EXTRACTS FROM DIE BANK [2] (original) (raw)
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
NOTEBOOK “β”
(“BETA”)
EXTRACTS FROM DIE BANK [2]
Die Bank, 1912, 2.
“_Herr von Gwinner’s Oil Monopoly_” (1032—) (Dr. Felix Pinner).
| cf.p. 13here[1]sic! | | | The Reichstag, on March 15, 1911, adoptedalmost unanimously a request for an oil monopoly.The government seized upon this “popular” (1032)idea. It turned out that the banks... “could notagree on the booty” (1033). Only the DeutscheBank was in favour!! The others (headed by the Discontogesellschaft) were against, partly because they considered the _DeutscheBank_’s booty excessive.[2] | | -------------------------------------- | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| | The struggle between the banks is useful forbusiness: “Only when the interested parties exposedone another—and they did so thoroughly, in amasterly way and with intimate knowledge oftheir mutual weaknesses—did clarity become pos-sible” (1034).... | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | |
The consumers are afraid of terrific (“colossal”, 1034) prices. The Standard Oil Co. served the consumer excellently.
The oil trust could be fought only by an electricity monopoly, by converting water-power into cheap electricity. But we shall get an electricity monopoly only when this becomes profitable to the producers.
| | “But the electricity monopoly will comewhen the producers need it, that is to say,when the next great crash in the electricalindustry is imminent, and when the gigan-tic, expensive power stations now beingput up at great cost everywhere by privateelectrical ‘concerns’, which are alreadyobtaining certain franchises from towns,from states, etc., can no longer work ata profit. Water-power will then have tobe used. But it will be impossible to con-vert it into cheap electricity at stateexpense; it will also have to be handedover to a ‘private monopoly controlledby the state’, because private industry hasalready concluded a number of contractsand has stipulated for heavy compensationfor its expensive steam-power plants, whichwill impose too great a burden on theground-rent of a state-controlled hydro-power monopoly. So it was with the nitratemonopoly, so it is with the oil monopoly,so it will be with the electric power monop-oly. It is time our state socialists, whoallow themselves to be blinded bya beautiful principle, understood, at last,that in Germany the monopolies havenever pursued the aim, nor have they hadthe result, of benefiting the consumer, oreven of handing over to the state partof the promoter’s profits; they have servedonly _to facilitate, at the expense of thestate, the recovery of private industrieswhich were on the verge of bankruptcy_”[3](1036, author’s italics). | | | | | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | -- | ------- | -------- | | | | | | | | | | N.B. | | | | | | | sic! | | | | | | | | | | | | | | !! | | | | | | | “tribute” tofinance | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | capital | | | | | | | !! | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | N.B.N.B. | | | | | | | |
| The Deutsche Bank was defeated by theStandard Oil Co. and in 1907 concludedwith the latter (under compulsion) a verydisadvantageous agreement by which, in1912, the Standard Oil Co. was able tobuy up cheaply the oilfields of the DeutscheBank.And so the Deutsche Bank set to workto build up a monopoly!! | there isa table of“interconnections”in oil“concerns” |
|---|
Opposing the Deutsche Bank was the Discontogesellschaft (with its Deutsche Erdöl Aktiengesellschaft), which worked very cautiously for an agreement with the Standard Oil Co.
Die Bank, 1912, 2, p. 695:
| “Statistics of English Joint-Stock Banks”(England and Wales). | { | Colonialbanks | } |
|---|
| | Deposits(£ million) | | | | | | | | | | ---------------------- | ----- | ----- | ------------- | ------------- | ------- | -------- | -------- | ----- | | N.B. | 1890— | 104 | banks | (joint-stock) | with | 2,203 | branches | 368 | | 1911— | 44 | ” | ” ” | ” | 5,417 | ” | 749 | | | In Scotland | | | | | | | | | | 1890— | 10 | ” | ” ” | ” | 975 | ” | | | | 1911— | 9 | ” | ” ” | ” | 1,227 | ” | | | | | In Ireland | | | | | | | | | | 1890— | 9 | banks | (joint-stock) | with | 456 | branches | | | | 1911— | 9 | ” | ” ” | ” | 739 | ” | | | | Colonial banks | | | | | | | | | | N.B. | 1890— | 30 | ” | ” ” | ” | 1,742 | ” | | | 1911— | 38 | ” | ” ” | ” | 3,645 | ” | | |
Die Bank, 1912, 2 (629 et seq.). “Oil Strategy” by Felix
Pinner:
on the one hand, the Germans (Discontogesellschaft and Erdöl Aktiengesellschaft) want to unite Rumania (and Russia) against the Standard Oil Co.;
| N.B.divisionof theworldby theoil trusts | | | on the other hand, Standard Oil foundeda company (Nederlandsche Koloniale Pe-troleum Maatschappy) in Holland herself,buying up oilfields (and concessions) in theDutch Indies—a blow against its chief rival:the Anglo-Dutch trust Shell(Koninklijke Shell), etc.Struggle for division of the world. “Divi-sion of the World”, p. 630. | | --------------------------------------- | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
Anglo-Dutch trust—Asia.
