MARTIN PALDAM | Aarhus University (original) (raw)

Papers by MARTIN PALDAM

Research paper thumbnail of Income, Growth, and Democracylooking for the Causal Structure

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Research paper thumbnail of The Religious Transition - A Long-Run Perspective

Social Science Research Network, 2009

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Research paper thumbnail of The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

European Journal of Political Economy, Mar 1, 2021

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Research paper thumbnail of Politics Matter After All

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 1991

The theoretical framework belongs to the family of political business cycles as are briefly surve... more The theoretical framework belongs to the family of political business cycles as are briefly surveyed in Table 14.1. We want to analyse (a) and (b). We therefore use the theory of partisan cycles (introduced by Hibbs, 1977) that takes off from the idea that governments have different ideologies, and that cycles are generated because governments change. The link between the different policies, as generated by the different ideologies, and the different outcomes depends crucially on the expectations regime assumed. In the original Hibbs-version of the theory there are no expectations.

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Research paper thumbnail of An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Inflation and Economic Growth in 12 Countries, 1950 to 1969

The Swedish journal of economics, Dec 1, 1973

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Research paper thumbnail of A small country in Europe's integration –generalizing the political economy of the Danish case

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2004

ABSTRACT

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Research paper thumbnail of The Pressures from the Balance of Payments: the Perspective of a Small Country

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Research paper thumbnail of Socioeconomic transitions as common dynamic processes

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Jul 4, 2016

Long-run socioeconomic transitions can be observed as stylized facts across countries and over ti... more Long-run socioeconomic transitions can be observed as stylized facts across countries and over time. For instance, poor countries have more agriculture and less democracy than rich countries, and this pattern also holds within countries for transitions from a traditional to a modern society. It is shown that the agricultural and the democratic transitions can be partly explained as the outcome of dynamic processes that are shared among countries. We identify the effects of common dynamic processes with panel estimators that allow for heterogeneous country effects and possible cross-country spillovers. Common dynamic processes appear to be in line with alternative hypotheses on the causes of socioeconomic transitions.

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Research paper thumbnail of Explaining development aid allocation by growth

Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Apr 19, 2013

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Research paper thumbnail of Does Economic Growth Lead to Political Stability?

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Research paper thumbnail of The Grievance Asymmetry Revisited: A Micro Study Of Economic Voting In Denmark, 1986-92

Social Science Research Network, Sep 15, 1999

ABSTRACT From an analysis of the economic voting of 17,100 Danes, it is demonstrated that the rea... more ABSTRACT From an analysis of the economic voting of 17,100 Danes, it is demonstrated that the reaction is about three times larger to a deterioration in the economy than to an improvement. The results point to the importance of economic stability in the welfare function. It provides an explanation of the costs of ruling. It thus explains why governments change.

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Research paper thumbnail of Salarios minimos y medios : un analisis empirico de causalidad. Los casos de argentina, brasil y chile

Minimum wage (MW) policies are an old and controversial tradition in Latin America. Controversy d... more Minimum wage (MW) policies are an old and controversial tradition in Latin America. Controversy develops principally on the different effects that in standard economic analysis are associated to MW policies such as creation of larger unem ployment, higher inflation and poorer generation of new job places in the economy. The crucial element in those analyses is the role played by MWs in explaining the movements in the average wage, a causal relationship that provides the basis for empirical testing. In this paper the causality links between minimum wages, average wages and prices are explored in the case of three Latin American countries: Ar gentina 1970/84, Brazil 1971/85 and Chile 1971/85. We start with a survey of the literature, and a brief description of the three labor markets. Our own analysis turns on the structure of causality between MWs on the one hand and average wages and prices on the other. The results are very different in the three countries. In Argentina we did not find strong evidence of causality running from minimum wages to average wages; MWs have apparently not played a very significant role in the Argentinean price/wage dynamics. The results for Chile are at the other extreme: there are very significant causal links both from price/wage rises to MW-rises and the other way. In this case, however, weakness of statistical causality between employment and wages indicates that the real effects of MW increases are small. Finally, the results from Brazil tell a more complex story: The strongest causal chain goes from price rises to MWs and from MWs to both skilled and uns killed wages. We conclude that WW is a policy instrument used in very different ways in the three countries and through a very different degree of enforcement. * Este trabajo fue presentado en el Encuentro Latinoamericano de la Sociedad Econometrica en 1986, en Argentina. Agradecemos especialmente los comentarios de Mario Blejer, Assar Lind beck, Constantino Lluch, Yoav Kislev y de un arbitro anonimo de Cuadernos de Economia, como tambien a los ayudantes de investigacion Jorge Miranda Meave y Steen Lau Jorgensen. Este trabajo y el Apendice sobre la tecnica y la filosofia de los tests de causalidad seran publica dos en espanol, como dos publicaciones separadas. Como deseamos que las versiones en espanol e ingles sean relativamente parecidas, existe un poco mas superposicion que la necesaria entre el Apendice y el texto principal. ** DRLDLM, Banco Mundial, Universidad de Aarhus, Aarhus, Dinamarca. *** DRLDLM, Banco Mundial, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.112 on Mon, 03 Oct 2016 05:43:18 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 290 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA N° 73

