David Corey - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Books by David Corey
The Sophists in Plato's Dialogues
The Just War Tradition (with J. Daryl Charles)
Papers by David Corey
COURSE OVERVIEW The backdrop for this course is supplied by contemporary events—by the problem of... more COURSE OVERVIEW The backdrop for this course is supplied by contemporary events—by the problem of international terrorism and the current attempt to address this problem through war. However, this is not a course on terrorism or on the “war against terror” per se; it is a course on the power of great texts to help us think deeply, ethically and concretely about war, and thus to debate the justice of any particular war in philosophically fruitful ways. As such, this is a course in the connection between citizenship, philosophy and tradition—in the ways that rich traditions of politicalphilosophical reflection can be brought to bear effectively on issues of contemporary life. The course begins with a session on “formulating questions.” In this introductory session we face the challenge of admitting our ignorance and trying to articulate the questions we would most like to answer. We turn then to a seven-week long, in-depth study of the just-war tradition, focusing on the authors and t...
This dissertation is a study of the Greek sophists as teachers of aretê (virtue or human excellen... more This dissertation is a study of the Greek sophists as teachers of aretê (virtue or human excellence) and a study of the conflict between sophistic and Socratic political values as portrayed in the dialogues of Plato. The first section offers a new definition of the term "sophist" based on ancient sources and attempts to present as clear a picture as is historically possible of the sophists' activities. The second section examines and evaluates Plato's criticisms of the sophists drawing attention especially to the dependence of certain criticisms upon a questionable set of epistemological assumptions about the role of knowledge in ethical action. And the final section describes in detail what the sophists understood aretê to entail and how they went about teaching it. ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETING THE SOPHISTS To say that the Greek sophists have captured the imagination of political theorists and philosophers is an understatement. They have in fact been studied and commented upon by almost every major political thinker since Hegel. In Leo Strauss's work, for example, the sophists feature prominently as the harbingers of what he terms "vulgar conventionalism," the belief that "by nature everyone seeks only his own good" and that the greatest good is "to have more than others or to rule others." 1 In Eric Voegelin, they appear as the "prototype of disorder," thinkers who resist with falsehoods and lies the "true order of the human psyche" and the "one type of true humanity," the philosopher. 2 In other writers the sophists appear not as villains but as heroes: Eric Havelock presents them as the earliest known "liberals," while Cynthia Farrar more recently casts them (some of them, at any rate) as the first democratic political theorists. 3 What is most striking, however, is not that the sophists should be deemed centrally important for the history of political thought-indeed, this might have been expected, since Plato devotes six dialogues to them and mentions them repeatedly in ten others. What is most striking is that there is so little scholarly agreement as to why the sophists are so important.
Πολιτεία LIBER AMICORUM AGOSTINO CARRINO MIMESIS / IL PRINCIPE E LA REPUBBLICA, 2020
In this essay I try to demystify the concept of “nationalism.” The task is complicated, because t... more In this essay I try to demystify the concept of “nationalism.” The
task is complicated, because the political rhetoric surrounding
nationalism—the rhetoric for and against it—has reached a fever
pitch in the United States and Europe. It is also complicated because
so many commentators have tried to sidestep the difficult questions
surrounding nationalism by repairing to a less-than-perfectly
helpful distinction, that between “nationalism” and “patriotism.”
This distinction is, no doubt, meant to clarify—to sort out bad from
good, intemperate from temperate. But it is a highly artificial
distinction, nonetheless, and has tended, unfortunately, to obscure
rather than clarify what most needs to be explored.
Reclaiming Liberalism, ed. Hardwick & Marsh, 2020
The effort to reclaim liberalism will require some understanding of what kind of liberalism to re... more The effort to reclaim liberalism will require some understanding of what kind of liberalism to reclaim. What is liberalism? What has happened historically such that it needs to be reclaimed? These turn out to be difficult questions. In this essay I propose a theoretical account of liberalism, a way of understanding what it is and why it has undergone such dramatic changes over the course of its history. At the heart of my account is the claim that liberalism did not come into being as an independent historical phenomenon but was rather a contingent aspect of a much broader, more powerfully sweeping historical movement, the “modern quest for freedom,” which predates liberalism, gives rise to it, and eventually overtakes it—at which point the quest for freedom itself (notoriously) retains the name “liberalism” in the United States for reasons partly principled, partly expedient. The theory of liberalism on offer here occupies the bulk of this essay, but it is not the only contribution I hope to make. My account of liberalism facilitates a unique assessment of some of its current weaknesses. And this in turn makes possible a concrete analysis of what an effort to reclaim liberalism might look like. In the end, I argue that the politics of warring freedoms (what contemporary liberalism has in part become) should give way to a markedly different conception of politics, which I call the politics of liberal truce.
