Marion Godman | Aarhus University (original) (raw)
Papers by Marion Godman
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2020
This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of... more This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have essences. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way that kinds are typically unified by certain core properties. We show how this unifying role offers a natural account of why certain properties are metaphysically essential to kinds.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2014
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favor of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that social motivation not only stands as a proximate account in its own right but also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g., fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications of t...
Natural kinds is a widely used and pivotal concept in philosophy-the idea being that the classifi... more Natural kinds is a widely used and pivotal concept in philosophy-the idea being that the classifications and taxonomies employed by science correspond to the real kinds in nature. Natural kinds are often opposed to the idea of kinds in the human and social sciences, which are typically seen as social constructions, characterised by changing norms and resisting scientific reduction. Yet human beings are also a subject of scientific study. Does this mean humans fall into corresponding kinds of their own? In The Epistemology and Morality of Human Kinds Marion Godman defends the idea of human kinds. She first examines the scientific use and nature of human kinds, considering the arguments of key philosophers whose work bears upon human kinds, such as Ian Hacking, John Searle, Richard Boyd and Ruth Millikan. Using the examples of gender, ethnic minorities and Buddhism she then argues that human kinds are a result of ongoing historical reproduction, chiefly due to pre-existing cultural models and social learning. Her novel argument shifts the focus away from the reductionism characteristic of research about human kinds. Instead, she argues that they are "multiply projectable" and deserving of scientific study not in spite of, but because of their role in explaining our identity, injustice and the emergence of group rights.
Synthese, Dec 17, 2018
Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important ... more Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or "special") sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind's members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individuation criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind's multiple projectable properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be cleared. Keywords Scientific realism • Historical essences • Species • Natural kinds • Path dependency • Essentialism Before the Origin, scientists had sought the intrinsic purpose and meaning of taxonomic order. Darwin replied that the ordering reflects historical pathways pure and simple
THINK: Philosophy for everyone, CUP
In this essay, I consider my relationship with my father who developed Alzheimer's disease and cr... more In this essay, I consider my relationship with my father who developed Alzheimer's disease and criticize dominant models of social interactions and relationships. I argue that the point of a relationship is not what we exchange or achieve within it. The point is not even the dependency on others for our vital needs. The point is simply that a relationship is valuable in and of itself.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Criminal Law and Philosophy
Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibil... more Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, react to the same desert-based considerations as do ascriptions of moral responsibility. In response, Stephen Morse has argued that the law should indeed be reformed so as to excuse those with severe psychopathy from blame, but that psychopaths who have committed criminal offences should still be subject to some legal repercussions such as civil commitment. We argue that consequentialist and norm-expressivist considerations analogous to those that support punishing psychopaths, or at least retaining some legal liability, might also be drawn on in favour of holding psychopaths morally accountable.
Biological Theory
In this article I examine some of the issues involved in taking psychiatric disorders as natural ... more In this article I examine some of the issues involved in taking psychiatric disorders as natural kinds. I begin by introducing a permissive model of natural kind-hood that at least prima facie seems to allow psychiatric disorders to be natural kinds. The model, however, hinges on there in principle being some grounding that is shared by all members of a kind, which explain all or most of the additional shared projectible properties. This leads us to the following question: what grounding do psychiatric disorders qua natural kinds have? My principal method for examining the issue is a case study of a particular psychiatric disorder: the so-called “apathetic children.” I argue that there appear to be at least two competing models that both appeal to non-organic a grounding of the disorder. However, for other psychiatric disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease, the evidence points toward an organic explanation of the disorder. I contend that what unites psychiatric disorders is not a distinctive type of grounding that all psychiatric disorders share, but the distinctive set of determinable properties that is shared by all psychiatric disorders.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favour of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that the social motivation hypothesis not only stands as a proximate account in its own right; it also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g. fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications the social motivation hypothesis has on existing modeling practice.
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favour of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden's fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that the social motivation not only stands as a proximate account in its own right; it also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g. fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications the social motivation hypothesis has on existing modelling practice.
Philosophical Psychology
Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain... more Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond.