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Research paper thumbnail of The political dimension of economic growth : proceedings of the IEA Conference held in San José, Costa Rica

Macmillan , St. Martin's Press eBooks, 1998

The International Economic Association - Acknowledgements - List of Contributors and Participants... more The International Economic Association - Acknowledgements - List of Contributors and Participants - Abbreviations and Acronyms - Preface - Introduction S.Borner - PART 1: THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT - Institutions as Investments R.H.Bates - Some Lessons on the Efficiency of Democracy from a Study of Dictatorship R.Wintrobe - The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: the Invisible Hand and the Use of Force M.Olson & M.McGuire - Causes of Change in Political-Economic Regimes P.Bernholz - PART 2: VOLATILITY, UNCERTAINTY, INSTITUTIONAL INSTABILITY AND GROWTH - Macroeconomic Volatility and Economic Development M.Gavin & R.Hausmann - Political Variables in Growth Regressions A.Brunetti - Political Stability and Economic Stagnation P.Keefer & S.Knack - Political Uncertainty, the Formation of New Activities and Growth J.Aizenman - Does Economic Growth Lead to Political Stability? M.Paldam - PART 3: RENT SEEKING AND CORRUPTION - Corruption and Rent Seeking J.M.Mbaku - Corruption and Countervailing Action in Pakistan M.S.Alam - PART 4: CASE STUDIES: POLICIES, COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - Disinflation and Overvaluation R.Dornbusch - Government Policy, Saving and Growth in Latin America V.Corbo - Growth and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1920-96 V.Borooah - Donor Conditionality and Policy Reform T.Killick - Institutional Analysis of Technical Cooperation D.Kattermann - PART 5: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM - Developing Democracy in Developing Countries B.Frey - Ethnic Rent Seeking, Stability and Institutional Reform in Sub-Sahara Africa M.S.Kimenyi - Healing Sick Institutions R.Klitgaard - PART 6: COMMENTS B.Weder, G.P.Pfeffermann & G.Shepherd

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Research paper thumbnail of The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

European Journal of Political Economy, 2021

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Research paper thumbnail of A model of the representative economist, as researcher and policy advisor

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018

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Research paper thumbnail of Skating on thin evidence: Implications for public policy

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018

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Research paper thumbnail of The Political Economy of Regulating Gambling

Gaming in the New Market Environment, 2008

Page 195. 184 8 The Political Economy of Regulating Gambling Illustrated with the Danish case Mar... more Page 195. 184 8 The Political Economy of Regulating Gambling Illustrated with the Danish case Martin Paldam1 8.1 Introduction: Three types of regulation with two purposes Gambling2 is a range of service products that is regulated in most coun-tries. ...

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Research paper thumbnail of The Good Society

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Research paper thumbnail of Comment on D. G. Blanchflower and A. J. Oswald, "The Wage Curve

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1990

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Research paper thumbnail of A small country in Europe's integration

A contract between a small country and a large organization is analyzed using an Edgeworth- Box m... more A contract between a small country and a large organization is analyzed using an Edgeworth- Box model. The population of the country is divided into two groups: people and elite. The contract has two explicit parameters: an exchange of so vereignty and a net transfer. A small country is defined as one where people consider the power they gain in the organiza tion to be infinitesimal. The elite recognize that they get a net power gain. Further, there are two implicit parameters, t he big-country advantage and some rents. It is shown that the lens for the elite is much larger than the lens for the population. In a dynamic integration process the contract will inevitably leave the lens. It is finally discussed if it is likely that the resistance of people will erode over time.

