Boris S . Solozhenkin | First Moscow Medical State University (original) (raw)
Papers by Boris S . Solozhenkin
From the World of Perception to the Phenomenology of Faculties // От мира восприятия к феноменологии способностей, 2024
«Феноменология восприятия» Мерло-Понти содержит посылку о восприятии как о первичном уровне данно... more «Феноменология восприятия» Мерло-Понти содержит посылку о восприятии как о первичном уровне данности мира. Восприятие предстает как всегда незавершенный синтез множественного, сводящий вместе телесные и вещественные аспекты. Такая наиболее простая трактовка восприятия как некого общего установления контакта внутри диады «тело-мир» есть предварительная аксиома для объяснения дальнейшего процесса смыслообразования. При этом теоретические искания Мерло-Понти явно предполагают большее, и восприятие мыслится им также и окончательной точкой поисков смысла этого контакта. Тем самым в Феноменологии различима и вторая трактовка восприятия как наделяющего смыслом, работающего в связке с дорефлексивным когито. Мерло-Понти предполагает, что эти трактовки совместимы друг с другом, однако переход между ними представляется действительно проблемным. В данной работе автор показывает, что предел изначального синтеза восприятия-некоторый смысл воспринятого («эта лошадь», «зеленая густота, которая неслась навстречу»)-недостижим изнутри самого восприятия и только его силами. Оно само опосредовано другими способностями, такими как память, рефлексия, и воображение. Необходимость этого аргументируется несколькими способами; отношения в паре восприятие-воображение представляют наиболее характерный случай, где Мерло-Понти, если судить по более поздним работам, сам подходит близко к признанию ограниченности гипотезы «мира восприятия», к необходимости феноменологической разработки темы способностей. Исходя из применения феноменологического метода и анализа концептуальных построений Мерло-Понти, можно заключить следующее: «Мир восприятия»-не существует, но возможна (и необходима!) феноменология способностей.
Merleau-Ponty's «Phenomenology of Perception» suggests perception to be the primary level of the giveness of the world. Perception appears as always an incomplete synthesis of the plural, bringing together bodily and material aspects. Such the simplest interpretation of perception as rendering a contact within the dyad «body-world» is a preliminary axiom for explaining the rest of the process of noematic sense formation. At the
same time, Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical intuitions clearly presuppose more, and perception is also thought of as the final point where sense is already given by some way. Thus, in Phenomenology, the second interpretation of perception presumes it to be sense-giving accompanied by the tacit cogito. Merleau-Ponty suggests that these interpretations are compatible with each other, but the transition between them seems really problematic. In the research author shos that the limit of the initial synthesis of perception — some sense of the perceived (exemplyfing meanings as «this horse», «the green density that rushed towards me») — is unattainable from within perception itself and by its means. Perception is itself
mediated by other faculties, such as memory, reflection, and imagination. Argumentation for this thesis is carried out in several ways; the relations in the perception/imagination pair show us the most characteristic case, where Merleau-Ponty, judging by later works, himself comes close to recognizing the limitations of the hypothesis of «the world of perception», to the need for a phenomenological development of the topic of faculties. Based on the application of the phenomenological method and the analysis of the conceptual constructions of Merleau-Ponty, we can conclude the following: «the world of perception» does not exist, but the
phenomenology of faculties is demanded.
Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология, 2020
Journal international de bioéthique et d'éthique des sciences
Quelle est la valeur de la confidentialité ? La société russe a été confrontée à cette question e... more Quelle est la valeur de la confidentialité ? La société russe a été confrontée à cette question en 2020, lorsque les mineurs âgés de 15 à 18 ans ont perdu leur droit à la vie privée. L’amendement à la loi fédérale, à l’origine de cette situation, a été reçu de manière ambiguë, mais a rapidement cessé d’être le sujet de discussion publique. Dans mon article, j’étudie cet événement dans un contexte bioéthique, en considérant les thèmes de la vie privée, de l’autonomie et de la relativité. La discussion sociale n’a pas été productive, car les arguments des deux parties contenaient un argument à double tranchant : selon les relations existantes dans une famille, l’amendement aura une signification positive ou négative. En soulignant toutes les faiblesses de ce déplacement de l’accent sur les relations (ce qui implique également l’inutilité du concept d’autonomie relationnelle ici), je désigne un véritable problème. Une situation conflictuelle s’est développée tant au niveau des principe...
Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies
The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity in bioethics, ... more The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity in bioethics, starting from the level assumed by the prevailing model of personal autonomy up to the cosmopolitan dimension innate to the global model proposed by Van Rensselaer Potter. In the article, autonomy is considered in the more general context of the individualization of Western societies. It is revealed that autonomy is inherently dependent on the idea of human well-being and the values of individualism and therefore it can be reduced to individual decisions. This devaluation of personal autonomy finds justifiable criticism among bioethicists. The concept of the subject is restored in the frame of the substantive model of autonomy indicating the inextricable connection of a choice and a common personal perspective. Such an individualistic approach to the subject is initially limited. Being concentrated on the behavior of a rational individual, the approach localizes all relevant ethical case...
Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University (Philosophical science), 2016
Аннотация. В представленной статье рассматриваются два подхода к сознанию: 1) �� �ен� �� �ен� �� ... more Аннотация. В представленной статье рассматриваются два подхода к сознанию: 1) �� �ен� �� �ен� �� �ен� �ен� �ен� нета-демонстрирующий избыточность термина сознание по отношению к результатам нейрофизиологических экспериментов, и 2) �� Серля, который как раз усматривает он� тологическую необходимость сознательного слоя опыта� �елаются выводы о концепте самосознания, исходя из теоретических посылок авторов, указывается на этический и социальный смыслы самосознания как дальнейшее развитие «диалога» двух концепту� альных позиций авторов� Ключевые слова: сознание, самосознание, субъект, ментальное, качества (квалиа)�
International Journal of Engineering and Advanced Technology, 2019
Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelia... more Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelian model, which captures the two-sided and fundamentally changeable nature of the relationship between subject and object. The article substantiates the idea that imagination, being considered outside of the context of psychologization or reduction of it only to the reproductive aspect, is a source of binary differences fundamental to philosophical thought. Following Hegel’s dialectical method, the authors note that the presence of the image already indicates the difference between the two dimensions of consciousness and knowledge. The image expresses the primary truth of substance and, at the same time, the way it is subjectively given. There is a differentiation of the subjective moment of Being with the realization of fantasy. All formations of Spirit are interpretations of the figurative series, primal scenes, the analog of which was studied by classical psychoanalysis. From this pers...
WISDOM
How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical resp... more How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical response to D. F. Verene’s account of the idea of the Whole, which is speculative and necessary for true philosophy. As this study shows, the idea in its essence depends upon two main criteria, ontological and epistemological. Both criteria perfectly demonstrate the logic of supplementation, which undermines the original conception. We argue that the speculative Whole has to be revisited. First, the only possibility to provide the connection between the idea of the Whole and self-knowledge in a consistent way could be given through the idea of holistic living. Secondly, the Whole must be thought virtual: that allows the Whole to exist in a variety of drafts, exclusive of the one true. Both our theoretical gestures result in a significant convergence of the concepts of the Whole and Becoming.
HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT OPERATOR AND NON-REDUCED IDENTITY:D. DENNETT AND D. SEARLE ON CONSCIOUSNESS, 2016
The article deals with two approaches to consciousness: D. Dennet’s reductive theorywhich demonst... more The article deals with two approaches to consciousness: D. Dennet’s reductive theorywhich demonstrates excessiveness of the term ‘consciousness’ to the results of neurophysiological research and the opposite one – Searle’s theory which considers conscious layer ofexperience as ontologically indespensable Proceeding from the authors’ theoretical premisesa conclusion is made that self-consciousness possesses both ethical and social meanings andmay be considered as a further development of the two critical views.
