Beverley J Paterson | The Australian National University (original) (raw)

Papers by Beverley J Paterson

Lancet Planetary Health, 2022

Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on ... more Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre-including this research content-immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

BMJ Global Health, 2023

Global health requires evidence-based approaches to improve health and decrease inequalities. In ... more Global health requires evidence-based approaches to improve health and decrease inequalities. In a roundtable discussion between health practitioners, funders, academics and policy-makers, we recognised key areas for improvement to deliver better-informed, sustainable and equitable global health practices. These focus on considering information-sharing mechanisms and developing evidence-based frameworks that take an adaptive function-based approach, grounded in the ability to perform and respond to prioritised needs. Increasing social engagement as well as sector and participant diversity in whole-of-society decision-making, and collaborating with and optimising on hyperlocal and global regional entities, will improve prioritisation of global health capabilities. Since the skills required to navigate drivers of pandemics, and the challenges in prioritising, capacity building and response do not sit squarely in the health sector, it is essential to integrate expertise from a broad range of fields to maximise on available knowledge during decision-making and system development. Here, we review the current assessment tools and provide seven discussion points for how improvements to implementation of evidence-based prioritisation can improve global health.

BMJ Global Health, 2023

PubMed, Jun 1, 2008

The year 2007 saw the most severe influenza season since national reporting of influenza began in... more The year 2007 saw the most severe influenza season since national reporting of influenza began in 2001. Early in the season the National Incident Room was activated to provide effective national surveillance, reporting and management of the 2007 seasonal influenza outbreak. A surveillance team were tasked with establishing enhanced surveillance for the 2007 season and investigating unusual events in this outbreak. Key data required to comprehensively describe the number of cases, morbidity, mortality and virology of the influenza outbreak and the possible sources of these data were identified. In 2007 the number of laboratory-confirmed notifications for influenza was 3.1 times higher than the five-year mean. Forty-four per cent of notifications occurred in Queensland. High notification rates were reflected in an increase in presentations with influenza-like illness to sentinel general practices and Emergency Departments. Notifications and notification rates were highest in the 0-4 and 5-9 years age groups, possibly due to a bias towards testing in these age groups. The clinical morbidity of the infection in terms of complications or most affected groups cannot be determined but anecdotal reports indicate this season may have impacted young adults more than is usual. The available data suggest influenza has caused a significant burden on workplaces and the health care system as indicated by data on absenteeism and presentations for health care. The proportion of H1 strains of influenza circulating varied across Australia but was higher than 2006 in most jurisdictions. In 2007, 1,406 influenza isolates from Australia were antigenically analysed at the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza in Melbourne: 58.7% were A(H3N2), 34.4% were A(H1N1) and 6.9% were influenza B viruses. Antigenic drift away from the vaccine strain A/Wisconsin/67/2005 was observed with the A(H3N2) viruses and was also seen with most of the A(H1N1) viruses when compared with the vaccine strain A/New Caledonia/20/99. The small number of influenza B viruses examined were predominately of the B/Yamagata-lineage. Monitoring influenza through the National Incident Room during the 2007 season offered an excellent opportunity to conduct enhanced surveillance under conditions that were real and potentially serious but not an emergency. It enabled the current state of our surveillance systems to be assessed and opportunities for improvement to be identified.

Tropical Medicine and International Health, 2016

objective The Pacific Syndromic Surveillance System (PSSS), launched in 2010, provides a simple m... more objective The Pacific Syndromic Surveillance System (PSSS), launched in 2010, provides a simple mechanism by which 121 sentinel surveillance sites in 21 Pacific island countries and areas perform routine indicator-and event-based surveillance for the early detection of infectious disease outbreaks. This evaluation aims to assess whether the PSSS is meeting its objectives, what progress has been made since a formative evaluation of the system was conducted in 2011, and provides recommendations to enhance the PSSS's performance in the future. methods Twenty-one informant interviews were conducted with national operators of the system and regional public health agencies that use information generated by it. Historic PSSS data were analysed to assess timeliness and completeness of reporting. results The system is simple, acceptable and useful for public health decision-makers. The PSSS has greatly enhanced Pacific island countries' ability to undertake early warning surveillance and has contributed to efforts to meet national surveillance-related International Health Regulation (2005) capacity development obligations. Despite this, issues with timeliness and completeness of reporting, data quality and system stability persist. conclusion A balance between maintaining the system's simplicity and technical advances will need to be found to ensure its long-term sustainability, given the low-resource context for which it is designed.

