedom of Information Act. However, I just scratched the
surface, but I have found enough documents to indicate that
there should be a plethora of other documents related to the
Cuban involvement in Vietnam if they were ever declassified, as
two U.S. Presidents have decreed. I also recommend that this
matter be thoroughly investigated by professional
investigators, not DPMO analysts.
I shall end this up shortly.
The Cubans were very heavily involved in Vietnam. They
maintained a whole section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, where many
American POW's were lost. I have also uncovered evidence of the
possibility that American POW's from the Vietnam War have been
held in Los Maristas, a secret Cuban prison run by Castro's G-2
intelligence service. The Cubans who claimed to have seen them,
later escaped, made it to the U.S. and were debriefed by the
FBI. At the FBI, when I requested documents to be released, I
got an answer of ``Give me their birthdays.''
My paper raises more questions than it answers, but only
history will prove me right or wrong. However, I think I am on
the right track. Only through full disclosure will we ever know
the truth. I was brought up with old-fashioned values. My
mother taught me at a young age that no matter how hard you
search for the truth, you won't find it, no matter what, unless
you really want to.
I end up concluding with there remarks: ignorance,
arrogance, disinterest, lack of caring, incompetence,
obfuscation. I rest my case.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Benge.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benge appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Cooksey. Mr. Garcia. I understand you are a Vietnam
veteran, but not a POW; is that correct?
STATEMENT OF ANDRES F. GARCIA, VICE PRESIDENT, CUBAN AMERICAN VETERANS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Garcia. I am a Vietnam veteran, sir, not a POW.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my testimony is a summary of my lengthier statement, and I would like it to be included in the record in its entirety. Mr. Cooksey. Without objection. Mr. Garcia. I would also like to have in the record a letter from the Paralyzed Veterans Association of Florida supporting these hearings. Mr. Cooksey. Without objection, it will be part of the permanent record. [The information referred to appears in the appendix.] Mr. Garcia. Chairman Gilman, Members of the House International Relations Committee, ladies and gentlemen. It is a privilege to participate in these hearings. Let me begin by thanking you and the Members of your Committee for your efforts to learn what happened to our POW's during the Cuban Program, under which 20 Americans in Cu Loc, the POW camp in North Vietnam, were tortured by agents of Fidel Castro's government, resulting in the tragic death of one of our POW's. My most sincere gratitude to Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her constant defense of veterans' rights and for her tireless efforts in uncovering the truth of the cruelty of Fidel Castro, not only against his own people, but also against the American people whom he hates with a passion, as demonstrated again and again by his actions throughout his life. This time his involvement in atrocities committed against our servicemen cannot be left unpunished. For the past 40 years Castro's Ministry of the Interior has utilized cruel methods of torture to break down those they consider enemies of the revolution. These same methods were used against 20 defenseless POW's in North Vietnam. My voice today is not the voice of a single veteran, who proudly served with the 82nd Airborne Division in Vietnam in 1968-1969 while I was still a Cuban refugee, but I am speaking for those Cuban- American men, like me, who do not have a voice today because they gave their lives fighting for freedom and justice with the U.S. Armed forces in Korea, Vietnam and Lebanon. What a difference between the actions of these men and the actions of those monsters that tortured our POW's. I am also speaking on behalf of a highly decorated Cuban- born Marine who served two tours in Vietnam and was killed by the same terrorist state that tortured our POW's. His name is Armando Alejandre, Jr. On February 24, 1996, Castro's air force shot down two U.S. unarmed civilian aircraft, killing Armando, two U.S.-born youngsters of Cuban descent and a legal U.S. resident. Speaking on behalf of my organization, CAVA, we stand ready to work with any Federal agency that asks for our support in getting more information on the POW issue. With the communication we now have with dissidents on the island and a number of Castro's military residing in the U.S., it is possible for us to obtain much more information today than in past years. We veterans will not allow this issue to fade away. We are committed to inform the American people of Castro's crimes again our servicemen, and we will mobilize the veterans at the national level if necessary. I am not only a member of CAVA but a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion and the Vietnam Veterans of America, and I will seek their support. Men in Congress, the press, some mayors, Governors and even the U.S. Chamber of Commerce believe we should be soft with Fidel Castro in order to change him. I propose that they ask Fidel Castro that, as a gesture of goodwill, he allow the alleged torturers to come to the United States to be questioned and to face their victims. If they have nothing to hide, Castro should cooperate. The fact is that nothing has changed since 1967. Fidel Castro continues to be the worst enemy the U.S. ever had. He is a dagger pointing at the U.S. underbelly. Yes, he is capable-- after having ordered the torture of POW's in Vietnam, he is capable of killing innocent children. He is capable of shooting down civilian unarmed airplanes carrying U.S. citizens. He is capable of using the drug trade to further undermine the U.S. and, yes, he is capable, willing, and able to perpetrate biological attack against the American people. He is capable, and he will continue to plan further attacks against the U.S. with impunity because he has always gotten away with anything he does. The time to stand firm is now. We should create a task force comprised of intelligence agencies to conduct a thorough investigation of the crimes against the POW's. But more important, we should indict and prosecute those found guilty, including Fidel Castro, who has all the responsibility. Every time we have taken a weak stand, we have lost. Look at the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and Iran. When we have taken a stand from a position of strength, we have been victorious. Look at Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Kosovo. We are the strongest power in the world and the world respects a leader. The leaders of this great Nation must assume a very important responsibility. We pray to God that your actions will lead to America doing the just, the moral, the right thing, without giving up its political and commercial interest. I do not want to close my testimony without trying to take care of a doubt you may have in your mind. Is this another reckless statement by a Cuban? I am a Cuban American. My parents sent me to this country when I was a teenager. I paid my dues in Vietnam; I am no longer a refugee, but a proud American citizen. My children were born here. I love this country. I want nothing but the best for America. I am Cuban by birth and American by choice. I am very proud of both. Thank you for this opportunity you have given me today and God bless you all. Mr. Cooksey. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia appears in the appendix.] Mr. Cooksey. I want to thank all of you for your testimony. It is very important. It is a story that needs to be out there. Americans need to hear it, the world needs to hear it, and your testimony has been good. I will open the questioning first with Congresswoman Ros- Lehtinen. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this opportunity. I would like, before I ask the panelists my questions, to recognize Congressman Mark Foley, our colleague from Florida, who has been participating in the briefings that we have held and is very anxious for us to move this investigation. Congressman Foley.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MARK FOLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Foley. Let me thank my colleague for all of her leadership on this important issue.
More appalling than the fact that Fernando Vecino Alegret
is now a high-ranking Cuban official is the fact that he has
been able to visit our country. Our country should not be open
to thugs like him. This is why I introduced, with Gary Ackerman
and Bob Franks and supported by my colleague, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen,
the Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act, H.R. 3058, which would
make all war criminals and perpetrators of atrocities, such as
torture, excludable from the United States of America.
I didn't become aware of this problem of war criminals
entering the United States until I recently learned that a key
member of the brutal military dictatorship that ruled Haiti
from 1991 to 1994 is now living comfortably in my congressional
district. In fact, more bizarre, he is a winner of over $3
million in the Florida lottery. Brutalized his countrymen, came
to America under the auspices of the State Department, and then
wins the lottery and lives in a guarded, gate community in Port
St. Lucie, Florida, unlike those that he beat and brutally
assassinated and murdered; they didn't have that luxury of
travel to the United States.
Initially, I just assumed it was a bizarre and isolated
episode. However, once I began to look into the issue more, I
realized how big a problem we have on our hands. According to
the Center for Justice and Accountability in San Francisco, at
least 60 alleged human rights violators are currently residing
in the United States. These are just the ones who have been
identified as living here; that is not even counting those who
have been able to visit the U.S. on visas.
In 1998, Canada began an aggressive campaign to locate and
keep out human rights abusers who attempt to enter their
country. As of July 1999, the Canadian Government indicated
that 400 cases are being processed toward removal, 307
suspected war criminals have been denied visas, 23 were
deported. That is a total of 700 war criminals that Canada has
detected. I applaud Canada for their pursuit of these people. I
think it is fair to say that based on Canada's figures and
taking into account the much bigger population in the U.S. and
other socioeconomic factors, we could have as many as 7,000
human rights abusers either living in or visiting the United
States at any given time.
We owe it to our brave veterans and refugees who have fled
persecution abroad that they should not have to come face to
face with their former tormentors in the Land of the Free.
Canada has been successful in tracking down modern war
criminals, and so can we.
If I may ask Mr. Garcia a quick question. Obviously, we are
aware of the visit in the past, in 1979. Are you aware of any
other visits Mr. Alegret has made to the United States
subsequently?
Mr. Garcia. No, sir. I am not aware of it.
Mr. Foley. Thank you. I appreciate my colleague yielding
the time, and I hope the Chairman will give her some additional
time since I took up her whole five minutes.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for
allowing Mr. Foley to speak. I think that the reason the
Administration is not fully behind your bill is that then they
would not be able to allow one of the biggest war criminals in
the world today, Fidel Castro, entry into the United States.
But we certainly hope that that bill passes.