National Affairs, 2020
Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in department... more Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in departments of philosophy and political science still lay claim to the field, those who actually have something illuminating to say about our political world are few and far between. We have no modern-day Plato or Aristotle, no Hobbes or Hegel, not even a Hannah Arendt or a Michael Oakeshott to offer us much-needed perspective. Why is this? Why are we more likely to learn something fresh about politics today from elite journalists, sociologists, and psychologists than from political philosophers? What is going on in our undergraduate and graduate curricula that stunts the development of political philosophy? Why are our professional journals filled more with articles about the history of political philosophy than with political philosophy itself? These are hard questions to answer, but they deserve attention. Something has gone wrong with the kind of pedagogy that is likely to make political philosophy possible. It has been corrupted by those who undervalue, as well as those who overvalue, the great texts of the discipline. It has been undercut by the overly cynical and the suspicious. And it has too often been shaped by apologists, activists, and ideologues rather than those who take the fundamental questions of politics seriously. It is worth considering what a more solid and constructive political-philosophical pedagogy would look like while responding to some of the distracting ideas and practices that now get in its way. In so doing, we might discover how political philosophy can once again become valued and well practiced.
Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in department... more Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in departments of Philosophy and Political Science still lay claim to the field, those who actually have something illuminating to say about our political world are few and far between. We have no modern-day Plato or Aristotle, no Hobbes or Hegel, not even a Hannah Arendt or a Michael Oakeshott to offer us much-needed perspective. Why is this? Why are we more likely to learn something fresh about politics today from elite journalists, sociologists, and psychologists than from political philosophers? What is going on in our undergraduate and graduate curricula that stunts the development of political philosophy? Why are our professional journals filled more with articles about the history of political philosophy than with political philosophy itself? These are hard questions to answer, but they nevertheless deserve attention. In my view something has gone wrong-or rather many things have gone wrong-with the kind of pedagogy that is likely to make political philosophy possible. Our pedagogy has been corrupted by those who undervalue as well as those who overvalue the great texts of the discipline. It has been undercut by the overly cynical and suspicious. And it has too often been shaped by apologists, activists, and ideologues rather than those who take the fundamental questions of politics seriously. In this essay I want to describe what I take to be a solid political-philosophical pedagogy and to respond to some of the distracting ideas and practices that now get in its way. In so doing, I hope to show how political philosophy might once again become valued and practiced.
Anamnesis, 2017
Abstract: People often think about justice in war in the simplest terms: some group commits an in... more Abstract: People often think about justice in war in the simplest terms: some group commits an injustice; another group attempts to remedy the wrong by means of force. But in fact the pursuit of justice is never so simple. While attempting to remedy wrongs of one kind, agents of justice commit wrongs of another. Nor is this easily avoidable. Rather, justice itself seems to admit of ambiguities that frustrate even our best efforts to correct wrongs. In this essay I expose the ambiguities of justice in war by analyzing real-world and literary examples. In so doing, I reveal some ethical issues that the just war tradition has not, to date, adequately addressed. To conclude, I explain why recognition of the ambiguities of justice in war is both morally and strategically advantageous.
Michael Oakeshott on Authority, Governance, and the State, 2019
Michael Oakeshott worried that during his lifetime liberal democracies had become dangerously obl... more Michael Oakeshott worried that during his lifetime liberal democracies had become dangerously oblivious to the problem of political legitimacy—the problem of ensuring that government power be used in ways that respect the freedom and political equality of all citizens. In this essay, I deepen Oakeshott’s concern by arguing that there has never been a successful theoretical argument to establish why some citizens should be able to exercise political power over other citizens under conditions of freedom and political equality. I conclude by considering the implications of this argument for the size and scope of liberal government today, particularly in the United States.