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
This thesis is about natural kinds, conceived as the basic subject matter of inductive generaliza... more This thesis is about natural kinds, conceived as the basic subject matter of inductive generalizations. An account of natural kinds is developed that pays particular attention to the empirical possibility and reality of kinds in the life and human sciences. It is argued that natural kinds should be understood as groups of individuals/instances that support multiple generalizations and that they do so by no accident because the members of these groups share a basic commonality. This commonality represents the kind’s non-accidental grounding. As opposed to the prevailing attitude, it is argued that this understanding of natural kinds does allow for the inclusion of human and social kinds in the same framework as “other” natural kinds. Nor is the account overly permissive since it also rules out definitional, conventional, and functional categories.
The main part of the thesis is devoted to showing how science itself can – and often does – discover why it is no accident that a given natural kind supports a variety of generalizations by determining the kind’s grounding. Two general and exhaustive models of grounding are proposed: first, an intrinsic or non-relational account, and second, a historical account. The basic model is inspired by Ruth Millikan’s work on the historical sciences (1999), but, in contrast to her, it is contended that the two models of grounding are both applicable in the life and human sciences.
It is argued against Michael Devitt’s biological intrinsic essentialism (2008) that biological species, such as tigers and humans, are natural kinds that have historical grounds. Moreover the possibility of historically grounded kinds can also explain why we expect to find cases of variably realization in these sciences. Finally, a case of a putative natural kind in child psychiatry is discussed in some detail. It is concluded that this case neither fits Millikan’s historical model nor Ian Hacking’s “looping” account of the case (2010). Instead, it is argued that this disorder has a non-relational grounding, but that this, in turn, is only possible against the background of other historically grounded kinds. More generally, the case reveals some key epistemic and moral issues that are involved in determining the grounds of kinds in the human sciences. This supports the idea that human natural kinds have yet to receive the full attention from philosophers that they deserve.
Books by Marion Godman
Philosophy of biology 1945-2015
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2020
This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of... more This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have essences. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way that kinds are typically unified by certain core properties. We show how this unifying role offers a natural account of why certain properties are metaphysically essential to kinds.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2014
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favor of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that social motivation not only stands as a proximate account in its own right but also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g., fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications of t...
Natural kinds is a widely used and pivotal concept in philosophy-the idea being that the classifi... more Natural kinds is a widely used and pivotal concept in philosophy-the idea being that the classifications and taxonomies employed by science correspond to the real kinds in nature. Natural kinds are often opposed to the idea of kinds in the human and social sciences, which are typically seen as social constructions, characterised by changing norms and resisting scientific reduction. Yet human beings are also a subject of scientific study. Does this mean humans fall into corresponding kinds of their own? In The Epistemology and Morality of Human Kinds Marion Godman defends the idea of human kinds. She first examines the scientific use and nature of human kinds, considering the arguments of key philosophers whose work bears upon human kinds, such as Ian Hacking, John Searle, Richard Boyd and Ruth Millikan. Using the examples of gender, ethnic minorities and Buddhism she then argues that human kinds are a result of ongoing historical reproduction, chiefly due to pre-existing cultural models and social learning. Her novel argument shifts the focus away from the reductionism characteristic of research about human kinds. Instead, she argues that they are "multiply projectable" and deserving of scientific study not in spite of, but because of their role in explaining our identity, injustice and the emergence of group rights.
Synthese, Dec 17, 2018
Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important ... more Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or "special") sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind's members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individuation criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind's multiple projectable properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be cleared. Keywords Scientific realism • Historical essences • Species • Natural kinds • Path dependency • Essentialism Before the Origin, scientists had sought the intrinsic purpose and meaning of taxonomic order. Darwin replied that the ordering reflects historical pathways pure and simple
THINK: Philosophy for everyone, CUP
In this essay, I consider my relationship with my father who developed Alzheimer's disease and cr... more In this essay, I consider my relationship with my father who developed Alzheimer's disease and criticize dominant models of social interactions and relationships. I argue that the point of a relationship is not what we exchange or achieve within it. The point is not even the dependency on others for our vital needs. The point is simply that a relationship is valuable in and of itself.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Criminal Law and Philosophy
Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibil... more Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, react to the same desert-based considerations as do ascriptions of moral responsibility. In response, Stephen Morse has argued that the law should indeed be reformed so as to excuse those with severe psychopathy from blame, but that psychopaths who have committed criminal offences should still be subject to some legal repercussions such as civil commitment. We argue that consequentialist and norm-expressivist considerations analogous to those that support punishing psychopaths, or at least retaining some legal liability, might also be drawn on in favour of holding psychopaths morally accountable.
