Prefaces and Introduction to the Conspectus of Hegel's Science of Logic (original) (raw)
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
Note: Quoted text and page numbers—i.e., (25)—indicate links to passages in Hegel’s Science of Logic.
Bern: Log. I. 175
Hegel’s Werke
Bd. I. Philosophische Abhandlungen
" II. The Phenomenology of Mind
" III-V. The Science of Logic
" VI-VII. (1 and 2) The Encyclopaedia
" VIII. The Philosophy of Law
" IX. The Philosophy of History
" X. (3 parts) Aesthetics
" XI-XII. The History of Religion
" XIII-XV. The History of Philosophy
" XVI-XVII. Miscellaneous Writings
" XVIII. Philosophical Propaedeutic
" XIX. (1 and 2) Hegel’s Correspondence
| Full Title of Collected Works G. W. Fr. Hegel[1] | |
|---|---|
| Collected Works of G. W. Fr. Hegel, Vol. III (Berlin, 1833) (468 pages) | “Complete edition by circle of friends of |
| “ The Science of Logic.”[2] Part 1. Objective Logic. | the deceased: Marheineke, Schulze, |
| Section 1. The Doctrine of Being. | Gans, Hen- |
| (Bern: Log I. 175) | nin, Hotho, Michelet, Förster.” |
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
| Vol. III,[3] p. 5 — a shrewd statement about logic: it is a “prejudice” that it ”teach-es how to think” (just as physiology ”teaches ... to digest”??) ... “logical science, which is the true con- tent of genuine metaphysics or pure spec- ulative philosophy.... ” (6) ...“Philosophy cannot borrow its method froma subordinate science, such as mathe- matics....” (6-7) ...“But it can be only the nature of the content which stirs in scientific cognition, while at the same time it is this very reflection of the content which itself ini- tially posits and produces its determina- tion.” (7) (The movement of scientific cognition — that is the essential thing.) “Understanding (Verstand) makes deter- minations” (bestimmt), Reason (Ver- nunft) is negative and dialectical because it dissolves into nothing (“in Nichts auflöst”) the determinations of Understanding. (7) The combination of these two—“Reason which understands or Understanding which reasons” (7) = the positive. Negation of “the simple” ... “movement of Mind ...” (7) (The “path of self-construction” = the path (this is the crux, in my opinion) of real cognition, of the process of cognising, of movement from ignorance to knowledge.[4] | |
|---|---|
| The movement of consciousness, “like the development of all natural and spiri- tual life,” rests on “the nature of the pure | This is char- acteristic! |
| essentialities which make up the content of Logic” (Natur der reinen Wessenheiten[5]). | |
| Turn it round: Logic and the theory of knowledge must be derived from “the development of all natural and spiritual life”. | |
| Up to here: preface to the First Edition. |
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
| “To present the realm of thought in its philosophical aspect—that is, in its own | |
|---|---|
| (NB) immanent activity, or (which comes | excellent! |
| to the same thing) in its necessary (NB) development....” (10) “The familiar forms of thought”—an im- portant beginning, “die leblosen Knochen eines Skeletts.”[6] (11) What is necessary is not leblose Knochen, but living life. The connection between thought and language (the Chinese language, inciden- tally, and its lack of development: (11), | |
| the formation of nouns and verbs. (11) In the German language words sometimes have “entgegengesetzte Bedeutung”[7] (12) (not simply “different” but opposed mean- ings)—“a joy to thought....” | the history of thought = the history of language?? |
| The concept of force in Physics—and of polarity (“the things distinguished insep- arably (Hegel’s italics) bound up to- gether”). (12) The transition from force to polarity—a transition to “higher Denk- verhältnisse.”[8] (12) | |
| [NB also p. 11.... “But if Nature in general is opposed, as physical, to what is mental, then it must be said that Logic is rather something supernatural....”] | nature and “das Geistige”[9] |
| Logical forms Allbekanntes sind,[10] but ... “was bekannt ist, darum noch nicht erkannt.[11] (13) “Infinite progress”—“liberation” of “forms of thought” from the matter (von dem Stoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration of the general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning of Knowledge.... “It was only after nearly everything that was necessary ... was available, that people began to trouble themselves about philo- sophic knowledge,” says Aristotle (13-14); and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyp- tian priests, the beginning of the mathe- matical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with “pure thought” presupposes “a long stretch of road already traversed by the mind | |
| of man.” In this kind of thought “those interests are hushed which move the lives of peoples and individuals.” (14) | interests “move the lives of peoples” |