The Imaginative Conservative, 2015
Journal of American Affairs
Journal of Political Ideologies , 2014
Michael Oakeshott's critique of 'political rationalism' is often regarded as a unique contributio... more Michael Oakeshott's critique of 'political rationalism' is often regarded as a unique contribution to the study of 20th-century 'ideologies.' But, in fact, Oakeshott understood rationalism and ideology as distinct phenomena. This article exposes the essence of each in Oakeshott's writings, analyses their complex relationship and shows how far back in human history they reached. Neither was, for Oakeshott, distinctly modern. In fact, he traced ideology and rationalism alike to the birth of philosophy in ancient Greece, even while he acknowledged important differences in their ancient and modern manifestations. Oakeshott's outlook with respect to these phenomena was significantly more pessimistic than that of other 20th-century analysts. He did not think our problems were easily curable. He did, however, harbour some hope (albeit dreamy) that in the domain of politics in particular, the metaphor of 'conversation' might somehow loosen the grip of ideological thought and action.
Forthcoming in Cosmos+Taxis
Dogmatomachy (ideological warfare) is a term borrowed from the work of the late political philoso... more Dogmatomachy (ideological warfare) is a term borrowed from the work of the late political philosopher, Eric Voegelin . In this essay I claim that it has infected contemporary liberaldemocratic politics, and I analyze it (using a method I appropriate from Michael Oakeshott) in terms of its logical postulates: abstraction, absolutization and the belief that total victory is achievable in domestic political disputes. I then show the folly of approaching politics in this manner by contrasting the constraints that necessarily characterize human politics with the relatively unconstrained politics exhibited by the mythopoetic figure of Olympian Zeus. In the end I conjecture that dogmatomachy, while wrongheaded as an approach to everyday politics, is likely to be with us for a long time, though I hold out some hope that by understanding its defects we may begin to seek its cure.
“Voegelin and Aristotle on Nous: What is Noetic Political Science?” The Review of Politics 64, no.1 (2002): 57-79
This paper considers the extent to which Eric Voegelin’s mature writings supply a basis for a sub... more This paper considers the extent to which Eric Voegelin’s mature writings supply a basis for a substantive ethical and political science. It does so by examining Voegelin’s understanding of nous as the ground for theorizing, and by relating this back to Aristotle. Aristotle is shown to have understood the activities of nous in two distinct ways. On the one hand, nous is the divine activity of the soul exploring its own ground. But nous is also induction (epagôgê) of the first principles of science through sense perception, memory and experience. The two basic activities of nous are related, but they have different values when it comes to the world of particulars. It is the argument of this paper that a substantive ethical and political science—one that sheds light on particulars—must include the inductive employment of nous and that the exclusion of this from Voegelin’s political science results in some discernible limitations.
The Sophists in Plato's Dialogues
The Just War Tradition (with J. Daryl Charles)
COURSE OVERVIEW The backdrop for this course is supplied by contemporary events—by the problem of... more COURSE OVERVIEW The backdrop for this course is supplied by contemporary events—by the problem of international terrorism and the current attempt to address this problem through war. However, this is not a course on terrorism or on the “war against terror” per se; it is a course on the power of great texts to help us think deeply, ethically and concretely about war, and thus to debate the justice of any particular war in philosophically fruitful ways. As such, this is a course in the connection between citizenship, philosophy and tradition—in the ways that rich traditions of politicalphilosophical reflection can be brought to bear effectively on issues of contemporary life. The course begins with a session on “formulating questions.” In this introductory session we face the challenge of admitting our ignorance and trying to articulate the questions we would most like to answer. We turn then to a seven-week long, in-depth study of the just-war tradition, focusing on the authors and t...
