Ilya Matveev | University of California, Berkeley (original) (raw)

Papers by Ilya Matveev

Problems of Post-Communism, 2024

The article studies a set of ideological orientations and policy networks in Russia that could be... more The article studies a set of ideological orientations and policy networks in Russia that could be grouped under the term "technocratic liberalism." It provides an account of the origins of the liberal economic experts, their participation in various reform projects, their political and discursive strategies. The focus is on the contradictions of the technocratic approach to reform as revealed in the discourse and actual practice of the reformers, and their attempts to overcome or avoid these contradictions that ultimately led them to the position they found themselves in after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Dossier THE WAR IN UKRAINE & THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONALISM, 2023

FES RUSSIA PROGRAMME – THE RUSSIAN CRISIS, 2023

Санкции, «частичная» мобилизация и сама война оказали крайне негативное влияние на уровень жизни ... more Санкции, «частичная» мобилизация и сама война оказали крайне негативное влияние на уровень жизни и социальную защищенность в России. Хотя экономического коллапса удалось избежать, страна за- шла на новый виток кризиса. В отчёте определены не- сколько областей, в которых негативный эффект был особенно серьёзным: бедность и уровень жизни, ситуация в промышленных районах, здравоохранение, НКО и демография. Нынешний кризис оставляет мало возможностей для сокращения бедности и увеличения реальных до- ходов в среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе. Эмиграция квалифицированных специалистов в области здравоохранения и социальной работы будет остро ощущаться уязвимыми слоями населения.

FES RUSSIA PROGRAMME – “THE RUSSIAN CRISIS“, 2023

Living standards and social protection in Russia have been negatively and profoundly affected by ... more Living standards and social protection in Russia have been negatively and profoundly affected by economic sanctions, the army draft and the war itself. While the economic collapse has been avoided, the stage is set for a renewed social crisis. The report identifies several areas in which the negative impact has been particularly significant: poverty and living standards, the situation in industrial areas, healthcare, the non-profit organisations and demography. The current crisis leaves little opportunity to decrease poverty and increase real incomes in the medium and long term. The emigration of skilled professionals in healthcare and social work will be felt acutely by vulnerable groups.

Russian Politics, 2023

While Russia became widely known in the 1990s for its experiment in shock therapy, by the mid-200... more While Russia became widely known in the 1990s for its experiment in shock therapy, by the mid-2000s the Kremlin pioneered a new set of policies that amounted to the national variant of the developmentalist approach. In this article, we take stock of the Russian developmentalism, focusing on the role of ideas, the institution-building by the federal and regional governments as well as specific developmental policies. While state-oriented, interventionist approach to economic development has had some successes on the level of individual industries, regions and projects, on the whole, it failed to achieve transformational developmental outcomes. The economy has stagnated for over a decade and the Russian export basket is less sophisticated than it was 20 years ago. We argue that the failure of the Russian approach to developmentalism cannot be reduced to corruption and rent-seeking: the lack of an effective coordination mechanism and a consistent policy strategy underpinned by a foundation in heterodox economics have also played a role.

Политика аполитичных. Гражданские движения в России 2011— 2013 годов, 2014

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Oct 27, 2022

Государственный капитализм сегодня находится в центре академических и политических дискуссий. Для... more Государственный капитализм сегодня находится в центре академических и политических дискуссий. Для одних он ассоциируется со смелой, неортодоксальной стратегией устойчивого экономического роста, для других – с опасным заблуждением, сопутствующим авторитаризму и коррупции. Если исторически государственный капитализм анализировался в марксистской традиции, то после возобновления интереса к этому явлению в конце 2000-х гг. оно оказалось в центре новой междисциплинарной области исследований на стыке экономики, политологии, менеджмента и социологии организаций, антропологии. Существует несколько интерпретаций государственного капитализма: он рассматривается контексте в промышленной политики (стимулирования экономического роста и технологического усложнения экономики), социальной политики (предотвращения безработицы, обеспечения низких цен на определенные товары и услуги), рентоориентированного поведения элит и патронажа, внешней политики и защиты национального суверенитета, финансиализации, глобализации и др. Государственный капитализм анализируется как на микроуровне отдельных отраслей, регионов и проектов, так и на макроуровне национальных экономик в целом. С начала 2000-х гг. Россия рассматривается как один из парадигматических случаев возвращения государства в экономику. В настоящем обзоре мы демонстрируем, что первая волна исследований российского государственного капитализма в 2000-х гг., за редкими исключениями, рассматривала его как проявление рентоориентированного поведения политических элит. Однако последующие исследования поставили под сомнение эту интерпретацию. Государственный капитализм в России стал рассматриваться как инструмент экономического развития, хотя и приносящий смешанные результаты, инструмент решения социальных проблем, особенно в моногородах, геополитический инструмент и средство защиты национального суверенитета, проводник финансиализации. Многочисленные эмпирические исследования государственного участия в российской экономике, появившиеся в 2010-е гг., демонстрируют, что российский государственный капитализм – сложное и многогранное явление. В то же время мы констатируем, что в данном исследовательском поле пока не произошла систематизация результатов и российская политическая экономия все еще ожидает макроанализа, учитывающего все ее структурные и институциональные особенности.