Standard Oil—rest of the world.
Standard Oil wants to seize everything.
The Germans want to defend themselves (+ Rumania + Holland + Russia??).
Die Bank, 1912, 1.
| Cinematrust!! | | | | “The Patriotism of the Trusts”, by L. Eschwe-ge: in Germany a trust has been formed forbuying up film distributors! (The firm of Pathé(Paris) produces 80,000 metres of film daily atone mark per metre. The cinemas of the worldput together yield an income of about onethousand million marks per year!!) (pp. 216-17). This industry lags behind in Germany; itis especially developed in France. In Germanyabout forty distributing agencies buy up filmsand “lease” them to cinema owners. (A trusthas been formed, Deutsche Filmindustrie A.-G. =Fiag, headed by the National-Liberal Depu-ty Paasche. Its capital = five million marks,of which “no small part”, obviously, was intend-ed to be used as “founders’ profit”).... A monop-oly is being launched. Will it succeed?? | | ------------- | | | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | |
| Die Bank, 1912, 1 (p. 223 et seq.),a short article by A. Lansburgh:“_The Financial Transac-tions of the Princes’ Trust_”(the name given by the Stock Exchangeto the “business affairs” of Prince Für-stenberg and Prince Hohenlohe, wealthyfinanciers). They invested millions (oftheir own and of the DeutscheBank) in the building firm of Boswau& Knauer, It raked in as much as 100,000,000 marks (!! p. 229), embarkedon a host of very risky enterprisesand went bankrupt. The DeutscheBank lost about twelve million marks,Fürstenberg about eight million (p. 226),the whole extent of the crash being covered and concealed (p. 226). Extreme-ly indignant, the author writes: “Ourwhole economic development is infectedby some of the Knauer poison” (230)....“The principle by which they (Boswau& Knauer) have worked, is hardlydifferent from that, for example, towhich the two biggest German electricalconcerns owe their successes” (228)....[4] | |
|---|---|
If Boswau & Knauer had managed to wriggle out by making others bear the risk, everyone would have praised them, and hundreds and hundreds would have been ruined!
Die Bank, 1912, 1.
L. Eschwege, Etatisation of Capitalism (p. 12—). The Reichstag elections. The battle of conservatives and democrats. “The question of whether the people or the bureaucracy should rule is still being debated, but the decision has already been made in favour of a third force, namely, the plutocracy” (12) ... “political freedom becomes an empty phrase in a country where the economic sources of wealth have become the monopoly of a few supermen” (12). Capitalism is being etatised: members of Zemstvos!! (municipality, district, etc.) are being appointed to Supervisory Boards. For example, in the Tempelhofer Feld Aktiengesellschaft. What a shady business!! “Petty hypocrisy” (15)—these delegates also receive bonuses, etc., etc. “A situation which is intrinsically dishonourable” results (16).... Government officials make “common cause with the plutocracy” (19)....
“Foreign Capital Investments in Canada”, p. 82 et seq.
| British . . . . . . . . . . | >2,000 | million dollars | | | | ---------------------------- | ------- | --------------- | | ----- | | American . . . . . . . . . . | 420 | ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ | | ⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ | | French . . . . . . . . . . | 80 | 80 | | | | German . . . . . . . . . . | 32 | 32 | | | | Belgian . . . . . . . . . . | {11.5 | | | | | Dutch . . . . . . . . . . | 11 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 123 | | | | |
L. Eschwege, The History of a Company Promotion. (p. 420 et seq.)—an aerodrome company.
Flugplatz Johannisthal near Berlin. The director Arthur Müller enlisted princes and princelings, took millions from them (share capital = 4 1⁄2 million marks), “gratis shares” for himself, resold them (the expert opinion of a venal valuer was that this land would yield colossal profit... in 10-20 years!!)—in general a gross deception, and everything strictly legal!!