| The categories of Logic are Abbrevi- aturen[12] (“epitomiert”[13] in another pas- age) for the “endless multitude” of “par- ticulars of external existence and of ac- tion....” (15) In turn, these categories _die_- nen[14] people in practice (“in the intellectual exercise of living content, in production and interchange”). (15) | |
| “We do not say of our feelings, impulses and interests that they serve us—rather, they are regarded as independent faculties and powers...all this is just what we are.”(15) | the relation of thought to interests and impulses... |
| And concerning forms of thought (Denk- formen) it cannot be said that they serve us, for they permeate “all our ideas” (16), they are “the Universal as such.” Objectivism: the categories of thought are not an auxiliary tool of man, but an expression of laws both of nature and of man—com- pare further the antithesis— of “subjective thinking” and “the objec- tive concept of the very essence of things”. We cannot “get beyond the nature of things”. | |
| “Also the remark against the "Critical Philosophy.” (17) It conceives the relation between “three terms” (We, Thought, Things) so that thoughts stand “in the mid- dle” between things and us, and so that this middle term “separates” (abschließt) “rather than... connects” (zusammenschli- eBen) us. This view may be met, says Hegel, by the “simple observation” that “these very things which are supposed to stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ... are themselves thought entities (Gedanken- dinge)” ... and “the so-called Thing-in-it- self is only ein Gedankendingder leeren Abstraktion.[15]” | against Kantianism |
| In my opinion, the essence of the argu- ment is: (1) In Kant, cognition demar- cates (divides) nature and man; actually it unites them; (2) In Kant, the “_empty abstraction_” of the Thing-in-it- self instead of living Gang, Bewegung,[16] deeper and deeper, of our knowledge about things. | |
| In Kant, Ding an sich[17] is an empty abstraction, but Hegel demands abstrac- tions which correspond to der Sache[18]: “der objective Begriff der Dinge die Sache selbst ausmacht,”[19] which cor- respond—speaking materialistically—to the real deepening of our knowledge of the world. | |
| It is incorrect to say that Denkformen are only a “Mittel”, “zum Gebrauch.”[20] (17) It is also incorrect to say that they are “äußere Formen,”[21] “Formen die nur | |
| an dem Gehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbst seien,” (forms which are merely forms at- tached to the content, and not the content itself). (17)... | NB |
| What Hegel demands is a Logic, the forms of which would be ge- haltvolle Formen,[22] forms of living, real content, inseparably connected with the content. And Hegel draws attention to “thoughts of all natural and spiritual things”, to the “substantial content....” (18) —“To bring into clear consciousness this logical character, which gives soul to mind and drives and operates in it, this is our problem.” (18) Logic is the science not of ex- ternal forms of thought, but of the laws of development “of all material, natural and spiritual things”, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world. “Instinctive action” (instinktartiges Tun) “is broken up ... into an infinitely di- verse matter.” On the other hand, “intelligent and conscious action” brings out “the con- tent of that which motivates” (den Inhalt des Treibenden) “out of its immediate unity with the subject” and makes it “an object for it” (for the subject). “In this web strong knots are formed now and then, which are foci of the arrest and direction of its” [the spirit’s, or the subject’s] “life and consciousness ....” (18) How is this to be understood? Man is confronted by a web of natural phenomena. Instinctive man, the savage, does not distin- guish himself from nature. Con- scious man does distinguish, cate- gories are stages of distinguishing, i.e. of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it. “Truth is infinite” (19) —its finiteness is its denial, “its end”. The forms (Denk- formen[23]), if one regards them as forms, “distinct from the substance and merely at- tached to it” are incapable of embrac- ing truth. The inaneness of these forms of [formal logic] makes them deserving of “contempt” (19) and “derision.” (20) The Law of identity, A = A, —vacuousness, “unerträglich.”[24]. (19) It is unfair to forget that these categories “have their place and validity in cognition.” (20) But as “indifferent forms” they can be “instruments of error and sophistry” (20), not of truth. “Contemplative thought” should include “der Inhalt”[25] as well as the “external form.” (20) | |
| “With this introduction of Content into logical consideration,” the subject becomes not Dinge but die Sache, der Begriff der Dinge.[26] | NB NB |
