Andreja Novakovic | University of California, Berkeley (original) (raw)

Uploads

Papers by Andreja Novakovic

In 1780 Frederick II pushed the Prussian Academy to put forward a controversial question for a pu... more In 1780 Frederick II pushed the Prussian Academy to put forward a controversial question for a public essay contest: "Is it useful for the people to be deceived, be it by leading it into new errors or by confirming it in those which it upholds?" Although Hegel would have been too young to participate in the contest, he took two later opportunities to provide what would have been his answer. Whereas the Phenomenology of Spirit evaluates Enlightenment's charge that religious faith is based on deception, the Philosophy of Right suggests that public opinion formation tends to lead to collective self-deception. In both versions of his answer, however, Hegel argues that it is impossible to deceive a people about its essence. In this paper I clarify what Hegel means by a people's essence and why he thinks it impossible to deceive a people about it.

In her book Tomorrow Sex Will be Good Again, Katherine Angel writes that "how we understand sex i... more In her book Tomorrow Sex Will be Good Again, Katherine Angel writes that "how we understand sex is inextricable from how we understand what it is to be a person". I bring together Angel’s idea of sexual encounters as learning processes, during which we learn what it is to be a person, and Hegel’s discussion of the experience of desire in his Phenomenology of Spirit. I argue that Hegel’s analysis of "immediate desire" in paragraph 175 can be fruitfully read through the lens of erotic desire, where the object of desire turns out to be another subject of desire.

Transformative experiences are widely discussed today because they seem to pose a special problem... more Transformative experiences are widely discussed today because they seem to pose a special problem for decision making. In my paper, I focus on a species of transformative experiences – conversion experiences – that are not preceded by a decision to become transformed. If we take aesthetic and religious conversions as examples, we see that conversions look like absurd occurrences not only in the moment, but also in hindsight. This is a challenge for the transformative experiences at issue in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. According to my proposal, Hegel thinks of these experiences as conversion-like in some respects, but he also holds that they can be reconstructed in the form of an argument. It is just that this argument is always going to trail in the wake of whatever transformative experiences themselves first disclose.

Simone de Beauvoir famously describes housework as a kind of torment: day after day, you have to ... more Simone de Beauvoir famously describes housework as a kind of torment: day after day, you have to wash dishes, dust furniture, etc. She concludes that because housework is endlessly repetitive, it cannot provide a person with a reason for living. I compare her account of housework with two conceptions of housework that presented it in a more positive light. The first is Silvia Federici's in her manifesto "Wages against Housework", which argues that housework has a social value in virtue of which it deserves to be waged. The second is Chantal Akerman's in her film "Jeanne Dielman", which depicts housework lovingly as demanding and satisfying. Although Federici and Akerman shared some of Beauvoir's ambivalence toward housework as a way of life, their aim was to make housework visible and to show its neglected significance.

In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel draws a favorable comparison between his project... more In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel draws a favorable comparison between his project and Plato’s Republic, while making a critical comment about an example taken from Plato’s Laws. In this paper we investigate what Hegel’s assessment of Plato’s two texts in political philosophy illuminates about his conception of ethical education and the extent to which his own method allows a philosopher to contribute to the process of making people good. We show that although Hegel agrees with Plato that one becomes good by becoming “a citizen in a state with good laws” (PR §153), he believes that philosophy must remain faithful to its limited role in determining what these are going to be.

Hegel’s Science of Logic tracks the self-contained and self-generated development of what Hegel c... more Hegel’s Science of Logic tracks the self-contained and self-generated development of what Hegel calls the concept. My question is: can the concept in the Logic surprise itself? I argue that the answer to that question is yes – the concept can surprise itself when it rediscovers itself in a place it did not expect to be. I first clarify the kind of perspective that the Logic asks us as readers to occupy and its difference from the perspective inside the “opposition” of consciousness. I then provide an example of the concept’s self-surprise, namely, the transition from subjective to realized purpose in the Subjective Logic. I conclude by drawing out some implications of self-surprise for Hegel’s method in the Logic and in the subsequent Realphilosophie.

In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes a set of practices, according to which women fulfill ... more In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes a set of practices, according to which women fulfill their "vocation" by working to sustain their family, whereas men work in civil society and the state. This paper examines how Hegel attempts to justify this gendered division of labor. In particular, I argue that Hegel takes the gendered division of labor to be a species of a division of mediating labor, according to which it is part of some people's job to represent one sphere in another. This, however, does not show that a gendered division of labor is either necessary or optimal in a rational social order. My paper concludes by asking what Hegel’s justification of the gendered division of labor tells us about his overall methodology.

Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a "second nature." This strategy has puzzled those ... more Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a "second nature." This strategy has puzzled those who assume that second nature represents a deficient appearance of ethical life, one that needs to be overcome, supplemented, or constantly challenged. I argue that Hegel identifies ethical life with a second nature because he thinks that a social order only becomes a candidate for ethical life if it provides a context conducive to the development of what I call "real habits." First, I show that a criterion for a real habit can be found in Hegel's Anthropology, namely, that of liberation. Next, I explain how the state, as Hegel analyzes it in the Philosophy of Right, provides such an environment by enabling trust toward and within it. I then consider two literary examples of contexts that fail to be similarly supportive-Coates' Between the World and Me and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale-concluding with reasons for thinking that real habits are an integral part of ethical life.

This chapter charts the critical reception of Hegel's social and political philosophy in the hand... more This chapter charts the critical reception of Hegel's social and political philosophy in the hands of Susan Blow, Anna Brackett, and Marietta Kies, members of a group known as the St. Louis Hegelians. I situate them in the philosophical movement of American idealism and argue that there is a common thread permeating their disagreements with Hegel, for each raises an implicit objection to Hegel's delineation of a rational social order. Susan Blow challenges Hegel's views on the institutional context of early childhood education, Anna Brackett Hegel's gendered division of labor, and Marietta Kies Hegel's differentiation of the motives in civil society and in the state. What their writings show is that Hegel's concrete description of ethical life, specifically of the boundaries between its social spheres, needs to be amended in order to make it relevant to an American context in the second half of the 19th century.

In this paper I ask why Hegel considers history’s “slaughter bench” to be one its redeemable feat... more In this paper I ask why Hegel considers history’s “slaughter bench” to be one its redeemable features and how this is compatible with his conception of human value, specifically his simultaneous insistence that human beings are not to be regarded as ever mere means for historical development, but as ends-in-themselves. I answer these questions by comparing his conception of human value to that in Kant’s formula of humanity, to which Hegel clearly alludes, and situating Hegel’s conception inside his philosophy of history. What I argue is that Hegel thinks human beings are never mere means because they aim at freedom simply in virtue of holding convictions, however misguided these may be, in this way sharing in the aim of history’s own development. I conclude by bringing Hegel’s account of human sacrifice to bear on W. G. Sebald’s On the Natural History of Destruction.

Hegel claims that nothing truly great has ever been accomplished in history without passion. In ... more Hegel claims that nothing truly great has ever been accomplished in history without passion. In this paper I aim to explain what he means by passion and why he holds it in such high esteem, even though he thinks that its great contribution is limited to historical contexts. I consider the role of passion in the cunning of reason, proposing that passion be understood as a concrete expression of reason. I also argue that passion illuminates the structure of motivation in general, specifically the relationship between “universality” and “particularity” embodied in what Hegel refers to as the matter-at-hand. Finally, I turn to the peculiarity of passion, showing that passion in the historically relevant sense differs from other motives because it is invested in an unrealized cause and involves the sacrifice of ordinary life.

Book Reviews by Andreja Novakovic

In 1780 Frederick II pushed the Prussian Academy to put forward a controversial question for a pu... more In 1780 Frederick II pushed the Prussian Academy to put forward a controversial question for a public essay contest: "Is it useful for the people to be deceived, be it by leading it into new errors or by confirming it in those which it upholds?" Although Hegel would have been too young to participate in the contest, he took two later opportunities to provide what would have been his answer. Whereas the Phenomenology of Spirit evaluates Enlightenment's charge that religious faith is based on deception, the Philosophy of Right suggests that public opinion formation tends to lead to collective self-deception. In both versions of his answer, however, Hegel argues that it is impossible to deceive a people about its essence. In this paper I clarify what Hegel means by a people's essence and why he thinks it impossible to deceive a people about it.

In her book Tomorrow Sex Will be Good Again, Katherine Angel writes that "how we understand sex i... more In her book Tomorrow Sex Will be Good Again, Katherine Angel writes that "how we understand sex is inextricable from how we understand what it is to be a person". I bring together Angel’s idea of sexual encounters as learning processes, during which we learn what it is to be a person, and Hegel’s discussion of the experience of desire in his Phenomenology of Spirit. I argue that Hegel’s analysis of "immediate desire" in paragraph 175 can be fruitfully read through the lens of erotic desire, where the object of desire turns out to be another subject of desire.

Transformative experiences are widely discussed today because they seem to pose a special problem... more Transformative experiences are widely discussed today because they seem to pose a special problem for decision making. In my paper, I focus on a species of transformative experiences – conversion experiences – that are not preceded by a decision to become transformed. If we take aesthetic and religious conversions as examples, we see that conversions look like absurd occurrences not only in the moment, but also in hindsight. This is a challenge for the transformative experiences at issue in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. According to my proposal, Hegel thinks of these experiences as conversion-like in some respects, but he also holds that they can be reconstructed in the form of an argument. It is just that this argument is always going to trail in the wake of whatever transformative experiences themselves first disclose.

Simone de Beauvoir famously describes housework as a kind of torment: day after day, you have to ... more Simone de Beauvoir famously describes housework as a kind of torment: day after day, you have to wash dishes, dust furniture, etc. She concludes that because housework is endlessly repetitive, it cannot provide a person with a reason for living. I compare her account of housework with two conceptions of housework that presented it in a more positive light. The first is Silvia Federici's in her manifesto "Wages against Housework", which argues that housework has a social value in virtue of which it deserves to be waged. The second is Chantal Akerman's in her film "Jeanne Dielman", which depicts housework lovingly as demanding and satisfying. Although Federici and Akerman shared some of Beauvoir's ambivalence toward housework as a way of life, their aim was to make housework visible and to show its neglected significance.