| Americanbankingmagnates | | | A. Lansburgh, “The Money Trust”(p. 432 et seq.).The National City Bank (Rocke-feller and the Standard Oil Co.)controls a capital of about $1,000million. The Bankers Trust Co.(Morgan) controls a capital of about $1,500-1,750 million. | 2 banks—2,750milliondollars(=11,000millionmarks)[5] | | ----------------------- | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
The author points out that nowhere are banks so strictly regulated as in America (“deposit” banks are strictly separated from “investment” banks; branch banks are forbidden, also the loan to any one person of more than 10 per cent of the capital, and so on). America has 26,000 “Lilliputian” banks (438)—and all to no purpose!! In reality the multi-millionaires rule and control. A change in the laws will merely lead to a change in the form of their rule.
Die Bank, 1912, 1, p. 523 et seq.
L. Eschwege, “_Cultural Fertiliser_” = German immigrants in Brazil. Unscrupulous advertising of the Brazilian Government (like that of the Canadian). Agents are paid ten marks for each immigrant. Lies about the prosperity of the immigrants, their poverty, etc., etc. They are sold land at speculative prices, etc., etc.
Die Bank, 1911, 1, p. 1 et seq.
| A. Lansburgh, “_Germany—A Rentier State_”. Deposits in German savings banks =about 16,500 million marks. Thisis a transfer of capital from a latent to apatent state, an aid to big capital, a con-version into loan capital (mostlyin mortgages). By refraining from disposingof their money themselves, the depositors“strengthen the power of big capital andweaken the strength of resistance of small-scale industry” (8). | | | N.B. title! | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | ----------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | “People in Germany ate ready to sneer atthe inclination to become rentiers that is ob-served in France. But they forget that as faras the bourgeoisie is concerned the situationin Germany is becoming more and more likeif that in France”[6] (10-11). | | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | |
About 45 of the amounts (45 per cent, apparently) in savings banks consist of deposits of 3,000 marks or over!!
Ibidem, p. 218: German Banks
| | Banks | Own capital | Borrowed capital | | | | -------- | ----------- | ---------------- | -------- | ----------------- | | 1883 | 160 | 890 | + | 850 (mill. marks) | | 1907 | 440 | 4,450 | + | 7,750 ” ” | | | +175% | +400% | + | 812% ” ” | |
Austrian Banks
| | (million kronen) | | | | | ------------------- | ----------- | ---------------- | ----- | | | Banks | Own capital | Borrowed capital | | | 1883 | 38 | 500 | 620 | | 1907 | 53 | 1,130 | 3,130 | | | +40% | +126% | +405% | |
Die Bank, 1911, 2, p. 605 et seq. “Twenty Years of English Banking”, by Alfred Lansburgh.
| Develop-ment of English banks | Banks | Deposits and current accounts | Scotland | Ireland | Capital(England+ Scotland+ Ireland) | Reserves |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1891[7] | 110 | 408.5 | +91.6 | +38.5£mill. | 69.8 | 36.4 |
| 1911 | 46 | 776.6 | 106.6 | 62.5 | 78.7 | 49.0 |
| Branches of | 46 English banks— | 5,218 (1910) | ||||
| Isle of Man | 2 | 9 | ||||
| Scottish | 9 | 1,242 | ||||
| Irish | 9 | 693 |
p. 813 et seq. Germany
| | No. of banks | Own capital(thousand mill.marks) | Borrowed money | Total capitalat the disposalof the banks | | | | --------------- | -------------------------------- | -------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ---------------------------------- | | 1872 | 174 | 1 | 1 | 3,000 mill. marks | Develop-ment ofbanking in Ger-many | | 1910 | 422 | 5 | 11 | 30,000 ” ” | |
1872... 23 banks out of 174 had a capital of 10 million
and >. They controlled 60 per cent of borrowed
money.
1910—11... 53 banks out of 422 had a capital of 10 million
and >. They controlled 82.5 per cent of borrowed
money (p. 818).
