Rafeeq Hasan | Amherst College (original) (raw)
Papers by Rafeeq Hasan
Kant’s Fundamental Assumptions, eds. Colin Marshall and Colin McLear (Oxford University Press), 2024
Liberty is a certain pattern of social forms.-Rawls, A Theory of Justice 1. Kant's Metaphysics of... more Liberty is a certain pattern of social forms.-Rawls, A Theory of Justice 1. Kant's Metaphysics of Morals has the highest of ambitions. It aims at nothing less than the unification of our ethical and political lives around a central conception of morality as rational freedom. In his late masterpiece, Kant treats "morality" as a genus term which branches into distinct yet interlocking spheres of legal and ethical duties. 2 Behind this philosophical architectonic lies the striking suggestion, one not often associated with Kant, that a moral and so free life requires not only individual virtue but also membership in a just polity. Yet at the same time as Kant proffers this edifying vision, his own moral theory makes it difficult to understand. Specifically, Kant's classification of legal obligation as a species of morality has struck many commentators as hard to reconcile with his own celebrated claim that morality is autonomous or self-legislated. In Kant's famous words, one 'gives the law to oneself.' 3 By this Kant means that one's obligations are derived from one's own reason, not from any external authority-be it God, the ruler, social custom, etc. But this generates a puzzle about Kant's theory of legality. For legal obligation does not seem autonomous in this way. Barring rare moments of referenda or revolution, people do not literally make or enforce the civil laws that bind them. Criminals don't imprison themselves.
Philosophical Engagements with Modernity (Festschrift for Robert Pippin), eds. Daniel Conway and Jon Stewart., 2024
Kant’s theory of rights says much about property, but little about the body. This is surprising. ... more Kant’s theory of rights says much about property, but little about the body. This is surprising. For Kant holds that the point of rights is to secure freedom from the wills of others, and surely bodily rights are more central to freedom than property. In this paper I develop Kant’s brief remarks on the body in order to explain why the body matters for the politics of freedom. I do so by addressing the worry, familiar to post-Kantian political philosophy, that rights discourse misconstrues the body in overly proprietary or ‘thing-like’ terms, treating the body as what a person possesses rather than as what a person most essentially is. In response, I argue that conceptualizing the body in the possessory vocabulary of rights plays an essential role in securing social equality. Paradoxically, persons must become thing-like to themselves in order to become more fully person-like to others.
Oxford Handbook of Kant, ed. Anil Gomes & Andrew Stephenson, 2023
This chapter explains Kant’s theory of Recht—a word that encompasses in translation ‘right’, ‘law... more This chapter explains Kant’s theory of Recht—a word that encompasses in translation ‘right’, ‘law’, and ‘justice’. It focuses on two of the theory’s central claims. First, that persons have a right to be independent of others’ control. Second, that independence requires a system of rights, a system which can only be realized through joint membership in the state. Combining these two claims yields an unexpected result: it is the very independence of persons which requires them to become cooperating citizens. In elucidating this idea, the chapter treats Kant’s views on topics such as: freedom of choice and action, the relation between natural rights and positive law, and the role played by both private property and economic redistribution in realizing independence. It also argues that careful attention to Kant’s theory of right warrants major revisions to the traditional understanding of Kantian morality. Against the standard picture of the Kantian moral agent as reasoning entirely on their own, the chapter suggests that for Kant, properly enacting one’s moral duties actually requires collective political institutions. I cannot fulfill my moral duty to aid you unless the law has settled what is mine to give. Kant thus joins an illustrious line of thinkers in treating man as a political animal.
Cambridge Companion to Rousseau's Social Contract
Property has a vexed status in Rousseau’s Social Contract. On one hand, Rousseau seems committed ... more Property has a vexed status in Rousseau’s Social Contract. On one hand, Rousseau seems committed to the conventionalist view that property is a creation of law and state. Yet Rousseau also recognizes pre-political dimensions of property, such as a right of first occupancy and a natural entitlement to land through “labor and cultivation.” In this chapter, I contend that Rousseau’s seemingly divergent views on property become less paradoxical once one distinguishes between the rights of others and the more self-regarding aspects of morality. Focusing on the dense section of the Social Contract titled “Of Real Property,” I argue that while Rousseau acknowledges moral obligations governing the use of things, he ultimately holds that persons only have full-fledged property rights within the state. I suggest, moreover, that Rousseau’s attention to both the political and pre-political dimensions of property continues to resonate in contemporary debate.