I would like to thank the panelists for excellent
testimony. I want to ask you about the debriefing that has been
going on and the information shared and how much you have been
a part of that. News sources and other official and unofficial
sources have referred to the existence of a CIA document
published in the early 1970's which provides an assessment of
who the Agency believes could be Fidel'' and Chico.''
Were you, or to the best of your knowledge, were any of
your fellow survivors of the Cuba Program'' ever shown this report, and were you debriefed by the CIA and other intelligence agencies? Last in this set, what more could have been done by these entities, and do you believe that with their resources that they should have been able to more firmly identify these torturers? Colonel Bomar. Colonel Bomar. I was not aware of being shown a report by the FBI, or whoever it was who did this, no. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Captain Vohden. Captain Vohden. There may have been that report, but it is a long time ago now. I may have been shown it, but I just don't recall. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. In the debriefing process, sketches were made of the torturers; however, those varied, differing degrees, from one to another. What physical characteristics stand out about Fidel'' that could facilitate an
identification?
Some of your colleagues have identified this person
Fernando Vecino Alegret as Fidel,'' or the man in the photo that is going to be shown to you--his name is Luis Perez Jaen-- fits the description of Fidel.'' What personality traits
would you attribute to Fidel'' and the others? Colonel Bomar. Colonel Bomar. Jaen, I would not recognize this as Fidel'' at all, no. My comment was, was it taken from 30,000 feet over Cuba?'' However, this photograph is the same as that one. I was shown this, or sent this, by Colonel Hubbard, this picture. My reaction was, it could have been, or maybe it couldn't have been. I wasn't 100 percent sure that this picture--I think probably because, is he 20 years old here? This is a long time before we met him, and he matured a lot. However, there was another picture, Ray. Captain Vohden. I don't know. Maybe that. That's all I have. Colonel Bomar. There was another one that he could very possibly have been. That was the closest that I have seen, but I don't have it right here. I think she showed it to me earlier. Yes, this picture right here. This would have been as close as I have seen, right here. This man right here. That could be him, but I am not 100 percent sure. Mr. Rohrabacher. For the record, could you tell us who it is that you are talking about? Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That would be Fernando. Colonel Bomar. The man in the center in this photograph. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That was given to us by people close to Fernando Vecino Alegret. These are photos taken in Cuba, family photographs and social events that he attended. Colonel Bomar. Very young in this picture. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. He is pointing to a photograph of a social occasion that took place in Cuba where he seems to share those characteristics. Now, getting back to my other question, unless Captain Vohden wants to weigh in on this---- Captain Vohden. I don't recognize this man as Fidel'' at
all. The other pictures, in one picture here there is a shirt
that he is wearing that is almost identical to the shirt that
he wore when I first met him. I don't know what you call that
shirt.
Identifying features of Fidel'': First, he was exceptionally tall for a Cuban; he is probably 6'2'', 6'2-1/ 2'', or something like that, which I think is unusual. He also spoke excellent English and he was very knowledgeable about the United States. So that would indicate he would have to have spent some time here in the United States. I had an impression that he was kind of comparable to Li'l Abner sometimes. He was a big, husky, robust sort of a man. But so far as the pictures are concerned, they could be. This is probably as close as I have seen. I have seen the picture of Alegret when he was older, but that is not at all possible. But this here, it could be. That is all I know. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. After the initial debriefings, were you ever approached again about new information, new sketches, new photographs, on the torturers; and if so, by whom and what was the result of these followups? Colonel Bomar. No, I never was. We did some initial sketches then. That was the last I heard of it. It was over. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Is that true for you? Captain Vohden. I saw sketches initially and there was a time, maybe eight or ten years ago, the FBI came to my house and asked if I would look at some pictures; and for about three days, I thumbed through photo albums and I never found a picture of Fidel.'' Also, there was staff from a Senate
Committee, a number of years back, who talked to me on a few
occasions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. When visiting delegations were allowed
directly into the camp, were you taken outside to meet them? Do
you recall seeing any outsiders in the camp? By outsiders,'' I mean Vietnamese officials or non-Vietnamese officials, not stationed at the camp and folks from other countries, journalists, any visits that we could use to locate the participants in an attempt to gain information about the torturers and who they were? How closed was The Zoo'' to others?
Colonel Bomar. I believe I saw some Chinese in the camp.
Obviously there were some Russians, but we never spoke with
them. But other than one man that was working on some
electrical box, the squawk box in our room--he was definitely a
friend of Fidel.'' Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Now you had said in your testimony that Fidel'' had had a position of authority in the camp based on
where he was sitting, where he was standing. That would seem to
indicate that the Vietnamese certainly knew who this individual
and the others were. Do you believe that they could give us
information to further clarify the identity?
Colonel Bomar. I don't think there is any doubt in any mind
that the North Vietnamese knew exactly who this was. He came to
the camp in a staff car, a Russian car, driven by a Vietnamese
officer. We had never seen that before. That is how he
traveled.
He did not live in this camp. He came from off-camp
somewhere. He came quite often, and it was always in a staff
car. The camp commander, Lump,'' rode a bicycle. That was the best they got; going up, there was the bicycle. But he rode around in a chauffeured staff car, so he was not an ordinary visitor to the camp. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Just one last question, if I may. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. What more do you think can be done by our agencies to get to the identities of these three torturers? Captain Vohden. One thing, just for starters, they should try to get a picture of this Alegret now, or try to get something from 1968 somewhere around that period of time. That would be very helpful to really identify and nail him. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Colonel? Colonel Bomar. I would give Ambassador Pete Peterson a call and say, hey, ask the Vietnamese who this guy is, who he was. Maybe we will turn the aide back on if you tell us. I would put pressure on our Ambassador up there to put pressure on the Vietnamese, and I think Peterson could do that. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your excellent testimony. We will have some other followup questions for you at a later date. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cooksey. Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Colonel Bomar, is it Fidel'' who had his own car? Is that
who we are talking about, the man who is responsible for
torturing you American prisoners, and he had his own car that
he was driven around in?
Colonel Bomar. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you believe that if he was simply an
English teacher he would have had his own car?
Colonel Bomar. That is really hard to believe. No, I never
did believe that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So anyone who is suggesting that this
program with the Cubans was simply a program to teach English
is ignoring facts, like the fact that Fidel'' was being driven around in his own staff car, correct? Colonel Bomar. Yes. Mr. Rohrabacher. It would have to be either an intentional ignoring of facts like that, or we are talking about a total idiot. Colonel Bomar. Yes, I agree. Mr. Rohrabacher. I want to make this very clear. Because this information that he had his own staff car isn't just something, you know; it has to be known by other people as well, right, especially people who might have been looking into this issue? Colonel Bomar. Yes. Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you think that as you just testified, the Vietnamese, of course, would have to know the name of the fellow that they issued the car to, right? Colonel Bomar. Absolutely. Mr. Rohrabacher. So the relationship between the Vietnamese and these Cubans that you are describing was not a relationship where someone was simply there teaching them English, but it seemed like they were actually in a position of authority; was that not true? Colonel Bomar. Yes. Captain Vohden. He was a high-ranking official from somewhere, and the Vietnamese gave him a lot of power to do what he did. He ran that whole show by himself. Because the Vietnamese knew what he did to Cobeil, and they just let him go ahead and do it. So this guy really had to have a lot of power to be able to do that, because I don't think the Vietnamese liked what happened to Cobeil. Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's just say, for the record, having been in Vietnam several times since the war and once during the war, let me note that the Vietnamese are claiming that all the reports from every one of the prison camps have just vanished, disappeared. They were destroyed at the end of the war, B-52 raids, and everything like that. That is an incredulous answer to those of us asking for those records. Colonel Bomar. They kept very minute notes when you were being interrogated. I am sure they have records of every possible thing that happened up there. Mr. Rohrabacher. They would certainly keep the records of the person that they issued the car to, right? I mean, this is not like the camp commander riding on a bicycle, right? So let us note that the people supposedly representing our government are telling us that they are letting the Vietnamese off the hook on those records. I am going to ask today--we will ask and find out whether or not they have insisted on the name of this English teacher, Fidel,'' from the Vietnamese. If
they are not pushing the Vietnamese on this, why are they not
pushing to get these things from the Vietnamese? Why are they
offering these excuses for the Vietnamese?
Would any of you like to add to that?
Captain Vohden. For one thing, there was this guy called
The Rabbit.'' He was probably the most well-known interrogation officer up in Vietnam. I have seen Rabbit''
talking to Fidel,'' so there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that they know. They would have to go to Rabbit''
and ask Rabbit'' what his name was. I am sure Rabbit''
wouldn't say.
Mr. Benge. I might also end up suggesting that they ask
The Lump,'' and there are DIA reports of The Lump's''
presence that should have his name in Cuba.