Germany, output of iron 1870: 1,346,000; 1910: 14,793,000 tons.[18]
L. Eschwege, “Plutocracy and Officialdom” (p. 825 et seq.). Typical of a petty-bourgeois reformist. Two examples:
| “Some years ago, owing to the rigidattitude of the Rhine-Westphalian CoalSyndicate, a strong anti-cartel movementswept through Germany. The Reich govern-ment appointed an Enquiry Committee tostudy the problem of cartels. In the courseof its proceedings, Government Coun-sellor Völker distinguished himself by hisbrilliant mastery of the subject and hissharp business-like speeches against thecartel representatives. Shortly thereafter,Counsellor Völker accepted a highly paidpost as leader of the German Steel Asso-ciation, Germany’s most powerful andclosely-knit cartel organisation. With thegovernment thus deprived of its bestexpert, the enquiry petered out” (827-28).There is no need, he remarks, to point toAmerica! | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | | | goodexample!(financecapitaland thegovernment)[19] | | | | |
| | There is an Imperial Private InsuranceSupervisory Office, which has done muchto control private insurance companies.And then the insurance companies comealong and entice the “controllers” withoffers of lucrative posts (including director-ships). “In recent years, no less than threecontrol officials have made the leap fromthe Imperial Supervisory Office to a direc-torship in an insurance company” (831). | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | | !! | |
Die Bank, 1911, 1, pp. 94-95. Recent statistics on the iron industry.
| (Thousand tons) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| produc-tion of pig-iron | 1810 | 15 | 158 | 54 | — | — | — |
| 1820 | — | — | 20 | 198 | — | 1,650 | |
| 1850 | — | 2,228 | 564 | 405 | 204 | 4,187 | |
| 1870 | 1,346 | 6,059 | 1,665 | 1,178 | 360 | 12,021 | |
| 1890 | 4,625 | 8,033 | 9,203 | 1,962 | 727 | 27,427 | |
| 1910 | 14,793 | 9,664 | 27,250 | 3,500 | 2,870 | 60,000 |
Die Bank, 1910, 1 (p. 401 et seq.), Alfred Lansburgh, “The Bank in the Service of the National Economy”—in connection with Riesser’s book, whom the author accuses of optimism and of ignoring the defects of the German banks.
| “holdings”ofthe modernbank!! | | | | Idem: Alfred Lansburgh, “The Hold-ings System in German Banking”(497 et seq.) and “Dangers of the HoldingsSystem”. Both articles yield very little;generalities, already known. The table of“holdings” (p. 500) alone is good. | | ---------------------------- | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| The Deutsche Bank[8] has holdings | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | Permanently | in | 17 | banks. | Of | these | 9 | have | holdings | in | 34 | banks; | Of | which | 4 | also | in | 7 |
| (2) | For an indefi-nite period | ” | 5 | ” | ———————— | ————————— | ———— | |||||||||||
| (3) | Occassionaly | ” | 8 | ” | ” | ” | 5 | ” | ” | ” | 14 | ” | ” | ” | 2 | ” | ” | 2 |
| ((My totals)) | 30 | 14 | 48 | ” | ” | ” | 6 | ” | ” | 9 |
| N.B. | | | | both banks and bankers included System of “holdings” N.B. | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | --------------------------------------------------------- | | | of these, i.e., out of 8—two Russian:the Siberian Commercial Bank and theRussian Bank for Foreign Trade, andone Austrian; the Wiener Bankverein | | | | | | | | | | | | | approximately thus | | | | |
| !! | | ⎧⎨⎪⎩ | in all the “concern” hasabout 500 million marksof its own money and 1,333 million marksof borrowed money | ⎫⎬⎪⎭ | .jpg)
| ⎛⎝ | the author hassquares withthe name ofthe bank | ⎞⎠ |
| -- | | ---- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------ | --------------------------------------------- | ------ |
| | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | apparently, these data on the Deutsche Bank can be taken to illustrate the holdings system | | | | |
| | approximately thus:the size of the bank in thecentre (the Deutsche Bank)is not in proportion, foramong the subsidiaries arebanks with a capital of 70-80million marks! | | .jpg)
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| | | |
Die Bank, 1910, 1, p. 288. A note: “German Concessions Abroad.”