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Research paper thumbnail of Income, Growth, and Democracylooking for the Causal Structure

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The Religious Transition - A Long-Run Perspective

Social Science Research Network, 2009

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

European Journal of Political Economy, Mar 1, 2021

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Politics Matter After All

Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 1991

The theoretical framework belongs to the family of political business cycles as are briefly surve... more The theoretical framework belongs to the family of political business cycles as are briefly surveyed in Table 14.1. We want to analyse (a) and (b). We therefore use the theory of partisan cycles (introduced by Hibbs, 1977) that takes off from the idea that governments have different ideologies, and that cycles are generated because governments change. The link between the different policies, as generated by the different ideologies, and the different outcomes depends crucially on the expectations regime assumed. In the original Hibbs-version of the theory there are no expectations.

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Research paper thumbnail of An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Inflation and Economic Growth in 12 Countries, 1950 to 1969

The Swedish journal of economics, Dec 1, 1973

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of A small country in Europe's integration –generalizing the political economy of the Danish case

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2004

ABSTRACT

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Research paper thumbnail of The Pressures from the Balance of Payments: the Perspective of a Small Country

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Socioeconomic transitions as common dynamic processes

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Jul 4, 2016

Long-run socioeconomic transitions can be observed as stylized facts across countries and over ti... more Long-run socioeconomic transitions can be observed as stylized facts across countries and over time. For instance, poor countries have more agriculture and less democracy than rich countries, and this pattern also holds within countries for transitions from a traditional to a modern society. It is shown that the agricultural and the democratic transitions can be partly explained as the outcome of dynamic processes that are shared among countries. We identify the effects of common dynamic processes with panel estimators that allow for heterogeneous country effects and possible cross-country spillovers. Common dynamic processes appear to be in line with alternative hypotheses on the causes of socioeconomic transitions.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Explaining development aid allocation by growth

Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Apr 19, 2013

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Does Economic Growth Lead to Political Stability?

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The Grievance Asymmetry Revisited: A Micro Study Of Economic Voting In Denmark, 1986-92

Social Science Research Network, Sep 15, 1999

ABSTRACT From an analysis of the economic voting of 17,100 Danes, it is demonstrated that the rea... more ABSTRACT From an analysis of the economic voting of 17,100 Danes, it is demonstrated that the reaction is about three times larger to a deterioration in the economy than to an improvement. The results point to the importance of economic stability in the welfare function. It provides an explanation of the costs of ruling. It thus explains why governments change.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Salarios minimos y medios : un analisis empirico de causalidad. Los casos de argentina, brasil y chile

Minimum wage (MW) policies are an old and controversial tradition in Latin America. Controversy d... more Minimum wage (MW) policies are an old and controversial tradition in Latin America. Controversy develops principally on the different effects that in standard economic analysis are associated to MW policies such as creation of larger unem ployment, higher inflation and poorer generation of new job places in the economy. The crucial element in those analyses is the role played by MWs in explaining the movements in the average wage, a causal relationship that provides the basis for empirical testing. In this paper the causality links between minimum wages, average wages and prices are explored in the case of three Latin American countries: Ar gentina 1970/84, Brazil 1971/85 and Chile 1971/85. We start with a survey of the literature, and a brief description of the three labor markets. Our own analysis turns on the structure of causality between MWs on the one hand and average wages and prices on the other. The results are very different in the three countries. In Argentina we did not find strong evidence of causality running from minimum wages to average wages; MWs have apparently not played a very significant role in the Argentinean price/wage dynamics. The results for Chile are at the other extreme: there are very significant causal links both from price/wage rises to MW-rises and the other way. In this case, however, weakness of statistical causality between employment and wages indicates that the real effects of MW increases are small. Finally, the results from Brazil tell a more complex story: The strongest causal chain goes from price rises to MWs and from MWs to both skilled and uns killed wages. We conclude that WW is a policy instrument used in very different ways in the three countries and through a very different degree of enforcement. * Este trabajo fue presentado en el Encuentro Latinoamericano de la Sociedad Econometrica en 1986, en Argentina. Agradecemos especialmente los comentarios de Mario Blejer, Assar Lind beck, Constantino Lluch, Yoav Kislev y de un arbitro anonimo de Cuadernos de Economia, como tambien a los ayudantes de investigacion Jorge Miranda Meave y Steen Lau Jorgensen. Este trabajo y el Apendice sobre la tecnica y la filosofia de los tests de causalidad seran publica dos en espanol, como dos publicaciones separadas. Como deseamos que las versiones en espanol e ingles sean relativamente parecidas, existe un poco mas superposicion que la necesaria entre el Apendice y el texto principal. ** DRLDLM, Banco Mundial, Universidad de Aarhus, Aarhus, Dinamarca. *** DRLDLM, Banco Mundial, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.112 on Mon, 03 Oct 2016 05:43:18 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 290 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA N° 73