Index on Censorship, 2022

Russian Analytical Digest, 2022

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over 40 countries have introduced sanctions again... more In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over 40 countries have introduced sanctions against Russia. The new restrictions concern finance, trade, logistics, and personal sanctions against businessmen and officials. In addition, more than 1,000 companies have ceased or limited their activities in Russia. In this article, I argue that the sanctions, despite their unprecedented scale, have not led to the collapse of the Russian economy, yet their effect is dramatic, multi-faceted, and will increase over time.

Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2022

The disastrous military campaign, unprecedented Western sanctions and the ensuing economic crisis... more The disastrous military campaign, unprecedented Western sanctions and the ensuing economic crisis tested the resilience of the Russian regime. Putin’s political system withstood the test; and his grip on power is as strong as ever. However, his ability to solve Russia’s problems and achieve constructive goals is another matter.

Socialist Register, 2022

This essay explores the dynamics of political polarization in Russia with a particular focus on c... more This essay explores the dynamics of political polarization in Russia with a particular focus on class. We find that the divide between the pro-reform camp and the left-nationalist opposition in the 1990s had a distinctly class character. In the 2000s, the polarization in society receded – both due to the objective factors (sustained economic recovery) and Vladimir Putin’s clever symbolic politics. However, the price to pay was widespread political apathy and the emergence of an authoritarian regime. In the 2010s, this regime was challenged by a new mass movement demanding fair elections and political liberties. The spell of depoliticization was broken, yet the new opposition politics had a rather narrow social base in the educated urban middle class. Furthermore, we find that the movement itself became the site of class formation, creating a common identity for the highly educated, yet often economically struggling intelligentsia and the successful private-sector professionals and entrepreneurs.

In the subsequent years, the regime attempted to politicize its own supporters through conservative and nationalist propaganda, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. During this period, the Kremlin pitted its loyal electorate in the rural and small-town ‘heartland’ against the ‘big city liberals’ who joined the opposition movement. Thus, the Russian regime acquired the familiar features of right-wing populism. Nevertheless, the Kremlin stopped one step away from creating its own loyalist street movement as it feared that such movement could eventually escape control and become dangerous for the regime itself. At the same time, Alexei Navalny, who by 2017-2018 assumed the leading role in the opposition movement, himself turned to populism, widening the movement’s social base and geographical scope. Currently, the regime struggles to maintain legitimacy, frequently resorting to repression. The opposition coalition is far wider than it was ten years ago, yet its populist politics is incoherent and contradictory. The Russian left, on the contrary, has a consistent set of programmatic commitments, yet it suffers from organizational weakness, ideological blind-spots and strategic mistakes. Nevertheless, both the opposition movement and its left wing carry on despite the constantly increasing pressure from an authoritarian state.

Journal of Labor and Society, 2021

Russia experienced both economic and geopolitical expansion in the 2000s. During this time, the K... more Russia experienced both economic and geopolitical expansion in the 2000s. During this time, the Kremlin and big business worked in tandem to assert Russian influence in post-Soviet space. However, the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 marked a new period that severed the state’s geopolitical strategy and the interests of big capital. While the state continues to engage in open and covert military action, the activity of Russian business abroad has sharply diminished. Relying on David Harvey’s concepts of territorial and capitalist logics of power, the article explores the interplay between political and economic imperialism during Putin’s 20 years in power and situates Russia within today’s global imperialist landscape. I find that the Kremlin’s geopolitical and geoeconomic shift in 2014 can ultimately be explained by the strategic orientation of the country’s leadership, in particular, the deeply ingrained emphasis on security and ‘hard power’. However, the turn away from economic imperialism was also structurally determined by the exhaustion of the country’s economic engine that no longer generates surplus capital in need of a ‘spatial fix’.