Philosophical Review, 2022
Kant maintains that while claims to property are morally possible in a state of nature, such clai... more Kant maintains that while claims to property are morally possible in a state of nature, such claims are merely "provisional"; they become "conclusive" only in a civil condition involving political institutions. Kant's commentators find this thesis puzzling, since it seems to assert a natural right to property alongside a commitment to property's conventionality. We resolve this apparent contradiction. Provisional right is not a special kind of right. Instead, it marks the imperfection of an action (that of acquiring ordinary rights) where public authorization is lacking. Provisional right thereby functions as a methodological device in a sequential elucidation of the moral basis of public law. To develop this reading, we first explain Kant's two-step account of property rights-his division between 'having' and 'acquiring.' Then we explain what is involved in a sequential exposition of "right" more generally.
What is domination? According to a leading strand of republican political philosophy, a person is... more What is domination? According to a leading strand of republican political philosophy, a person is dominated when under the unconstrained power of another. Call this the dyadic conception of domination, because it involves a two-person relation. I argue that domination is better understood structurally. Structural domination is domination by institutions. Rather than a master dominating a slave and a boss dominating a worker (as in dyadic domination), structural domination holds that the institution of slavery dominates the slave and labor law dominates the worker. Without the structural conception, I contend, one misdescribes the power dynamics of paradigm cases of domination.
I criticize two ways of interpreting Kant's claim that property rights are merely 'provisional' i... more I criticize two ways of interpreting Kant's claim that property rights are merely 'provisional' in the state of nature. Weak provisionality holds that in the state of nature agents can make rightful claims to property. What is lacking is the institutional context necessary to render their claims secure. By contrast, strong provisionality holds that making property claims in the state of nature wrongs others. I argue for a third view, anticipatory provisionality, according to which state of nature property claims do not wrong others, but anticipate a condition in which the authority to make such claims can no longer be unilaterally determined.
The coercive authority of the Kantian state is rationally grounded in the ideal of equal external... more The coercive authority of the Kantian state is rationally grounded in the ideal of equal external freedom, which is realized when each individual can choose and act without being constrained by another's will. This ideal does not seem like it can justify state-mandated economic redistribution. For if one is externally free just as long as one can choose and act without being constrained by another, then only direct slavery, serfdom, or other systems of overt
In this article, I criticize Rawls's well-ordered society for failing to secure a right to meanin... more In this article, I criticize Rawls's well-ordered society for failing to secure a right to meaningful work. I critically discuss five technical Rawlsian ideas: self-respect, social union, the difference principle, the powers and prerogatives of office, and fair equality of opportunity. I then claim that radical restructuring of the workplace conflicts with Rawls's individualistic understanding of freedom. Briefly drawing on Hegel, an under-recognized historical influence on Rawls, I then correct Rawls by arguing for a conception of freedom that is internally related to broader solidaristic values associated with meaningful work.
In Rousseau's Social Contract, political laws are rationally binding because they satisfy the int... more In Rousseau's Social Contract, political laws are rationally binding because they satisfy the interests that motivate individuals to obey such laws. The later books of Emile justify morality by showing that it is continuous with the natural dispositions of a well-broughtup subject and is thus conducive to genuine happiness. In both the moral and political cases, Rousseau argues for an internal connection between the rational ground of an obligation and the broader aspects of human psychology that are satisfied and expressed by acting from that obligation. Yet, inspired by Kantian philosophy, the recent and influential Social Autonomy interpretation has disjoined rationality and psychology. Criticising this interpretation, I argue that for Rousseau, obligations are justified because they satisfy the demands made by our moral psychology, most notably amour-propre, i.e. the desire to have one's worth recognised by others.
Recent interpretations of Rousseau suggest that autonomy is the master concept by which to unders... more Recent interpretations of Rousseau suggest that autonomy is the master concept by which to understand his justification of the state. The Rousseauian state is legitimate insofar as it enables individuals to obey only their own wills and thus to be free. Autonomy-based interpretations cannot adequately account for Rousseau's remarks on the role of the state in securing a collective form of happiness through political community. These interpretations incorrectly construe collective happiness as pertaining only to how civic-minded citizens might be psychologically motivated to obey the state's dictates, rather than to what makes the state legitimate. By contrast, I offer a new interpretation according to which the Rousseauian state is justified because it enables a mutually constitutive relationship between the autonomy of individuals and the happiness that stems from participation in political community.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (hereafte... more Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (hereafter, Second Discourse) has exerted a magnetic attraction on its readers since its publication in 1755, despite (or perhaps because
Political philosophy is in the midst of a Rousseau revival. Recent decades have seen a number of ... more Political philosophy is in the midst of a Rousseau revival. Recent decades have seen a number of important interpretations of Rousseau as a powerful and systematic philosopher of freedom.