В представленной статье рассматриваются два подхода к сознанию: 1) Д. Деннета – демонстрирующий избыточность термина сознание по отношению к результатам нейрофизиологических экспериментов, и 2) Д. Серля, который как раз усматривает онтологическую необходимость сознательного слоя опыта. Делаются выводы о концепте самосознания, исходя из теоретических посылок авторов, указывается на этический и социальный смыслы самосознания как дальнейшее развитие «диалога» двух концептуальных позиций авторов.
Is Imagination Fundamental? on the Issue of theGenesis of Subjectivity, 2019
Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelia... more Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelian model, which captures the two-sided and fundamentally changeable nature of the relationship between subject and object. The article substantiates the idea that imagination, being considered outside of the context of psychologization or reduction of it only to the reproductive aspect, is a source of binary differences fundamental to philosophical thought. Following Hegel's dialectical method, the authors note that the presence of the image already indicates the difference between the two dimensions of consciousness and knowledge. The image expresses the primary truth of substance and, at the same time, the way it is subjectively given. There is a differentiation of the subjective moment of Being with the realization of fantasy. All formations of Spirit are interpretations of the figurative series, primal scenes, the analog of which was studied by classical psychoanalysis. From this perspective, the genesis of such subjective modes as consciousness, self-consciousness and mind inevitably includes symbolization, interpretation of the "Self" images, cognizing, willing and acting in various situations and contexts. The study of the concepts developed by Hegel, Kennouche, Verene and Merleau-Ponty allows concluding about two arguments in favor of the fundamentality of imagination. This refers, on the one hand, to subjective imagination that generates meanings and the need for their interpretation and, on the other hand, to the initial form of synthesis, on the basis of which, the subject and object of cognition, formations of consciousness and types of knowledge characteristic of them are further distinguished. The image, being the first meeting of the concrete and universal, is capable of setting the plot of one or another form of subjectivity.
AUTONOMY OF MINORS QUESTIONED: RUSSIAN CASE WITH THE LOSS OF MEDICAL SECRECY, 2023
What is the value of confidentiality? Russian society faced this issue in 2020, when minors aged ... more What is the value of confidentiality? Russian society faced this issue in 2020, when minors aged 15 to 18 lost their privacy. The amendment to the Federal Law, caused the situation, was received ambiguously, but quickly ceased to be the subject of public discussion. In my article, I study this event in a bioethical context, considering the topics of privacy, autonomy and relativity. Social discussion was not productive, since the arguments of both sides contained a double-edged argument: depending on existing relations in a family, the amendment will have a positive or negative meaning. By pointing out all the weaknesses of this shift in emphasis to relationships (that also implies the uselessness of the concept of relational autonomy here), I designate a real problem. A conflict situation has evolved both within bioethical principles and within the single principle – respect for autonomy. Due to the lack of confidentiality, the opportunity to act according to one’s own personal plan, presupposed by informed consent, is devalued. Autonomy turns out to be incomplete, twofold: it exists only for onetime decisions, and it is not in the long-term perspective because of a possibility of interference by others (parents, guardians) in this decision-making process. Since such criteria of autonomous action as intentionality and noncontrol may be violated, the autonomy of minors becomes contradictory. To avoid this, the autonomy should be either established as partial, or, by insisting on the return of confidentiality back to minors of the specified age, restored as full. Partial autonomy is a paradox, and a teenager should be endowed with what I call, considering the age criteria, the “presumption of autonomy”. If we do not give up autonomy completely, then we must restore its context consistently and non-contradictory: the ability of minors of this age category to make medically significant decisions requires the restoration of confidentiality and vice versa. Additionally, I investigate privacy’s impact on confidentiality: in Russian bioethics and medical practice, privacy is not considered as a source of other rights, the initial principle organizing the discourse.