There are also congressional reports.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we should be pushing----
Mr. Benge. That would seem be the first person to ask.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Ask about that particular person The Lump''--they should find him in order to ask about the names of these torturers. We will try to find out whether or not those people, supposedly representing our interest and supposedly representing the U.S. Government, have actually fulfilled that responsibility in a competent manner. You can count on that. Mr. Garcia, you mentioned something previously--I read something by you where you said that during the war, you were in Central Highlands and that someone had said something about your not using your name, because there were other Cubans around but were on the other side; is that correct? Mr. Garcia. No, that is the testimony of one of the members of our organization. His name is Leonardo Viota-Sesin, and he was in a fire base close to the Cambodia border. There was an American officer in charge of the base, and they had Montagnards working on that base. When he came to the base, the officer asked him where was he from; he said that he was Cuban, and he took him aside. He said, don't ever mention on this base that you are a Cuban, or they will kill you. When he asked why, the officer pointed out toward Cambodia and said, there is a brigade of North Vietnamese on the other side of the border. They have a group of Cubans who take care of all the interrogation, and many of the Montagnards have died over there. Mr. Rohrabacher. So there was evidence that the Cubans are not only in North Vietnam interrogating prisoners, but outside of Vietnam. Perhaps in South Vietnam there are some intelligence reports that have been privy to that, that indicate that as well. During the war I was not in the military, but I spent a little time in the Central Highlands with the Montagnards and found them to be very brave people. The word would have gotten around--these people had their whispering networks--if there was a Cuban person torturing them on the other side of the border. I don't think I have any more time, but did you have something you wanted to add? Mr. Benge. Yes. There was Raul Valdes Vivo, who was assigned to COSVN headquarters in South Vietnam. There was a Cuban contingent at the COSVN headquarters, which was the North Vietnamese headquarters for South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia. Ironically, he was placed there by Fidel's''
brother, at the insistence of Fidel's'' brother, and the Cuban also was on the front tank. When the North Vietnamese overran the palace in Saigon, the Cuban contingent had prestige enough with the North Vietnamese, that they were on the first tanks going into the palace. They had an engineering brigade that had maintained a good portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail there. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Let us just note, finally, you expected the fanatic Communists under Fidel Castro to have done what you are talking about because they considered that as being their job. You have to consider the Vietnamese did that, because they were doing their job. What we have to find out is why our government isn't doing its job in protecting the interest of our people and getting the word out to the people of the United States. It is either incompetence or worse. I appreciate you putting these words on the record. This is information we need to talk about and call our government to task for not following up on information they knew about, but the rest of us didn't. Thank you. Mr. Cooksey. Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I can't tell you how much respect I have, and I think every Member of the Committee has, for you gentlemen for putting your lives on the line and having to go through this terrible torture. It is almost incomprehensible that one human being can carry out this type of barbarity on another human being. I think it is embarrassing that our government hasn't done more to bring to justice these criminals, these people that visited this horror on you. This is something that should not be swept under the rug. This is something that we ought to use the full powers of this government to get to the bottom of and to bring these people to justice. I know we have another panel here, so I will not take up all my time. The only question I would have is, if we could actually determine who these people are--I hate to even use the term people for those who did this to the U.S. Air Force pilot and the rest of you--what do you think would be appropriate if we could bring these people to justice at this time for what they have done? Captain Vohden. You say, what would be appropriate?''
Mr. Chabot. Yes. What do you think? If our government could
bring these people to justice, what do you think would be the
appropriate punishment at this point, these many years later?
What do you think we should do?
Captain Vohden. What are they doing with Pinochet right
now, I would say. What they are doing with Pinochet at a
minimum and try him. If he is found guilty, hang him.
Mr. Chabot. Colonel Bomar, I heard your testimony before,
so I was wondering if you had any feelings with respect to
that.
Colonel Bomar. Yes, I think he should be tried and brought
to task for what he did there. He is a murderer, and we have
laws that govern this.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, and we appreciate your
testimony here today. Hopefully, as I say, this will not be
swept under the rug.
Mr. Cooksey. Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen, did you have another
question?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I just had one more question,
if I might. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Captain, you had testified today that you believe that the
purpose of the Cuba Program'' was to prepare POW's for release. I have a question about the reasons that you all thought this heinous program was under way. It has also been said that this was part of a propaganda campaign. Others said that it was a psychological experiment linked to the university at Hanoi, and still others say that it was used as a method to test interrogation techniques. Could it have been a combination of all of these? Please elaborate, if you might, on what you believe to have been the role of these torturers; why bring these three in, rather than Vietnamese interrogators; and why did the Vietnamese allow them such access to our U.S. pilots. Captain Vohden. I think they wanted to release some prisoners about the time this program started. I think this surrender'' program was like, you have a child; you want the
child to do something, and you spank that kid to make him do
what you want him to do.
There may have been some guys in the program who
surrendered without being tortured, but they wanted you to
surrender. So, after we all had surrendered, we started to get
a few extra cigarettes a day. He brought us tea in the morning.
We got a chess set. He gave me a cigar to smoke. He gave us
these extra-special things to make us feel good. Then he
started moving more and more guys into the room. So that, if we
were released, we could say, yeah, we were with a bunch of
guys?
Another thing he did, he forced us to carve things, little
wooden toys and things like this. This would be used to show
our remorse, and we could give these to the Vietnamese people.
Everything to make us look good if we were released.
Another thing we did, we built a fish pond; we dug a big
hole, and they put fish in it to help the Vietnamese people.
Then that last day when the announcement came that the
POW's were going to be released, they came down and cut our
wires so we couldn't hear it. So I think all these reasons
indicate to me that it was a release program.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Colonel?
Colonel Bomar. I agree that we were there for more than
Vietnamese propaganda. It was a bigger thing to me, as I
stated, whether it was the Tet Offensive or whether it was this
meeting in Havana. There was more to this Fidel'' program. But I think it was also, as you said, it could have been techniques that they could use to break Americans or prisoners. You listed several reasons, and every one seemed to fit. They could all have been, but I think release may have been a possibility, although I don't think they would have released me. Captain Vohden. Could I add something? I think they were just looking for someone in the group who potentially might be released. Another thing, when we had quizzes, Fidel'' talked about
the war and about going home all the time. He showed us
pictures of fashion models in Magazines. He talked about our
wives and families. We saw articles in Time and Newsweek
magazine. He tried every argument in the book to convince us
that the U.S. war was wrong. He did a lot of these things.
Again, this helped me to form my opinion.
Mr. Benge. In my research report, there is a copy of an FBI
report that gives the name of a Cuban gentleman who went to
Hanoi and coincides with the exact time that the Cuba Program'' stopped. It coincides with the exact time that the outside Cuban showed up at the camp and the program was shut down, and in that FBI report it says that this man was going to gather this information for this second symposium on war crimes trials. It is a very interesting, interesting piece, and it fits exactly right with the timing that the program was shut down. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that Chairman Gilman's letter, dated November 1st, to Louis Freeh, the Director of the FBI, be made a part of our record, indicating that he would like the FBI's cooperation, especially as it relates to the new partners that we have in Eastern Europe and the new Soviet Republics and elsewhere, former Communist regimes that are now moving further toward democracy, who have opened up many of their records. We would like for the FBI to work with our new allies to look at those files and ask the individuals there for help in discovering who these three torturers were and identifying them. I ask that it be made a part of the record. [The information referred to appears in the appendix.] Mr. Cooksey. Without objection. Again, you have been excellent witnesses, and again, this is a story that needs to be told. Today we find time to investigate the war criminals that have committed similar crimes in the Balkans just in very recent history and very recent memory. But this world also has time to investigate the people that committed war crimes in World War II. Stalin, he probably killed more people than anyone else, also Hitler and his henchmen. Vietnam is recent memory for those of us that were in the military at the time. This is something that should be pursued, too, no matter what the politics of it is. I think that it is interesting to observe who is here today and who is not here today at this hearing. I know that two of you were on active duty in the military at the time. You were Cold War warriors in what was probably the Third World War, and you did win ultimately that war by standing up to this Communist threat. Those records that my colleague just referred to are out there; they are out there in some recent publications. But, going back to the time that we were all in the military--Air Force, Navy, Army, whatever--we had incompetent leadership in the executive branch of government at that time. According to David Halberstam's book, The Best and the
Brightest,'' the people that were in Johnson's Cabinet were
incompetent as well and were responsible for some real dumb
things that were done in fighting the air war in Vietnam. If
you want to get a good look at that period, I would encourage
you to read a book, The Tragedy of the Soviet Period,'' written by Martin Malia. It was written by a UC-Berkeley professor. I know you made a comment about a UC-Berkeley professor, but this is a book I would encourage you to read. There is another book, The Black Book of Communism.''
Where you can go back and find out what really went on. These
records are available.
Again, I want to thank you for coming, for being here
today. I feel very strongly that this should be pursued. Again,
you have been excellent witnesses. We will move on to the next
panel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooksey. Our second panel is made up of two individuals
who are former military officers, former United States Army
officers, and they are now at the Department of Defense. The
first is Mr. Robert Jones, who has served as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War-Missing
Personnel Affairs since May 1998. Mr. Jones is a decorated two-
tour Vietnam combat veteran; he is also a disabled veteran.
Previously, Mr. Jones was a Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs in the
Department of Veterans Affairs.
Mr. Robert Destatte is a Technical Adviser to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary. Mr. Destatte is the Chief Analyst of the
Department of Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office.
So we are delighted to have you here. I feel that you both
can speak with some authority because you are both veterans,
Vietnam veterans, and have a major responsibility for looking
into this matter.