In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel draws a favorable comparison between his project... more In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel draws a favorable comparison between his project and Plato’s Republic, while making a critical comment about an example taken from Plato’s Laws. In this paper we investigate what Hegel’s assessment of Plato’s two texts in political philosophy illuminates about his conception of ethical education and the extent to which his own method allows a philosopher to contribute to the process of making people good. We show that although Hegel agrees with Plato that one becomes good by becoming “a citizen in a state with good laws” (PR §153), he believes that philosophy must remain faithful to its limited role in determining what these are going to be.

Hegel’s Science of Logic tracks the self-contained and self-generated development of what Hegel c... more Hegel’s Science of Logic tracks the self-contained and self-generated development of what Hegel calls the concept. My question is: can the concept in the Logic surprise itself? I argue that the answer to that question is yes – the concept can surprise itself when it rediscovers itself in a place it did not expect to be. I first clarify the kind of perspective that the Logic asks us as readers to occupy and its difference from the perspective inside the “opposition” of consciousness. I then provide an example of the concept’s self-surprise, namely, the transition from subjective to realized purpose in the Subjective Logic. I conclude by drawing out some implications of self-surprise for Hegel’s method in the Logic and in the subsequent Realphilosophie.

In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes a set of practices, according to which women fulfill ... more In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes a set of practices, according to which women fulfill their "vocation" by working to sustain their family, whereas men work in civil society and the state. This paper examines how Hegel attempts to justify this gendered division of labor. In particular, I argue that Hegel takes the gendered division of labor to be a species of a division of mediating labor, according to which it is part of some people's job to represent one sphere in another. This, however, does not show that a gendered division of labor is either necessary or optimal in a rational social order. My paper concludes by asking what Hegel’s justification of the gendered division of labor tells us about his overall methodology.

Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a "second nature." This strategy has puzzled those ... more Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a "second nature." This strategy has puzzled those who assume that second nature represents a deficient appearance of ethical life, one that needs to be overcome, supplemented, or constantly challenged. I argue that Hegel identifies ethical life with a second nature because he thinks that a social order only becomes a candidate for ethical life if it provides a context conducive to the development of what I call "real habits." First, I show that a criterion for a real habit can be found in Hegel's Anthropology, namely, that of liberation. Next, I explain how the state, as Hegel analyzes it in the Philosophy of Right, provides such an environment by enabling trust toward and within it. I then consider two literary examples of contexts that fail to be similarly supportive-Coates' Between the World and Me and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale-concluding with reasons for thinking that real habits are an integral part of ethical life.

This chapter charts the critical reception of Hegel's social and political philosophy in the hand... more This chapter charts the critical reception of Hegel's social and political philosophy in the hands of Susan Blow, Anna Brackett, and Marietta Kies, members of a group known as the St. Louis Hegelians. I situate them in the philosophical movement of American idealism and argue that there is a common thread permeating their disagreements with Hegel, for each raises an implicit objection to Hegel's delineation of a rational social order. Susan Blow challenges Hegel's views on the institutional context of early childhood education, Anna Brackett Hegel's gendered division of labor, and Marietta Kies Hegel's differentiation of the motives in civil society and in the state. What their writings show is that Hegel's concrete description of ethical life, specifically of the boundaries between its social spheres, needs to be amended in order to make it relevant to an American context in the second half of the 19th century.

In this paper I ask why Hegel considers history’s “slaughter bench” to be one its redeemable feat... more In this paper I ask why Hegel considers history’s “slaughter bench” to be one its redeemable features and how this is compatible with his conception of human value, specifically his simultaneous insistence that human beings are not to be regarded as ever mere means for historical development, but as ends-in-themselves. I answer these questions by comparing his conception of human value to that in Kant’s formula of humanity, to which Hegel clearly alludes, and situating Hegel’s conception inside his philosophy of history. What I argue is that Hegel thinks human beings are never mere means because they aim at freedom simply in virtue of holding convictions, however misguided these may be, in this way sharing in the aim of history’s own development. I conclude by bringing Hegel’s account of human sacrifice to bear on W. G. Sebald’s On the Natural History of Destruction.

Hegel claims that nothing truly great has ever been accomplished in history without passion. In ... more Hegel claims that nothing truly great has ever been accomplished in history without passion. In this paper I aim to explain what he means by passion and why he holds it in such high esteem, even though he thinks that its great contribution is limited to historical contexts. I consider the role of passion in the cunning of reason, proposing that passion be understood as a concrete expression of reason. I also argue that passion illuminates the structure of motivation in general, specifically the relationship between “universality” and “particularity” embodied in what Hegel refers to as the matter-at-hand. Finally, I turn to the peculiarity of passion, showing that passion in the historically relevant sense differs from other motives because it is invested in an unrealized cause and involves the sacrifice of ordinary life.