Transformation of the subject in bioethics: From an autonomous person to cosmopolitan, 2020
The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity ... more The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity in bio-ethics, starting from the level assumed by the prevailing model of personal autonomy up to the cosmopolitan dimension innate to the global model proposed by Van Rensselaer Potter. In the article, autonomy is considered in the more general context of the individu-alization of Western societies. It is revealed that autonomy is inherently dependent on the idea of human well-being and the values of individualism and therefore it can be reduced to individual decisions. This devaluation of personal autonomy finds justifiable criticism among bioethicists. The concept of the subject is restored in the frame of the substantive model of autonomy indicating the inextricable connection of a choice and a common per-sonal perspective. Such an individualistic approach to the subject is initially limited. Being concentrated on the behavior of a rational individual, the approach localizes all relevant ethical cases. In the modern world, global problem intersect with each other they cease to be noticed and moreover become intimatized due to their individualistic description. This approach to the subject is thus inadequate and needs to be replaced. For this purpose, the difference between the two traditions within bioethics must be overcome: an autonomous person and cosmopolitan remain the two significant models of subjectivity, and the bridge between them has never been built. The article explores the possibility of such a transition to a cosmopolitan position on the classic example from The Phenomenology of Spirit. It can be concluded that the current position of the theory of the subject is tenuous on both flanks of bioethics. When it loses the message of subjectivity and becomes a servant of the technological approach, we get just another version of medical ethics and lose the long-term perspective appropriate for the cosmopolitan world.
Цель данной статьи — проследить развитие идеи субъективности в биоэтике, на-чиная с уровня, предполагаемого господствующей моделью автономной личности, к которой отсылают “Principles of Biomedical Ethics”, вплоть до космополитического измерения, свойственного глобальной модели, предложенной В. Р. Поттером. Авто-номия рассматривается в более общем контексте произошедшей индивидуализации западных обществ; она является как констатацией этого факта, так и определенным требованием абсолютной свободы. Обозначенная в качестве первого биоэтического принципа, автономия оказывается по своей сути зависимой от идеи благосостояния человека и ценностей индивидуализма. В условиях постмодернового общества она может быть редуцирована до отдельно взятых решений. Это обесценивание личност-ной автономии находит вполне оправданную критику среди биоэтиков. Идея субъ-екта восстанавливается сторонниками субстантивной модели автономии, указываю-щей на неразрывную связь того или иного выбора и общей личностной перспективы. В статье показано, что подобный подход к субъекту изначально ограничен, факти-чески речь идет о разумном индивиде и локальном видении ситуации. В современ-ном мире глобальные проблемы пересекаются друг с другом и перестают замечаться, интимизируются при индивидуалистическом способе их описания. Последний тем самым не является адекватным и нуждается в замене. Трудность в том, что для этого должно быть преодолено различие внутри самой биоэтики между двумя традиция-ми: автономная личность и космополит остаются двумя значимыми моделями субъ-ективности, мост между которыми так и не был построен. В данной статье изучается возможность такого перехода к космополитической позиции на классическом при-мере из «Феноменологии духа». Как можно заключить, теории субъекта приходится непросто на обоих флангах биоэтики; как только последняя теряет посыл субъек-тивности и становится служанкой технологического подхода, мы получаем еще одну версию медицинской этики и теряем долгосрочную перспективу, соответствующую космополитическому миру.
SPECULATIVE WHOLE REVISED, 2023
How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical resp... more How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical response to D. F. Verene"s account of the idea of the Whole, which is speculative and necessary for true philosophy. As this study shows, the idea in its essence depends upon two main criteria, ontological and epistemological. Both criteria perfectly demonstrate the logic of supplementation, which undermines the original conception. We argue that the speculative Whole has to be revisited. First, the only possibility to provide the connection between the idea of the Whole and self-knowledge in a consistent way could be given through the idea of holistic living. Secondly, the Whole must be thought virtual: that allows the Whole to exist in a variety of drafts, exclusive of the one true. Both our theoretical gestures result in a significant convergence of the concepts of the Whole and Becoming.