Mr. Cooksey. We will open with you, Mr. Jones.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. JONES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PRISONER OF WAR-MISSING PERSONNEL AFFAIRS
Mr. Jones. Thank you. I welcome today's opportunity to address the Committee on the roles my office and the former
Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office on POW/MIA Affairs
have had in the Cuba Program,'' a program whose brutal purpose still remains unresolved. I ask that my statement in its entirety be entered into the record after this hearing. Mr. Cooksey. Without objection. Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, DOD became aware of the Cuba
Program'' immediately following Operation Homecoming, and we
have shared our knowledge with the appropriate agencies and the
Congress beginning as early as July, 1973. We have appeared
before in congressional hearings on this subject in 1987 and
again in 1996.
Mr. Chairman, I truly am humbled to follow this group of
former POW's who have addressed the Committee here this
morning. None of us can fully understand the trying experiences
and inhumane treatment that they endured while they were in
captivity. These men sacrificed greatly for this Nation. They
are truly American heroes whose sacrifices stretch the limits
of one's imagination. Those who endured the abuses of the
Cuba Program'' suffered dearly and are examples of those whose sense of duty and commitment to our Nation was tested to the limits of their human endurance. Thankfully, all of those who were involved in this brutal activity have been accounted for and returned to the United States. The mission of my agency is to account for those American heroes who were lost while serving in foreign lands and have not returned to American soil. Currently, there are 2,047 Americans who remain unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. My office pursues the resolution of those cases by using a number of investigative tools. We have received more than 21,000 reports possibly pertaining to Americans in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, none of those have led us to the return of a single live American. We have a robust archival research and oral history program, as well as unilateral and trilateral investigations in each of the three Southeast Asian countries. These methods have, in fact, produced significant investigative leads that have led to a number of resolved cases. To date, we have accounted for 536 missing Americans. We continue to pursue all avenues with live Americans as our No. 1 priority. As my staff explained in their separate briefing to Representative Ros-Lehtinen, our ability to accomplish this humanitarian mission is wholly dependent on the willingness of foreign governments around the globe to allow American POW/MIA specialists access to their territory, their citizens and their historical records. I firmly believe that any attempt on the part of the Department of Defense to merge investigations of war crimes into our accounting activities may jeopardize our ability to accomplish our humanitarian mission. DPMO is not a criminal investigative arm of the Federal Government. Our mission is separate. We are charged with the fullest possible accounting for U.S. military and certain American civilian personnel who become missing as a result of hostile action. Our mission is humanitarian in nature, not linked to other bilateral foreign policy concerns. DPMO's role with regard to the Cuba Program'' has been to
act as a repository of historical information to ensure it is
available to the appropriate Federal agencies. The
sensitivities associated with our humanitarian accounting
mission clearly prohibit us from any involvement in the pursuit
of the perpetrators of these misdeeds.
Based upon recent congressional inquiries, I directed a
complete historical file review and requested other Federal
agencies to provide us with information they may have related
to this issue. This is being done to ensure that my office has
a comprehensive record of the Cuba Program'' as a historical file. I was informed on October 29th that Ambassador Peterson has met with Mr. Hung, Director of the Americas Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to request the assistance of the Government of Vietnam in supplying information about the Cuban interrogators of American POW's from 1967 to 1968. Mr. Hung listened with interest and responded that he would research the questions presented in the talking points that the Ambassador left with him. I believe we all look forward to the responses to those questions. I personally will be in Southeast Asia during the period of November 29th through the 11th of December, traveling throughout Southeast Asia, to include Vietnam. Rest assured I will discuss this program with Ambassador Peterson upon my arrival in Hanoi. Mr. Chairman, I share the same sense of outrage that you and the Members of the Committee do regarding the torturous abuse endured by our prisoners of war at the hands of these presumed Cuban interrogators. I believe that the pursuit of these criminals by my agency has a real potential to disrupt our mission to return our men, or their remains, to their families, many of whom have waited for more than 50 years. I do not recommend my office taking such action when it has the potential to jeopardize the hopes of the families of our missing. I do believe with all my heart that these men should be tracked down, brought to justice by the appropriate agency. I recommend that requests for further investigation of the Cuba
Program'' be directed to the appropriate agencies that are
chartered to pursue violations of the law of armed conflict.
DPMO stands equally ready to continue to provide information to
an interagency group as required. We will continue our policy
of transparency, making available our historical files and
knowledge on this issue.
I clearly support the goals for this hearing as stated by
Representative Ros-Lehtinen. I will also say that I will be in
Moscow next week. Rest assured that I will raise this ``Cuba
Program'' with my Moscow counterpart.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to introduce a
Member of my staff, Mr. Bob Destatte, a senior Southeast Asia
analyst, a man who I respect very highly for his knowledge of
Southeast Asia. I believe Mr. Destatte can address any
technical questions you or the Committee may have.
Thank you. This concludes my remarks.
Chairman Gilman. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Destatte, if you wish you may put your
full statement in the record or you may summarize, whichever
you may deem appropriate.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT DESTATTE, CHIEF ANALYST, PRISONER OF WAR- MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Destatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Gilman, and distinguished Committee Members. I have a
short statement. I would like to read it and I would like to
ask that the statement be entered into the record in its
entirety.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, the full statement will
be made part of the record.
Mr. Destatte. First, let me join Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Jones in saluting the American heroes who shared
with this Committee this morning their experiences as victims
of what has become known as the Cuba Program.'' One of those gentleman, Captain Ray Vohden, and I worked together for a while in the Pentagon, when I first joined this issue. Let me begin. Chairman Gilman. Put the mike a little closer, Mr. Destatte. Thank you. Mr. Destatte. I would like to begin with a brief description of the Cuba Program'' on the basis of what is in
the written record, which I believe will complement the
personal accounts that we received earlier this morning.
The American POW's coined the term Cuba Program'' to describe a program in which a small team of Caucasian interrogators brutally beat and tortured 19 American aviators in a camp that our POW's nicknamed The Zoo'' in Hanoi,
between July 1967 and August 1968. One of those POW's, as we
heard earlier today, U.S. Air Force Major Earl Cobeil,
eventually died from those beatings.
The Caucasian interrogators spoke English fluently, but
with a Spanish accent. They spoke knowledgeably about Central
America and the United States. In an exchange with one of our
POW's, a Vietnamese guard referred to the Caucasian
interrogators as Cubans. These and other factors led many of
the POW's and analysts, including myself, to believe that the
interrogators were Cubans, possibly Cubans who had lived in the
United States.
The POW's nicknamed the chief Caucasian interrogator
Fidel.'' They nicknamed his principal assistant Chico.''
several days before the program ended, a third man the POW's
nicknamed variously Pancho'' and Garcia'' appeared to
replace Fidel.'' The POW's, as we heard earlier, observed another man who might have been Cuban working as an electrical technician in the POW camp during the closing months of the program. They also heard the voice of a woman they believed was Cuban on the camp radio for about two weeks near the end of the program. The DOD first learned about the Cuba Program'' in March,
1973 when the reports of the first post-homecoming debriefings
began arriving in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Prisoner of
War/Missing in Action Office. By March 1973, nearly two weeks
before the last POW was released, the DIA's POW/MIA Office had
brought this issue to the attention of senior Department of
Defense officials; and by the 23rd of March, the U.S.
Government had established a coordinated effort to learn the
identity of the Cubans. That effort involved the Defense
Intelligence Agency, each of the armed services, the National
Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee's chief investigator, among others.
In April, 1974, a little over a year later, the CIA
informed the DIA that CIA analysts had tentatively identified
the interrogator, nicknamed Fidel,'' as one Luis Perez, also known as Luis Perez Jaen, a captain in the Cuban Ministry of Interior. This captain was in Hanoi during the Cuba
Program'', had a history of interrogating foreigners in Cuba,
and was in the U.S. during 1956 and 1957, buying and shipping
arms to Cuba; and he possessed most of the physical and
personality traits of Fidel'' that our POW's had described. The CIA provided DIA a copy of a photograph of Luis Perez Jaen that was published in the Cuban newspaper, Oriente, on 25 February 1959. The photograph, which we have shared with the Committee, depicts Perez Jaen wearing a military cap and a full beard. Between November, 1975 and mid-1976, U.S. Air Force investigators asked seven victims of the Cuba Program'' to
examine this photograph of Luis Perez Jaen. Six of these men
could not state positively that he was the interrogator they
nicknamed Fidel,'' primarily because the photograph depicts him wearing a full beard. One of the seven, Colonel Donald Waltman, wrote in a 1976 note to a U.S. Air Force investigator, quote, I say, yes, that is 'Fidel', or at least a guy who
looks too much like him. I have to try to imagine him clean
shaven, and when I do, it is him. Maybe because I would like to
ID him so damn bad. It is the most look-alike 'Fidel' picture I
have seen,'' end quote.
Also in April, 1974, the CIA informed the DIA that
Chico'' might be a Cuban named Veiga, whose first name they did not know, an employee of the Cuban Department of State Security. Reportedly, Veiga had studied at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1958 and 1959. An extensive followup investigation by U.S. Air Force investigators failed to confirm the identity of this person. Other names have been suggested over the years; however, subsequent investigations either ruled them out or proved inconclusive. For example, the DIA POW/MIA Office provided historical information about the Cuba Program'' to the FBI when it
investigated a 1987 report that a Cuban employee of the United
Nations might be one of the Cuban interrogators. The FBI worked
closely with returned POW's in that investigation.