Kant’s Fundamental Assumptions, eds. Colin Marshall and Colin McLear (Oxford University Press), 2024
Liberty is a certain pattern of social forms.-Rawls, A Theory of Justice 1. Kant's Metaphysics of... more Liberty is a certain pattern of social forms.-Rawls, A Theory of Justice 1. Kant's Metaphysics of Morals has the highest of ambitions. It aims at nothing less than the unification of our ethical and political lives around a central conception of morality as rational freedom. In his late masterpiece, Kant treats "morality" as a genus term which branches into distinct yet interlocking spheres of legal and ethical duties. 2 Behind this philosophical architectonic lies the striking suggestion, one not often associated with Kant, that a moral and so free life requires not only individual virtue but also membership in a just polity. Yet at the same time as Kant proffers this edifying vision, his own moral theory makes it difficult to understand. Specifically, Kant's classification of legal obligation as a species of morality has struck many commentators as hard to reconcile with his own celebrated claim that morality is autonomous or self-legislated. In Kant's famous words, one 'gives the law to oneself.' 3 By this Kant means that one's obligations are derived from one's own reason, not from any external authority-be it God, the ruler, social custom, etc. But this generates a puzzle about Kant's theory of legality. For legal obligation does not seem autonomous in this way. Barring rare moments of referenda or revolution, people do not literally make or enforce the civil laws that bind them. Criminals don't imprison themselves.
Philosophical Engagements with Modernity (Festschrift for Robert Pippin), eds. Daniel Conway and Jon Stewart., 2024
Kant’s theory of rights says much about property, but little about the body. This is surprising. ... more Kant’s theory of rights says much about property, but little about the body. This is surprising. For Kant holds that the point of rights is to secure freedom from the wills of others, and surely bodily rights are more central to freedom than property. In this paper I develop Kant’s brief remarks on the body in order to explain why the body matters for the politics of freedom. I do so by addressing the worry, familiar to post-Kantian political philosophy, that rights discourse misconstrues the body in overly proprietary or ‘thing-like’ terms, treating the body as what a person possesses rather than as what a person most essentially is. In response, I argue that conceptualizing the body in the possessory vocabulary of rights plays an essential role in securing social equality. Paradoxically, persons must become thing-like to themselves in order to become more fully person-like to others.
Oxford Handbook of Kant, ed. Anil Gomes & Andrew Stephenson, 2023
This chapter explains Kant’s theory of Recht—a word that encompasses in translation ‘right’, ‘law... more This chapter explains Kant’s theory of Recht—a word that encompasses in translation ‘right’, ‘law’, and ‘justice’. It focuses on two of the theory’s central claims. First, that persons have a right to be independent of others’ control. Second, that independence requires a system of rights, a system which can only be realized through joint membership in the state. Combining these two claims yields an unexpected result: it is the very independence of persons which requires them to become cooperating citizens. In elucidating this idea, the chapter treats Kant’s views on topics such as: freedom of choice and action, the relation between natural rights and positive law, and the role played by both private property and economic redistribution in realizing independence. It also argues that careful attention to Kant’s theory of right warrants major revisions to the traditional understanding of Kantian morality. Against the standard picture of the Kantian moral agent as reasoning entirely on their own, the chapter suggests that for Kant, properly enacting one’s moral duties actually requires collective political institutions. I cannot fulfill my moral duty to aid you unless the law has settled what is mine to give. Kant thus joins an illustrious line of thinkers in treating man as a political animal.
Cambridge Companion to Rousseau's Social Contract
Property has a vexed status in Rousseau’s Social Contract. On one hand, Rousseau seems committed ... more Property has a vexed status in Rousseau’s Social Contract. On one hand, Rousseau seems committed to the conventionalist view that property is a creation of law and state. Yet Rousseau also recognizes pre-political dimensions of property, such as a right of first occupancy and a natural entitlement to land through “labor and cultivation.” In this chapter, I contend that Rousseau’s seemingly divergent views on property become less paradoxical once one distinguishes between the rights of others and the more self-regarding aspects of morality. Focusing on the dense section of the Social Contract titled “Of Real Property,” I argue that while Rousseau acknowledges moral obligations governing the use of things, he ultimately holds that persons only have full-fledged property rights within the state. I suggest, moreover, that Rousseau’s attention to both the political and pre-political dimensions of property continues to resonate in contemporary debate.
