Lambros Pechlivanos | Athens University of Economics and Business (original) (raw)

Papers by Lambros Pechlivanos

Social Science Research Network, Oct 4, 1999

International Conference on E-Business and Telecommunication Networks, 2006

This paper studies management when the principal has different degrees of commitment power. In a ... more This paper studies management when the principal has different degrees of commitment power. In a model in which both the principal and agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, implicit incentives arise when the principal is not able to commit herself to long-term contracts. The presence of implicit incentives makes the agents more reluctant to behave cooperatively (they actually have incentives to 'sabotage' their colleagues). This forces the principal to offer more 'collectively oriented' incentive schemes than in the presence of commitment, in order to induce the desired level of cooperation. Moreover, teamwork exposes agents to higher risks than the ones they are exposed to in a Taylorist workplace. We find that the optimal team size is constrained by risk considerations, and is decreasing in the uncertainty of the production technology and in the time horizon of the team.

An optimization-based control framework that simultaneously determines the optimal inventory and ... more An optimization-based control framework that simultaneously determines the optimal inventory and product pricing policies is developed for multi-product, multi-echelon supply chain networks. The optimization problem aims at adjusting the available manufacturing resources, product transportation, inventories and prices for the entire supply chain network to satisfy demand while maximizing network’s revenues and service level, through the minimization of unsatisfied demand, over a specified rolling time horizon. The control scheme employs model predictive control principles with local feedback inventory controllers for the satisfaction of the overall objectives. Customer demand responses to product prices are taken directly into consideration through the explicit utilization of demand elasticity. The optimal manipulation of the product prices acts as an additional instrument for the efficient operation of the supply chain through the direction of product demand in less congested parts...

Abstract------------------------------The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-va... more Abstract------------------------------The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. Bikhchandani (1988) has shown that if it is common knowledge that a bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent, this bidder (almost surely) never wins the auction. This paper is the first to show that this result does not carry through when one allows for two-sided uncertainty. Whe show that even if the probabilities that one of the bidders is advantaged while the other one is disadvantaged are arbitrarily large, in every equilibrium, the disadvantaged bidder needs to win the auction with strictly positive probability. We then solve for the equilibria in two cases (one with two types and another with a continuum of types) and we characterize their expected revenues properties. We find that although they underperform relative to "comparable " symmetric auctions, they perform much better than what it...

European Journal of Operational Research, 2008

E-commerce will strongly penetrate the market if coupled with appropriate technologies and mechan... more E-commerce will strongly penetrate the market if coupled with appropriate technologies and mechanisms. Mobile agents may enhance the intelligence and improve the efficiency of systems in the e-marketplace. We propose a dynamic multi-lateral negotiation model and construct an efficient negotiation strategy based on a ranking mechanism that does not require a complicated rationale on behalf of the buyer agents. This strategy can be used to extend the functionality of autonomous intelligent agents, so that they quickly reach to an agreement aiming to maximise their owner’s utility. The framework proposed considers both contract and decision issues, is based on real market conditions, and has been empirically evaluated. Moreover, it is shown that in a linear framework like the one we employ, more elaborate ranking mechanisms do not necessarily improve efficiency.

Journal of Labor Economics, 2002

Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking, 2015