SHELTER POLICY. (Hansard, 20 April 1939) (original) (raw)
The Government are now in a position to announce their policy in regard to the provision of heavily protected shelters against air attack; but, before stating the conclusions arrived at, I should like to summarise the various stages in the development of the Government's shelter policy so that the matter may be viewed as a whole and in proper perspective.
The House may recollect that on 3rd November last my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary indicated that it would be the policy of the Government to provide protection against splinter, blast and the fall of debris for all in vulnerable areas who could not fairly be expected to provide it for themselves. A fortnight later, after certain preliminary work had been carried out Departmentally, I called to my aid in settling the details of this policy three engineers of great eminence recommended for this purpose at my request by the President of the Institution of Civil Engineers. These engineers, working in conjunction with the technical advisers of my Department, presented their report on 20th December; and before the House rose for the Christmas Recess I made a detailed statement of the means by which effect was to be given to that policy and of the special Exchequer assistance to be made available.
472 It will be recalled that the policy involved the adoption of a variety of expedients according to the varying conditions under which protection had to be provided. As the House knows, the first item in that policy comprised the distribution on a very large scale of a simple type of portable steel shelter suitable for erection in the gardens or yards of two-storey dwelling-houses. The distribution of these shelters began on the 20th February and has proceeded at a rate substantially in excess of the estimates originally made by the engineers. Already over 300,000 unit shelters capable of sheltering up to 1,500,000 people have been distributed; and distribution will for the future proceed at an accelerated rate.
The next item consisted in the strengthening of suitable basements. It had been hoped that the execution of this part of the policy would proceed with equal expedition: but it soon became clear that grave doubts were entertained in certain quarters—doubts based partly on an interpretation or misinterpretation of experience in Spain and partly on considerations of a more technical character —whether basements could in fact, be made reasonably safe by the methods proposed. I felt, therefore, that before proceeding to action on a large scale it was essential that these doubts should be cleared up by further investigation and practical tests. The necessary experiments were at once taken in hand under the guidance of the three engineers already referred to. They have necessarily taken time, as the results of each test had to be studied and interpreted before the next could be arranged. The last test was completed only a fortnight ago. The result has been to demonstrate the soundness of the strengthening device proposed.
Accordingly, steps were taken on 4th April to place the first orders for material; which had necessarily been held in abeyance pending the results of these tests, and simultaneously, with the collaboration of the professional institutions and of the trades concerned in building and civil engineering work, an organisation has been created to assist the local authorities in carrying out as speedily as possible the surveys and subsequent structural work, not only for the strutting of suitable basements but for the execution of the various alternative473 courses recommended in the engineer's report in cases in which neither the portable shelter nor the strutted basement could provide a satisfactory solution. There remained the question of the deep or heavily protected shelter, which as I have explained to the House on previous occasions—would be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any part of the policy of lighter protection on which the Government have already determined.
When my Department came to grips with that problem it speedily became clear that both technical and non-technical considerations of great complexity were involved and that, while certain broad conclusions could be formulated at once, further technical investigations of a fundamental character would be essential before a final judgment could be put forward with any confidence as the basis of a practical policy. For example, the data available in this country or from sources abroad were markedly deficient in regard to such matters as the physical characteristics of what is known as blast and its physiological effects and the effect of concussion on structures buried or partly buried in the earth. The resources of an enlarged and strengthened research department were brought to bear on these problems, and at the same time various projects which had been submitted for my consideration, including what is known as the Finsbury scheme, and certain proposals for car park shelters, were submitted for examination and advice to independent experts of the highest standing. Taking advantage of the time which these investigations would inevitably occupy I thought it desirable to convene a special conference to assist me by bringing under independent review all the considerations, non-technical as well as technical, which bear upon the problem.
That conference—which met under the chairmanship of Lord Hailey and included the Hon. Member for East Woolwich (Mr. Hicks), for whose ready collaboration I am very grateful—has now submitted a most comprehensive and valuable report. This has been laid before Parliament, and copies will be available in the Vote Office this afternoon. Hon. Members will find in the report itself a full statement of the considerations which the conference took into account, and I need only state the decisions which the Government have reached after considering the report and the results so far available of the various474 technical investigations to which I have referred. These are as follow:First, no grounds are shown for departing from the policy of blast and splinter proof protection already announced and summarised earlier in this statement, and the Government will accordingly make every effort to assure its being carried out as speedily as possible in vulnerable areas. Second, an attempt to provide bomb-proof shelters on any general scale would prove impossible in practice, and would be a mistaken policy. Third, there is a case for providing heavily protected shelter for certain key points and certain vital services. Fourth, technical advice will be afforded as speedily as possible to industrialists and others as to the form or forms which such shelters might take. These are the governing decisions which have been taken in this matter. Broadly, the Government have accepted the principles of the report of the Hailey Conference, though there remain a number of points on which further consideration is required. In particular, it will rest with the Government to indicate, through the appropriate Departments, in what cases more heavily protected shelter is considered desirable in the interests of all concerned. This will present a difficult problem of selection, but it is hoped that by proceeding first with the most obvious and urgent cases a solution representing a fair balance of considerations will be worked out. In the meantime, the Government earnestly hope that all concerned will proceed as rapidly as possible, with the provision of shelter proof against blast, splinter and the fall of debris, for all people in areas exposed to risk whether at their work, in their homes or in the streets.