Might Makes Right: The Return of Spheres of Influence, Frank Visser / ChatGPT (original) (raw)
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The Return of Spheres of Influence
Frank Visser / ChatGPT

For much of the post-World War II period—especially after the Cold War—the international system aspired, at least rhetorically, to be governed by rules rather than raw power. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggression, and multilateral institutions were presented as constraints on the ambitions of great powers. Today, that framework is visibly fraying. A more archaic logic is reasserting itself: might makes right, and the world is increasingly imagined as divisible into spheres of influence—Russia in Ukraine, China in Taiwan, and the United States in its historical backyard of Latin America.
This is not a new world order so much as an old one resurfacing.
The Illusion of a Rules-Based Order
The so-called “rules-based international order” was always unevenly applied. The United States and its allies promoted norms of sovereignty and self-determination, while regularly violating them when strategic interests were at stake—from Vietnam and Chile to Iraq and Libya. Still, the existence of shared rules, institutions, and diplomatic rituals imposed some friction on naked territorial conquest. Wars of annexation were officially taboo, even when proxy conflicts and regime change operations flourished in their place.
What has changed is not hypocrisy, but restraint. Major powers are now increasingly willing to act openly and unilaterally, dismissing international law as an inconvenience rather than a legitimizing framework.
Russia and the Logic of Imperial Reversion
Russia's invasion of Ukraine marks the clearest break with post-Cold War norms in Europe. The justification—historical entitlement, security buffers, ethnic protection—belongs to a nineteenth-century imperial vocabulary. Ukraine's sovereignty matters less, in this view, than Russia's perceived right to dominate its near abroad.
The deeper lesson is not merely Russian aggression, but the normalization of territorial revisionism. If borders can be changed by force when a sufficiently powerful state insists, then sovereignty becomes conditional—a privilege granted by stronger neighbors rather than an inherent right.
China, Taiwan, and Strategic Inevitability
China's claim over Taiwan follows a parallel logic, though expressed with more patience and strategic ambiguity. Beijing frames reunification as inevitable, portraying resistance as temporary defiance against historical destiny. Military pressure, economic coercion, and diplomatic isolation serve as instruments short of war, but the underlying principle is the same: power precedes consent.
Here, too, the international community hesitates. Taiwan's democratic self-determination collides with China's economic and military weight. As with Ukraine, support is vocal but calibrated, revealing an uncomfortable truth: principles are defended only up to the point where costs become too high.
The United States and Its Informal Empire
The United States rarely annexes territory, but it has long enforced dominance in Latin America through coups, sanctions, covert operations, and economic leverage. From the Monroe Doctrine onward, the hemisphere has been treated as a zone of privileged interest. When Washington speaks of democracy and human rights, the region's history hears regime change and dependency.
What distinguishes the U.S. role today is less moral superiority than strategic continuity. While condemning Russian and Chinese expansionism, the United States implicitly claims its own sphere—one enforced not by tanks crossing borders, but by financial pressure, political influence, and selective intervention.
A Fragmenting Moral Landscape
The result is a world in which universal norms are increasingly replaced by transactional power politics. Smaller states are forced to choose patrons, hedge their bets, or accept vulnerability. International law survives as rhetoric, but its enforcement depends on alignment with dominant powers.
This erosion carries profound risks. When might becomes the primary arbiter, miscalculation becomes more likely, arms races accelerate, and diplomacy loses credibility. Moreover, the moral authority of liberal democracies weakens when their critique of aggression appears selective.
Conclusion: The Price of Cynicism
We may indeed be entering a world where Russia gets Ukraine, China gets Taiwan, and the United States gets South America—not because this arrangement is just, but because power can enforce it. Yet such a world is neither stable nor sustainable. History shows that spheres of influence generate resistance, proxy wars, and eventual backlash.
The tragedy is not only for the countries caught in between, but for the idea that international politics could rise above brute force. The return of “might makes right” is less a strategic triumph than an admission of failure—a confession that, when tested, the promise of a rules-based order was thinner than advertised.