From the World of Perception to the Phenomenology of Faculties // От мира восприятия к феноменологии способностей, 2024
«Феноменология восприятия» Мерло-Понти содержит посылку о восприятии как о первичном уровне данно... more «Феноменология восприятия» Мерло-Понти содержит посылку о восприятии как о первичном уровне данности мира. Восприятие предстает как всегда незавершенный синтез множественного, сводящий вместе телесные и вещественные аспекты. Такая наиболее простая трактовка восприятия как некого общего установления контакта внутри диады «тело-мир» есть предварительная аксиома для объяснения дальнейшего процесса смыслообразования. При этом теоретические искания Мерло-Понти явно предполагают большее, и восприятие мыслится им также и окончательной точкой поисков смысла этого контакта. Тем самым в Феноменологии различима и вторая трактовка восприятия как наделяющего смыслом, работающего в связке с дорефлексивным когито. Мерло-Понти предполагает, что эти трактовки совместимы друг с другом, однако переход между ними представляется действительно проблемным. В данной работе автор показывает, что предел изначального синтеза восприятия-некоторый смысл воспринятого («эта лошадь», «зеленая густота, которая неслась навстречу»)-недостижим изнутри самого восприятия и только его силами. Оно само опосредовано другими способностями, такими как память, рефлексия, и воображение. Необходимость этого аргументируется несколькими способами; отношения в паре восприятие-воображение представляют наиболее характерный случай, где Мерло-Понти, если судить по более поздним работам, сам подходит близко к признанию ограниченности гипотезы «мира восприятия», к необходимости феноменологической разработки темы способностей. Исходя из применения феноменологического метода и анализа концептуальных построений Мерло-Понти, можно заключить следующее: «Мир восприятия»-не существует, но возможна (и необходима!) феноменология способностей.
Merleau-Ponty's «Phenomenology of Perception» suggests perception to be the primary level of the giveness of the world. Perception appears as always an incomplete synthesis of the plural, bringing together bodily and material aspects. Such the simplest interpretation of perception as rendering a contact within the dyad «body-world» is a preliminary axiom for explaining the rest of the process of noematic sense formation. At the
same time, Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical intuitions clearly presuppose more, and perception is also thought of as the final point where sense is already given by some way. Thus, in Phenomenology, the second interpretation of perception presumes it to be sense-giving accompanied by the tacit cogito. Merleau-Ponty suggests that these interpretations are compatible with each other, but the transition between them seems really problematic. In the research author shos that the limit of the initial synthesis of perception — some sense of the perceived (exemplyfing meanings as «this horse», «the green density that rushed towards me») — is unattainable from within perception itself and by its means. Perception is itself
mediated by other faculties, such as memory, reflection, and imagination. Argumentation for this thesis is carried out in several ways; the relations in the perception/imagination pair show us the most characteristic case, where Merleau-Ponty, judging by later works, himself comes close to recognizing the limitations of the hypothesis of «the world of perception», to the need for a phenomenological development of the topic of faculties. Based on the application of the phenomenological method and the analysis of the conceptual constructions of Merleau-Ponty, we can conclude the following: «the world of perception» does not exist, but the
phenomenology of faculties is demanded.
Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология, 2020
Journal international de bioéthique et d'éthique des sciences
Quelle est la valeur de la confidentialité ? La société russe a été confrontée à cette question e... more Quelle est la valeur de la confidentialité ? La société russe a été confrontée à cette question en 2020, lorsque les mineurs âgés de 15 à 18 ans ont perdu leur droit à la vie privée. L’amendement à la loi fédérale, à l’origine de cette situation, a été reçu de manière ambiguë, mais a rapidement cessé d’être le sujet de discussion publique. Dans mon article, j’étudie cet événement dans un contexte bioéthique, en considérant les thèmes de la vie privée, de l’autonomie et de la relativité. La discussion sociale n’a pas été productive, car les arguments des deux parties contenaient un argument à double tranchant : selon les relations existantes dans une famille, l’amendement aura une signification positive ou négative. En soulignant toutes les faiblesses de ce déplacement de l’accent sur les relations (ce qui implique également l’inutilité du concept d’autonomie relationnelle ici), je désigne un véritable problème. Une situation conflictuelle s’est développée tant au niveau des principe...
Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies
The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity in bioethics, ... more The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity in bioethics, starting from the level assumed by the prevailing model of personal autonomy up to the cosmopolitan dimension innate to the global model proposed by Van Rensselaer Potter. In the article, autonomy is considered in the more general context of the individualization of Western societies. It is revealed that autonomy is inherently dependent on the idea of human well-being and the values of individualism and therefore it can be reduced to individual decisions. This devaluation of personal autonomy finds justifiable criticism among bioethicists. The concept of the subject is restored in the frame of the substantive model of autonomy indicating the inextricable connection of a choice and a common personal perspective. Such an individualistic approach to the subject is initially limited. Being concentrated on the behavior of a rational individual, the approach localizes all relevant ethical case...
Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University (Philosophical science), 2016
Аннотация. В представленной статье рассматриваются два подхода к сознанию: 1) �� �ен� �� �ен� �� ... more Аннотация. В представленной статье рассматриваются два подхода к сознанию: 1) �� �ен� �� �ен� �� �ен� �ен� �ен� нета-демонстрирующий избыточность термина сознание по отношению к результатам нейрофизиологических экспериментов, и 2) �� Серля, который как раз усматривает он� тологическую необходимость сознательного слоя опыта� �елаются выводы о концепте самосознания, исходя из теоретических посылок авторов, указывается на этический и социальный смыслы самосознания как дальнейшее развитие «диалога» двух концепту� альных позиций авторов� Ключевые слова: сознание, самосознание, субъект, ментальное, качества (квалиа)�
International Journal of Engineering and Advanced Technology, 2019
Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelia... more Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelian model, which captures the two-sided and fundamentally changeable nature of the relationship between subject and object. The article substantiates the idea that imagination, being considered outside of the context of psychologization or reduction of it only to the reproductive aspect, is a source of binary differences fundamental to philosophical thought. Following Hegel’s dialectical method, the authors note that the presence of the image already indicates the difference between the two dimensions of consciousness and knowledge. The image expresses the primary truth of substance and, at the same time, the way it is subjectively given. There is a differentiation of the subjective moment of Being with the realization of fantasy. All formations of Spirit are interpretations of the figurative series, primal scenes, the analog of which was studied by classical psychoanalysis. From this pers...
WISDOM
How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical resp... more How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical response to D. F. Verene’s account of the idea of the Whole, which is speculative and necessary for true philosophy. As this study shows, the idea in its essence depends upon two main criteria, ontological and epistemological. Both criteria perfectly demonstrate the logic of supplementation, which undermines the original conception. We argue that the speculative Whole has to be revisited. First, the only possibility to provide the connection between the idea of the Whole and self-knowledge in a consistent way could be given through the idea of holistic living. Secondly, the Whole must be thought virtual: that allows the Whole to exist in a variety of drafts, exclusive of the one true. Both our theoretical gestures result in a significant convergence of the concepts of the Whole and Becoming.
HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT OPERATOR AND NON-REDUCED IDENTITY:D. DENNETT AND D. SEARLE ON CONSCIOUSNESS, 2016
The article deals with two approaches to consciousness: D. Dennet’s reductive theorywhich demonst... more The article deals with two approaches to consciousness: D. Dennet’s reductive theorywhich demonstrates excessiveness of the term ‘consciousness’ to the results of neurophysiological research and the opposite one – Searle’s theory which considers conscious layer ofexperience as ontologically indespensable Proceeding from the authors’ theoretical premisesa conclusion is made that self-consciousness possesses both ethical and social meanings andmay be considered as a further development of the two critical views.