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Research paper thumbnail of The political dimension of economic growth : proceedings of the IEA Conference held in San José, Costa Rica

Macmillan , St. Martin's Press eBooks, 1998

The International Economic Association - Acknowledgements - List of Contributors and Participants... more The International Economic Association - Acknowledgements - List of Contributors and Participants - Abbreviations and Acronyms - Preface - Introduction S.Borner - PART 1: THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT - Institutions as Investments R.H.Bates - Some Lessons on the Efficiency of Democracy from a Study of Dictatorship R.Wintrobe - The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: the Invisible Hand and the Use of Force M.Olson & M.McGuire - Causes of Change in Political-Economic Regimes P.Bernholz - PART 2: VOLATILITY, UNCERTAINTY, INSTITUTIONAL INSTABILITY AND GROWTH - Macroeconomic Volatility and Economic Development M.Gavin & R.Hausmann - Political Variables in Growth Regressions A.Brunetti - Political Stability and Economic Stagnation P.Keefer & S.Knack - Political Uncertainty, the Formation of New Activities and Growth J.Aizenman - Does Economic Growth Lead to Political Stability? M.Paldam - PART 3: RENT SEEKING AND CORRUPTION - Corruption and Rent Seeking J.M.Mbaku - Corruption and Countervailing Action in Pakistan M.S.Alam - PART 4: CASE STUDIES: POLICIES, COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - Disinflation and Overvaluation R.Dornbusch - Government Policy, Saving and Growth in Latin America V.Corbo - Growth and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1920-96 V.Borooah - Donor Conditionality and Policy Reform T.Killick - Institutional Analysis of Technical Cooperation D.Kattermann - PART 5: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM - Developing Democracy in Developing Countries B.Frey - Ethnic Rent Seeking, Stability and Institutional Reform in Sub-Sahara Africa M.S.Kimenyi - Healing Sick Institutions R.Klitgaard - PART 6: COMMENTS B.Weder, G.P.Pfeffermann & G.Shepherd

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Research paper thumbnail of The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

European Journal of Political Economy, 2021

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of A model of the representative economist, as researcher and policy advisor

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Skating on thin evidence: Implications for public policy

European Journal of Political Economy, 2018

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The Political Economy of Regulating Gambling

Gaming in the New Market Environment, 2008

Page 195. 184 8 The Political Economy of Regulating Gambling Illustrated with the Danish case Mar... more Page 195. 184 8 The Political Economy of Regulating Gambling Illustrated with the Danish case Martin Paldam1 8.1 Introduction: Three types of regulation with two purposes Gambling2 is a range of service products that is regulated in most coun-tries. ...

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Research paper thumbnail of The Good Society

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Comment on D. G. Blanchflower and A. J. Oswald, "The Wage Curve

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1990

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of A small country in Europe's integration

A contract between a small country and a large organization is analyzed using an Edgeworth- Box m... more A contract between a small country and a large organization is analyzed using an Edgeworth- Box model. The population of the country is divided into two groups: people and elite. The contract has two explicit parameters: an exchange of so vereignty and a net transfer. A small country is defined as one where people consider the power they gain in the organiza tion to be infinitesimal. The elite recognize that they get a net power gain. Further, there are two implicit parameters, t he big-country advantage and some rents. It is shown that the lens for the elite is much larger than the lens for the population. In a dynamic integration process the contract will inevitably leave the lens. It is finally discussed if it is likely that the resistance of people will erode over time.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact