Who Lost the Battle of Chickamauga? (original) (raw)
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Jan. 10, 1864
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January 10, 1864
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NOTES ON GEN. ROSECRANS' REPORT, BY GEN. WOOD.
At date of Chattanooga, Oct. 21, Brig.-Gen. THOMAS L. WOOD replies to the following extract from the report of Gen. ROSECRANS:
"Gen. WOOD, overlooking the order to close up on Gen. REYNOLDS, supposed be was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing to the rear of Gen. BRANNAN, who, it appears, was not out of line, and in echelon and slightly in rear of REYNOLDS' right.
By this unfortunate mistake, a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and, striking DAVIS in flank and rear, as well as in front, threw his whole division in confusion."
Gen. WOOD writes:
"The plain intention and object of the entire paragraph is to shield Gen. ROSECRANS from the responsibility of the unfortunate mistake, and its still more unfortunate consequences, and to fix the responsibility on myself."
He makes the following explanation and defence:
"At 10 3/4 o'clock of Sunday morning the 20th of September ult., the following was the position of my division in line of battle: The left of my division was closed up on and rested firmly against the right of Gen. BRANNAN's division, which in turn had its left fully up, and resting on the right of Gen. REYNOLDS' division. Gen. BRANNAN assures me that his division was in line with Gen. REYNOLDS' division, with his left closed up, and resting firmly on REYNOLDS' right. On the right of my division was Gen. DAVIS' division.
At the time my division was not engaged at all -- not a shot being fired on the front. Half an hour previously there had been some skirmishing, but that had subsided. There was, however, satisfactory reason for believing that the enemy was in considerable force in my front, hence I was keenly on the alert. But while the enemy was quiescent on my front, he was not so elsewhere. The roar of artillery and the rattle of musketry, borne to us from the left, told unmistakably that our comrades were heavily engaged with the foe.
A few minutes, perhaps five, before 11 o'clock A.M., on the 20th, I received the following order:
HEADQUARTERS, D.C., Sept. 20, 10:45.
Brig.-Gen. Wood, Com'g. Div., &c.
The General Commanding directs that you close up on REYNOLDS as fast as possible, and support him.
Respectfully, &c. FRANK J. BOND,
Major and A.D.C.
This order was addressed as follows:
10:45 A.M., Gallop -- Brig.-Gen. WOOD, Comd'g Div.
At the time it was received, there was a division (BRANNAN's) in line between my division and Gen.-REYNOLDS'. I was immediately in rear of the centre of my division at the time. I immediately dispatched my staff officers to the brigade commanders, directing them to move by the left, crossing in the rear of Gen. BRANNAN's division, to close up on and support Gen. REYNOLDS; and as the order was peremptory, I directed the movement to be made at the 'double-quick.' The movement was commenced immediately.
As there was a division between Gen. REYNOLDS' and mine, it was absolutely physically impossible for me to obey the order by any other movement than the one I made. How was I to close up on Gen. REYNOLDS and support him, (as my division was then situated in reference to Gen. REYNOLDS' division,) out by withdrawing from the line and passing in rear of Gen. BRANNAN's division?"
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