Captain Vohden described the three days he spent going over
photos associated with that investigation. However, the POW's
could not positively identify the Cuban at the United Nations
as one of the men who tortured them in Hanoi.
Recent news stories suggest that the Cuban Minister of
Education, Fernando Vecino Alegret, is the interrogator our
POW's nicknamed Fidel.'' Fernando Vecino Alegret first came to our attention shortly before he visited the United States in November, 1978. At that time, Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies examined the possibility that he was the interrogator named Fidel.'' We have been searching our
historical files for any record we might have received from
those agencies concerning this man. Two days ago, we discovered
a still-classified September, 1973 report that described
Fernando Vecino Alegret as an engineering graduate, who studied
at the University of Havana during 1962-65. The report also
stated that he founded the Cuban Military Technical Institute
in September 1966 and that he was its Director from September,
1966 until January, 1973.
We have not yet had time to confirm the origin and
reliability of that report. However, if the information in the
report is accurate, there is little chance that Fernando Vecino
Alegret could be the interrogator Fidel.'' Among the names we have received, the two names the CIA suggested in 1974 remain the most likely candidates for the interrogators named Fidel'' and Chico,'' but I should emphasize we do not know who he is. The only information we have concerning the purpose of the Cuba Program'' comes from the American POW's who were victims
and two Vietnamese military officers. The preponderance of
information in our files, most of it coming from the returnees
themselves, suggests that the Cuba Program'' was a Cuban assistance program that went awry, and that the Vietnamese terminated the program shortly after the interrogator named Fidel'' beat Major Cobeil into a near-catatonic state from
which he never recovered.
The Department of Defense has kept the Congress informed
about the Cuba Program'' from the very beginning. For example, the DPMO's predecessor office, the Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office for Prisoners of War/ Missing in Action Affairs, presented testimony about the Cuba
Program'' to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee during
hearings on 2 July 1973, about three months after the last
American POW was released. A former POW who was a victim of the
program, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Larry Spencer, also
testified before the Subcommittee.
Later, the DIA POW/MIA Office provided historical
information to the Subcommittee's chief investigator, Mr.
Alfonso L. Tarabochia, who conducted an independent effort to
identify the interrogators. I believe Captain Vohden also made
reference to that investigation. By September, 1974, Mr.
Tarabochia had tentatively concluded that Fidel'' was a Cuban named Pedro Fumero. Unfortunately, the returned POW's who were victims of Fidel'' could not identify Fumero as one of their
interrogators.
The DPMO's DIA predecessor office also provided an
appraisal to the House Armed Services Committee on 6 October,
1977. More recently, the DPMO provided updates on the Cuba Program'' to Congressman Dornan in March, 1987, August, 1996, and 11 and 17 September, 1996. The story about the Cuba Program'' is not new. For
example, I have with me eight news articles about the Cuba Program'' published in 1973, 1977, and 1981 in Washington, D.C., New York, Baltimore, Denver, and Des Moines. These articles are based on information released by DPMO's predecessor, the DIA's POW/MIA Office, and personal accounts by POW's who were victims of the program. I would like to comment briefly for the public record about recent press reports about the Cuba Program.'' News reports
published in the Miami Herald on 22 August, 1999, and the
Seattle Times on 28 October 1999, suggested that this issue
was, concealed for decades by official U.S. secrecy'' and, the full story of Fidel and the so-called `Cuba Program' is
finally becoming public,''. The same article speculated that
the reason the story has drawn little attention is, perhaps because most POW's obeyed Pentagon orders to keep quiet to protect POW's who might remain in Vietnam and perhaps because 'Fidel's' identification as a Cuban was then only an unconfirmed allegation by the POW's.'' The facts are that the Department of Defense officials asked the POW's who were returning during Operation Homecoming in 1973 not to speak out publicly about the torture until after the last POW was released. The last POW was released on 1 April 1973; the first stories by returning POW's about the Cuba
Program'' appeared in American newspapers the next day, on 2
April, 1973.
Some of the sources cited in these articles portrayed
DPMO's role incorrectly. As Mr. Jones stated, we are not a
counterintelligence office or a law enforcement office. Our
mission is humanitarian. It is to account for American
servicemen who were lost while serving abroad. All American
victims of the Cuba Program'' are accounted for. Successive administrations, the Congress, the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, the Pacific Command's Joint Task Force, the U.S. Army Central Identifications Laboratory, the National League of Families--literally thousands of Americans have worked hard for many years to build and sustain programs that today are allowing us to account for Americans lost in the old Soviet Union, in North Korea, in Southeast Asia, and many other areas in the world. As Secretary Jones stated earlier, our mission is humanitarian, and it is worldwide. Our ability to accomplish our mission is wholly dependent on the willingness of foreign governments to allow our POW/MIA specialists to have access to their citizens, their records, and their territory. Suggestions that DPMO should investigate war crimes risks undoing the results of years of hard work and would jeopardize our ability to accomplish our humanitarian mission. Now, having said that, DPMO is a central repository for historical information concerning the American POW/MIA issue. As Secretary Jones stated earlier, DPMO stands ready to share historical information and knowledge about the program with appropriate U.S. agencies. In conclusion, the history of the issue is that the POW/MIA Office informed senior Department of Defense officials immediately upon learning about the actions of the presumably Cuban interrogators. Those officials immediately directed appropriate intelligence and investigative agencies to try to identify those interrogators. In 1974, CIA analysts tentatively identified two Cuban officials as the interrogators Fidel'' and Chico.'' Their victims, however, were not able to confirm their identities. We have also kept the Congress and the public informed. We will remain a repository of historical information about all aspects of the POW/MIA issue and remain ready to share that historical information with appropriate Federal intelligence and investigative offices. However, as Secretary Jones stated earlier, we believe that DPMO should not become involved in efforts to investigate the program and jeopardize our accounting mission. I am ready to respond to questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Destatte appears in the appendix.] Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. There were several Vietnamese interrogators at The Zoo,'' as we had heard from
the POW's, Spot,'' Rabbit,'' Elf,'' in addition to the camp commander who we discussed in the previous panel known as The Lump.''
Have any attempts been made by DOD or any other U.S. agency
to question these individuals in order to try to obtain further
information about these Cuban torturers?
Mr. Destatte. I personally asked the interrogator whom
Captain Vohden and Colonel Bomar call The Rabbit'' about this program. While he acknowledged that these men were Cubans, he did not provide the names, and I don't know of any other efforts. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So he said they were Cubans. Mr. Destatte. I don't recall the exact words of the conversation, but it was during a formal interview. My memory is that I mentioned to him that several of our returned POW's described having been interrogated by Cubans at the POW camp the Americans called The Zoo,'' and that the Vietnamese
called Nga Tu So.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. When did this conversation take place?
Mr. Destatte. This conversation took place--I would have to
check my notes--in the early 1990's, sometime in 1992.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will followup on that. Thank you.
Without actually revealing the details since the report is
still classified, do you know the origin, the author, the
source of the information in the CIA report on the Cuba Program'' and the two men mentioned in the CIA report, Fidel'' and Chico,'' as possibly being Cuban agents, part of Castro's Ministry of Interior. Was any followup done to this CIA report? Mr. Destatte. There was followup. The CIA report included, as an enclosure, a 1959 photograph of the Cuban their analysts believe was Fidel.'' The Air Force, Air Force investigator
showed that photograph to seven of the victims of the program.
Six of those men stated that they were unable to confirm that
this was Fidel.'' The seventh, as I mentioned in my statement, Colonel Waltman, believed that it was Fidel,'' or
at least the most look-alike photograph he had seen of
Fidel.'' Other persons have looked at that photograph. As a matter of fact, at the close of the last panel, I asked Colonel Carpenter, who was sitting behind the table here, and Captain Vohden again about that, and they were quite insistent this is not Fidel.'' So I suppose, parenthetically, our experience
has been that making identifications of persons from
photographs is a very uncertain endeavor. It is unlikely to
yield conclusive results.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Jones, you had said in your testimony
that you will soon be in Vietnam, in just a few days. In our
dealings with the Vietnamese, particularly in recent years as
trade negotiations have intensified, has the U.S. raised the
issue of the Cuba Program'' specifically with those officials? Have there been any official requests for information? Why or why not? Mr. Jones. I cannot answer in regard to the trade negotiations because my office does not participate in those negotiations, ma'am. We are fully engaged in negotiating with the Vietnamese concerning accounting for missing Americans. So I am afraid I am not the person to answer that question. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Eliminate the part about trade negotiations. I just said that to parenthetically state that we are in such a positive working relationship with Vietnam that now we are discussing trade deals. But having nothing to do with trade, what about the many U.S. agencies that have specifically asked? Do you know if yours or any others asked the Vietnamese officials about the Cuba Program,'' specific requests made for information?
