Affidavit of TOJO Hideki 東條英機宣誓供述書 #5 (original) (raw)

STATIONING TROOPS IN NORTH FRENCH INDO-CHINA

北部仏印進駐

東条英機宣誓供述書 - 国立国会図書館デジタルコレクション (ndl.go.jp)

13. As War Minister, and in conjunction with the Supreme Command, I participated in the stationing of troops in northern French Indo-China about the end of September 1940. The southern policy itself was the resulting effect of the continuous economic strangulation of Japan by America and Britain, and the general lines were laid on the “Gist of Main Points in Regard to Dealing With the Situation to Meet the Changes in World Conditions” determined on 27 July 1940. (Ex. 1310) There were two aspects to this southern policy. One was to sever the coalition between America and Britain with Chungking, as a means of solving the China Incident, and the other was the establishment of economic self-sufficiency for Japan. Both aspects developed as High State Policy in order to preserve the right of self-existence and of self-defense and, furthermore, they were intended to be attained through peaceful means until pressure from America, Britain, and the Netherlands, against Japan, resulted in unforeseen practical developments.

一三、一九四〇年九月末の北部仏印への軍隊の進駐には、私は陸軍大臣として統帥部と共にこれに干与しました。南方政策そのものは、米英による日本への継続的な経済圧迫の結果であり、その大綱は同年七月二七日に決定された「世界情勢の推移に伴う時局処理要綱」に基づくものでありました（法廷証第一三一〇号）。この南方政策には二つの側面がありました。一つは支那事変の解決手段として米英と重慶との連携を分断すること、もう一つは日本の自給自足の経済体制を確立することであります。何れも自存自衛を保持するための高度な国家政策として発展したものであって、しかもこれは米英蘭からの日本に対する圧力が予期せざる実際的な展開をもたらすまでは、平和的手段によって達成することを期しておったのであります。

14. I shall testify now relative to the request made to the French Indo-China authorities for a grant of facilities in connection with the dispatch of a small Japanese force to northern French Indo-China. Primarily, this troop movement was made at the urgent request of the Supreme Command as a necessary adjunct in conducting the China Incident. During the life of the previous Cabinet, that is, the latter part of June 1940, the French Indo-China authorities had agreed voluntarily to prohibit the passage of supplies through French Indo-China to the Chang Kai-shek regime, and, in order to carry out this arrangement, an observation force was dispatched from Japan. (Ex. No. 618) Identical arrangements were made in Burma at about the same time. However, after putting the plan into action, it became clear that it was impossible to insure complete stoppage of aid to Chungking with such a small observation force. In addition to this, after the partial closure of traffic on the French Indo-China border, it was announced from Chungking that the route would be reopened by force, and it gradually accumulated its military strength near the border regions. Under these changed circumstances the Japanese High Command felt it necessary to defend North French Indo-China. Moreover, the Supreme Command desired to carry out the campaign in the interior of China as a means of speedily concluding the China Incident, and wished to have bases in northern French Indo-China for that purpose. The Liaison Conference held about the latter part of July gave recognition to this request, and the Government was ordered to negotiate with the French authorities. (Original text: the Government decided to negotiate with the French side.) The important items required were the stationing of a specified number of troops in northern French Indo-China, and the passage of a specified number of troops through that region. To the best of my recollection, the strength of the former was set at 6000 and that of the latter at about 25,000 (Original text: 2,000). Negotiations were commenced on 1 August 1940 between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and the French Ambassador to Japan, M. Charles Arsene Henry, and an understanding was reached on 30 August after a formal exchange of notes. (Fx, No. 620 Appendix 10 - I, II) This understanding was that Japan recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of France in French Indo-China, and France, on her part, undertook to offer special facilities for the stationing of Japanese troops in the specified area. Japan further guaranteed that this situation was not to take on the nature of a military occupation.

一四、私は以下に日本軍の少数の部隊を北部仏印に派遣したことにつき仏印当局に便宜供与を求めたことについて証言致します。元来この派兵は支那事変遂行のために必要な補助として統帥部の切迫せる要望に基づいて行われたものであります。前内閣の任期中、即ち一九四〇年六月下旬に仏印当局は自発的に蒋介石政権への仏印経由の物資輸送を自主的に禁止することに合意しており、この取り決めを実行するために日本から監視部隊が派遣されました（法廷証六一八号）。ほぼ同時期にビルマに於ても同様の取り決めがなされました。しかしながら、計画を実行に移すと小規模な監視部隊では重慶への援助を完全に止めることは不可能であることが判明しました。更に、仏印国境の交通の一部閉鎖の後、重慶は武力でルートを再開すると発表し、徐々に国境付近の軍事力を増強していったのであります。このような状況の変化を受けて、日本の統帥部は北部仏印防衛の必要を感じました。さらに統帥部は、支那事変を早期に解決するため中国内陸部での作戦遂行を望み、それがため北部仏印に基地を置くことを希望しました。七月下旬に開催された連絡会議でこの要請は承認され、政府は仏当局との交渉を命ぜられました（原文「政府がフランス側に交渉することになったのであります」）。この要求の要点は北部仏印に一定数の軍隊を置くこと、また一定数の軍隊を通過せしめることでありました。その兵力は前者六千、後者は二万五千（原文「二千」）位であったと記憶しております。交渉は一九四〇年八月一日から松岡外務大臣とシャルル・アルセーヌ・アンリ駐日仏国大使との間で始められ、八月三〇日に公文の交換を経て合意に至ったのであります（法廷証六二〇付属書第十ノ一、及び二）。この了解は、日本が仏印に於けるフランスの主権と領土保全を承認し、フランス側は指定地域における日本軍駐留に特別な便宜を供与することを約束するというものでありました。日本はさらに、この状況が軍事占領の性質を有せざることを保証しました。