Russian Analytical Digest, 2021

Income inequality in Russia is increasingly discussed in academic circles and society at large. H... more Income inequality in Russia is increasingly discussed in academic circles and society at large. However, different data sources produce different estimates of inequality. According to household surveys, income inequality in Russia corresponds to that of European countries. Official Rosstat figures indicate a higher level of inequality closer to that of the United States. Finally, various attempts at augmenting survey data with tax records produce even higher estimates, placing Russia among the world's most unequal nations, such as Brazil and South Africa. Due to the dramatic underrepresentation of the top incomes in the survey data, it is likely that tax-based estimates are the closest to the truth. While it is safe to say that income inequality in Russia is very high, the direction of its change in the last 20 years remains unclear. This issue cannot be resolved without more detailed statistics from the Federal Tax Office over a longer period of time.

Europe-Asia Studies, 2020

The purpose of this article is to place developments in welfare policy since 2012 in the context ... more The purpose of this article is to place developments in welfare policy since 2012 in the context of the different models of welfare restructuring in Russia. We focus on President Vladimir Putin’s Decree No. 597, which set out to raise the salaries of doctors, teachers and other categories of public employees. We find that neoliberalism is deeply embedded in policy practice. Furthermore, in order to examine the local effects of national trends in welfare restructuring since 2012, we present a case study of maternity care services in two Russian regions.

East European Politics, 2020

In the wake of the economic crisis of 2014–2016, the Russian government implemented tough austeri... more In the wake of the economic crisis of 2014–2016, the Russian government implemented tough austerity measures, earning the praise of the International Monetary Fund. However, the spending cuts were unevenly distributed across different welfare programmes, budget levels (i.e. federal and regional) as well as across different Russian regions. The article argues that this distribution is indicative of a consistent strategy of blame avoidance similar to that of the Western democracies. Specifically, the most politically sensitive budget outlays, such as pension spending, were largely protected from cuts, while areas less visible to voters, such as education, were disproportionately affected by austerity measures. Furthermore, the federal centre shifted the burden of austerity to the regions, turning regional governors into scapegoats for the federal policies. Nevertheless, in some instances fiscal considerations trumped political risk, as even cash benefits (apart from pensions) experienced deep cuts. Furthermore, the analysis of the regional spending patterns reveals that some regional governments tried to stimulate the local economy during the crisis. However, this led to even more stringent welfare austerity policies than in other regions.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 2019

The article argues that the Russian authorities downplay the influence of big business on the pol... more The article argues that the Russian authorities downplay the influence of big business on the policymaking process, which remains strong. The sources of business influence lie in the potential for individual and collective lobbying (instrumental power), but also in the state's structural dependence on capital, which forces the authorities to anticipate the investment decisions of capital holders (structural power). The article shows how changes in both the structural and the instrumental power of large firms correspond to major shifts in the country's political economy: the 1998 economic crisis, the turn to dirigiste policies in 2003-2004, and the beginning of the confrontation with the West in 2014. The article concludes that the business elite in Putin's Russia corresponds to Jeffrey Winters and Benjamin Page's definition of "oligarchy" as a narrow group of the super-wealthy that dominates certain policy areas in the context of extreme wealth and income inequality.

International Review of Modern Sociology, 2019

This article traces the evolution of the neoliberal policy paradigm in Putin's Russia. It deals w... more This article traces the evolution of the neoliberal policy paradigm in Putin's Russia. It deals with an apparent paradox: while Putin's rule has always been based on a sharp rhetorical break with the disastrous first decade of Russia's post-Soviet history, he nevertheless continued many of the neoliberal policies of his predecessor, in some areas carrying them out far more consistently than Yeltsin ever could. Despite his crticism of the oligarchs, Putin allowed them to expand their wealth on an unprecedented scale. Since the mid-2000s, the government has increasingly experimented with dirigiste policies, yet this divergence from neoliberalism did not fundamentally threaten the position of the oligarchs. Eventually, the government settled on a combination of neoliberalism and dirigisme that enhances the political stability of the regime at the expense of economic growth. However, lack of growth itself undermines stability, as the unpopular reforms, such as the increase of the retirement age, erode the regime's legitimacy. At the same time, Kremlin's standoff with the West since 2014 puts a serious strain on its relationship with big capital, which is highly integrated into the global economy. These multiple tensions make the future of Russian politics highly uncertain.