Mr. Jones. As I mentioned and as Mr. Destatte mentioned
earlier, he personally took part in an oral history interview
of one of the guards that was mentioned by the former POW's. So
there has been some followup in that regard. However, as we
testified earlier, all of the participants in this particular
program have been accounted for. Thus, the role of my office
has been completed in terms of investigating specifically what
happened to those 19 individuals. We continue to act as a
repository for the historical records related to that program.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Do you believe that the acts committed
against the POW's violate the Geneva Convention? If those are
found to be true, do you believe that, once identified, the
three torturers should be tried as war criminals and that we
should gear efforts toward that goal?
Mr. Jones. As I testified in my statement, ma'am, I firmly
support the goals that you stated earlier for the purposes of
this hearing, and I most certainly believe that those
individuals should be tracked down and brought to justice for
their conduct.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Now, you had said that your specific
agency has a specified mission. What agency then do you believe
should lead the investigation on the Cuba Program'' and what agencies, in addition, should be included? Should CIA, DIA, FBI, State Department be? What agencies should be involved? Mr. Jones. Looking at the nature of the circumstances, I believe that the State Department should be lead agency. I believe that they have an office that is charged to investigate violations of the Geneva Convention and the laws of armed conflict. So I believe that the State Department would be the best agency to lead a review of this program and to conduct a followup investigation. I believe that they should be supported by the appropriate Intelligence Community--DIA, CIA, as well as the FBI. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Destatte, we understand that DPMO has joint commissions with Russia and is working together with former Eastern Bloc countries in an attempt to obtain information about American POW's which may have been sent to those countries during various Cold War conflicts. Further, we understand that television and other mediums are used to reach out to the general population of those countries so that they can help us have information to contribute. Have similar attempts been made regarding information on the Cuba Program'' and the torturers?
Mr. Destatte. We have taken a different approach in
Vietnam. Let me preface my remarks by stating that I helped
open the first U.S. office in Vietnam after the war in 1991,
and worked over there for the American POW/MIA Office which we
opened in mid-1991. One of the first things we did was put
together a program where we visited each of the military region
headquarters and each of the province headquarters and
delivered to each of those headquarters information about
Americans who were lost in their respective areas, requesting
their support in finding witnesses, finding documents and
otherwise accounting for the men who were lost in those
regions.
We have also since 1988, approximately 5 times a year, sent
for a month at a time approximately 100 Americans, mostly
active duty military personnel, into Vietnam. They break down
into small teams of varying sizes, they fan out through the
country looking for information or excavating crash sites or
grave sites that were discovered during earlier investigations.
I believe that it would be difficult to find a single village
in Vietnam that has not been visited at least once by one of
our teams. I think it would be almost impossible to find an
adult citizen of Vietnam who is not aware of our keen interest
in accounting for our people.
So we have taken a different approach in Vietnam than the
Joint Commission is taking in Russia. I believe we have covered
the country very effectively, and I believe the results that we
have seen in recent years of this approach demonstrates the
effectiveness of that approach.
Mr. Jones. If I might add to that, I will be traveling to
Moscow on Sunday. I will be in Moscow through the 10th of
November. Rest assured that I will raise this at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow and with the Russian with whom I will be
meeting.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Jones. Have you had a
chance to look at Ambassador Peterson's letter that we just
received this morning? You will be following up with him and
other officials in Vietnam on this issue?
Mr. Jones. I am hopeful, ma'am, that we will have a
response from the Vietnamese before I get to Vietnam. But if we
do not, rest assured that I will speak to the Ambassador in
regard to this program.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. One last question: Are you aware of
reports which state that the suspect that the CIA believes to
be Fidel'' was in the U.S. and involved in smuggling arms to Castro in the 1950's; and did you know that both Alegret and Jaen were in the United States at the same time, and this comes from Alegret by his own admission as quoted in a book that was published by the Castro regime? We want to note, if there is any followup that you know of on this data, was it used to trying to discern which of the two was in fact Fidel,'' if any; and given that Alegret and the
one whom the CIA believes to be Chico'' were in Louisiana and other U.S. locations at the same time, were there any efforts to determine whether Alegret was actually Chico,'' and that
the name that the CIA had for Chico'' was an alias? What attempts have been made to followup on any of these bits of information? Mr. Destatte. I don't know that we have. I know that we do not have a comprehensive record of all the actions that were taken because, as I mentioned earlier, we were not the investigators. The investigations were conducted by the Air Force, by the other service agencies--the FBI, CIA, et cetera. The document that I mentioned to you earlier this morning recognizes that there are unconfirmed reports that Alegret attended high school in the United States. Given his age, I believe his date of birth is 1939, I graduated from high school in 1957, and I was born in 1939. So he was in the United States at conceivably the same time as Jaen, but under different circumstances. But that is just speculation on my part. I don't know what efforts were made by other agencies. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I think it is clear that since this first was looked at at this point in time a lot of new information has come out, a lot of new testimony, declassified papers, new information that could help us to identify these individuals; and certainly an interagency task force would be one of the ways to get at this information. We hope that that comes about. I would like to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for questions. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Now, Mr. Destatte, you asked one of the guards---- Mr. Destatte. Not a guard, he was a---- Mr. Rohrabacher. Interrogator. Mr. Destatte. He was a commissioned officer. He described himself as an interpreter. POW's described him as an interrogator. Mr. Rohrabacher. You asked him about whether or not the other interrogators were Cuban, and the answer was? Mr. Destatte. I described the program in a sentence or two--my memory is that I described it in a sentence or two and asked him to comment on it. In response, he referred to them as Cubans. Now, whether he was following my lead or whether that was confirmation, I leave that up to your judgment. Mr. Rohrabacher. This was a formal interview, you said. That is how you described it? Mr. Destatte. Yes. Mr. Rohrabacher. You recorded this interview? Mr. Destatte. I don't recall whether we recorded that interview or not. I know typically when I write a report I usually record over the interview tapes in any event. Mr. Rohrabacher. You record over the interview tapes after you have conducted a formal interview? Mr. Destatte. The purpose of the recording the interview in most instances is to aid in report writing. Mr. Rohrabacher. I am a little fascinated by that. You are saying that of your formal interviews, you actually don't keep records of them then? Mr. Destatte. That is not what I said. Mr. Rohrabacher. It sounds like what you are telling me is that you record over the tapes when you do--I am just requesting you to send that tape and that interview to me. Mr. Destatte. If I have the tape. Mr. Rohrabacher. Seeing that you just said you record over the interviews, perhaps that will be a good excuse for not sending me the tape. But if you have it, I am making a formal request, Madam Chairman, from this Committee; and we will confirm this with the Chairman of the Committee, that this is a formal request from the Committee. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We will pass that on to the Chairman, and I am sure that he will work with you on that. Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like the notes and the tape that you have from that interview. During that interview you said you asked about the names, but he wouldn't tell. Is that what you said? Mr. Destatte. Did not tell me. Mr. Rohrabacher. What year was this interview? Mr. Destatte. June, 1992. Mr. Rohrabacher. June, 1992. Mr. Destatte. I might add that the document that I just consulted for that date is part of the official record of the 17 September 1996 hearing held by Congressman Dornan. You can find that document. Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. I am not just asking for the document; I am asking for that tape, and if the tape still exists---- Mr. Destatte. As I told you, Congressman, that was several years ago. I do not know whether I have that specific tape or not. I told you that routinely when I use a tape recorder, which is not in all cases, I use the tape recorder only to assist me in writing my report. When I finish writing the report, typically I record over that. I will have to consult our files at the office to know whether or not I retained a copy of that tape. Mr. Rohrabacher. That is fine. It just doesn't seem that that is a very professional way to handle---- Mr. Destatte. Sir, I resent your implications that I am being less than honest with you. Mr. Rohrabacher. You may resent anything you want. I am here to ask questions. If you resent those questions---- Mr. Destatte. Sir, I came here to provide accurate information. Mr. Rohrabacher. How long have you been in the position that you are in today with this POW/MIA issue? Mr. Destatte. I joined this issue in September 1979. Mr. Rohrabacher. Is it normal that they have someone who is an employee of the Department of Defense at the same job for as long as that? Mr. Destatte. I don't know what is normal'' in that
respect.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You don't know what is normal policy for
the Department of Defense where you have worked for all those
years? You haven't noticed that other jobs seem to be rotating,
but you seem to be staying in the same spot?
Mr. Destatte. I don't know your point.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Rohrabacher, rest assured, as soon as we
return to the office, we will ascertain if the documents and
the tape that you are requesting are in fact part of our files.
I will do everything to personally ensure that you receive
those documents.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Was this the first time that you testified that we knew the
day after the prisoners got back that there was a Cuban
interrogation program? Was this the first time, in your
interview in 1992, that a Vietnamese was officially asked about
the Cuba Program''? Mr. Destatte. Let me repeat, our mission is to account for missing personnel. Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. Mr. Destatte. The purpose of my interview that day was to gather information that would lead to an accounting for our personnel. Out of personal curiosity on this particular issue, the Cuba Program,'' I took advantage of the opportunity to
ask that question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You don't believe that perhaps--we have a
picture of a gentleman who is murdered under interrogation by
these Cubans; you don't think that there might perhaps be
another American that was unaccounted for that might have been
murdered by the same program that we don't know about and that
maybe that is your job?