15. This MATSUOKA-HENRY agreement of 30 August 1940 settled the basic principles, and there was a concurrence that the French Government was to promptly issue the necessary instructions to the local French Indo-China authorities to commence negotiations on the spot for the purpose of satisfying Japan's specific requirements. Accordingly, Major General Nishihara, who was there present as Chief of the Observation Party, and acting under instructions from Imperial Headquarters, immediately opened negotiations with the French Indo-China authorities and the agreement on those basic items was arrived at by 4 September. (Fx. No. 620 Appendix 11) The detailed items concerning the facilities to be offered was scheduled to be signed on 6 September, but this was delayed by reason of an unfortunate incident occuring on 5 September involving the alleged crossing of the boundary between French Indo-China and China by a Japanese battalion. Incidentally it was ascertained through a later Court-Martial proceeding that the battalion did not violate the French Indo-China border at all. As a matter of fact, this troop movement was for patrol purposes, and not a single shot was fired, but the French Indo-China authorities made this occurrence an excuse for refusal to sign the detail agreement. At that time, the French Indo-China authorities outwardly swore allegiance to the Vichy Government but there was room for doubt as to the actual veracity of their real intent. On our part, there was a critical urgency for troop dispatch and there was much anxiety over the breakdown of the negotiations. Nevertheless, in spite of this drawback the policy of peaceful settlement was maintained to the very end, and the Army General Staff sent the Chief of the First Section to French Indo-China to assist in the negotiations.

一五、一九四〇年八月三〇日のこの松岡・アンリ協定は基本原則を定め、現地に於てはフランス政府が日本側に明示された要求を満たすことを目的とする交渉を開始するために現地の仏印当局に必要な訓令を速やかに出すことで合意致しました。そこで監視機関委員長として現地におりました西原少将は、大本営の指示の下に直ちに仏印当局との交渉を開始し、九月四日にはこれらの基礎的事項の妥結を見るに至りました（法廷証六二〇号付属書第一一号）。便宜供与に関する細目協定は九月六日に調印される予定でありましたが、不幸にも九月五日に日本の或る大隊が仏印と支那との国境を越えたとされる事件が発生したため、調印は延期されました。ついでながら、その後の軍法会議の審理により、この大隊は仏印国境を全く侵犯していなかったことが判明しております。実際のところ、この部隊の移動は哨戒が目的であり、一発の銃弾も発射されませんでしたが、仏印当局はこの出来事を細目協定への署名を拒否する口実としたのであります。当時、仏印当局は表面上はヴィシー政府への忠誠を誓っておりましたが、その真偽に於ては疑問の余地がありました。我が方では派兵を急ぐ必要があり、交渉が決裂するのではないかと大きな不安を抱いておりました。しかし、このような障碍があったにも拘らず、平和的解決の方針は最後まで維持され、陸軍参謀本部は第一部長を仏印に派遣し、この交渉を援助せしめました。

On that occasion both the Chief of the Amy General Staff and myself, as War Minister, gave strict injunction (Original text: earnest advice) that the dispatch of troops must be carried out on a peacetime basis. Notwithstanding all these efforts, the detail agreement was not finalized and so about 18 or 19 September Imperial Headquarters issued instructions to the Nishihara Unit to request a reply, with the dead line to be set at noon of 22 September. (Tokyo time.) It was felt that since the local authorities were procrastinating, despite the agreement of the French Home Government, some resort to freedom of action on our part was justified, and, consequently, the evacuation of Japanese nationals was effected before that dead line.

その時、陸軍大臣である私と陸軍参謀総長は共に、軍隊の派遣は平時を基準として実施しなければならないと厳しく訓令（原文「平和進駐によるべきことを懇切に訓諭」）したのでありました。是等の努力にも拘わらず細目協定はまとまらず、同月一八日か一九日頃、大本営は西原部隊に対し九月二二日正午（東京時間）を期限として返答を求めよと指示を出しました。フランス本国政府の同意にも拘わらず、地元当局が遷延するのであるから、我々が何らかの行動の自由を行使することは正当であると思われ（原文「自由進駐も止むを得ずと考えた」）、その結果、期限前に日本国民の避難が実施されました。

