J.T. Turner | Anderson University (South Carolina) (original) (raw)
Papers by J.T. Turner
The Expository Times, 2013
Philosophia Christi, 2019
The Scriptures suggest that Christians are to grow up into the “mind of Christ” or, as Craig Keen... more The Scriptures suggest that Christians are to grow up into the “mind of Christ” or, as Craig Keener calls it, the “mind of the Spirit.” While there have been a few recent works that discuss how mental sharing between the human person and the divine person(s) might contribute to sanctification (for example, Alston), there are not any that discuss a mereological account of how the mental union works with reference to the bodily resurrection. Since I understand the human’s eschatological union with the divine to be the occasion of theosis, I offer in this paper a metaphysical model of at least one aspect of theosis: a part/whole relationship between the mind of a human and the mind of the Spirit, with reference to the eschatological bodily resurrection. I call the union “mental saturation.”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2020
A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete huma... more A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete human nature could have been united hypostatically to the second Person of the Trinity. Oliver Crisp argues that a potency to have been possibly hypostati-cally united to the Logos is an important part of what it means for a human person to be made in the image of God. Against this line of reasoning, and building on an argument in print by Andrew Jaeger, I argue two things: first, that many metaphysics of human persons on offer fail to allow the Logos possibly to unite hypostatically to just any concrete human nature. And this is because, given the necessity of iden-tity (if x = y, necessarily x = y), every metaphysics that deploys an identity relation between a human person and her human nature or some essential component of her human nature fails to allow concrete human natures to be identical to any other per-son than they in fact are or else to lack some essential component that is identical to any other person than it in fact is. And, in the Incarnation, the Logos does not unite with a person. Second, supposing the preceding line of reasoning goes through, I argue that Oliver Crisp’s thesis about the imago Dei is mistaken, provided that it relies on a metaphysics of human persons that deploys an identity relation between a person and her concrete human nature or else some essential component of her concrete human nature.
Religious Studies, 2019
Many in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbu... more Many in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbus Patrum on Holy Saturday and (2) that the human nature of Jesus is a hylemorphic compound, the unity of a human soul and prime matter. I argue that (1) and (2) are incompatible; for the name ‘Jesus’, ‘Christ’, and ‘Jesus Christ’ rigidly designates a human being. But, given a certain view of hylemorphism, the human being, Jesus, ceased to exist in the time between his death and resurrection. So, Jesus did not descend to Hades/Limbus Patrum, even if God the Son did.
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2018
In this paper, I offer something of a prolegomenon, outlining some areas in which certain str... more In this paper, I offer something of a prolegomenon, outlining some areas in which certain strands of biblical theology and analytic theological reflection can be mutually informative. To do so, my paper unfolds in three ways. In the first section, I provide some reasons to think that biblical theologians are onto a reading of Scripture that merits the attention of analytic theologians. In section II, I outline some areas in the biblical theological data that would benefit from analytic exploration and reflection. Finally, in sections III and IV, I present a test case: the imago Dei and the importance of the future bodily resurrection. This should help show how this strand of biblical theology and analytic theological reflection can be mutually informative.
Journal of Reformed Theology, 2017
Typically, Christian theology includes an understanding of human afterlife consisting of two stag... more Typically, Christian theology includes an understanding of human afterlife consisting of two stages. The first is a disembodied existence as an immaterial being in the time between death and resurrection. Normally, it's affirmed that some disembodied humans go to Heaven/Paradise between one's death and resurrection; this is a state I call The Intermediate State. The second stage is the bodily resurrection. In this paper, I focus on The Intermediate State. Though the majority of the Christian tradition affirms it, I think it's mistaken. To show two reasons why, I argue that a traditional metaphysics of human persons deployed to explicate The Intermediate State brings with it one or the other of at least two untoward consequences for Christian theology.
