View 531 August 11 - 17, 2008 (original) (raw)
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
Those interested in the new Cold War may find this amusing:
http://twentymajor.net/wp-content/photos/orig_georgia.jpg
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Georgia on My Mind
I suppose I should write an essay on this, but I don't really have time.
I can say that whatever moral imperatives we may have to help Georgia pales into insignificance compared to our moral obligations in 1956 when the Hungarians revolted against Russian rule. I have an old friend who had been a captain in the Hungarian national army; his unit attempted to take a movie studio in the hopes of finding American uniforms, which they would wear in hopes of making the Russians believe the Americans were coming.
Eisenhower sent Hungary no help. The danger of Central Nuclear War was too great, and we did not have the military force present in the area to create a fait accompli.
The Russians retain over 20,000 nuclear warheads, and several thousand ICBM's. We have not built Ballistic Missile Defenses. The Russians still have missile submarines. The only real defense of the coasts is ground based lasers with popup mirrors, as described in the first reports of the Citizens Advisory Council on National Space Policy written for Reagan in 1980. We have not built those defenses. We are not equipped to play nuclear chicken games. We have stood down most of our deterrent force, and our Strategic Forces are vulnerable to a number of first strike scenarios.
Of course it will never come to Central Nuclear War; so we say. But the only effective intervention we could make in Georgia would require "tactical" nuclear weapons. The problem is that the a tactical nuclear weapon, during the Cold War, was one that went off in Germany; use of nukes anywhere else would precipitate strategic nuclear strikes. If we attempted intervention in Georgia with anything other than nukes, it would be a disaster. If we attempted to use nukes against Russian forces, what would then be the limits of conflict? Would Baltimore harbor survive?
Of course the Russians would never think that way, just as they would never send tanks into Prague, or into Georgia. But every part of the history of the last century taught the Russians one thing: there is no such thing as overkill. If you are going to fight, send in everything you can. (I believe the US term for this is shock and awe...)
Walter Lippmann once wrote that military power was like a bank account against which the diplomats could write checks; and it was very possible to be overdrawn. The United States is very nearly overdrawn now.
If we want to play the game of world Empire, there are costs. The first is to create SAC again, complete with full restoration of the ICBM force, young officers in silos on Christmas and other holidays, air crews sleeping in quarters on runways, rebuilding the numbered Air Forces. The second is real Strategic Defense, with orbital elements, ground based lasers, pop-up mirrors, local, and midrange interceptors, endgame defenses, and the homeland security measures required to protect all that. None of this is cheap. It is unlikely that the American people will pay that cost.
We may be the only superpower, but that does not automatically give us mastery of the world, and it is unlikely that the American people would pay the costs in blood, treasure, and ruthlessness to assume that role.
Military power is like a bank account. We may draw against it, but being overdrawn is not advisable. If we attempt any real intervention in Georgia, we will be overdrawn. The US has many common interests with Russia. It may be time to look into those. We may have more influence with the Russians as friends as we would ever have in a new Cold War.
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Chronicles: Your Home is Not Your Castle
http://www.telegram.com/article/
20080809/NEWS/808090323/1008/
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L' Affaire Plaime developments:
http://jammiewearingfool.blogspot.com/
2008/08/bad-day-for-left-gets-
worse-plame-suit.html
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I am getting a number of emails with my return address promoting various products including something having to do with Angelina Jolie. Of course I did not send those.
I will generally no send you links except possible to this web site, and any email I write will be pretty unambiguously from me; but even then be careful.
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Subject: The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power | Stratfor's take,
Jerry
Here is Stratfor's take on Georgia and Russia:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/
russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power
I find little to disagree with.
Ed
= = =
Little to disagree with indeed. The US policy of trying to encircle Russia instead of making friends with the Russians has been a disaster, and will remain so. Kosovo was key: we were willing to bomb a sovereign state to require them to give part of their territory to illegal alien invaders. If we would do that, what else might we do? Clearly Russian security lay in their military forces, not in any kind of pledges from either Republican or Democratic politicians in the United States.
Why it was thought necessary for the US to generate a cordon sanitaire around Russia is beyond my kenning. And I fail to comprehend why we were not working actively to prevent a Georgian invasion of a territory composed mostly of ethnic Russians. We had a presence there. It was not used to prevent war. Indeed, from first appearance we did nothing to prevent, and may have encouraged, Georgian adventurism.
We sowed the wind. The Georgians have reaped the whirlwind, but the returns are not all in. We may yet find more reasons to regret our actions here; and the more blustering we do at this point the sillier we look. We should not make empty threats. God save us if the threats we make are not empty.
EWO. EWO. Emergency War Orders....
