Katherine Zimmerman | American Enterprise Institute (original) (raw)

Reports by Katherine Zimmerman

American Enterprise Institute, Mar 14, 2022

Yemen’s Houthis are part of the Iranian-led informal alliance known as the Axis of Resistance and... more Yemen’s Houthis are part of the Iranian-led informal alliance known as the Axis of Resistance and increasingly threaten regional security in the Middle East. US policy has framed the Houthis as an artifact of Yemen’s war—a local Yemeni movement with local aims or, alternatively, a Yemeni proxy under Iran’s full command. Instead, the Houthis have preserved their autonomy while integrating into Iran’s network of state and nonstate actors opposed to Western influence in the Middle East. Houthi ties with Iran and other Axis members have strengthened significantly during the past eight years of Yemen’s war, and Iranian-sourced capabilities transferred to the Houthis have expanded the conflict beyond Yemen’s borders. US policy has lagged behind these developments and does not reflect an understanding of Houthi or Iranian aspirations beyond Yemen’s civil war.
Shared interests underpin the relationship between the Houthis and Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Houthi leaders uphold Iran’s Islamic Revolution as a model to follow, and Iran’s revisionist ideas and efforts to reshape the regional order resonate with them. They thus have found common ground with other Axis members seeking to change the status quo through force, including Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias, among others. For Iran, the Houthis initially presented an opportunity to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern border, and Iran has led an effort to cultivate the Houthis as part of its network. The Houthis now rely on Iran and the Axis to retain certain capabilities necessary for their ongoing projection of power from Yemen and have begun to support Axis initiatives from which they do not necessarily benefit.
Senior IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah officials coordinate support to the Houthis. The effort to develop the Houthis’ military capabilities has transformed the Houthis’ threat. Previously, the Houthis could only defend their own territory. Now, they can project force far beyond Yemen’s borders. Iranian-sourced weapons include antiaircraft systems, ballistic missiles, short- and long-range UAVs, land-based IEDs, and WBIEDs. Many of these weapons were not present in Yemen before the war. A cadre of Quds Force and Hezbollah operatives are also on the ground in Yemen, training and advising the Houthis. Iran has formal diplomatic relations with the Houthi government, and Iranian diplomats have advanced Houthi interests on the international stage. Other Axis of Resistance members have developed relationships with the Houthis, hosting their representatives and promoting Houthi narratives. Additionally, IRGC- and Hezbollah-linked networks have provided the Houthis with financial support and fuel transfers. This report’s appendixes document the types of support by actor in detail.

American Enterprise Institute, 2020

The US can no longer afford to prioritize counterterrorism at the cost of competing with global p... more The US can no longer afford to prioritize counterterrorism at the cost of competing with global powers such as China and Russia. Instead, the US must transform its approach to countering al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups by focusing on the environment that enables both Salafi-jihadis and adversaries such as China and Russia to expand their influence. Transforming the approach requires the US to improve how it operates in complex and fragile environments. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) is an opportunity to drive the necessary change throughout the interagency to succeed in these spaces. But its implementation has fallen short. Senior administration officials should use the GFA to develop and implement a strategic-level approach that underscores conflict prevention, stabilization, and peace building. This means using foreign assistance effectively to advance American interests and contest territory that will otherwise fall to Salafi-jihadis or to Beijing or Moscow.

American Enterprise Institute, 2019

The US is losing against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups, which are all... more The US is losing against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups, which are all part of the Salafi-jihadi movement. US counterterrorism efforts have made Americans safer, but the Salafi-jihadi movement is more than its terrorism threat. That movement now prioritizes developing its relationships with local Sunni communities, from which it draws its strategic strength, to transform the Muslim world. Winning today means adopting a strategy beyond counterterrorism that will defeat the Salafi-jihadi movement, instead of just countering the terrorism threat. The US must reframe its approach against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other groups. With the help of partners, the US must sever the ties of the Salafi-jihadi movement to local Sunni communities. America and its allies must offer these communities a viable alternative to these terror groups.

American Enterprise Institute, 2017

The US is losing the war against an enemy it has misunderstood for decades. Al Qaeda, the Islamic... more The US is losing the war against an enemy it has misunderstood for decades. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), and the Salafi-jihadi groups that threaten the United States are stronger, smarter, and more resilient than they were on September 11, 2001. Americans have confused tactical success on the battlefield against both ISIS and al Qaeda with progress in this war. They have narrowed their understanding of the threat to far-away and compartmentalized fights in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia and to the random acts of inspired violence conducted by "lone wolves." Yet 16 years after going to war, the US is further from winning.

