Integral Perspectives on Indian Religions: Ken Wilber, Jean Gebser and Beyond, William Kelly (original) (raw)
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Integral World: Exploring Theories of Everything
An independent forum for a critical discussion of the integral philosophy of Ken Wilber
Bill Kelly received his Ph.D in communication studies at the University of New Mexico and his dissertation focused on Japan-US relations. From 2002 to 2014, he was a lecturer in the communication studies department at UCLA. His academic articles have appeared in Public Relations Review, China Media Research, The Global Intercultural Communication Reader, and_Intercultural Mirrors_. Kelly is the author of A New World Arising: Culture and Political Economy in Japanese, Chinese, Indian, and Islamic Civilizations.
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Ken Wilber, Jean Gebser and Beyond
William Kelly
Wilber's View of Eastern Religions
The greatest shortcoming of these two pioneering integral thinkers is the simplification and undervaluing of non-Western religious traditions.
In this essay I am going to evaluate the perspectives on Indian religions of the integral thought first of Ken Wilber and then of Jean Gebser. My focus will be on the relation between Indian religions and the structures of consciousness of Indian people from the time of the Vedas to the modern era. Then I will examine what I see as key issues that still need to be dealt with in order to dispel confusion about the consciousness structures of Indian people in their historical expression.
I was confused about not only Indian religions but about the Eastern mystical and esoteric traditions in general after reading Ken Wilber's Up from Eden in the early 1980s. Wilber maintained that these ancient religions in their highest form were only practiced by a select few, whereas almost everyone else adhered to a version of the religion based on myth. For him, this level of awareness exhibits a developmental lack of consciousness: the ego thinks in ignorant and uninformed ways. What was most striking was his claim that the higher forms of Eastern religion had minimal impact in these societies.
Wilber's dilemma was that he had to explain how Eastern esoteric religions were at the transpersonal level, yet the societies from which they came were at the prepersonal stage. In contrast, the esoteric traditions were driven underground in the West and, unlike in the East, were not well preserved and accessible. As a result many North Americans and Europeans were looking East attracted by the esoteric dimensions of Buddhism, Hinduism, Daoism, and Sufism. Yet, the societies where they could be found were, according to Wilber, at a lower developmental stage than the West. The West was trying to consolidate the gains of the rational ego, whereas the Eastern societies were predominantly at the perpersonal mythic-membership stage. Western influence was altering this situation but also weakening the appeal of mystic spirituality in Asian nations and the Islamic world.
I thought Wilber's solution to the dilemma was ingenious but unconvincing. At the time, I was living in Japan and motivated to study Japanese history in order to understand the conditions that led to World War II. The more I studied Japanese history, the less satisfied I was with Wilber's explanation of how the higher forms of Eastern religions are advanced despite the “arrested development” of the inhabitants of those societies. It seemed that modern Japanese culture and people's consciousness had fallen rather than progressed in comparison with the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries when Zen Buddhism flourished and the traditional culture flowered most beautifully.
In his Nobel lecture “Japan the Beautiful and Myself,” Yasunari Kawabata celebrated the spiritual and artistic splendors of medieval Japan while feeling lost in the cultural desert that Japan had largely become. The aristocratic culture that Kawabata venerates coexisted with a “people's culture” that was emerging during the same period. Pure Land Buddhism was practiced by mostly lower social strata, and its devotional outlook was accompanied by moves to evade the rigidity of the Japanese caste system, a heightened political consciousness, and a love of poetry. A public sphere with a largely aesthetic orientation appeared, although it differed in its activities from the deliberations of nascent Western publics.
Similar doubts about the adequacy of Wilber's stage theory arose in my mind when I examined the consciousness of Indian people from ancient times onward. A rich philosophical tradition had developed from the middle of the first millennium BCE in the Upanishads although such philosophy was not systematic and did not have a unified doctrine. Coexisting with mythic elements are teachings backed by reasoned argument stemming from the foundational insight that the supreme unifying principle of the universe is present within the nature of each human being. This philosophy known as Vedanta is the core of Indian wisdom, although diverse religious traditions have existed extending from Buddhism and Jainism to the many variations within Hinduism. Rational and integral consciousness along with the mythic structure were present in these religions from ancient times.
