Convoy HG 50 - warsailors.com (original) (raw)
Notes:
Commodore was initially intended for Charles Plumier, Vice Commodore for Trentino, but Charles Plumier did not sail, so Trentino became Commodore, Vice Admiral B. Fairbairn's vessel, while the captain of Empire Snipe was Vice Commodore.
The convoy had 10 ships on departure, 2 joined on Jan. 22 (named below). 8 were present at the splitting point.
Average speed: 6.03 knots.
Portugal, on a voyage from Lisbon (Jan. 2-1941) for Methil and Goole with 2230 tons pyrites, was not seen after dark on Jan. 11, 35 50N 13 40W. She was officially posted as missing on March 26 ("Joint Arbritation Committee consider War Loss. Missing Ship Committee consider lost Jan. 20").
Kapetan Stratis (Captain M. Faindos), on a voyage from Lisbon for Belfast and Barry with 6282 tons of iron ore and pitwood, and not seen after dark on Jan. 11, 35 50N 13 40W, was sunk by FW 200 Kondor aircraft on Jan. 22 - there were no survivors, all 28 died.
The Commodore says that the above 2 ships, as well as Thelma, were "unable to maintain the low average speed of the remainder in the head seas and wind experienced. As the convoy was already several hours late it was not possible further to reduce speed". He adds that Kapetan Stratis was reported to have been machine gunned and later bombed far to the east of the ordered route, and Thelma, last seen at dusk on Jan 12 in 36 55N 16 55W, was reported to have been torpedoed* 180 miles east of the route given in case of separation, and "It therefore appears on the face of it that these two Masters were guilty of flagrant disregard of their instructions". These instructions were for stragglers to proceed to the westward of the route followed by the convoy; in view of recent air activity, they were on no account to be to the eastward of the route given. The Commodore suggests that an enquiry should be held and the necessary disciplinary action taken against Masters who are guilty of such disregard of instructions, and adds that the matter of stragglers "is now becoming acute as all stragglers are being mopped up by aircraft if they escape U-boats. It is clear that many losses would be avoided if Masters of ships that become separated from the convoy were to adhere to the route given them for use in such an event".
* There is no such attack mentioned for Thelma by Jürgen Rohwer. The Belgian Portugal, however, is said to have been sunk by the Italian submarine Marcello (Teppati) at 12:20 German time on Jan. 20-1941 in 50N 19W, with a footnote stating: "The Portugal was reported missing after 20.01.41. Marcello attacked one ship which was identified by the German xB-Dienst as the Greek Eleni". Marcello's claim of having sunk Portgual is repeated at the last external website that I've linked to below.
Note, however, that my page about the Norwegian Thelma mentions her being attacked by Marcello that day. This piece of information was found in "Nortraships flåte" by J. R. Hegland, who, it appears, has mistaken the identity of the ship, as the tonnage for Thelma in HG 50 is given as 1593 gt, which was the British ship by that name, and not the Norwegian one (unless the tonnage is an error in the Convoy document?). Hegland adds that the ship was attacked by artilleri from this sub at 12:30 in 50N 18 45W, but defended herself with her stern gun and arrived Oban undamaged on Jan. 25. See also this discussion on my Ship Forum, as well as a more recent thread starting here. So, the question remains, which ship did Marcello attack that day? And if Thelma was the victim, who then, sank Portugal? (Only one attack is mentioned on the site about Marcello).
Mostyn, on a voyage from Lisbon for Port Talbot with 2060 tons of pitwood, was last seen at dusk on Jan 20 in 51 36N 20 29W. At that time the force of the wind was 7-8 and she was unable to keep up at under 5 knots, though had done "all possible during the voyage, such as the intelligent cutting of corners, to keep up. When last seen she was proceeding on the route ordered for stragglers". She was attacked by FW 200 Kondor aircraft on Jan. 23. Out of a crew of 21 and 1 gunner - 2 crew died. She was abandoned, and a tug sent to assist on Jan. 25 failed to locate the ship, which was presumed sunk.
Brief summary of Commodore's narrative of voyage:
The convoy was about 10 hours late at the rendezvous with Convoy SLS 61, due to heavy weather with head winds force 7-8 and high seas during most of the voyage. As the position of the SLS convoy was not known, it was assumed that it was ahead, and course and speed were adjusted for the local escort rendezvous, but although the lost time was made up, the bad weather caused the convoy to be late for this rendezvous as well.