A decision could not be reached with the French Indo-China authorities before noon of the 22nd, but we, on our part, made certain concessions, and two hours after the stipulated time, i.e. about 2 P.M., the detailed agreement was finally signed by both parties. (Fx. 620, Appendix 12) Nevertheless, at 12:30 in the morning of the following day (the 23rd) an exchange of firing took place between the Japanese and French troops on the border between French Indo-China and China. This incident was occasioned by the fact that the front line troops stationed near the border were deployed in inaccessible mountains and valleys, and contact with them was therefore difficult. In spite of every effort on our part communication as to the conclusion of terms could not be transmitted in time. The French also, on their part, were delayed in relaying information to their troops, (Original text: the notification on the French side was also incomplete,) but this small encounter of arms was settled within the same day. The Nishimura Corps was scheduled to enter Haiphong Bay under escort of the French Navy but because of this clash on land at the northern front it did not enter at Haiphong Bay but landed without incident on the beach to the south. There was, in addition, another incident involving a Japanese observation squadron, which due to a misunderstanding in signals between the Commanding Officer and his subordinates, dropped bombs in the outskirts of Haiphong, but this was clearly a mistake and inconsequential.

二二日の正午までには仏印当局と合意に至ることはできませんでしたが、我が方も一定の譲歩を為し、規定の時刻から二時間後の午後二時頃に、細目協定は最終的に両者によって署名されました（証六二〇号付属書一二号）。然るにその翌日（二三日）午前零時半に仏印と支那との国境で日仏間に銃撃戦が起りました。この事件は、国境付近に駐留する第一線兵団は到達し難い山岳地帯や渓谷に配置されており、彼らとの接触が困難であったために発生致しました。日本側のあらゆる努力にも拘わらず、細目妥結を時間内に通知することができませんでした。また、フランス側に於ても部隊への情報伝達が遅れておりました（原文「第一線兵団は交通不便な山や谷の間に分散して居ったがため、連絡が困難で二十二日午後二時の細目妥結を通知することが日本側の努力にも拘わらず不可能であったのと、フランス側に於ても、その通知が不徹底であったからであります」）。しかしこの小衝突は同日中に解決しました。西村兵団はフランス海軍の護衛を受けてハイフォン湾に入ることになっておったのでありますが、北方正面での陸上衝突のためにハイフォン湾には入らず、南方の海浜に無事上陸しました。さらに、日本の偵察飛行隊が隊長と部下との信号の誤解によりハイフォン郊外に爆弾を投下した事件も起こりましたが、これは過失であったことは明白であり、取るに足らぬものでありました。

16. To summarize. The dispatch of Japanese troops to north French Indo-China in the latter part of September 1940 was prompted by a desire to speedily solve the China Incident and from beginning to end it was our consistent policy to accomplish that wish peacefully. The strength of the forces was held down to the barest minimum, and the actual number dispatched was, as I remember, only about 4,000, a figure far below the agreed total. That the American authorities well understood the above circumstances is shown by the message of President Roosevelt to the Japanese Emperor on 8 December 1941, which contains the following, “More than a year ago your Majesty's government concluded an agreement with the Vichy government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into northern Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north.”

一六、要するに一九四〇年九月下旬の北部仏印への派兵は、支那事変を早期に解決せんとする願望から始まったものであり、それを平和的に達成することが終始一貫した方針でありました。部隊の規模も最小限に止め、実際に派遣された人数は合意された総数を遥かに下回る四千名程度であったと記憶しております。米国当局が上記の状況をよく理解していたことは、一九四一年一二月八日にルーズベルト大統領の日本の天皇陛下宛の親書（原文のみ「法廷証一二四五号J」）に示されております。そこには次のようにあります。「一年以上前に陛下の政府はヴィシー政府と協定を締結し、その協定により、それより以北に於て作戦中の日本軍を保護するため、五千から六千の日本軍が北部仏印に入る許可を得た」とあります。

As explained above, although some minor unforeseen incidents occurred in connection with the entry, in order to maintain strict troop discipline, I, as War Minister, took stringent disciplinary measures and enforced them. To wit, the Regimental Commander and subordinate officers were court-martialed, and the local Commanding General and Staff members of the Imperial Headquarters were either removed from office or transferred to minor posts. These measures were taken in line with the wishes of the Emperor stressing the necessity for strict military discipline, which were uttered time and again previous to this, and which were in accordance with my own consistent policy to uphold military order and enforce military discipline, and these were activated by the requirements of internal administrative need (Original text: the matters of the discipline inside of the military) and did not in any way indicate that there was any responsibility on our part under international law vis-a-vis the French.

以上に説明しましたような次第で、進駐に際しては予期せぬ軽微な出来事も起りましたが、軍規を厳格に維持するため、私は陸軍大臣として厳重なる規律措置を講じ、これを執行しました。即ち連隊長以下を軍法会議にかけ、現地司令官及び大本営幕僚を或いは罷免し或いは左遷したのであります。これらの措置は厳格な軍規の必要性を強調する天皇陛下の御意向に沿って取ったもので、これは陛下がそれ以前より繰り返し述べられてきたものであり、また私自身の軍の秩序を維持し軍規を守らしめるという一貫した方針によるもので、国内の行政上の必要性に迫られて発動されたもの（原文「軍内部の規律に関すること」）でありまして、これはフランス側に対して国際法上の責任を我々が負っていることを示すものでは決してありません。