Philosophical Review, 2022
Kant maintains that while claims to property are morally possible in a state of nature, such clai... more Kant maintains that while claims to property are morally possible in a state of nature, such claims are merely "provisional"; they become "conclusive" only in a civil condition involving political institutions. Kant's commentators find this thesis puzzling, since it seems to assert a natural right to property alongside a commitment to property's conventionality. We resolve this apparent contradiction. Provisional right is not a special kind of right. Instead, it marks the imperfection of an action (that of acquiring ordinary rights) where public authorization is lacking. Provisional right thereby functions as a methodological device in a sequential elucidation of the moral basis of public law. To develop this reading, we first explain Kant's two-step account of property rights-his division between 'having' and 'acquiring.' Then we explain what is involved in a sequential exposition of "right" more generally.
What is domination? According to a leading strand of republican political philosophy, a person is... more What is domination? According to a leading strand of republican political philosophy, a person is dominated when under the unconstrained power of another. Call this the dyadic conception of domination, because it involves a two-person relation. I argue that domination is better understood structurally. Structural domination is domination by institutions. Rather than a master dominating a slave and a boss dominating a worker (as in dyadic domination), structural domination holds that the institution of slavery dominates the slave and labor law dominates the worker. Without the structural conception, I contend, one misdescribes the power dynamics of paradigm cases of domination.
I criticize two ways of interpreting Kant's claim that property rights are merely 'provisional' i... more I criticize two ways of interpreting Kant's claim that property rights are merely 'provisional' in the state of nature. Weak provisionality holds that in the state of nature agents can make rightful claims to property. What is lacking is the institutional context necessary to render their claims secure. By contrast, strong provisionality holds that making property claims in the state of nature wrongs others. I argue for a third view, anticipatory provisionality, according to which state of nature property claims do not wrong others, but anticipate a condition in which the authority to make such claims can no longer be unilaterally determined.
The coercive authority of the Kantian state is rationally grounded in the ideal of equal external... more The coercive authority of the Kantian state is rationally grounded in the ideal of equal external freedom, which is realized when each individual can choose and act without being constrained by another's will. This ideal does not seem like it can justify state-mandated economic redistribution. For if one is externally free just as long as one can choose and act without being constrained by another, then only direct slavery, serfdom, or other systems of overt
In this article, I criticize Rawls's well-ordered society for failing to secure a right to meanin... more In this article, I criticize Rawls's well-ordered society for failing to secure a right to meaningful work. I critically discuss five technical Rawlsian ideas: self-respect, social union, the difference principle, the powers and prerogatives of office, and fair equality of opportunity. I then claim that radical restructuring of the workplace conflicts with Rawls's individualistic understanding of freedom. Briefly drawing on Hegel, an under-recognized historical influence on Rawls, I then correct Rawls by arguing for a conception of freedom that is internally related to broader solidaristic values associated with meaningful work.
In Rousseau's Social Contract, political laws are rationally binding because they satisfy the int... more In Rousseau's Social Contract, political laws are rationally binding because they satisfy the interests that motivate individuals to obey such laws. The later books of Emile justify morality by showing that it is continuous with the natural dispositions of a well-broughtup subject and is thus conducive to genuine happiness. In both the moral and political cases, Rousseau argues for an internal connection between the rational ground of an obligation and the broader aspects of human psychology that are satisfied and expressed by acting from that obligation. Yet, inspired by Kantian philosophy, the recent and influential Social Autonomy interpretation has disjoined rationality and psychology. Criticising this interpretation, I argue that for Rousseau, obligations are justified because they satisfy the demands made by our moral psychology, most notably amour-propre, i.e. the desire to have one's worth recognised by others.
Recent interpretations of Rousseau suggest that autonomy is the master concept by which to unders... more Recent interpretations of Rousseau suggest that autonomy is the master concept by which to understand his justification of the state. The Rousseauian state is legitimate insofar as it enables individuals to obey only their own wills and thus to be free. Autonomy-based interpretations cannot adequately account for Rousseau's remarks on the role of the state in securing a collective form of happiness through political community. These interpretations incorrectly construe collective happiness as pertaining only to how civic-minded citizens might be psychologically motivated to obey the state's dictates, rather than to what makes the state legitimate. By contrast, I offer a new interpretation according to which the Rousseauian state is justified because it enables a mutually constitutive relationship between the autonomy of individuals and the happiness that stems from participation in political community.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (hereafte... more Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (hereafter, Second Discourse) has exerted a magnetic attraction on its readers since its publication in 1755, despite (or perhaps because
Political philosophy is in the midst of a Rousseau revival. Recent decades have seen a number of ... more Political philosophy is in the midst of a Rousseau revival. Recent decades have seen a number of important interpretations of Rousseau as a powerful and systematic philosopher of freedom.