American Enterprise Institute, 2018

The Salafi-jihadi movement shifted to prioritizing local over global objectives during the Arab S... more The Salafi-jihadi movement shifted to prioritizing local over global objectives during the Arab Spring. Analysts wrongly understood this as a weakening of the groups. Groups have hidden their true nature by hiding their ties to global jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and by rebranding and reorganizing on the ground. Movement leaders design and execute attacks in ways that create doubt and ambiguity about the responsible party. This new technique exploits US counterterrorism policy, which is not designed to pursue anyone other than the individuals directly responsible for the attack. American officials are countering a dynamic enemy with an irrelevant and outdated strategy.

American Enterprise Institute, 2019

Successes on the battlefields against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups h... more Successes on the battlefields against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups have not led to their defeat or permanently reduced their threat to the United States. The deterioration of conditions in the Muslim world has made communities vulnerable to and created opportunities for the Salafi-jihadi vanguard to develop local ties. The reliance of the Salafi-jihadi movement on its relationship with Sunni communities to strengthen and expand beyond ideological supporters is a key vulnerability. The US should reorient its efforts to focus not only on disrupting and preventing active terror plots as a national security priority but also on severing the relationships the Salafi-jihadi movement has formed with Sunni communities.

Journal Articles by Katherine Zimmerman

Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 2023

Although U.S. officials still called for the defeat of the transnational terrorist organizations,... more Although U.S. officials still called for the defeat of the transnational terrorist organizations, U.S. strategy became focused on the terrorist threats they posed to American interests and shifted the responsibility of defeating the local manifestations of these organizations to partners. The U.S. military thus invested heavily in cultivating partnerships with local security forces to combat the various al Qaeda and Islamic State branches, embracing the “by, with, and through” operational approach to limit direct combat exposure of U.S. forces. This approach also changed the role of armed drones in counterterrorism operations. Drone strikes now supplement local partnerships and other counterterrorism activities because their long-range strike precision complements a low-footprint, partner-based approach.

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Apr 2021

This paper defines the al Qaeda network today and traces its evolution since the dual challenges ... more This paper defines the al Qaeda network today and traces its evolution since the dual challenges of the Arab Spring and Osama bin Laden's death. It finds that al Qaeda has evolved after these setbacks to better achieve its own aims within the Muslim world.

PRISM vol. 9, no. 1, 2020

American blood and treasure should be prioritized to secure U.S. national interests. The United S... more American blood and treasure should be prioritized to secure U.S. national interests. The United States military is not the world’s police force, and where others can share the burden, the United States should add only its unique capabilities. But defending U.S. interests extends even into faraway lands, including Africa. While Africa may never be a top national security concern for the United States, a convergence of gains by state and nonstate actors alike there affect U.S. security and economic interests globally. Yet the Pentagon’s recent effort to rebalance its resources against great power competitors—especially China and Russia—after almost two decades of counterterrorism dominance places the commitment of U.S. military resources to Africa in question. Drawing down too far militarily in Africa risks losing influence on the continent to those very same state actors, erasing hard–fought counterterrorism gains, and compromising U.S. global interests.

Papers by Katherine Zimmerman

American Enterprise Institute, 2020

Sahel-based Salafi-jihadi groups including al Qaeda and the Islamic State coordinate and cooperat... more Sahel-based Salafi-jihadi groups including al Qaeda and the Islamic State coordinate and cooperate across organizational divides united by common objectives, shared histories, and ethnic ties, creating a unique ecosystem of ideology and terror. The Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel is strengthening rapidly. The number of attacks will continue to rise and will become deadlier as groups’ capabilities improve. The groups’ coordinated effort to transform Sahelian society and governance into their vision under Islam has helped destabilize the region and has created additional opportunities for Salafi-jihadi growth.

Congressional Testimony by Katherine Zimmerman

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, 2019

Testimony on US national security interests in Yemen in the context of the Yemen civil war and th... more Testimony on US national security interests in Yemen in the context of the Yemen civil war and the humanitarian crisis.

House Committee on Homeland Security, 2017

Testimony on the al Qaeda network and its threat to the US.

House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 2013

Testimony on al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's threat to the US and its role in the global al Q... more Testimony on al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's threat to the US and its role in the global al Qaeda network.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, 2011

Testimony on al Shabaab's influence in Somalia and its threat to humanitarian assistance programs.