Journal of Analytic Theology, May 2017
My argument proceeds in two stages. In §I, I sum up the intuitions of a popular argument for " sa... more My argument proceeds in two stages. In §I, I sum up the intuitions of a popular argument for " satisfaction accounts " of Purgatory that I label, TAP. I then offer an argument, taken from a few standard orthodox Christian beliefs and (at least) one axiom of Christian theology, to show that TAP is unsound. In the same section, I entertain some plausible responses to my argument that are prima facie consistent with these beliefs and axiom. I find these responses wanting. In §II, I offer a sorites puzzle and a problem of evil against TAP, given the orthodox Christian understanding of Christ's parousia, showing that TAP and the intuitions driving it are faulty. To attempt something of a corrective, I end by offering a modest theological suggestion for thinking through " the logic of total transformation. "
Journal of Analytic Theology, Apr 2017
The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on ear... more The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that have been applied to the doctrine of the resurrection: substance dualism, constitutionalism, and animalism. We argue that animalism offers a superior explanation for the necessity of the resurrection: since human persons just are their bodies, life after death requires resurrection of one's body. We conclude that Christian dualists owe us an explanation and that Christians should seriously consider the merits of animalism.
The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on ear... more The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that have been applied to the doctrine of the resurrection: substance dualism, constitutionalism, and animalism. We argue that animalism offers a superior explanation for the necessity of the resurrection: since human persons just are their bodies, life after death requires resurrection of one’s body. We conclude that Christian dualists owe us an explanation and that Christians seriously should consider the merits of animalism.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2015
In the sixteenth century, Sir Thomas More criticized Martin Luther’s purported denial of a consci... more In the sixteenth century, Sir Thomas More criticized Martin Luther’s purported denial of a conscious intermediate state between bodily death and bodily resurrection. In the same century, William Tyndale penned a response in defense of Luther’s view. His argument essentially defended the proposition: If the Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. In this article, I enter the fray and argue for the truth of this conditional claim. And, like William Tyndale, I use the content and argument of a particular chapter in the Bible, namely, 1 Corinthians 15, to make the point.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014
I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems o... more I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ (CP)], each more problematic than the next: CP1: Her definition of constitution lacks explanatory power; CP2: If there is a plausible definition of constitution, constitution implies either too many persons or no human persons at all; CP3: Constitution yields no essential distinction between human and divine persons. If my argument(s) go through, her constitution view has neither an explanation for diachronic personal identity nor personal identity through resurrection.
Book Reviews by J.T. Turner
The Expository Times, Dec 2014
The Expository Times, 2013
Philosophia Christi, 2019
The Scriptures suggest that Christians are to grow up into the “mind of Christ” or, as Craig Keen... more The Scriptures suggest that Christians are to grow up into the “mind of Christ” or, as Craig Keener calls it, the “mind of the Spirit.” While there have been a few recent works that discuss how mental sharing between the human person and the divine person(s) might contribute to sanctification (for example, Alston), there are not any that discuss a mereological account of how the mental union works with reference to the bodily resurrection. Since I understand the human’s eschatological union with the divine to be the occasion of theosis, I offer in this paper a metaphysical model of at least one aspect of theosis: a part/whole relationship between the mind of a human and the mind of the Spirit, with reference to the eschatological bodily resurrection. I call the union “mental saturation.”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2020
A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete huma... more A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete human nature could have been united hypostatically to the second Person of the Trinity. Oliver Crisp argues that a potency to have been possibly hypostati-cally united to the Logos is an important part of what it means for a human person to be made in the image of God. Against this line of reasoning, and building on an argument in print by Andrew Jaeger, I argue two things: first, that many metaphysics of human persons on offer fail to allow the Logos possibly to unite hypostatically to just any concrete human nature. And this is because, given the necessity of iden-tity (if x = y, necessarily x = y), every metaphysics that deploys an identity relation between a human person and her human nature or some essential component of her human nature fails to allow concrete human natures to be identical to any other per-son than they in fact are or else to lack some essential component that is identical to any other person than it in fact is. And, in the Incarnation, the Logos does not unite with a person. Second, supposing the preceding line of reasoning goes through, I argue that Oliver Crisp’s thesis about the imago Dei is mistaken, provided that it relies on a metaphysics of human persons that deploys an identity relation between a person and her concrete human nature or else some essential component of her concrete human nature.