Gebser's Mid-Century Approach to Eastern Religions
In recent years, I began reading Jean Gebser's The Ever-Present Origin (1949, 1953) which questioned the progressive view of history. He presented an alternative view of the unfolding of history that made more sense to me. Gebser, like Wilber, thinks there are somewhat discrete periods of consciousness emergence; yet, for him, the shift from one structure to another is not unambiguously positive. Both gains and losses from the previous era are visible. On the other hand, Wilber's view is progressive: the stages that come later reflect a more evolved form of consciousness than the earlier ones.
For Gebser, the different structures of consciousness are expressions of different dimensions of the human being with no one dimension such as the mental being more advanced than what had previously emerged. He rejects the idea that the mental/rational dimension is more evolved than the consciousness structures that had predominated in earlier times. This is where Wilber's notion of “transcend and include” clearly diverges from Gebser's principle of discontinuous mutations in which the only connection between earlier and later structures is that both are expressions of different dimensions of one whole and complete human being.
Gebser's approach to historical unfolding was more persuasive and convincing to me than Wilber's progressive view. It doesn't place the modern West in the vanguard of human advance and relegate the non-Western parts of the world to playing catch-up with the West. Another significant difference is that Gebser sees Europe as having been largely in the deficient phase of the mental structure (the “rational”) for the past few centuries, whereas Wilber's view of the post-Enlightenment era is more positive. But Gebser does not take the anti-modern position that human development has been regressing. His view is rather that the efficient aspects of mental consciousness will be integrated with the mythic, magic, and archaic worldviews in the new mutation that is already emerging, the integral structure of consciousness.
On the other hand, Wilber thinks that the Enlightenment performed a great service, providing the scientific knowledge that the great religious traditions need in order to become more inclusive, comprehensive, and complete. The people of earlier eras lacked knowledge of human development, since introspection cannot provide the maps to locate precisely the unconscious attachments that need to be made objects of mindful awareness. Modern science provides this knowledge, enabling us to discover these blind spots and bring them to conscious awareness. Through this process of transcendence, we can then move on to a higher stage of development.
Gebser recognizes that the mental structure had an efficient or creative phase in ancient Greece when the balance between being and having or doing was maintained. But this harmony was disrupted with the onset of the deficient phase of the mental structure during the past few centuries. Once unlimited economic development, the ideology of progress, and radical nationalism became the dominant forces, the drive to achieve power and control over nature and others superseded the ideal of emancipation based on equality. The promise of the Enlightenment was eclipsed and demonic forces unleashed.
Structures of Consciousness and Indian Religions
Georg Feuerstein in Wholeness or Transcendence? (1992) defines structures of consciousness as cognitive and cultural outlooks in a manner similar to Gebser. It is a psychohistoric approach, viewing the sociocultural realm as an expression of distinctive forms of consciousness while seeing transformations of consciousness reflected in patterns of social relationships, in the humanities, and in the arts. His main focus is on the mythic and integral structures as defined by Gebser, although he briefly mentions mental consciousness.
I will focus on the manifestations of the mental structure in a later section, but it is worth noting that it has been present from the beginning of Indian philosophical thought. The metaphysics found in sections of the Rig-Veda and the Upanishads are expressions of a mental framing that compares with the philosophies of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Plato. These Western philosophies had elements of myth similar to the Indian scriptures, but Aristotle introduced a purely rational outlook in which myth was excluded.
Feuerstein clearly distinguishes between the mythic and integral interpretations of religion, the integral structure corresponding to Wilber's second- and third-tiers of consciousness. The mythic structure is, above all, centered around the pursuit of transcendence which means to extinguish the ego in order to experience the Universal Self, the ground of existence. The mythic period is one of vastly increased language ability and imaginative power in which life is viewed in terms of polarities rather than dualities. It is a closed world symbolized by the circle where group identity prevails. The main elements of mythic Indian spirituality are its exclusive orientation to transcendence, non-participation in social life, looking down on the physical body and women, renunciation of the external world to extinguish all desire and craving, and meditation as a way to destroy the ego.