New England Journal of Medicine

To the Editor: We are concerned that Yuki and Hartung (June 14 issue),(1) in their otherwise comp... more To the Editor: We are concerned that Yuki and Hartung (June 14 issue),(1) in their otherwise comprehensive review of the Guillain-Barré syndrome, have overlooked the importance of public health efforts in the surveillance of acute flaccid paralysis to the eradication of polio. Surveillance of acute flaccid paralysis, and hence Guillain-Barré syndrome, which the authors describe as the "most frequent cause of acute flaccid paralysis worldwide," is a key strategy in global efforts aimed at its eradication.(2) The recent declaration by the World Health Assembly that poliovirus eradication is a programmatic emergency for global public health(3) should convince clinicians around the . . .

Communicable diseases intelligence quarterly report, Jan 30, 2013

With eradication almost within reach, the importance of detecting every poliomyelitis case has ta... more With eradication almost within reach, the importance of detecting every poliomyelitis case has taken on additional significance. The selected surveillance strategy must be effective and efficient. A review of polio surveillance in Australia was conducted to consider whether current strategies were optimal. Document review and semi-structured key informant interviews were used to conduct the review. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and thematically analysed. The review was an iterative process with feedback on the findings sought from interviewees. Since Western Pacific Regional polio-elimination status was certified, one imported adult case was detected in 2007 in Australia, with no evidence of further transmission, and no Australian paediatric cases identified. Respondents reported that: it was not possible to prevent importations; paediatric cases were more likely to be identified than adult cases; and there may be a low level of suspicion among clinicians. Case detection and...

AS, et al. Historical data and modern methods reveal insights in measles epidemiology: a retrospe... more AS, et al. Historical data and modern methods reveal insights in measles epidemiology: a retrospective closed cohort study.

The goal of syndromic surveillance is the earlier detection of epidemics, allowing a timelier pub... more The goal of syndromic surveillance is the earlier detection of epidemics, allowing a timelier public health response than is possible using traditional surveillance methods. Syndromic surveillance application for public health purposes has changed over time and reflects a dynamic evolution from the collection, interpretation of data with dissemination of data to those who need to act, to a more holistic approach that incorporates response as a core component of the surveillance system. Recent infectious disease threats, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian influenza (H5N1) and pandemic influenza (H1N1), have all highlighted the need for countries to be rapidly aware of the spread of infectious diseases within a region and across the globe. The International Health Regulations (IHR) obligation to report public health emergencies of international concern has raised the importance of early outbreak detection and response. The emphasis in syndromic surveillance is changing from automated, early alert and detection, to situational awareness and response. Published literature on syndromic surveillance reflects the changing nature of public health threats and responses. Syndromic surveillance has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to rapidly shifting public health needs. This adaptability makes it a highly relevant public health tool.