Mr. Destatte. That assertion rests on the preposterous
notion that the 19 survivors of that program either, failed to
know about this alleged other prisoner, or knowing about it,
failed to tell about it when they came home.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is it preposterous to say then that there
is information about this program that those 19 prisoners may
not know about?
Mr. Destatte. No, I didn't say that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is what it sounds like you are
saying.
Is it preposterous, for example, that the Vietnamese kept
Ambassador Peterson, when he was a POW, totally isolated from
the other POW's for the first three years of his captivity? Is
that a preposterous suggestion?
Mr. Destatte. Are you familiar with the record?
Mr. Rohrabacher. No other POW knew that Congressman
Peterson was being held captive during those first three years;
is that preposterous?
Mr. Destatte. How does that relate to our discussion here?
Mr. Rohrabacher. It relates to it because you have a
situation with interrogators from Cuba who may have information
about prisoners that is not being followed up on by you, and it
is your job to followup on it. It is your job to determine if
there are any MIA's out there.
Mr. Destatte. Are you suggesting then that there was a
secret POW camp system or something of that nature?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well----
Mr. Destatte. I truly don't understand your question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will tell you. I will tell what you my
question is. My question is, is there any evidence that perhaps
some MIA's or people who were MIA were being held during that
time period and were actually POW's, and the information was
not available to the rest of the prisoners or to the United
States Government?
Mr. Destatte. I believe that we know the identity of every
American who was in that prisoner of war camp during that
period of time, and that all of those prisoners are accounted
for.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That was a really good answer to a
question that I didn't ask. It was really great of you to word
it that way.
Mr. Destatte. I believe that our focus on the Cuba Program'' and what the---- Mr. Rohrabacher. The point, Mr. Destatte, is that the Cuba Program'' may be a key to answer some information about
other missing prisoners rather than just these 19.
Now, they have committed crimes----
Mr. Destatte. To the best of our knowledge and the to best
of the knowledge of the witnesses that have appeared here
today, those Cubans were active in one prisoner of war camp,
the prisoner of war camp that our American prisoners called
The Zoo,'' that the Vietnamese called Nga Tu So. We know the identity of every American who was in that camp, and all of those Americans are accounted for. Now, if you have information that the Cubans were active in another camp, fine. I don't have that information. Mr. Rohrabacher. Did you ask in your formal interview in 1992 whether there were Cubans involved in any other camps? Mr. Destatte. As I told you before, the purpose of that interview was to learn information that might help us account for Americans who were still unaccounted for, not to learn about the Cuba Program.'' The Americans who were involved in
the Cuba Program'' are all accounted for. Mr. Rohrabacher. Fine. Luckily, I have some time to followup on these questions on the record rather than being stuck at five minutes, so your attempt to use up the time will not get you off the hook. Is the fact that there might be another Cuban prison camp which might indicate that there are some American POW's that you didn't know about, but you are not bothering to ask whether there were Cubans at another prison in this particular formal interview that you went through? Mr. Destatte. I believe that the information that the intelligence services, that the DPMO and its predecessor office, have collected over the years allows us to state with confidence that we know of every POW camp which held American prisoners in North Vietnam and all of the prisoners that were in those camps; and all of those prisoners were accounted for. There is no separate prison camp or there are no American prisoners who were held in a separate prison. The question about the possibility of Cubans in another prison camp is a moot question. There wasn't another prison camp for them. Mr. Rohrabacher. Not even worth asking about it. Not even worth asking, right? Here you are, the one we are depending on to get this information. Mr. Destatte. No, sir, you are depending on my office to account for Americans who are still unaccounted for. If you want to know about the Cubans, if you want to know what the Cubans did or did not do in Vietnam, then, as we have said before, we suggest that you address that question to agencies that are appropriately chartered to pursue those questions. Mr. Rohrabacher. Is your office tasked with coordinating all government activity in terms of POW/MIA's in Vietnam? Mr. Destatte. We are tasked with accounting for Americans who failed to return home at the end of the war. Mr. Rohrabacher. Are you tasked with coordinating the activity of other government agencies? Mr. Jones. Sir, my office as the Director of--DPMO is to be responsible to make sure what we do everything we possibly can to account for missing Americans, and that includes interagency coordination. Mr. Rohrabacher. So if these questions were going to be examined, you would have to actually make the request or coordinate the activity? Mr. Destatte. No. Mr. Rohrabacher. OK. Mr. Jones. Sir, in regard to that comment, I would like to say, if you recall, in my written testimony, I did in fact send recently a request to the other Federal agencies to determine if they had any other additional information related to this program. Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Now, in 1992, when you conducted this formal interview for which the tapes may be missing, you asked whether or not there were Cubans involved, and you didn't ask whether the Cubans were involved in any other camps. But after that, you said that they didn't want to give you the names. You asked for the names; they wouldn't give you any names involved. Yet haven't you categorized the North Vietnamese, or I should say, the Vietnamese activities involved with MIA/POW's as being in full cooperation with your efforts? Mr. Jones. Sir, that is a certification that is required by the Congress of the United States. It is made by the Department of State and the President of the United States. We provide statistical information to support that. Mr. Rohrabacher. If we have a question being asked, and you know what the names of these torturers of Americans are, and we aren't getting an answer, isn't that somewhat less than full cooperation? Mr. Jones. Sir, that question was asked of the Vietnamese on October 9th by Ambassador Peterson. Mr. Rohrabacher. It was asked in June 1992. Mr. Destatte. Let me comment on that. The answer to that question does not contribute one iota to our efforts to account for Americans who are missing, and that is not---- Mr. Rohrabacher. You don't think that the torture of Americans in prisons in Vietnam and finding them and trying to ask them what went on and who it was that they were dealing with would lead to any information that we might not know about who was being held? Have you ever met with the person that the prisoners have called The Lump''?
Mr. Destatte. I have no idea who he is.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is not the question, have you ever
met with the person. You are saying that you have not; is that
correct?
Mr. Destatte. That is correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now The Lump,'' of course, is a Vietnamese. Is this part of our request to the Vietnamese Government to provide The Lump'' and interviews with The Lump''; is that part of our request that was made by Ambassador Peterson? Mr. Jones. Sir, I cannot say what Ambassador Peterson requested of the Vietnamese. I was not present. Mr. Rohrabacher. So if we know this fellow known as The
Lump'' has been identified, they could say who they think he
was. I think that was part of the testimony today--maybe not--
that was part of the testimony that they could identify him. We
have not made an official request to talk to him; is that
right?
Mr. Jones. Sir, I am not aware of the identity of anyone
called The Lump'' that was made available to my office. Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. So we have a request for the names of the Cubans turned down in 1992 by a low-level person, and that wasn't followed up again until seven years later, I guess just recently, when Ms. Ros-Lehtinen decided to call some attention here. Again, it seems to me that what we are talking about is less than full cooperation with our efforts. By the way, this idea, Mr. Destatte, about demanding that people who tortured Americans be sought and be prosecuted for war crimes, risks undoing all the work that we have done. Mr. Destatte. Sir, that is a distortion of my statement. Mr. Rohrabacher. Go right ahead and clarify it. Mr. Destatte. I said that pursuit of that objective by my office would risk jeopardizing our ability to accomplish our mission. If you wish to pursue that, my recommendation would be that you pursue that through an agency of the U.S. Government that is duly chartered to pursue those kinds of investigations. Mr. Rohrabacher. But is not your office duly chartered to task other government agencies with this type of activity? Mr. Destatte. Is it not your suggestion that we do what we have just told you, which is not appropriate for our office, and that is to investigate war crimes? Mr. Rohrabacher. If you are an American citizen and American citizens have been tortured and a crime has been committed against American military personnel---- Mr. Destatte. There are 2,047 families that are waiting for answers on their missing family member. Our obligation is to account for their missing family member. The mission of investigating war crimes lies elsewhere in the Federal Government, and I would suggest that you would get better answers by pursuing it there. Mr. Rohrabacher. War crimes committed against those people, the torture, the brutal torture of American prisoners of war? Is this of concern to you? Mr. Destatte. As I told you before, we believe that we know the identity of every American who was a prisoner of war, and they are accounted for, those who were in the camps in North Vietnam. Mr. Jones. Sir, if I might interject here---- Mr. Rohrabacher. Because of the full cooperation the North Vietnamese have been giving to you, what about again making just one last attempt at this. Ambassador Peterson and several other POW's and MIA's who eventually became POW's, were kept in isolated camps and did not intermingle and were declared missing in action, and no one knew whether they were alive or dead for several years--isn't that the case? Mr. Destatte. I would have to go back and look at the record. Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me clarify the record for you. Ambassador Peterson told me that personally. Mr. Destatte. I also accompanied Ambassador Peterson back to that very prison camp, and he described for me and the others with him how he communicated--even though isolated, how he communicated with prisoners in other parts of that prison. So I must tell you, I am not sure that you are accurately portraying what he said. I would have to go back to the record and refresh my memory. Mr. Rohrabacher. I would hope that having been active for so long on this issue that your memory would be pretty good, considering that you knew we were going to have a hearing today. Mr. Destatte. I came here to discuss the Cuba Program,''
not to discuss the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. The possibility that there were other
Cubans involved in torturing Americans someplace else. That is
what the question is. These people are what I am trying to lead
to, of course----
Mr. Destatte. Persons were held in approximately--I don't
recall the exact figure offhand, but I believe--eleven
different locations in North Vietnam in the Hanoi area.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That we know of.