Biological Theory
In this article I examine some of the issues involved in taking psychiatric disorders as natural ... more In this article I examine some of the issues involved in taking psychiatric disorders as natural kinds. I begin by introducing a permissive model of natural kind-hood that at least prima facie seems to allow psychiatric disorders to be natural kinds. The model, however, hinges on there in principle being some grounding that is shared by all members of a kind, which explain all or most of the additional shared projectible properties. This leads us to the following question: what grounding do psychiatric disorders qua natural kinds have? My principal method for examining the issue is a case study of a particular psychiatric disorder: the so-called “apathetic children.” I argue that there appear to be at least two competing models that both appeal to non-organic a grounding of the disorder. However, for other psychiatric disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease, the evidence points toward an organic explanation of the disorder. I contend that what unites psychiatric disorders is not a distinctive type of grounding that all psychiatric disorders share, but the distinctive set of determinable properties that is shared by all psychiatric disorders.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favour of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden’s fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that the social motivation hypothesis not only stands as a proximate account in its own right; it also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g. fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications the social motivation hypothesis has on existing modeling practice.
Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychologi... more Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated social rewards. We also argue in favour of our own social motivation hypothesis over Robert Sugden's fellow-feeling account (due originally to Adam Smith). We suggest that the social motivation not only stands as a proximate account in its own right; it also provides a plausible scaffold for other more sophisticated motivations (e.g. fellow-feelings). We conclude by discussing some possible implications the social motivation hypothesis has on existing modelling practice.
Philosophical Psychology
Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain... more Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond.
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
This thesis is about natural kinds, conceived as the basic subject matter of inductive generaliza... more This thesis is about natural kinds, conceived as the basic subject matter of inductive generalizations. An account of natural kinds is developed that pays particular attention to the empirical possibility and reality of kinds in the life and human sciences. It is argued that natural kinds should be understood as groups of individuals/instances that support multiple generalizations and that they do so by no accident because the members of these groups share a basic commonality. This commonality represents the kind’s non-accidental grounding. As opposed to the prevailing attitude, it is argued that this understanding of natural kinds does allow for the inclusion of human and social kinds in the same framework as “other” natural kinds. Nor is the account overly permissive since it also rules out definitional, conventional, and functional categories.
The main part of the thesis is devoted to showing how science itself can – and often does – discover why it is no accident that a given natural kind supports a variety of generalizations by determining the kind’s grounding. Two general and exhaustive models of grounding are proposed: first, an intrinsic or non-relational account, and second, a historical account. The basic model is inspired by Ruth Millikan’s work on the historical sciences (1999), but, in contrast to her, it is contended that the two models of grounding are both applicable in the life and human sciences.
It is argued against Michael Devitt’s biological intrinsic essentialism (2008) that biological species, such as tigers and humans, are natural kinds that have historical grounds. Moreover the possibility of historically grounded kinds can also explain why we expect to find cases of variably realization in these sciences. Finally, a case of a putative natural kind in child psychiatry is discussed in some detail. It is concluded that this case neither fits Millikan’s historical model nor Ian Hacking’s “looping” account of the case (2010). Instead, it is argued that this disorder has a non-relational grounding, but that this, in turn, is only possible against the background of other historically grounded kinds. More generally, the case reveals some key epistemic and moral issues that are involved in determining the grounds of kinds in the human sciences. This supports the idea that human natural kinds have yet to receive the full attention from philosophers that they deserve.