В представленной статье рассматриваются два подхода к сознанию: 1) Д. Деннета – демонстрирующий избыточность термина сознание по отношению к результатам нейрофизиологических экспериментов, и 2) Д. Серля, который как раз усматривает онтологическую необходимость сознательного слоя опыта. Делаются выводы о концепте самосознания, исходя из теоретических посылок авторов, указывается на этический и социальный смыслы самосознания как дальнейшее развитие «диалога» двух концептуальных позиций авторов.
Is Imagination Fundamental? on the Issue of theGenesis of Subjectivity, 2019
Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelia... more Based on the issue of the genesis of subjectivity, the authors of the article turn to the Hegelian model, which captures the two-sided and fundamentally changeable nature of the relationship between subject and object. The article substantiates the idea that imagination, being considered outside of the context of psychologization or reduction of it only to the reproductive aspect, is a source of binary differences fundamental to philosophical thought. Following Hegel's dialectical method, the authors note that the presence of the image already indicates the difference between the two dimensions of consciousness and knowledge. The image expresses the primary truth of substance and, at the same time, the way it is subjectively given. There is a differentiation of the subjective moment of Being with the realization of fantasy. All formations of Spirit are interpretations of the figurative series, primal scenes, the analog of which was studied by classical psychoanalysis. From this perspective, the genesis of such subjective modes as consciousness, self-consciousness and mind inevitably includes symbolization, interpretation of the "Self" images, cognizing, willing and acting in various situations and contexts. The study of the concepts developed by Hegel, Kennouche, Verene and Merleau-Ponty allows concluding about two arguments in favor of the fundamentality of imagination. This refers, on the one hand, to subjective imagination that generates meanings and the need for their interpretation and, on the other hand, to the initial form of synthesis, on the basis of which, the subject and object of cognition, formations of consciousness and types of knowledge characteristic of them are further distinguished. The image, being the first meeting of the concrete and universal, is capable of setting the plot of one or another form of subjectivity.
AUTONOMY OF MINORS QUESTIONED: RUSSIAN CASE WITH THE LOSS OF MEDICAL SECRECY, 2023
What is the value of confidentiality? Russian society faced this issue in 2020, when minors aged ... more What is the value of confidentiality? Russian society faced this issue in 2020, when minors aged 15 to 18 lost their privacy. The amendment to the Federal Law, caused the situation, was received ambiguously, but quickly ceased to be the subject of public discussion. In my article, I study this event in a bioethical context, considering the topics of privacy, autonomy and relativity. Social discussion was not productive, since the arguments of both sides contained a double-edged argument: depending on existing relations in a family, the amendment will have a positive or negative meaning. By pointing out all the weaknesses of this shift in emphasis to relationships (that also implies the uselessness of the concept of relational autonomy here), I designate a real problem. A conflict situation has evolved both within bioethical principles and within the single principle – respect for autonomy. Due to the lack of confidentiality, the opportunity to act according to one’s own personal plan, presupposed by informed consent, is devalued. Autonomy turns out to be incomplete, twofold: it exists only for onetime decisions, and it is not in the long-term perspective because of a possibility of interference by others (parents, guardians) in this decision-making process. Since such criteria of autonomous action as intentionality and noncontrol may be violated, the autonomy of minors becomes contradictory. To avoid this, the autonomy should be either established as partial, or, by insisting on the return of confidentiality back to minors of the specified age, restored as full. Partial autonomy is a paradox, and a teenager should be endowed with what I call, considering the age criteria, the “presumption of autonomy”. If we do not give up autonomy completely, then we must restore its context consistently and non-contradictory: the ability of minors of this age category to make medically significant decisions requires the restoration of confidentiality and vice versa. Additionally, I investigate privacy’s impact on confidentiality: in Russian bioethics and medical practice, privacy is not considered as a source of other rights, the initial principle organizing the discourse.