The Chamber of Commerce in Barmen writes in a Memorandum to the Minister of Trade:
| | “A considerable amount of German capital is invested in the Transvaal goldmines, despite which, unfortunately, sup-plies from German engineering factoriesfor the Transvaal mines are only verysmall, because the technical managementof the mines is predominantly in Englishhands. From this point of view, it wouldbe extremely regrettable if the Mannes-mann concessions (in Morocco) were to beabsorbed in the French mining syndicate.If that were to happen the technical man-agement of the Moroccan mines would quitecertainly fall wholly into French hands,and there would be no prospect of supplyingGerman machinery and equipment. It wouldbe an irreparable mistake if German capi-tal, while sharing in Moroccan miningenterprises, were to leave the technicalmanagement in French hands, just as ithas been left in English hands in theTransvaal. The German engineering indus-try would not benefit from such an exploi-tation of the Mannesmann mines, andGerman capital participation would onlybenefit the French engineering industry.On the other hand, German industry wouldbenefit immensely if even only a compar-atively small part of the Moroccan mineswere under German technical management”.(Quoted from pp. 288-89.) | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | good exampleof the role,significanceand policy of financecapital | | | | |
“The Campaign Against the French Big Banks”, p. 236 et seq.
| | | Articles by Lysis (at first in La Grande Revue,1906). | | - | ------------------------------------------------------- |
| The book by his supporter, Jules Domergue, TheQuestion of Credit Societies.A reply to Lysis—Testis, The Role of CreditInstitutions in France, 1907, a book (articles in Revue politique et parlementaire). | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | |
A superficial appraisal: Lysis exaggerates but, basically, is correct. The rentier state= France. Capital flows from a country with a low rate of interest into countries with a high rate of interest. Lysis, his critic alleges, is not an expert, etc.
| According to Lysis, the banks charge up to 7 percent as commission on the sale of foreign securities!!! | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | | | 7%!!! | | | | | | | |
(1910, 2) p. 1200: from data of the American National Monetary Commission.
Statistics of Deposits and Savings
| N.B. | Great Britain (£ million) | France (million francs) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank deposits | Savings- bank deposits | Bank deposits | Savings- bank deposits | |||||
| 1880 | 425 | 8.4 | 78 | 1.6 | ? | ? | 1,280 | 0.9 |
| 1888 | 624 | 12.4 | 105 | 2.0 | 1,923 | 1.5 | 2,762 | 2.1 |
| 1908 | 1,160 | 23.2 | 212 | 4.2 | 4,703 | 3.7 | 5,226 | 4.2 |
| (My) total | ||||||||
| Germany | Thousand millionmarks | |||||||
| Bank deposits | Deposits in credit societies | Savings- bank deposits | Britain | France | Germany | |||
| 1880 | 529 | 364 | 2,614 | 10.0 | ? | 3.5 | ||
| 1888 | 1,142 | 425 | 4,550 | 14.4 | 3.7 | 6.0 | ||
| 1908 | 7,067 | 2,207 | 13,889 | 27.4 | 7.9 | 23.1 |
And the editors remark that this “apparent” national wealth should not be identified with the national wealth in general.
From a note on the financier Eduard Engel, who died in November 1910:
| careerof bankdirectors | | | “Many Berlin directors only obtained theirposts because their creditors saw no otherway of saving their money except by launch-ing the debtor on a career. While secretlycursing him for his frivolity, in public theypraised his diligence—in their own well-understood business interests” (1202-03). | | ---------------------- | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
Die Bank, 1909, 1, p. 79. A note: “The Pull of the Bank”—government officials become directors of banks (Waldemar Muller, von Klitzing, Helfferich, Schönfeld) and in industry (Völker, Budde)....
“How about the integrity of a state official, whose secret longing is for a cosy niche in the Behrenstrasse [the Deutsche Bank]?”[9] (79).
p. 301 et seq. Alfred Lansburgh, “The Economic Importance of Byzantinism”—an ardent little article (petty bourgeois sentimentality) against the plutocracy’s connection with the Kaiser, etc.
| wellput! | | | “We recall the journey to Palestine and theimmediate result of this journey, the construc-tion of the Baghdad railway, that fatal ‘greatproduct of German enterprise’, which ismore responsible for the ‘encirclement’ thanall our political blunders put together”[10] (307). | | -------- | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
Ludwig Eschwege, “Revolutionising Tendencies in the German _Iron Industry_”.