American Enterprise Institute, Mar 14, 2022

Yemen’s Houthis are part of the Iranian-led informal alliance known as the Axis of Resistance and... more Yemen’s Houthis are part of the Iranian-led informal alliance known as the Axis of Resistance and increasingly threaten regional security in the Middle East. US policy has framed the Houthis as an artifact of Yemen’s war—a local Yemeni movement with local aims or, alternatively, a Yemeni proxy under Iran’s full command. Instead, the Houthis have preserved their autonomy while integrating into Iran’s network of state and nonstate actors opposed to Western influence in the Middle East. Houthi ties with Iran and other Axis members have strengthened significantly during the past eight years of Yemen’s war, and Iranian-sourced capabilities transferred to the Houthis have expanded the conflict beyond Yemen’s borders. US policy has lagged behind these developments and does not reflect an understanding of Houthi or Iranian aspirations beyond Yemen’s civil war.
Shared interests underpin the relationship between the Houthis and Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Houthi leaders uphold Iran’s Islamic Revolution as a model to follow, and Iran’s revisionist ideas and efforts to reshape the regional order resonate with them. They thus have found common ground with other Axis members seeking to change the status quo through force, including Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias, among others. For Iran, the Houthis initially presented an opportunity to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern border, and Iran has led an effort to cultivate the Houthis as part of its network. The Houthis now rely on Iran and the Axis to retain certain capabilities necessary for their ongoing projection of power from Yemen and have begun to support Axis initiatives from which they do not necessarily benefit.
Senior IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah officials coordinate support to the Houthis. The effort to develop the Houthis’ military capabilities has transformed the Houthis’ threat. Previously, the Houthis could only defend their own territory. Now, they can project force far beyond Yemen’s borders. Iranian-sourced weapons include antiaircraft systems, ballistic missiles, short- and long-range UAVs, land-based IEDs, and WBIEDs. Many of these weapons were not present in Yemen before the war. A cadre of Quds Force and Hezbollah operatives are also on the ground in Yemen, training and advising the Houthis. Iran has formal diplomatic relations with the Houthi government, and Iranian diplomats have advanced Houthi interests on the international stage. Other Axis of Resistance members have developed relationships with the Houthis, hosting their representatives and promoting Houthi narratives. Additionally, IRGC- and Hezbollah-linked networks have provided the Houthis with financial support and fuel transfers. This report’s appendixes document the types of support by actor in detail.

American Enterprise Institute, 2020

The US can no longer afford to prioritize counterterrorism at the cost of competing with global p... more The US can no longer afford to prioritize counterterrorism at the cost of competing with global powers such as China and Russia. Instead, the US must transform its approach to countering al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups by focusing on the environment that enables both Salafi-jihadis and adversaries such as China and Russia to expand their influence. Transforming the approach requires the US to improve how it operates in complex and fragile environments. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) is an opportunity to drive the necessary change throughout the interagency to succeed in these spaces. But its implementation has fallen short. Senior administration officials should use the GFA to develop and implement a strategic-level approach that underscores conflict prevention, stabilization, and peace building. This means using foreign assistance effectively to advance American interests and contest territory that will otherwise fall to Salafi-jihadis or to Beijing or Moscow.

American Enterprise Institute, 2019

The US is losing against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups, which are all... more The US is losing against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups, which are all part of the Salafi-jihadi movement. US counterterrorism efforts have made Americans safer, but the Salafi-jihadi movement is more than its terrorism threat. That movement now prioritizes developing its relationships with local Sunni communities, from which it draws its strategic strength, to transform the Muslim world. Winning today means adopting a strategy beyond counterterrorism that will defeat the Salafi-jihadi movement, instead of just countering the terrorism threat. The US must reframe its approach against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other groups. With the help of partners, the US must sever the ties of the Salafi-jihadi movement to local Sunni communities. America and its allies must offer these communities a viable alternative to these terror groups.

American Enterprise Institute, 2017

The US is losing the war against an enemy it has misunderstood for decades. Al Qaeda, the Islamic... more The US is losing the war against an enemy it has misunderstood for decades. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), and the Salafi-jihadi groups that threaten the United States are stronger, smarter, and more resilient than they were on September 11, 2001. Americans have confused tactical success on the battlefield against both ISIS and al Qaeda with progress in this war. They have narrowed their understanding of the threat to far-away and compartmentalized fights in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia and to the random acts of inspired violence conducted by "lone wolves." Yet 16 years after going to war, the US is further from winning.