Background: Australian bat lyssavirus (ABLV) infects a number of flying fox and insectivorous bat... more Background: Australian bat lyssavirus (ABLV) infects a number of flying fox and insectivorous bats species in Australia. Human infection with ABLV is inevitably fatal unless prior vaccination and/or post-exposure treatment (PET) is given. Despite ongoing public health messaging about the risks associated with bat contact, surveillance data have revealed a four-fold increase in the number of people receiving PET for bat exposure in NSW between 2007 and 2011. Our study aimed to better understand these humanbat interactions in order to identify additional risk communication messages that could lower the risk of potential ABLV exposure. All people aged 18 years or over whom received PET for non-occupation related potential ABLV exposure in the Hunter New England Local Health District of Australia between July 2011 and July 2013 were considered eligible for the study. Eligible participants were invited to a telephone interview to explore the circumstances of their bat contact. Interviews were then transcribed and thematically analysed by two independent investigators. Results: Of 21 eligible participants that were able to be contacted, 16 consented and participated in a telephone interview. Participants reported bats as being widespread in their environment but reported a general lack of awareness about ABLV, particularly the risk of disease from bat scratches. Participants who attempted to 'rescue' bats did so because of a deep concern for the bat's welfare. Participants reported a change in risk perception after the exposure event and provided suggestions for public health messages that could be used to raise awareness about ABLV. Conclusions: Reframing the current risk messages to account for the genuine concern of people for bat welfare may enhance the communication. The potential risk to the person and possible harm to the bat from an attempted 'rescue' should be promoted, along with contact details for animal rescue groups. The potential risk of ABLV from bat scratches merits greater emphasis.

Science, 2009

A key determinant of the success of influenza containment is the transmission rate of the novel s... more A key determinant of the success of influenza containment is the transmission rate of the novel strain. C. Fraser et al. [“Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): Early findings,” Reports, 19 June, p. [1557][1]] estimated the basic reproduction number ( R ) of the Mexican outbreak of influenza A (H1N1) to be in the range of 1.2 to 1.6. The value of R is a key measure of transmissibility and estimates the number of secondary cases in a completely susceptible population. Their findings were comparable to lower estimates for the 1918 pandemic, where R ranged from 2 to 3 ([ 1 ][2]). To further investigate the transmissibility of this novel virus, we conducted a secondary analysis of the largest reported cluster of influenza A (H1N1) ([ 2 ][3]). We used survey data from students of the St. Francis Preparatory School outbreak in the United States to calculate the effective reproduction number ( R ) in a school-based setting. R is the average number of secondary cases generated by an infectious case during an epidemic and is usually comparable to R . This survey collected data on self-reported fever and either cough or sore throat between 8 and 28 April 2009. We used the method proposed by Vynncky et al. ([ 3 ][4]) to calculate R from the growth rate of the epidemic. We based our