| not things, but the laws[27] of their movement, materialistically ...”the logos, the reason of that which is." (21) And on page (22) at the beginning, the subject of logic is expressed in the words: | |
| ...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seiner Notwendigkeit.” | “develop- ment” of thinking in accordance with its necessity |
| The categories have to be derived (and not taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (not by “exposition”, not by “assurances,” but with proofs) proceeding from the simplest, most fundamental (Being, Noth- ing, Becoming (das Werden)) (without taking others)—here, in them, “in this germ, the whole development.” (23) |
INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC
| | Logic is usually understood as being the “science of thinking,” the “bare form of cognition.” (27) Hegel refutes this view. He is against Ding an sich[28] as “something beyond thought.” (29) Forms of thinking apparently “have no applicability to Things-in-themselves.” (31) Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis,[29] which does not cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is not Verstand[30] also a Thing-in-itself? (31) “Transcendental idealism, carried more consistently to its logical conclusion, has perceived the nullity of the spectre of the Thing-in-itself left over from the critical philosophy—that abstract shadow detached from all content—and has had the aim of demolishing it altogether. Also, this phi- losophy (Ficthe?) made a beginning of mak- inf reason develop its own determinations out of itself. But the subjective attitude of this attempt did not admit of its being carried to completion.” (32) Logical forms are tote Formen[31]— for they are not regarded as an “organic unity,” (33) as “their living concrete unity” (ibidem). | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | In the Phenomenology of Mind I have examined “the movement of con- sciousness, from the first direct contradiction (Gegensatz) between itself and the object, up to absolute knowledge. (34) This path goes through all the forms of the relation of con- sciousness to the object....” | | | | | | | | “Truth, as science, is pure self-conscious- ness unfolding itself...” (35) “objective think- ing“ ... ”the concept, as such, is that which exists in and for itself.” (35) (36: clerical- ism, God, the realm of truth, etc., etc.) | | | | 37: | Kant imparted “an essentially subjec- tive signification” to “logical determi- nations”. But “thought determinations” have “an objective value and exist- ence”. (37) The old logic has fallen into Verachtung.[32] (38) It requires trans- formation... | | | 39— | The old, formal logic is exactly like a child’s game, making pictures out of jig-saw pieces (in Verachtung ge- kommen[33]: (38)) | | | 40 | Philosophy must have its own method (not that of mathematics, contra Spi- noza, Wolff und Andere[34]). | | | 40-41: | “For method is the conscious- ness of the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of its content,” | NB | | and the rest of page 41 gives a good explanation of dialectics “es ist der Inhalt in sich, die Dia- lektik, die er an ihm selbst hat, welche ihn fortbewegt.” (42) “The given sphere of phenomena is moved forward by the content itself of this sphere, the dialectic, which it (this content) has in (an) itself” (i.e., the dialectic of its own movement). | | | | | | | | “The negative is to an equal extent pos- itive” (41)—negation is something defi- nite, has a definite content, the inner con- tradictions lead to the replacement of the old content by a new, higher one. | | | | | | | | In the old logic there is no transition, de- velopment (of concept and thought), there | | | | is not “_eines inneren, notwen- digen Zusammenhangs_”[35] (43) of all the parts and “Übergang”[36] of some parts into others. | NB | | | | | | | And Hegel puts forward two basic require- ments: 1) “The necessity of connection” and 2) “the immanent emergence of distinctions”. | | | | | | | | Very important!! This is what it means, in my opinion: 1. Necessary connection, the ob- jective connection of all the aspects, forces, tendencies, etc., of the given sphere of phenomena; 2. The “immanent emergence of dis- tinctions” - the inner objective logic of evolution and of the struggle of the differences, polarity. | | | | | | | | Shortcomings of the Platonic dialectics in Parmenides. [37] “Dialectic is generally regarded as an external and negative procedure, that does not belong to the subject-matter itself, that is based on pure vanity, as a subjec- tive craving to shake and break down what is fixed and true,—or that at best leads to nothing but the inaneness of the dialec- tically treated matter.” (43) | | | | | | | | 44 | The great merit of Kant was that he removed “den Schein von Willkür”[38] from dialectics. | | | Two | important