Lurigethan* from SLS 61 was overtaken on Jan. 20 but reported she could only do 4 knots, and by 18:30 she was hull down astern in 51 36N 20 29W. At this time, a diversion from the route was made, following an Admiralty message received at 18:00. (Contact was never made with Convoy SLS 61. The Commodore feels that since HG convoys usually had smaller ships than SL convoys, adverse weather will affect them differently, making contact more difficult, and proposes a different procedure than the existing one for junction).
* The British Lurigethan, on a voyage from Port Sudan for Hull with 2459 tons of cotton seed and 871 tons general, was bombed by FW 200 aircraft on Jan. 23, abandoned on fire. She had a crew of 50 and 1 gunner - 15 crew and the gunner died. She was eventually sunk by U-105 on Jan. 26 - see this external page, which adds that the survivors were picked up by HMS Arabis (the victim of this attack was previously believed to have been the Dutch Heemskerk from SL 61, but this ship sank on the 21st).
At 16:00 on Jan. 22, 2 stragglers from Convoy SLS 61 joined HG 50, namely Casamance (French/MOWT 1940) and Belgian Mafuta. This convoy had departed Freetown on Jan. 1-1941, arrived Liverpool on the 26th.
Casamance, in need of repairs to anchor gear (she could only drop one anchor), asked for permission to proceed to Clyde instead of Oban as routed. The Commodore says "As his final destination was Hull and this would involve anchoring in the exposed anchorage at Methil, approval was given".
He considers the station keeping to be average, "when the weather admitted", while visual signalling was "very good", and adds: "Most ships now have Aldis lamps and are good at Morse, which greatly helps the conduct of a convoy. W/T Watch was kept in Trentino only. The set had been severely gagged which limited its utility and few distress messages were intercepted. The two ship's operators kept watch and watch and did well in the absence from my staff of a service rating".
In the report there's also a section on signalling, which gives a good insight into the related difficulties experienced in a convoy, and the Commodore's opinion on a new method proposed:
"Having now completed 20 voyages since the beginning of the war practically all of which were in convoy all the time, I have had long and intimate experience of the all important question of signalling. The necessity for cutting down signalling to a minimum is now generally recognized by the more experienced Commodores, but a good deal remains to be done in simplifying the method of making such signals as have to be used. The chief offenders in this respect are the R.V. and Position signals, and the night intention signals for alterations of course. R.V. signals take no less than 13 flags and pendants and night alteration of course 10 if made as laid down. In the method now proposed the R.V. and Position signals can be made with one 5 flag hoist and the night alteration of course with one 4 flag hoist.
The advantages of the method are:
Quickness - Signals can be got through in less than half the time now required.
Labour - As all the signalling has to be done by the Officer of the Watch and one man, the bending on an hoisting of long signals is a lengthy and labourious business, especially in the usual Atlantic weather. Every flag saved is of importance.
Liability to error - In the method proposed, the entire signal is made by flags, no pendants being used. Flags are much easier to read, especially at the increased distances now in use, than pendants which, too, are often small and dirty. The new method therefore helps to speed up signals and avoid error.
Halliard space - This is a consideration in most merchant ships and the new method assists this.
Secrecy - The new method preserves the secrecy of the night alterations of course.
These tables have been well tried in one convoy for 14 days and proved highly satisfactory. All ships of the convoy reported very favourably on the method. Credit is due to Chief Yeoman of Signals F. E. A. Bartlett P/J 90180 who devised the tables".
Escorts:
Local Escort from Gibraltar: HMS Jonquil and Geranium - parted company at 18:30 on Jan. 12 in 36 55N 16 55W.
Ocean Escort: HMS Scarborough - overtook convoy at 08:00 Jan 12 in 36 30N 15 30W, parted company at Liverpool on Jan. 26.
HMS La Malouine joined at 18:30 on Jan. 20 in 51 36N 20 29W.
HMS Jackal and Malcolm, HMCS Skeena, HMS Arabis, Shikari, Hesperus, Jonquil, Geranium and an unnamed trawler joined at 16:45 on Jan. 21 in 53 23N 20 20W, but were not all present at the same time. The rendezvous had been ordered for 09:45 on the 20th, but due to the heavy weather the convoy was late.
Air Escort:
Jan 8 - from departure Gibraltar until dusk.
Air Escort from the U.K. was met at 10:05 on Jan. 23 in 54 56N 13 54W, and from then on aircraft were present at intervals every day during daylight hours for the rest of the voyage.
Related external links:
HG (& SL) Convoys - In chronological order.
See also Mike Holdoway's website about the
SL convoys - He also has a section on the OS convoys, going in the other direction. They can be reached via the main page.
To the next HG convoy in my list HG 51