parameter assumptions on estimates for seasonal influenza commonly reported in the literature, because such values are not yet available for H1N1. The parameters were as follows: incubation period of 2 days; infectious period of 3 days; and a calculated serial interval of 5 days. The serial interval is the time between the onset of symptoms for first and second generation cases. Using daily data from the outbreak growth phase, we calculated R to be 2.69 [95% confidence interval: 2.20 to 3.22; degrees of freedom (df) = 13]. Increasing the estimated infectious period to 5 days results in an R of 3.45 (95% confidence interval: 2.74 to 4.28; df = 13). The confidence interval for R was derived from a Monte Carlo simulation based on the uncertainty of the slope estimate. Estimates of R were relatively insensitive to the use of data from the growth phase or entire outbreak. Our calculated R is specific to this school setting and, with the increased transmission potential of a close-contact setting such as a school, is likely to be higher than transmission rates in the community-wide Mexican outbreak. The use of parameters estimated from seasonal influenza will need confirmation for the 2009 influenza A H1N1 virus. Our analysis supports the findings from Fraser et al. that this H1N1 virus has a transmission rate comparable to the lower R estimates of 2 for the 1918 pandemic ([ 1 ][2]). 1. [↵][5] 1. G. Chowell, 2. H. Nishiura, 3. L. Bettencourt , J. R. Soc. Interface 4, 155 (2007). [OpenUrl][6][Abstract/FREE Full Text][7] 2. [↵][8] 1. T. R. Frieden , Commissioner, “St. Francis Prep Update: Swine Flu Outbreak” (New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, New York, 2009); ([www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cd/h1n1\_stfrancis\_survey.pdf][9]). 3. [↵][10] 1. E. Vynncky, 2. A. Trindall, 3. P. Mangtani , Int. J. Epidemiol. 36, 881 (2007). [OpenUrl][11][Abstract/FREE Full Text][12] [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1176062 [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #ref-2 [4]: #ref-3 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1 in text" [6]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DJournal%2Bof%2BThe%2BRoyal%2BSociety%2BInterface%26rft.stitle%253DJ%2BR%2BSoc%2BInterface%26rft.issn%253D1742-5662%26rft.aulast%253DChowell%26rft.auinit1%253DG.%26rft.volume%253D4%26rft.issue%253D12%26rft.spage%253D155%26rft.epage%253D166%26rft.atitle%253DComparative%2Bestimation%2Bof%2Bthe%2Breproduction%2Bnumber%2Bfor%2Bpandemic%2Binfluenza%2Bfrom%2Bdaily%2Bcase%2Bnotification%2Bdata%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.1098%252Frsif.2006.0161%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Apmid%252F17254982%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [7]: /lookup/ijlink/YTozOntzOjQ6InBhdGgiO3M6MTQ6Ii9sb29rdXAvaWpsaW5rIjtzOjU6InF1ZXJ5IjthOjQ6e3M6ODoibGlua1R5cGUiO3M6NDoiQUJTVCI7czoxMToiam91cm5hbENvZGUiO3M6MTI6InJveWludGVyZmFjZSI7czo1OiJyZXNpZCI7czo4OiI0LzEyLzE1NSI7czo0OiJhdG9tIjtzOjI1OiIvc2NpLzMyNS81OTQ0LzEwNzEuMi5hdG9tIjt9czo4OiJmcmFnbWVudCI7czowOiIiO30= [8]: #xref-ref-2-1 "View reference 2 in text" [9]: http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cd/h1n1_stfrancis_survey.pdf [10]: #xref-ref-3-1 "View reference 3 in text" [11]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DInt.%2BJ.%2BEpidemiol.%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.1093%252Fije%252Fdym071%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Apmid%252F17517812%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [12]:…