things: | | | (1) Die Objektivität # des Scheins[39] | NB: unclear, return to it!! | | | (2) die Notwendigkeit des Wilderspruchs[40] selbstbewegende Seele[41] ... (“inher- ent negativity”) ... “the principle of all phys- ical and spiritual life” (44) # Is not the thought here that semblance also is objective, for it contains one of the aspects of the objective world? Not only Wesen,[42] but Schein, too, is objective. There is a difference between the subjective and the objective, BUT IT, TOO, HAS ITS LIMITS. The dialectical = = “comprehending the antithesis in its unity....” | | | | | | | | 45 Logic resembles grammar, being one thing for the beginner and another thing for one who knows the language (and lan- guages) and the spirit of language. “It is one thing for him who approaches Logic and the Sciences in general for the first time and another thing for him who comes back from the sciences to Logic.” | subtle and profound! | | | | | | | Then logic gives “the essential character of this wealth” (des Reichtums der Welt- vorstellung[43]), “the inner nature of spir- it and of the world....” (46) | | | | | | | | “Not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular” (47) | c.f. Capital | | | | | | | A beautiful formula: “Not mere- ly an abstract universal, but a uni- versal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular, the individual, the single” (all the (all the wealth of the particular and single!)!! Très bien! | | | | | | | | “—Just as one and the same moral maxim in the mouth of a youth who understands it quite accurately does not have the significance and scope which it has in the mind of a man of years and experience, for whom it expresses the full force of its con- tent. | a good comparison (materialist) | | | | | | | Thus, the value of logic only receives due appreciation when it is the result of ex- perience of the sciences; then it presents itself to the mind as universal truth, not as a particular department of knowledge alongside other departments and realities, but as the essence of all this other con- tent....” (47) | “sum-total of experience of the sciences” NB (“Essence”) the “essential content of all other knowledge” | | | | | | | | | | | “The system of logic is the realm of shades" (47), free from "all sensuous con- creteness....” | | | | | | | | (50)— | ...“not abstract, dead and immo- bile, but concrete....” [This is characteristic! The spirit and essence of dialectics!] | | | (52) | Note ... the results of Kant’s philos- ophy ...: “that reason can cognise no valid content, and with regard to absolute truth must be referred to faith....” | Kant: to res- trict “reason” and strength- en faith[44] | | | | | | (53) Once again, that Ding an sich = an abstraction, the product of thinking that abstracts. | | |
Notes
[1] The first edition of Hegel’s works in German consists of 18 volumes (1832-45) and an additional volume in two parts (1887).
[2] Wissenschaft der Logik (The Science of Logic) consists of two parts (three books).
[3] Hegel, Werke, Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.
[4] In the manuscript the words “from ignorance to knowledge” are struck out with a horizontal line, apparently instead of being underlined.—Ed.
[5] In the nature of pure essentialities—Ed.
[6] “the lifeless bones of a skeleton”—Ed.
[7] “opposed meanings”—Ed.
[8] “relations of thought”—Ed.
[9] “the mental”—Ed.
[10] “are familiar to all”—Ed.
[11] “what is familiar is not on that account necessarily known_”—_Ed.
[12] abbreviations_—_Ed.
[13] optimised—Ed.
[14] serve_—_Ed.
[15] a thought entity of empty abstraction—Ed.
[16] progress, the movement—Ed.
[17] the Thing-in-itself—Ed.
[19] “the objective concept of things constitutes their very essence”—Ed.
[20] a “means,” “for use”—Ed.
[21] “external forms”—Ed.
[22] forms with content—Ed.
[23] forms of thought—Ed.
[24] “insufferable"—Ed.
[25] “content”—Ed.
[26] things, but the essence, the concept of things—Ed.
[27] The word “laws” is linked by an arrow with the word “logos” in the next paragraph—Ed.
[28] Thing-in-itself—Ed.
[29] True cognition is absurd—Ed.
[30] understanding—Ed.
[31] dead forms—Ed.
[32] disrepute—Ed.
[33] It has fallen into disrepute.—Ed.
[34] and others—Ed.
[35] “an inner, necessary connection_”—_Ed.
[36] “transition”—Ed.
[37] Parmenides—the name of one of Plato’s dialogues, in which the philosophical views of Parmenides, the ancient Greek Eleatic philosopher, are discussed.
[38] “the semblance of arbitrariness”—Ed.
[39] the objectivity of semblance—Ed.
[40] the necessity of contradiction—Ed.
[41] self-moving soul—Ed.
[42] essence—Ed.
[43] the wealth of the world view—Ed.
[44] Lenin is apparently referring to the following well-known statement by Kant in the preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason: “I would have to restrict the field of knowledge to make place for faith.”