| technicalrevolutionin theironindustry | | | The main centre in Germany for ore extrac-tion and iron has shifted from the Rhine-Westphalian area to Lorraine-Luxemburg (inthe South-West). The rich phosphate ore(the Minette ore of Luxemburg and Lorraine)was previously of no value. It has becomeexcellent owing to (1) the Thomas method;(2) electro-steel (electro-rods: 15 years’ guar-antee against 9 years previously). Ores inLuxemburg-Lorraine amount to 2,000 mil-lion tons (enough for 200 years at the pres-ent rate of German consumption) (pp. 316-17) | | ------------------------------------- | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | |
A. Lansburgh, “How Great Is the German National Wealth?”, p. 319 et seq.
| A criticism of the well-known book bySteinmann-Bücher and his estimate: 350 thou-sand million marks (190-200—Lexis andSchmoller; Great Britain—250-300, France—200-225). The chief component figure givenby Steinmann-Bücher (a) = 180 thousandmillion of “private property in real andpersonal estate”—two or three times(p. 324) the real amount, for he (_Ballod_p. 322), too, overlooked this!!) took insurancepolicies (162.6 thousand million, rounded offto 180!!), whereas insurance is always at thevalue replacement would cost, and not thereal value. “They made the same mistake as thesecond-hand dealer who in taking stock listedold furniture and clothing at the price ofnew” (325). And a number of other mistakesof Steinmann-Bücher!!! | |
|---|---|
Ludwig Eschwege, “Cement”, 115 et seq. (1909, 1).
| | A strongly cartelised industry. Monopolyprices (_cost of production 180_marks per carload, sale price 280 marks!!,230 marks!!). Sale price with delivery _400_marks per carload!! Profits yield 12-16 percent dividend. Every effort is made to elimi-nate competition: false reports of the badsituation in the industry, anonymous noticesin the press (capitalists, beware of invest-ing your money in cement facto-ries!!); buying up of “_outsiders_” (examples:60,000-80,000-150,000 marks in “compensation”:p.125). Cartels by regions: South German, UpperSilesian, Central German, Hanoverian, Rhine-Westphalian, North German and Lower Elbesyndicates.[11] | | | how do thesyndicatesoperate? | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | ---------------------------- | | | | | | |
Die Bank, 1909, 2. Articles by Eugen Kaufmann on French banks. Three big banks—Crédit Lyonnais, Comptoir National, Société Génerale.
| N.B.incomes ofdirectorsand boardmembers | | | For all three: 1908—749.1 million francs(capital + reserves) and 4,058 million de-posits (in general, borrowed money).Number of members of the board of manage-ment (administrative councils) 13-15-17. Theirincome 500,000-750,000 (!!) francs(Crédit Lyonnais) (p. 851). | | --------------------------------------- | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| | | | Crédit Lyonnais has a “_FinancialResearch Service_” with >50 per-sons (engineers, economists, lawyers, statis-ticians, etc.)—costing 0.6-0.7 million francsannually (it studies industrial enterprises,railways, etc., of various countries, collectsinformation, and so on). The service is dividedinto eight departments: 1) industry; 2) railwayand steamship companies; 3) general statis-tics; 4) information on securities; 5) financialreports, etc. Cuttings from financial news-papers and journals of the whole world, andso on and so forth.[12] | | | | ----------------- | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | | | | | | | | | “researchservice” | | | | | | | | | | |
The number of branches (in France) (1908) (p. 857):
| | Paris and region | | Provinces | | Total | Abroad | | | ------------------------ | ----------------------- | --------- | --------- | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------- | | French big banks | Crédit Lyonnais . . . . | 53 | 192 | 245 | 22 | (mostly in thecolonies)(p. 954) | | Comptoir National . . . | 51 | 140 | 191 | 23 | | | | Société Générale . . . . | 89 | 636 | 725 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 193 | 968 | 1,161 | 47 Σ mine | | | |
The Société Générale figure includes 222mobile branches in the provinces (open once or twice a week on market days).
Employees boys (grooms) ages 13-16—30-40 francs per month; lower-grade office workers, above 16-60 francs per month. Then up to 2,000-2,400 francs annually. Departmental heads in the Crédit Lyonnais—up to 40,000 francs annually.