Transformation of the subject in bioethics: From an autonomous person to cosmopolitan, 2020
The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity ... more The purpose of the article is to trace the development of the idea of subjectivity in bio-ethics, starting from the level assumed by the prevailing model of personal autonomy up to the cosmopolitan dimension innate to the global model proposed by Van Rensselaer Potter. In the article, autonomy is considered in the more general context of the individu-alization of Western societies. It is revealed that autonomy is inherently dependent on the idea of human well-being and the values of individualism and therefore it can be reduced to individual decisions. This devaluation of personal autonomy finds justifiable criticism among bioethicists. The concept of the subject is restored in the frame of the substantive model of autonomy indicating the inextricable connection of a choice and a common per-sonal perspective. Such an individualistic approach to the subject is initially limited. Being concentrated on the behavior of a rational individual, the approach localizes all relevant ethical cases. In the modern world, global problem intersect with each other they cease to be noticed and moreover become intimatized due to their individualistic description. This approach to the subject is thus inadequate and needs to be replaced. For this purpose, the difference between the two traditions within bioethics must be overcome: an autonomous person and cosmopolitan remain the two significant models of subjectivity, and the bridge between them has never been built. The article explores the possibility of such a transition to a cosmopolitan position on the classic example from The Phenomenology of Spirit. It can be concluded that the current position of the theory of the subject is tenuous on both flanks of bioethics. When it loses the message of subjectivity and becomes a servant of the technological approach, we get just another version of medical ethics and lose the long-term perspective appropriate for the cosmopolitan world.
Цель данной статьи — проследить развитие идеи субъективности в биоэтике, на-чиная с уровня, предполагаемого господствующей моделью автономной личности, к которой отсылают “Principles of Biomedical Ethics”, вплоть до космополитического измерения, свойственного глобальной модели, предложенной В. Р. Поттером. Авто-номия рассматривается в более общем контексте произошедшей индивидуализации западных обществ; она является как констатацией этого факта, так и определенным требованием абсолютной свободы. Обозначенная в качестве первого биоэтического принципа, автономия оказывается по своей сути зависимой от идеи благосостояния человека и ценностей индивидуализма. В условиях постмодернового общества она может быть редуцирована до отдельно взятых решений. Это обесценивание личност-ной автономии находит вполне оправданную критику среди биоэтиков. Идея субъ-екта восстанавливается сторонниками субстантивной модели автономии, указываю-щей на неразрывную связь того или иного выбора и общей личностной перспективы. В статье показано, что подобный подход к субъекту изначально ограничен, факти-чески речь идет о разумном индивиде и локальном видении ситуации. В современ-ном мире глобальные проблемы пересекаются друг с другом и перестают замечаться, интимизируются при индивидуалистическом способе их описания. Последний тем самым не является адекватным и нуждается в замене. Трудность в том, что для этого должно быть преодолено различие внутри самой биоэтики между двумя традиция-ми: автономная личность и космополит остаются двумя значимыми моделями субъ-ективности, мост между которыми так и не был построен. В данной статье изучается возможность такого перехода к космополитической позиции на классическом при-мере из «Феноменологии духа». Как можно заключить, теории субъекта приходится непросто на обоих флангах биоэтики; как только последняя теряет посыл субъек-тивности и становится служанкой технологического подхода, мы получаем еще одну версию медицинской этики и теряем долгосрочную перспективу, соответствующую космополитическому миру.
SPECULATIVE WHOLE REVISED, 2023
How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical resp... more How to think of the Whole? Our theoretical findings on that matter emanate from the critical response to D. F. Verene"s account of the idea of the Whole, which is speculative and necessary for true philosophy. As this study shows, the idea in its essence depends upon two main criteria, ontological and epistemological. Both criteria perfectly demonstrate the logic of supplementation, which undermines the original conception. We argue that the speculative Whole has to be revisited. First, the only possibility to provide the connection between the idea of the Whole and self-knowledge in a consistent way could be given through the idea of holistic living. Secondly, the Whole must be thought virtual: that allows the Whole to exist in a variety of drafts, exclusive of the one true. Both our theoretical gestures result in a significant convergence of the concepts of the Whole and Becoming.