edward kane | Boston College (original) (raw)

edward kane

Edward J. Kane is Professor of Finance at Boston College. From 1972 to 1992 he held the Everett D.Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University. Previously, he taught at Princeton and Iowa State. A founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, he rejoined the organization in 2005 until its disbandment in 2015. Kane served for twelve years as a trustee and member of the finance committee of Teachers Insurance. He was a senior fellow in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial Research until 2014. Kane has consulted for numerous agencies, including the World Bank, IMF, several components of the FederalReserve System, and three foreign central banks. He consulted as well for the congressional Budget Office, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Office ofTechnology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. He is a past president and fellow of the American Finance Association and a former Guggenheim Fellow. He also served as president of the International Atlantic Economic Society and the NorthAmerican Economics and Finance Association. Kane is a longtime research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Besides authoring three books, he has published widely in professional journals and still serves on five editorial boards. He received his BS from Georgetown University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Address: Tucson, Arizona, United States

less

Uploads

Papers by edward kane

The Journal of Finance, 1978

The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, 1990

This paper uses the methods of cultural anthropology to explain why tougher stress tests, higher ... more This paper uses the methods of cultural anthropology to explain why tougher stress tests, higher capital requirements, and additional liquidity requirements are insufficient to end too-big-to-fail subsidies to megabanks.

China Finance Review International

PurposeThis paper explains the value of interpreting the design of a country's financial safe... more PurposeThis paper explains the value of interpreting the design of a country's financial safety net as an exercise in incomplete social contracting.Design/methodology/approachSafety net contracts unlucky financial institutions and customers to transfer some or all of what would otherwise be ruinous losses to taxpayers in other sectors. Their capacity to do this is based on a series of unspoken and slowly varying cultural norms that govern when government support is supplied to an insolvent bank, in what forms, on what terms and under what limitations. Identifying these norms is the purpose of this paper. Identifying similarities in the norms that hold sway in the United States and China is the main contribution this paper has to offer.FindingsRegulators do not want to face the consequences of challenging large insolvent banks' claims that funding problems that their managers know to be hopeless reflect a spate of reversible bad luck and a temporary shortfall in liquidity. In...

Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions in the NAFTA Countries and Beyond

ABSTRACT Too Big to Fail policies make taxpayers into disadvantaged equity investors in favored f... more ABSTRACT Too Big to Fail policies make taxpayers into disadvantaged equity investors in favored firms. Taxpayers deserve to receive dividends and disclosure rights on this equity. One way to do this would be to establish trusteeships with the right to issue treasury stock if dividends are interrupted.

Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 1970