In contrast to the world-negating outlook of mythic religion, integral consciousness requires the actualization of self-knowledge, a global orientation, and a sense of social responsibility. Feuerstein presents a very impressive list of qualities associated with this structure: going beyond the ego rather than annihilating it, a transparent self, the overcoming of death anxiety and feelings of lack, an open-minded attitude, full bodily presence, the ability to experience genuine intimacy with others, a reverence for all of life, and a focus on serving others.
There have been four quite influential religions in India over the past 2500 years: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Islam. In addition, Jews, Sikhs, and Christians have left their mark. There has also been considerable diversity within Hinduism. So it is not easy to make confident statements about the type of consciousness structures that Indian religions have reflected during any one period of time. Feuerstein has examined whether the orientations of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have been mythic or integral, since there has been much confusion on this issue. His model of mythic spirituality is classical Yoga, with Vedanta, Buddhism, and Jainism also in this category, whereas the integral or holistic teachings are represented by the Bhagavad Gita, Mahayana Buddhism, Tantrism, and Hatha Yoga.
Limitations of the Frameworks of Wilber and Gebser for Understanding Indian Religion
Although Feuerstein agrees that the mythic structure of consciousness most characterizes Eastern peoples, his portrait of Indian religions shows that the frameworks of both Wilber and Gebser fall short in accounting for their development. In Wilber's case, he sees mythic religion as mostly made up of stories that promise a reunion with God in heaven after death. But this characterization does not account for the central aspiration of Indian mythic religion which is to unite the realized individual self with the divine. This path is one of transcendence but not one in which heaven is the desired goal. And, as Gebser pointed out, the quest for immortality reflects a magic orientation.
Indian mythic religion can hardly be reduced to what Wilber considers to be the often childish qualities of mythic religion with its embarrassing and silly stories such as Moses parting the Red Sea. A more accurate reading would emphasize the discipline of renunciation in which the letting go of worldly attachments leads to genuine happiness. Renunciation was so attractive in ancient India that the authorities had to reinterpret it by encouraging people to leave the social world and go to the forest only after having completed their duties as householders. What is lacking in Indian mythic religion, though, is the life-affirming spirit that characterizes integral consciousness.
Feuerstein considers the strength of Indian people to be their ability to engage in introspection and to achieve mystical realization. These qualities developed during the mythic age were highly positive and are sorely lacking in the current deficient phase of mental consciousness. Instead of being transcended and included in accord with Wilber's theory, these characteristics have been mostly lost, a loss whose severity is being increasingly acknowledged. So Wilber's view of mythic religion is partial and limited, since it does not accurately describe the most important aspect of Indian mythic religion.
When we think of the rigidity and cruelty of the Hindu caste system, mythic consciousness appears in its most negative expression. But we must be careful not to see this principle of social order as mandated by scripture. As Debashish Banerji explains in Meditations on the Isha Upanishad (2020), some hymns of the Vedas were interpreted by members of the priestly and royal castes in a way that justified a strict hierarchical structure in which the priests became the dominant caste as well as gatekeepers to access to the gods. In response, the Upanishads were created by “dissidents” who affirmed the validity of direct experience of the divine, serving as a countercultural critique of the powerful groups that used the Vedas for materialistic and hierarchical ends. Here is the hint of a more socially responsible attitude in which all people are seen as having access to God.
Similar to Wilber, Gebser perceives Indian religion in a restricted manner. He, too, makes a blanket judgment that the central Indian religions have expressed mythic consciousness. Although Gebser accurately views Hinduism as reflecting a dominant mythic structure, Feuerstein points out that he did not sufficiently appreciate the efforts made by movements within Hinduism to escape the strong gravitational pull of mythic thinking. The same can be said for Indian Buddhism. As already noted, Feuerstein cites the Bhagavad Gita, Mahayana Buddhism, Tantrism, and Hatha Yoga as examples of the historical presence of a not insignificant integral structure of consciousness.
Integral teachings emphasizing wholeness and mythic ones oriented toward transcendence have both flourished since ancient times, enriching, influencing, and balancing each other.
The Bhagavad Gita memorably achieved a highly imaginative blending of the contrasting ideals of renunciation and world-affirmation by putting forward the goal of spiritually transforming the world, representing the earliest attempt in India to offer a comprehensive integral view of life. In this scripture, the divine presence is pictured as pervading the world of becoming while at the same time transcending it. Krishna teaches that the goal of spiritual practice is inner renunciation, not renunciation of the world. Inner renunciation means that the ego does not act—action spontaneously arises from the ground of existence. As Krishna says, the yogi “in action sees inaction and in inaction sees action.”
To be fair to Wilber and Gebser, the Bhagavad Gita viewed from today's vantage point is an incomplete expression of integral consciousness. Although it recognizes that we must uphold the moral order, it tends to define ethical action in terms of the customs and values that prevail in the existing society. Ideally, these ethical norms reflect the order of the universe as created by God. But powerful forces within society interpreted this order in a hierarchical manner, leading to the ascendance of a caste system of institutionalized inequality.
The Mental Structure of Consciousness in Indian Traditional Religions
Neither Wilber nor Gebser recognize the importance of mental/rational consciousness in the traditional religions of India. For Wilber, the culture had not yet evolved to this point in ancient times; Indian society was still at the mythic-membership stage, even though there were a few exceptional beings who opened the eye of contemplation. Gebser, too, views Indian religion as mythic, not allowing for significant religious texts and movements that express an integral awareness. But if we accept, as Feuerstein does, that Indian religion has had important currents that demonstrate an integral mode of thinking, then we must also acknowledge that mental/rational thought has been mastered. Wilber and Gebser both assert that the highest levels of consciousness are accessible only to those who have already developed their mental faculty.
We need to be careful not to uncritically assent to common generalizations about “the East” and Eastern philosophy that lead us astray. India has a significantly different civilization from that of China which includes Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. As a result, Indian philosophy has qualities that set it apart from the philosophical traditions within the Chinese sphere. For instance, although its religions have been predominantly mythic like those of East Asia, they tend to have a more other-worldly orientation. Most importantly for our purposes, Indian thought gives universals far more value than particulars. This emphasis on the general leads to a preference for abstractions, whereas East Asian thought pays more attention to concrete events, places, and people, relying more on similes and metaphors to bring ideas to life. India and East Asia have very different religious outlooks.
A consequence of the confusion I have described is a frequent downplaying of the vitality and influence of rational thought within Indian philosophy. There is a common image that India was mired in mythic thinking until the coming of the British. It is accompanied by the notion that democracy, since it presupposes a reliance on reason and argumentation, had to be a British gift. However, the inadequacy of this perspective on Indian thought has been demonstrated by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen in The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (2005). It fails to account for the fact that in the great Indian religious epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, dialogues, debates, and alternative views abound.
A Flourishing Tradition of Reasoning and Argument
In fact, there is a long history of public reasoning in India that goes back to the early Buddhists who saw discussion as a way to achieve social progress. Councils were held that were open to the general public as a vehicle for settling disputes among those with divergent points of view. The most famous was convened during the reign of the Buddhist Emperor Ashoka during the third century BCE with the aim of ironing out differences of religious teachings and practices while also touching on social issues. Ashoka was a great proponent of public discussion who provided a code to ensure restraint and moderation in speech and to honor one's opponents in the conduct of arguments. He also propagated a message of excellence in governance, including basic freedoms for all social groups, by distributing stone tablets throughout the land.
It may be thought that the use of reason and argument was limited to men and members of the privileged classes. Sen gives evidence to show that long ago, although men did have a larger role in public discussion, women's voices were not negligible. Even as far back as the Upanishads, women are present in some of the most impressive dialogues and ask probing questions. A revealing instance is in the Mahabharata where Draupadi persuades her husband King Yudishthira to engage in battle with those who want to usurp his throne, despite his reluctance to kill. She hardly fits the stereotype of the passive woman.