New South Wales Public Health Bulletin, 2011

Human encephalitis in Australia causes substantial mortality and morbidity, with frequent severe ... more Human encephalitis in Australia causes substantial mortality and morbidity, with frequent severe neurological sequelae and long-term cognitive impairment. This review discusses a number of highly pathogenic zoonotic viruses which have recently emerged in Australia, including Hendra virus and Australian bat lyssavirus which present with an encephalitic syndrome in humans. Encephalitis surveillance currently focuses on animals at sentinel sites and animal disease or definitive diagnosis of notifiable conditions that may present with encephalitis. This is inadequate for detecting newly emerged viral encephalatides. Hospital-based sentinel surveillance may aid in identifying increases in known pathogens or emergence of new pathogens that require a prompt public health response.

Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2011

BMJ, 2011

Objective To assess the impact of the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic in England during the two wa... more Objective To assess the impact of the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic in England during the two waves of activity up to end of February 2010 by estimating the probabilities of cases leading to severe events and the proportion of the population infected. Design A Bayesian evidence synthesis of all available relevant surveillance data in England to estimate severity of the pandemic. Data sources All available surveillance systems relevant to the pandemic 2009 A/H1N1 influenza outbreak in England from June 2009 to February 2010. Pre-existing influenza surveillance systems, including estimated numbers of symptomatic cases based on consultations to the health service for influenza-like illness and cross sectional population serological surveys, as well as systems set up in response to the pandemic, including follow-up of laboratory confirmed cases up to end of June 2009 (FF100 and Fluzone databases), retrospective and prospective follow-up of confirmed hospitalised cases, and reported deaths associated with pandemic 2009 A/H1N1 influenza. Main outcome measures Age specific and wave specific probabilities of infection and symptomatic infection resulting in hospitalisation, intensive care admission, and death, as well as infection attack rates (both symptomatic and total). The probabilities of intensive care admission and death given hospitalisation over time are also estimated to evaluate potential changes in severity across waves. Results In the summer wave of A/H1N1 influenza, 0.54% (95% credible interval 0.33% to 0.82%) of the estimated 606 100 (419 300 to 886 300) symptomatic cases were hospitalised, 0.05% (0.03% to 0.08%) entered intensive care, and 0.015% (0.010% to 0.022%) died. These correspond to 3200 (2300 to 4700) hospital admissions, 310 (200 to 480) intensive care admissions, and 90 (80 to 110) deaths in the summer wave. In the second wave, 0.55% (0.28% to 0.89%) of the 1 352 000 (829 900 to 2 806 000) estimated symptomatic cases were hospitalised, 0.10% (0.05% to 0.16%) were admitted to intensive care, and 0.025% (0.013% to 0.040%) died. These correspond to 7500 (5900 to 9700) hospitalisations, 1340 (1030 to 1790) admissions to intensive care, and 240 (310 to 380) deaths. Just over a third (35% (26% to 45%)) of infections were estimated to be symptomatic. The estimated probabilities of infections resulting in severe events were therefore 0.19% (0.12% to 0.29%), 0.02% (0.01% to 0.03%), and 0.005% (0.004% to 0.008%) in the summer wave for hospitalisation, intensive care admission, and death respectively. The corresponding second wave probabilities are 0.19% (0.10% to 0.32%), 0.03% (0.02% to 0.06%), and 0.009% (0.004% to 0.014%). An estimated 30% (20% to 43%) of hospitalisations were detected in surveillance systems in the summer, compared with 20% (15% to 25%) in the second wave. Across the two waves, a mid-estimate of 11.2% (7.4% to 18.9%) of the population of England were infected, rising to 29.5% (16.9% to 64.1%) in 5-14 year olds. Sensitivity analyses to the evidence included suggest this infection attack rate could be as low as 5.9% (4.2% to 8.7%) or as high as 28.4% (26.0% to 30.8%). In terms of the probability that an infection leads to death in the second wave, these correspond, respectively, to a high estimate of 0.017% (0.011% to 0.024%) and a low estimate of 0.0027% (0.0024% to 0.0031%). Conclusions This study suggests a mild pandemic, characterised by case and infection severity ratios increasing between waves. Results suggest low ascertainment rates, highlighting the importance of systems enabling early robust estimation of severity, to inform optimal public health responses, particularly in light of the apparent resurgence of the 2009 A/H1N1 strain in the 2010-11 influenza season.

BMC Public Health, 2014

Background Flying foxes (megachiroptera) and insectivorous microbats (microchiroptera) are the kn... more Background Flying foxes (megachiroptera) and insectivorous microbats (microchiroptera) are the known reservoirs for a range of recently emerged, highly pathogenic viruses. In Australia there is public health concern relating to bats’ role as reservoirs of Australian Bat Lyssavirus (ABLV), which has clinical features identical to classical rabies. Three deaths from ABLV have occurred in Australia. A survey was conducted to determine the frequency of bat exposures amongst adults in Australia’s most populous state, New South Wales; explore reasons for handling bats; examine reported practices upon encountering injured or trapped bats or experiencing bat bites or scratches; and investigate knowledge of bat handling warnings. Methods A representative sample of 821 New South Wales adults aged 16 years and older were interviewed during May and June 2011, using a computer assisted telephone interview (CATI) method. Frequencies, proportions and statistical differences in proportion were perf...

Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, 2011

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the members of the Writing Committee and do n... more The opinions expressed in this article are those of the members of the Writing Committee and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions or organizations with which they are affiliated.

Lancet Planetary Health, 2022

BMJ Global Health, 2023

PubMed, Jun 1, 2008

Tropical Medicine and International Health, 2016

New England Journal of Medicine

Communicable diseases intelligence quarterly report, Jan 30, 2013

Science, 2009

New South Wales Public Health Bulletin, 2011

Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2011

BMJ, 2011

BMC Public Health, 2014

Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, 2011