American Enterprise Institute, 2018

The Salafi-jihadi movement shifted to prioritizing local over global objectives during the Arab S... more The Salafi-jihadi movement shifted to prioritizing local over global objectives during the Arab Spring. Analysts wrongly understood this as a weakening of the groups. Groups have hidden their true nature by hiding their ties to global jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and by rebranding and reorganizing on the ground. Movement leaders design and execute attacks in ways that create doubt and ambiguity about the responsible party. This new technique exploits US counterterrorism policy, which is not designed to pursue anyone other than the individuals directly responsible for the attack. American officials are countering a dynamic enemy with an irrelevant and outdated strategy.

American Enterprise Institute, 2019

Successes on the battlefields against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups h... more Successes on the battlefields against al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other like-minded groups have not led to their defeat or permanently reduced their threat to the United States. The deterioration of conditions in the Muslim world has made communities vulnerable to and created opportunities for the Salafi-jihadi vanguard to develop local ties. The reliance of the Salafi-jihadi movement on its relationship with Sunni communities to strengthen and expand beyond ideological supporters is a key vulnerability. The US should reorient its efforts to focus not only on disrupting and preventing active terror plots as a national security priority but also on severing the relationships the Salafi-jihadi movement has formed with Sunni communities.

Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 2023

Although U.S. officials still called for the defeat of the transnational terrorist organizations,... more Although U.S. officials still called for the defeat of the transnational terrorist organizations, U.S. strategy became focused on the terrorist threats they posed to American interests and shifted the responsibility of defeating the local manifestations of these organizations to partners. The U.S. military thus invested heavily in cultivating partnerships with local security forces to combat the various al Qaeda and Islamic State branches, embracing the “by, with, and through” operational approach to limit direct combat exposure of U.S. forces. This approach also changed the role of armed drones in counterterrorism operations. Drone strikes now supplement local partnerships and other counterterrorism activities because their long-range strike precision complements a low-footprint, partner-based approach.

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Apr 2021

This paper defines the al Qaeda network today and traces its evolution since the dual challenges ... more This paper defines the al Qaeda network today and traces its evolution since the dual challenges of the Arab Spring and Osama bin Laden's death. It finds that al Qaeda has evolved after these setbacks to better achieve its own aims within the Muslim world.

PRISM vol. 9, no. 1, 2020

American blood and treasure should be prioritized to secure U.S. national interests. The United S... more American blood and treasure should be prioritized to secure U.S. national interests. The United States military is not the world’s police force, and where others can share the burden, the United States should add only its unique capabilities. But defending U.S. interests extends even into faraway lands, including Africa. While Africa may never be a top national security concern for the United States, a convergence of gains by state and nonstate actors alike there affect U.S. security and economic interests globally. Yet the Pentagon’s recent effort to rebalance its resources against great power competitors—especially China and Russia—after almost two decades of counterterrorism dominance places the commitment of U.S. military resources to Africa in question. Drawing down too far militarily in Africa risks losing influence on the continent to those very same state actors, erasing hard–fought counterterrorism gains, and compromising U.S. global interests.

American Enterprise Institute, 2020

Sahel-based Salafi-jihadi groups including al Qaeda and the Islamic State coordinate and cooperat... more Sahel-based Salafi-jihadi groups including al Qaeda and the Islamic State coordinate and cooperate across organizational divides united by common objectives, shared histories, and ethnic ties, creating a unique ecosystem of ideology and terror. The Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel is strengthening rapidly. The number of attacks will continue to rise and will become deadlier as groups’ capabilities improve. The groups’ coordinated effort to transform Sahelian society and governance into their vision under Islam has helped destabilize the region and has created additional opportunities for Salafi-jihadi growth.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, 2019

Testimony on US national security interests in Yemen in the context of the Yemen civil war and th... more Testimony on US national security interests in Yemen in the context of the Yemen civil war and the humanitarian crisis.

House Committee on Homeland Security, 2017

Testimony on the al Qaeda network and its threat to the US.

House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 2013

Testimony on al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's threat to the US and its role in the global al Q... more Testimony on al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's threat to the US and its role in the global al Qaeda network.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, 2011

Testimony on al Shabaab's influence in Somalia and its threat to humanitarian assistance programs.