Sen questions the assumption that rational discourse was only practiced by high-status members of the community. Argument was also a vehicle for relatively disadvantaged groups to make their case against Brahmin orthodoxy and the authority of the priestly caste. These were religious movements such as Buddhism and Jainism that initially rebelled against the hierarchical social order and asserted human equality. There are also arguments against caste presented in the Hindu epics and in premodern times, the devotional movements of Hinduism (bhakti) and Islam (Sufism) influenced the writings of mystical poets often from the working class such Kabir, Dadu, and Ravi-das who were critical of artificial social divisions of caste and religious insularity.
A long tradition of tolerance and pluralism supported the development of secular attitudes, culminating in the arguments of the Muslim Emperor Akbar in the late sixteenth century for a state that did not favor any religion. He put his reasoned conclusions into practice by ending discriminatory practices against non-Muslims, encouraging Hindu culture, and giving high positions to Hindus. Sen sees continuity between such support of religious diversity and the twentieth-century promotion of secularism by such leading figures as Gandhi, Nehru, and Tagore. They were instrumental in creating a favorable climate for the creation of a secular Indian constitution and for official government policies in favor of multiculturalism. Modern Indian secularism has not been primarily a reflection of Western attitudes.
Beyond Wilber and Gebser
The greatest shortcoming of these two pioneering integral thinkers is the simplification and undervaluing of non-Western religious traditions. This may seem an unlikely criticism of Wilber, yet his portrayal of Eastern religions has a major limitation, since he does not appreciate the extent to which several different structures of consciousness have been co-present. As a result, these Eastern societies seem less developed and behind the West in the evolution of their consciousness, despite their well-preserved esoteric traditions. In the case of Indian religion, this means neglecting the great social impact of religious streams with significant rational and third-tier dimensions; instead his focus is on the mythic structure which he believes represents an earlier stage of development that the West has largely transcended.
A similar shortcoming is apparent in the work of Gebser. Feuerstein points out in Structures of Consciousness (1987) that although Gebser correctly identifies the main focus of Indian religions as the pursuit of samadhi, his judgments on Indian religion “tend to be too summary.” Feuerstein attributes this failing to Gebser being “relatively uninformed about the enormously complex consciousness technology within the fold of Hinduism, or even Indian Buddhism.” In other words, he did not recognize that practitioners of Indian religions had also experienced integral consciousness and that some of the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita and Mahayana Buddhism, for example, reflect this intimate familiarity with the ultimate spiritual realization. Since he doesn't recognize this integral stream, he also neglects the role of reason in Indian thought.
Gebser's history of consciousness is more accurate than Wilber's on the issue of progress. Wilber sees the structure that develops later as more advanced than the previous one, whereas Gebser considers each structure except for the integral as equal in its degree of spiritual realization. Each structure of consciousness reflects a particular faculty of the human being, and it is only when all are integrated that there is a complete or whole person.
Gebser is on firmer ground than Wilber, since mythic spirituality in India represents an enormous breakthrough that is no less impressive than the groundbreaking achievements of the Enlightenment. And the abominations of the caste system are no more hideous than the endangering of all life through the prospect of nuclear war, the destruction of nature, and the spread of extreme individualism, social alienation, and nihilism. It is also important to recall that just as the Hindu scriptures do not prescribe a radically unequal and unjust social order based on caste, the egalitarian principles of the Enlightenment are not consistent with imperialism, racism, and sexism.
Going beyond both Wilber and Gebser means putting forward a framework for understanding the history of consciousness that does justice to the very complex and fluid dynamics of history as it is lived. Different structures of consciousness coexist and the values and institutions that arise from them get mixed and blended. This makes generalizations, although necessary, quite risky. In particular, there is a need to become better attuned to the realities of non-Western societies and to not be so quick to offer theories and philosophies, relatively uninformed, that do not account for these realities. The world still awaits a thinker with sufficient understanding of the major civilizations and indigenous societies to contribute a truly universal history of consciousness.