Mr. Destatte. We believe that that there were no others.
That has been looked at not just by myself. Thousands of
Americans have looked at that issue very carefully, and there
is not a shred of evidence that there was any other prison that
held Americans.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will just have to say that I am not
convinced, and we have other people who are honest American
citizens who have looked into this and are not convinced.
Some questions don't seem to be asked; they don't seem to
be asked and we seem to be cataloguing or categorizing the
Vietnamese as being fully cooperating with us when we are
afraid to ask certain questions of them.
Mr. Destatte. I don't believe that that is a fair
statement. The we'' in this case, I presume, means the U.S. Government; and the U.S. Government has asked the question. This particular office of the U.S. Government should not be asking those kinds of questions. Mr. Rohrabacher. I am glad that you are so committed to your humanitarian mission. I think it is extraordinary that one individual has been at the Department of Defense at the same humanitarian mission all of these years, and I think that the reason why there are rotations in jobs like your own in the Department of Defense is to ensure that one person or several people cannot monopolize information and use their own judgment that may be good or bad judgment. Mr. Destatte. There are approximately 120 or 130 men and women in our office. There is quite a turnover. There is always fresh blood, there are always fresh views. There is always a fresh questioning of assumptions and conclusions. But there are also a few old-timers who help ensure that we don't reinvent the wheel every one or two years. One of our greatest mistakes during the Vietnam War was the institutionalization of inexperience, the one-year tour, very oftentimes broken up into six months in a given assignment. I would suggest that the alternative to having experience is chaos. Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, if I might interject at this point, the success of my office, as I testified earlier, has been based solely upon our capability to access foreign countries, their citizens, their historical archives without retribution, to assist us in accounting for the missing Americans around the globe. We have, in fact, been very successful in that because we have not pursued war crimes, we have left that up to the appropriate agencies. As I testified earlier, I believe that such an investigation into the Cuba Program'' should be led by the
appropriate office within the Department of State, supported by
those other agencies who have the capabilities to assist them
in that investigation. I would say for the record that based
upon the current evidence on record, we have no evidence to
substantiate that there was another Cuba Program'' outside the one that we are discussing here today. Mr. Rohrabacher. OK. Several years ago, when I went to Vietnam with Mr. Peterson while he was a Member of Congress, we participated in negotiations with the Vietnamese. At that time, I asked for the records of the prisons that the Vietnamese had of all the Americans, and we were told that those records were not available. Many of them are like they were erased after doing other interviews, I guess, or their records were blown up by B- 52 raids near the end of the war. Now, I didn't really accept that answer, and I made an official request of them and asked our government, the people involved in this, to follow through on insisting on receiving the records of those camps, so that we could prove or disprove whether or not there was a possibility that there were people kept without other people knowing about it. Because that information would only be available in those records. Has there been a turnover of these records to us? I guess I made that request five years ago. Mr. Destatte. The Vietnamese have turned over quite a large number of records. I don't recall the exact number, but it is in the thousands. Among those records, the only record that comes to mind that fits the description that you have put forth is a record that the Vietmanese say is a record of all Americans who entered the prison system in the North. That has been turned over to us. Mr. Rohrabacher. I am not talking about a record of all Americans; I am talking about a record of their prison system, and I was very clear about that. These people, like every other military or government operation, they kept records of how much food they bought, how much it cost, who was in charge of procuring food, how many people they were protecting and guarding, how many people they were taking care of. Mr. Destatte. I recall you and I had a conversation about that on a bus in Hanoi. I made a memorandum of that conversation, and I would like to ask permission to provide a copy of that memorandum of record of our conversation to the Committee and make it a part of the official record of this hearing. I believe that will answer the question for the Committee. Mr. Rohrabacher. Maybe instead of holding off to the point that we can't ask a followup question, maybe you could answer the question now, rather than us waiting for the memorandum? Have the Vietnamese provided the information that I requested about their camps? Mr. Destatte. To the best of my knowledge, they have not provided the document that you requested. But again I ask if I might be permitted to enter into the record, in its entirety, my memorandum of record of that conversation. Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, they have not complied with the request. Yet we are talking about the Vietnamese as fully cooperating with us. I think I should leave it at that. I thank the Chairman for his indulgence. Chairman Gilman. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Rohrabacher. I appreciate Ms. Ros-Lehtinen permitting me to have the time. Usually I get five minutes to ask questions. I think this has been very valuable for all concerned. Chairman Gilman. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Just a followup question on the line of questions that Mr. Rohrabacher said. We had a previous panelist, as you know, Andres Garcia; and he referred to the experiences of another Cuban American veteran, several of them, who were told that there were Cubans who served as interrogators across the Cambodian borders, a presence of Cubans possibly, and in other places beyond The Zoo.'' We
have been talking about that with Mr. Rohrabacher, that line of
questioning; and just to reiterate, we believe that is an
important area for us to do further investigation and finding
out, even though you believe that other POW's may not have been
tortured by these other Cubans.
Mr. Destatte. I can give you an answer to that offhand.
There were two camps for Americans in Cambodia. The one
camp was a camp administered by what the Communists called
Headquarters B-3 Front. This was the military headquarters that
controlled their main force units in the Western Highlands. The
other camp was subordinate to what they called B-2 Front.
In both instances, these camps were mobile, and the B-2
Front camp moved around the area along the border between
Vietnam and Cambodia. Many Americans have returned from that
camp and there is no evidence at all that there was any Cuban
involvement in either of those camps.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We look forward to working
with you and especially with the other agencies to followup on
some of these leads and reopen this case so that justice can be
done in the memory of Earl Cobeil, the U.S. Air Force pilot who
was murdered while in captivity, and to honor the brave service
of these men who were testifying today and others who could not
be here with us.
Mr. Destatte. If I could ask your indulgence for just a
moment, we got off the track here for awhile. I share the
interests of all Americans in ensuring that these people who so
brutally treated our POW's and, in particular, beat Major
Cobeil to death, are brought to justice properly. But at the
same time, I think that it should be done in such a way that
does not jeopardize our mission to account for those Americans
who are still missing.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Destatte.
Thank you Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
I have just two brief questions. Secretary Jones, the fall
of the Berlin Wall created an opportunity to seek information
from our former Soviet bloc adversaries on the Cuba Program'' and other POW-related matters. Can you please tell us what efforts have been made to date to glean information from Eastern European and other sources? Mr. Jones. Sir, my office has the responsibility for the oversight of the Joint Commission in support of the U.S.-Russia Commission. I have staff routinely conducting oral history interviews in former Eastern Bloc countries, former Soviet Union countries. Chairman Gilman. That is still ongoing? Mr. Jones. Yes, sir. As I mentioned while you were voting, sir, I will personally be in Moscow this weekend and will be meeting with the U.S.-Russia Commission in Moscow. Chairman Gilman. Thank you. Mr. Destatte, documents provided to our Committee provide uncorroborated reports that American POW's may have been taken from Vietnam to Cuba. Can you comment on those reports and tell the Committee what efforts have been made to look into and verify if such transfers did indeed take place? Mr. Destatte. I am not familiar with those particular reports. But as I said earlier, I believe that we know the identity of all Americans who were held as prisoners in the Vietnamese prison system, and I believe they are all accounted for, either through their return, alive, the return of the remains; or in some cases, their deaths have been confirmed, but we have not yet been able to recover their---- Chairman Gilman. Have you asked any specific questions with regard to that issue, the Cubans? Mr. Destatte. Transfer of Americans--I think in a general sense that we pursued this question in our pursuit of information about Americans in the camps, we can answer that; but no, we have not investigated specifically or focused specifically on that that I am aware of. Chairman Gilman. Let me ask that you do pursue that and get back to our Committee with any response you get. Chairman Gilman. Mr. Jones, when you travel to Vietnam in the near future, we would like to ask you to make an effort, either directly or through our embassy, to secure meetings with the former guards at The Zoo'' or others who might be able to
identify Fidel'' and the other torturers. Would you make a request of that when you---- Mr. Jones. Sir, I will be more proactive than that. I will request that my the collection unit, Stony Beach pursue this task and immediately begin to try to interview those individuals. Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much. Secretary Jones, how many F-111's were shot down? How many F-111 pilots survived and how many were returned? Mr. Jones. Sir, I am not qualified to answer that type of technical question. May I defer to Mr. Destatte and see if he has the information at hand. Chairman Gilman. F-111's? Mr. Destatte. Can I give you a written answer on that? I don't recall that offhand. Chairman Gilman. If you could provide that for a Committee, we would appreciate that. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I want to thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership and your commitment to discovering the truth about this terrible Cuba Program.'' We
thank you so much.
Chairman Gilman. We thank our witnesses for your patience
and for being here with us throughout the questioning, and we
appreciate your response.
Committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
November 4, 1999=======================================================================
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