This dissertation is a study of the Greek sophists as teachers of aretê (virtue or human excellen... more This dissertation is a study of the Greek sophists as teachers of aretê (virtue or human excellence) and a study of the conflict between sophistic and Socratic political values as portrayed in the dialogues of Plato. The first section offers a new definition of the term "sophist" based on ancient sources and attempts to present as clear a picture as is historically possible of the sophists' activities. The second section examines and evaluates Plato's criticisms of the sophists drawing attention especially to the dependence of certain criticisms upon a questionable set of epistemological assumptions about the role of knowledge in ethical action. And the final section describes in detail what the sophists understood aretê to entail and how they went about teaching it. ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETING THE SOPHISTS To say that the Greek sophists have captured the imagination of political theorists and philosophers is an understatement. They have in fact been studied and commented upon by almost every major political thinker since Hegel. In Leo Strauss's work, for example, the sophists feature prominently as the harbingers of what he terms "vulgar conventionalism," the belief that "by nature everyone seeks only his own good" and that the greatest good is "to have more than others or to rule others." 1 In Eric Voegelin, they appear as the "prototype of disorder," thinkers who resist with falsehoods and lies the "true order of the human psyche" and the "one type of true humanity," the philosopher. 2 In other writers the sophists appear not as villains but as heroes: Eric Havelock presents them as the earliest known "liberals," while Cynthia Farrar more recently casts them (some of them, at any rate) as the first democratic political theorists. 3 What is most striking, however, is not that the sophists should be deemed centrally important for the history of political thought-indeed, this might have been expected, since Plato devotes six dialogues to them and mentions them repeatedly in ten others. What is most striking is that there is so little scholarly agreement as to why the sophists are so important.
Πολιτεία LIBER AMICORUM AGOSTINO CARRINO MIMESIS / IL PRINCIPE E LA REPUBBLICA, 2020
In this essay I try to demystify the concept of “nationalism.” The task is complicated, because t... more In this essay I try to demystify the concept of “nationalism.” The
task is complicated, because the political rhetoric surrounding
nationalism—the rhetoric for and against it—has reached a fever
pitch in the United States and Europe. It is also complicated because
so many commentators have tried to sidestep the difficult questions
surrounding nationalism by repairing to a less-than-perfectly
helpful distinction, that between “nationalism” and “patriotism.”
This distinction is, no doubt, meant to clarify—to sort out bad from
good, intemperate from temperate. But it is a highly artificial
distinction, nonetheless, and has tended, unfortunately, to obscure
rather than clarify what most needs to be explored.
Reclaiming Liberalism, ed. Hardwick & Marsh, 2020
The effort to reclaim liberalism will require some understanding of what kind of liberalism to re... more The effort to reclaim liberalism will require some understanding of what kind of liberalism to reclaim. What is liberalism? What has happened historically such that it needs to be reclaimed? These turn out to be difficult questions. In this essay I propose a theoretical account of liberalism, a way of understanding what it is and why it has undergone such dramatic changes over the course of its history. At the heart of my account is the claim that liberalism did not come into being as an independent historical phenomenon but was rather a contingent aspect of a much broader, more powerfully sweeping historical movement, the “modern quest for freedom,” which predates liberalism, gives rise to it, and eventually overtakes it—at which point the quest for freedom itself (notoriously) retains the name “liberalism” in the United States for reasons partly principled, partly expedient. The theory of liberalism on offer here occupies the bulk of this essay, but it is not the only contribution I hope to make. My account of liberalism facilitates a unique assessment of some of its current weaknesses. And this in turn makes possible a concrete analysis of what an effort to reclaim liberalism might look like. In the end, I argue that the politics of warring freedoms (what contemporary liberalism has in part become) should give way to a markedly different conception of politics, which I call the politics of liberal truce.
National Affairs, 2020
Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in department... more Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in departments of philosophy and political science still lay claim to the field, those who actually have something illuminating to say about our political world are few and far between. We have no modern-day Plato or Aristotle, no Hobbes or Hegel, not even a Hannah Arendt or a Michael Oakeshott to offer us much-needed perspective. Why is this? Why are we more likely to learn something fresh about politics today from elite journalists, sociologists, and psychologists than from political philosophers? What is going on in our undergraduate and graduate curricula that stunts the development of political philosophy? Why are our professional journals filled more with articles about the history of political philosophy than with political philosophy itself? These are hard questions to answer, but they deserve attention. Something has gone wrong with the kind of pedagogy that is likely to make political philosophy possible. It has been corrupted by those who undervalue, as well as those who overvalue, the great texts of the discipline. It has been undercut by the overly cynical and the suspicious. And it has too often been shaped by apologists, activists, and ideologues rather than those who take the fundamental questions of politics seriously. It is worth considering what a more solid and constructive political-philosophical pedagogy would look like while responding to some of the distracting ideas and practices that now get in its way. In so doing, we might discover how political philosophy can once again become valued and well practiced.
Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in department... more Political philosophy seems to have fallen on hard times. Though plenty of academics in departments of Philosophy and Political Science still lay claim to the field, those who actually have something illuminating to say about our political world are few and far between. We have no modern-day Plato or Aristotle, no Hobbes or Hegel, not even a Hannah Arendt or a Michael Oakeshott to offer us much-needed perspective. Why is this? Why are we more likely to learn something fresh about politics today from elite journalists, sociologists, and psychologists than from political philosophers? What is going on in our undergraduate and graduate curricula that stunts the development of political philosophy? Why are our professional journals filled more with articles about the history of political philosophy than with political philosophy itself? These are hard questions to answer, but they nevertheless deserve attention. In my view something has gone wrong-or rather many things have gone wrong-with the kind of pedagogy that is likely to make political philosophy possible. Our pedagogy has been corrupted by those who undervalue as well as those who overvalue the great texts of the discipline. It has been undercut by the overly cynical and suspicious. And it has too often been shaped by apologists, activists, and ideologues rather than those who take the fundamental questions of politics seriously. In this essay I want to describe what I take to be a solid political-philosophical pedagogy and to respond to some of the distracting ideas and practices that now get in its way. In so doing, I hope to show how political philosophy might once again become valued and practiced.
Anamnesis, 2017
Abstract: People often think about justice in war in the simplest terms: some group commits an in... more Abstract: People often think about justice in war in the simplest terms: some group commits an injustice; another group attempts to remedy the wrong by means of force. But in fact the pursuit of justice is never so simple. While attempting to remedy wrongs of one kind, agents of justice commit wrongs of another. Nor is this easily avoidable. Rather, justice itself seems to admit of ambiguities that frustrate even our best efforts to correct wrongs. In this essay I expose the ambiguities of justice in war by analyzing real-world and literary examples. In so doing, I reveal some ethical issues that the just war tradition has not, to date, adequately addressed. To conclude, I explain why recognition of the ambiguities of justice in war is both morally and strategically advantageous.
Michael Oakeshott on Authority, Governance, and the State, 2019
Michael Oakeshott worried that during his lifetime liberal democracies had become dangerously obl... more Michael Oakeshott worried that during his lifetime liberal democracies had become dangerously oblivious to the problem of political legitimacy—the problem of ensuring that government power be used in ways that respect the freedom and political equality of all citizens. In this essay, I deepen Oakeshott’s concern by arguing that there has never been a successful theoretical argument to establish why some citizens should be able to exercise political power over other citizens under conditions of freedom and political equality. I conclude by considering the implications of this argument for the size and scope of liberal government today, particularly in the United States.
The Imaginative Conservative, 2015
Journal of American Affairs
Journal of Political Ideologies , 2014
Michael Oakeshott's critique of 'political rationalism' is often regarded as a unique contributio... more Michael Oakeshott's critique of 'political rationalism' is often regarded as a unique contribution to the study of 20th-century 'ideologies.' But, in fact, Oakeshott understood rationalism and ideology as distinct phenomena. This article exposes the essence of each in Oakeshott's writings, analyses their complex relationship and shows how far back in human history they reached. Neither was, for Oakeshott, distinctly modern. In fact, he traced ideology and rationalism alike to the birth of philosophy in ancient Greece, even while he acknowledged important differences in their ancient and modern manifestations. Oakeshott's outlook with respect to these phenomena was significantly more pessimistic than that of other 20th-century analysts. He did not think our problems were easily curable. He did, however, harbour some hope (albeit dreamy) that in the domain of politics in particular, the metaphor of 'conversation' might somehow loosen the grip of ideological thought and action.
Forthcoming in Cosmos+Taxis
Dogmatomachy (ideological warfare) is a term borrowed from the work of the late political philoso... more Dogmatomachy (ideological warfare) is a term borrowed from the work of the late political philosopher, Eric Voegelin . In this essay I claim that it has infected contemporary liberaldemocratic politics, and I analyze it (using a method I appropriate from Michael Oakeshott) in terms of its logical postulates: abstraction, absolutization and the belief that total victory is achievable in domestic political disputes. I then show the folly of approaching politics in this manner by contrasting the constraints that necessarily characterize human politics with the relatively unconstrained politics exhibited by the mythopoetic figure of Olympian Zeus. In the end I conjecture that dogmatomachy, while wrongheaded as an approach to everyday politics, is likely to be with us for a long time, though I hold out some hope that by understanding its defects we may begin to seek its cure.