Religious Studies, 2019
Many in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbu... more Many in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbus Patrum on Holy Saturday and (2) that the human nature of Jesus is a hylemorphic compound, the unity of a human soul and prime matter. I argue that (1) and (2) are incompatible; for the name ‘Jesus’, ‘Christ’, and ‘Jesus Christ’ rigidly designates a human being. But, given a certain view of hylemorphism, the human being, Jesus, ceased to exist in the time between his death and resurrection. So, Jesus did not descend to Hades/Limbus Patrum, even if God the Son did.
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2018
In this paper, I offer something of a prolegomenon, outlining some areas in which certain str... more In this paper, I offer something of a prolegomenon, outlining some areas in which certain strands of biblical theology and analytic theological reflection can be mutually informative. To do so, my paper unfolds in three ways. In the first section, I provide some reasons to think that biblical theologians are onto a reading of Scripture that merits the attention of analytic theologians. In section II, I outline some areas in the biblical theological data that would benefit from analytic exploration and reflection. Finally, in sections III and IV, I present a test case: the imago Dei and the importance of the future bodily resurrection. This should help show how this strand of biblical theology and analytic theological reflection can be mutually informative.
Journal of Reformed Theology, 2017
Typically, Christian theology includes an understanding of human afterlife consisting of two stag... more Typically, Christian theology includes an understanding of human afterlife consisting of two stages. The first is a disembodied existence as an immaterial being in the time between death and resurrection. Normally, it's affirmed that some disembodied humans go to Heaven/Paradise between one's death and resurrection; this is a state I call The Intermediate State. The second stage is the bodily resurrection. In this paper, I focus on The Intermediate State. Though the majority of the Christian tradition affirms it, I think it's mistaken. To show two reasons why, I argue that a traditional metaphysics of human persons deployed to explicate The Intermediate State brings with it one or the other of at least two untoward consequences for Christian theology.
Journal of Analytic Theology, May 2017
My argument proceeds in two stages. In §I, I sum up the intuitions of a popular argument for " sa... more My argument proceeds in two stages. In §I, I sum up the intuitions of a popular argument for " satisfaction accounts " of Purgatory that I label, TAP. I then offer an argument, taken from a few standard orthodox Christian beliefs and (at least) one axiom of Christian theology, to show that TAP is unsound. In the same section, I entertain some plausible responses to my argument that are prima facie consistent with these beliefs and axiom. I find these responses wanting. In §II, I offer a sorites puzzle and a problem of evil against TAP, given the orthodox Christian understanding of Christ's parousia, showing that TAP and the intuitions driving it are faulty. To attempt something of a corrective, I end by offering a modest theological suggestion for thinking through " the logic of total transformation. "
Journal of Analytic Theology, Apr 2017
The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on ear... more The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that have been applied to the doctrine of the resurrection: substance dualism, constitutionalism, and animalism. We argue that animalism offers a superior explanation for the necessity of the resurrection: since human persons just are their bodies, life after death requires resurrection of one's body. We conclude that Christian dualists owe us an explanation and that Christians should seriously consider the merits of animalism.
The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on ear... more The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that have been applied to the doctrine of the resurrection: substance dualism, constitutionalism, and animalism. We argue that animalism offers a superior explanation for the necessity of the resurrection: since human persons just are their bodies, life after death requires resurrection of one’s body. We conclude that Christian dualists owe us an explanation and that Christians seriously should consider the merits of animalism.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2015
In the sixteenth century, Sir Thomas More criticized Martin Luther’s purported denial of a consci... more In the sixteenth century, Sir Thomas More criticized Martin Luther’s purported denial of a conscious intermediate state between bodily death and bodily resurrection. In the same century, William Tyndale penned a response in defense of Luther’s view. His argument essentially defended the proposition: If the Intermediate State obtains, then bodily resurrection is superfluous for those in the paradisiacal state. In this article, I enter the fray and argue for the truth of this conditional claim. And, like William Tyndale, I use the content and argument of a particular chapter in the Bible, namely, 1 Corinthians 15, to make the point.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014
I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems o... more I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ (CP)], each more problematic than the next: CP1: Her definition of constitution lacks explanatory power; CP2: If there is a plausible definition of constitution, constitution implies either too many persons or no human persons at all; CP3: Constitution yields no essential distinction between human and divine persons. If my argument(s) go through, her constitution view has neither an explanation for diachronic personal identity nor personal identity through resurrection.