Number of employees
| Crédit Lyonnais | up to | 5,000 |
|---|---|---|
| Comptoir National | 4,000 | |
| (including Paris | 2,500) | |
| Socidté Générale | 7,000 | |
| (including Paris | 1,000) | |
| of whom 300-400 women. |
| p. 1101 (1909, 2). A note on the Bagh-dad railway “friction” with GreatBritain, etc.: 500 million of German moneyin an unknown country, and friction withGreat Britain and France; is not worth thebones of a single grenadier, is a “fataladventure”, etc. etc. | | | | | | Baghdadrailway | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | | | ------------------------- | | -------------- | | | | | | | attitude tocolonialpolicy | | |
p. 799. A note: “Banking in Occupational Statistics”.
| | (No. of women in brackets) | | | | | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------ | ----- | ------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------ | | | | 1882 | | 1895 | | 1907 | banks,their economic structure | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (Headings) | | | | | | | | (1 and 2) bankers,bank directors,etc . . . . . . . | 6,896 | (148) | 7,719 | (195) | 11,070 | (185) | | (3) bank (and sav-ings bank)employees . . . . | 12,779 | (95) | 23,644 | (444) | 50,332 | (2,728) | | (4 and 5) appren-tices, watchmen,members offamilies, work-ing part time,etc. . . . . | 6,207 | (56) | 5,268 | (170) | 9,275 | (382) | | Σ= | 25,882 | (299) | 36,631 | (809) | 70,677 | (3,295) | | No. of (3) per 100(of 1 and 2)[employees per100 bosses] . . | 182.6 | 304.8 | 471.4 | | | |
Alfred Lansburgh, “German Capital Abroad”, p. 819 et seq. Die Bank, 1909, 2.
| _N.B.Kautsky_N.B. | The author tries to prove Kautsky’s favourite argument that trade develops better with independent countries.[13] | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1889 | 1908 | Per cent in- crease | |||
| “Debtor coun- tries”(of Ger-many) | Rumania . . | 48.2 | 70.8 | + | 47 |
| Portugal . . | 19.0 | 32.8 | + | 73 | |
| Argentina | 60.7 | 147.0 | + | 143 | |
| Brazil . . . | 48.7 | 84.5 | + | 73 | |
| Chile . . . . | 28.3 | 52.4 | + | 85 | |
| Turkey . . . | 29.9 | 64.0 | + | 114 |
| authordoes_not_ givethesetotals | ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩ | ——————— | Σ = | 234.8 | 451.5 | + | 92 | % | ← | ⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| financial-ly inde-pendentcountries | Great Britain | 651.8 | 997.4 | 53 | ||||||
| France | 210.2 | 437.9 | 108 | |||||||
| Belgium | 137.2 | 322.8 | 135 | |||||||
| Switzerland | 177.4 | 401.1 | 127 | |||||||
| Australia | 21.2 | 64.5 | 205 | |||||||
| Dutch Indies | 8.8 | 40.7 | 363 | |||||||
| ——————— | Σ = | 1,206.6 | 2,264.4 | + | 87 | % | ← |
The author draws the conclusion:
| cf. Kautsky(andSpectator) | | | | “This much is certain; it is a gross errorto regard foreign capital investment, inwhatever form, as a specially effectiveforce in favour of German products, toregard it as the pioneer of German trade”(828). | | ------------------------- | | | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| | (The author did not sum up the results,which refute him!!)He is refuted even more emphaticallyby the concrete data he himself cites onthe relationship between loans and exports(Pp. 826 and 827)[14]:“In 1890-91, a Rumanian loan wasfloated through the German banks, whichhad already in previous years made ad-vances on this loan. It was used chiefly topurchase railway materials in Germany.In 1901,[15] German exports to Rumaniaamounted to 55 million marks. The follow-ing year they dropped to 39.4 millionmarks and, with fluctuations, to 25.4 mil-lion in 1900. Only in very recent yearshave they regained the level of 1891,thanks to two new loans.“German exports to Portugal rose, follow-ing the loans of 1888-89, to 21,100,000(1890); then, in the two following years,they dropped to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000and regained their former level only in1903.“The figures of German trade with Argen-tina are still more striking. Loans werefloated in 1888 and 1890; German exportsto Argentina reached 60,700,000 marks(1889). Two years later they amountedto only 18,600,000 marks, less than one-third of the previous figure. It was notuntil 1901 that they regained and surpassedthe level of 1889, and then only as a resultof new loans floated by the state and bymunicipalities, with advances to buildpower stations, and with other creditoperations.“Exports to Chile, as a consequence of theloan of 1889, rose to 45,200,000 marks(in 1892), and a year later dropped to22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loanfloated by the German banks in 1906was followed by a rise of exports to84,700,000 marks in 1907, only to fallagain to 52,400,000 marks in 1908.” | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | --------------------------------- | | | | | | | this especiallyN.B.!!Myaddition:Years ofloans: | | | | | | | 1890-91??1888-8918881890?18891906 |
| | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | Strange that the author should not see how these facts refute him: the rise in exports occurs precisely _after_the loans and in consequence (infolge) ofthem. | | | | | |