“Voegelin and Aristotle on Nous: What is Noetic Political Science?” The Review of Politics 64, no.1 (2002): 57-79
This paper considers the extent to which Eric Voegelin’s mature writings supply a basis for a sub... more This paper considers the extent to which Eric Voegelin’s mature writings supply a basis for a substantive ethical and political science. It does so by examining Voegelin’s understanding of nous as the ground for theorizing, and by relating this back to Aristotle. Aristotle is shown to have understood the activities of nous in two distinct ways. On the one hand, nous is the divine activity of the soul exploring its own ground. But nous is also induction (epagôgê) of the first principles of science through sense perception, memory and experience. The two basic activities of nous are related, but they have different values when it comes to the world of particulars. It is the argument of this paper that a substantive ethical and political science—one that sheds light on particulars—must include the inductive employment of nous and that the exclusion of this from Voegelin’s political science results in some discernible limitations.
“The Sophists,” in the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought (2014).
“The Case Against Teaching Virtue for Pay: Socrates and the Sophists,” History of Political Thought 23, no. 2 (2002): 189-210
The practice of teaching virtue (arete) for pay was typical of the Greek sophists but consistentl... more The practice of teaching virtue (arete) for pay was typical of the Greek sophists but consistently eschewed by their contemporary Socrates. Plato and Xenophon offer various explanations for Socrates' refusal to take pay, explanations intended not only to reflect favourably upon their teacher but also to reflect negatively upon the sophists. Indeed, Plato and Xenophon have been so persuasive in this regard that the mere fact of accepting pay has become a common source of invective against the sophists. This paper examines and evaluates these passages of Plato and Xenophon in light of the historical information we have concerning sophistic and Socratic pedagogy in general and it reaches two major conclusions: first, that most of the reasons ascribed to Socrates for refusing to accept pay are sufficiently problematic to raise serious doubts about their authenticity and, second, that none of these reasons functions successfully as a general critique of the sophists.
Less than a month earlier, Jean Elshtain, a distinguished professor at the University of Chicago,... more Less than a month earlier, Jean Elshtain, a distinguished professor at the University of Chicago, wrote an editorial for the Los Angeles Times, in which she too discussed Iraq in light of the just war tradition. But she reached a different conclusion: she saw a -strong case‖ for the use of force against the Hussein regime. Her argument was buttressed by a number of factors, including the seventeen UN sanctions that Iraq had ignored and which the UN had failed to enforce, egregious human rights violations perpetrated by Iraq against its own people since the late ‗70s, genocidal practices against the Kurds, Hussein's repeated threats of terrorism against US and European interests, and the destabilizing effect of his policies on the region. Elshtain ended by pointing out that the mere fact that -America's political and military leaders take seriously the question of just cause, and restrain themselves in their use of force, is a credit to the continuing relevance of the just war tradition in our violent world.‖ I juxtapose these clashing commentaries not to defend a particular view about American involvement in Iraq but rather to raise a more basic question: what is the just war tradition? The question, I realize, sounds elementary. And yet I do not assume that Carter and Elshtain agree completely in their understanding of this tradition, nor do I assume all of us in this room would feel comfortable saying exactly what it is. I wrote a question for a national survey recently which revealed that only 19% of college seniors today (some of our most highly educated citizens)-only 19% can distinguish a valid criterion of a just war from a list of bogus criteria presented in a multiple choice format. The seniors included students from our nation's leading institutions-Harvard, Yale and Princeton, among them. This suggests that we are failing to impart to our own the most basic understanding of a just war. And yet this is troubling-for if Carter and Elshtain agree in one thing (and they may not agree in much more), it is that the just war tradition is the proper framework for collective deliberations about war; both claim, indeed, that if we forsake this tradition, we shall forfeit our credibility in the world, no longer being the people we once were.
David Corey's Professional Webpage
Undergraduate Course for Non-Musicians on the Tradition of Classical Music in the West
Non-specialist, undergraduate course on the tradition of western classical music
Friends and Colleagues, This is a draft of a syllabus for a course I'm teaching this fall. Const... more Friends and Colleagues, This is a draft of a syllabus for a course I'm teaching this fall. Constructive critical feedback welcome.