Мир России, 2019

В научной литературе преобладает точка зрения, согласно которой российский круп- ный бизнес ... more В научной литературе преобладает точка зрения, согласно которой российский круп- ный бизнес в путинский период оказался полностью подчинен власти, что выражает- ся, в частности, в полном запрете на поддержку оппозиции и принудительном финан- сировании важных для государства проектов. Однако стремительный рост числа российских миллиардеров и их совокупного состояния в 2000–2010-е годы указывает на формирование в России политической и институциональной среды, благоприятной для крупного бизнеса. В настоящей статье утверждается, что картина политическо- го влияния крупных собственников остается неполной без учета таких факторов, как структурная власть бизнеса (зависимость государства от экономических решений, при- нимаемых крупными компаниями), информационная асимметрия между государством и капиталом (преимущество крупных компаний в области информации и экспертизы), а также инструментальная власть бизнеса (формальные и неформальные каналы влияния). Если в 1990-е годы российский крупный бизнес обладал крайне высокой инструменталь- ной, но низкой структурной властью, то в 2000-е и 2010-е годы на первый план выходит именно структурная зависимость государства от капитала: руководство страны прово- дит политику, выгодную крупным собственникам, с целью поддержать уровень инвести- ций и экономического роста. В то же время у крупного бизнеса появляются новые каналы неформального влияния на власть, такие как сближение с бизнесменами из путинского ближнего круга. Согласно собранной в рамках исследования информации из открытых источников, 9 из 96 миллиардеров из российского рейтинга Forbes за 2017 год имеют или имели в прошлом широкие деловые связи с четырьмя близкими к В.В. Путину бизнес- менами. Все эти факторы позволяют российскому крупному бизнесу играть активную, а не подчиненную роль в отношениях с государством.

Problems of Post-Communism, 2024

The article studies a set of ideological orientations and policy networks in Russia that could be... more The article studies a set of ideological orientations and policy networks in Russia that could be grouped under the term "technocratic liberalism." It provides an account of the origins of the liberal economic experts, their participation in various reform projects, their political and discursive strategies. The focus is on the contradictions of the technocratic approach to reform as revealed in the discourse and actual practice of the reformers, and their attempts to overcome or avoid these contradictions that ultimately led them to the position they found themselves in after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Dossier THE WAR IN UKRAINE & THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONALISM, 2023

FES RUSSIA PROGRAMME – THE RUSSIAN CRISIS, 2023

Санкции, «частичная» мобилизация и сама война оказали крайне негативное влияние на уровень жизни ... more Санкции, «частичная» мобилизация и сама война оказали крайне негативное влияние на уровень жизни и социальную защищенность в России. Хотя экономического коллапса удалось избежать, страна за- шла на новый виток кризиса. В отчёте определены не- сколько областей, в которых негативный эффект был особенно серьёзным: бедность и уровень жизни, ситуация в промышленных районах, здравоохранение, НКО и демография. Нынешний кризис оставляет мало возможностей для сокращения бедности и увеличения реальных до- ходов в среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе. Эмиграция квалифицированных специалистов в области здравоохранения и социальной работы будет остро ощущаться уязвимыми слоями населения.

FES RUSSIA PROGRAMME – “THE RUSSIAN CRISIS“, 2023

Living standards and social protection in Russia have been negatively and profoundly affected by ... more Living standards and social protection in Russia have been negatively and profoundly affected by economic sanctions, the army draft and the war itself. While the economic collapse has been avoided, the stage is set for a renewed social crisis. The report identifies several areas in which the negative impact has been particularly significant: poverty and living standards, the situation in industrial areas, healthcare, the non-profit organisations and demography. The current crisis leaves little opportunity to decrease poverty and increase real incomes in the medium and long term. The emigration of skilled professionals in healthcare and social work will be felt acutely by vulnerable groups.

Russian Politics, 2023

While Russia became widely known in the 1990s for its experiment in shock therapy, by the mid-200... more While Russia became widely known in the 1990s for its experiment in shock therapy, by the mid-2000s the Kremlin pioneered a new set of policies that amounted to the national variant of the developmentalist approach. In this article, we take stock of the Russian developmentalism, focusing on the role of ideas, the institution-building by the federal and regional governments as well as specific developmental policies. While state-oriented, interventionist approach to economic development has had some successes on the level of individual industries, regions and projects, on the whole, it failed to achieve transformational developmental outcomes. The economy has stagnated for over a decade and the Russian export basket is less sophisticated than it was 20 years ago. We argue that the failure of the Russian approach to developmentalism cannot be reduced to corruption and rent-seeking: the lack of an effective coordination mechanism and a consistent policy strategy underpinned by a foundation in heterodox economics have also played a role.