| | Lansburgh’s petty-bourgeois standpoint:“And German industry would profit [ifthe exported capital remained at home]not only in amount but in distribution.Capital would be distributed freely overmany branches of industry, would flowalong numerous channels, whereas fromabroad, as experience has shown, it flowsinto the order books of a few privilegedfirms which, in addition, have to pay dearlyfor their privileges. Krupp could telus a thing or two about how many millionsin expenses, known as baksheesh or bysome other name, have to be paid to supportGerman credit activity abroad. Yet thedistribution of capital, which hasto cover as many branches of industry aspossible, is of prime importance for thewhole industrial development of Germany”(824-25).... “Production that in this wayconstantly regenerates itself by its ownforces [by the investment of capital withinthe country] guarantees continued har-monious development”[16] (p. 825). | | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | !! | | | | | | | | | | gem!!he has“persuaded”Krupp!!! | | | | | “natural”!!ha-ha | | | | | | | | | | “harmony” | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | The export of capital does not produce stable tradeconnections: the author tries to prove this by the exam-ples (pp. 826-27), cited by me above: pp. 101-02 of thisnotebook[17] | | | | | |
| A. Lansburgh, “_Trends in theModern Enterprise_” (“Two books”),p. 1043 et seq. A short review of Levy’s Monopolies and Trusts and Liefmann’s Financial and Industrial Companies. Lans-burgh says, rightly, that both are one-sided: Levy’s accent is on the _technical_strength of concentration, Liefmann’s onthe strength of financial (oligarchic) oppres-sion. | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | ----------------------- | | | | | Levyversus Liefmann |
| | “The growing role of stocks and securities(“Effektifizierung”) in industry vastly in-creases the scale of production, reduces thenumber of independent producers andmakes it easier for the few—if theyare not prepared to be bought up by somegiant trust—to unite in order to suppressall newly-arising competition. Though thatpoint is made neither by Liefmann norLevy, it clearly emerges from both books.This might, perhaps, prompt someone towrite a book that is urgently needed:a book that describes how a security-manipulating oligarchy has wrested con-trol of the republic’s economic life” (1051-52). | | | | | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Sometimes the development is through concentration to cartels (Levy has shown this particularly clearly). But not always. “Substitution of securities” can lead at one stroke to a trust, e.g., “in colonial railway construction”.... Technical concentration is progressive as regards technique; financial concentration can strengthen, and does strengthen, the omnipotence of monopoly capital alongside backward technique.
Notes
[1] See pp. 89-90 of this volume.—Ed.
[2] See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 249-50.—Ed.
[3] Ibid., pp. 250-51.—Ed.
[4] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 286.—Ed.
[5] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 219.—Ed.
[6] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 278.—Ed.
[7] In the first column the figures are for the years mentioned, in the following columns for 1890 and 1910.—Ed.
[8] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 212.—Ed.
[9] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 237.—Ed.
[10] Ibid.—Ed.
[11] See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 207-08.—Ed.
[12] Ibid., pp. 222-23.—Ed.
[13] See present edition, Vol. 22. p. 291.—Ed.
[14] Ibid., pp. 291-92.—Ed.
[15] Lansburgh’s mistake; should be 1891.—Ed.
[16] See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 292.—Ed.
[17] See pp. 192-94 of this volume.—Ed.
[18] The figures on German iron output, written by Lenin in the margin, are from a table in the January 1911 issue of Die Bank (p. 95), in an item headed: “Iron and Steel Industry after 100 Years”. Lenin quotes part of the table on p. 184 of this volume, under the heading “Recent Statistics on the Iron Industry”. p. 183
[19] The data on the relations between finance capital and the governments, and Lenin’s comments on them, were further developed in Imperialism, and other writings. Lenin showed that the development of monopoly and finance capital inevitably leads to a small group of industrial and financial magnates—a financial oligarchy—playing a decisive part in the economy and politics of the capitalist countries, the bourgeois state, too, being wholly subordinated to it. The monopolies subordinate and use the state machine by putting representatives of the government on their boards of directors and by having their own representatives enter capitalist governments. This has become a regular practice. In the U.S.A., for example, all the top government posts are held by men representing the main financial groups of Morgan, Rockefeller, etc. p. 183