Политика аполитичных. Гражданские движения в России 2011— 2013 годов, 2014

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Oct 27, 2022

Государственный капитализм сегодня находится в центре академических и политических дискуссий. Для... more Государственный капитализм сегодня находится в центре академических и политических дискуссий. Для одних он ассоциируется со смелой, неортодоксальной стратегией устойчивого экономического роста, для других – с опасным заблуждением, сопутствующим авторитаризму и коррупции. Если исторически государственный капитализм анализировался в марксистской традиции, то после возобновления интереса к этому явлению в конце 2000-х гг. оно оказалось в центре новой междисциплинарной области исследований на стыке экономики, политологии, менеджмента и социологии организаций, антропологии. Существует несколько интерпретаций государственного капитализма: он рассматривается контексте в промышленной политики (стимулирования экономического роста и технологического усложнения экономики), социальной политики (предотвращения безработицы, обеспечения низких цен на определенные товары и услуги), рентоориентированного поведения элит и патронажа, внешней политики и защиты национального суверенитета, финансиализации, глобализации и др. Государственный капитализм анализируется как на микроуровне отдельных отраслей, регионов и проектов, так и на макроуровне национальных экономик в целом. С начала 2000-х гг. Россия рассматривается как один из парадигматических случаев возвращения государства в экономику. В настоящем обзоре мы демонстрируем, что первая волна исследований российского государственного капитализма в 2000-х гг., за редкими исключениями, рассматривала его как проявление рентоориентированного поведения политических элит. Однако последующие исследования поставили под сомнение эту интерпретацию. Государственный капитализм в России стал рассматриваться как инструмент экономического развития, хотя и приносящий смешанные результаты, инструмент решения социальных проблем, особенно в моногородах, геополитический инструмент и средство защиты национального суверенитета, проводник финансиализации. Многочисленные эмпирические исследования государственного участия в российской экономике, появившиеся в 2010-е гг., демонстрируют, что российский государственный капитализм – сложное и многогранное явление. В то же время мы констатируем, что в данном исследовательском поле пока не произошла систематизация результатов и российская политическая экономия все еще ожидает макроанализа, учитывающего все ее структурные и институциональные особенности.

Index on Censorship, 2022

Russian Analytical Digest, 2022

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over 40 countries have introduced sanctions again... more In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over 40 countries have introduced sanctions against Russia. The new restrictions concern finance, trade, logistics, and personal sanctions against businessmen and officials. In addition, more than 1,000 companies have ceased or limited their activities in Russia. In this article, I argue that the sanctions, despite their unprecedented scale, have not led to the collapse of the Russian economy, yet their effect is dramatic, multi-faceted, and will increase over time.

Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2022

The disastrous military campaign, unprecedented Western sanctions and the ensuing economic crisis... more The disastrous military campaign, unprecedented Western sanctions and the ensuing economic crisis tested the resilience of the Russian regime. Putin’s political system withstood the test; and his grip on power is as strong as ever. However, his ability to solve Russia’s problems and achieve constructive goals is another matter.

Socialist Register, 2022

This essay explores the dynamics of political polarization in Russia with a particular focus on c... more This essay explores the dynamics of political polarization in Russia with a particular focus on class. We find that the divide between the pro-reform camp and the left-nationalist opposition in the 1990s had a distinctly class character. In the 2000s, the polarization in society receded – both due to the objective factors (sustained economic recovery) and Vladimir Putin’s clever symbolic politics. However, the price to pay was widespread political apathy and the emergence of an authoritarian regime. In the 2010s, this regime was challenged by a new mass movement demanding fair elections and political liberties. The spell of depoliticization was broken, yet the new opposition politics had a rather narrow social base in the educated urban middle class. Furthermore, we find that the movement itself became the site of class formation, creating a common identity for the highly educated, yet often economically struggling intelligentsia and the successful private-sector professionals and entrepreneurs.

In the subsequent years, the regime attempted to politicize its own supporters through conservative and nationalist propaganda, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. During this period, the Kremlin pitted its loyal electorate in the rural and small-town ‘heartland’ against the ‘big city liberals’ who joined the opposition movement. Thus, the Russian regime acquired the familiar features of right-wing populism. Nevertheless, the Kremlin stopped one step away from creating its own loyalist street movement as it feared that such movement could eventually escape control and become dangerous for the regime itself. At the same time, Alexei Navalny, who by 2017-2018 assumed the leading role in the opposition movement, himself turned to populism, widening the movement’s social base and geographical scope. Currently, the regime struggles to maintain legitimacy, frequently resorting to repression. The opposition coalition is far wider than it was ten years ago, yet its populist politics is incoherent and contradictory. The Russian left, on the contrary, has a consistent set of programmatic commitments, yet it suffers from organizational weakness, ideological blind-spots and strategic mistakes. Nevertheless, both the opposition movement and its left wing carry on despite the constantly increasing pressure from an authoritarian state.

Journal of Labor and Society, 2021

Russia experienced both economic and geopolitical expansion in the 2000s. During this time, the K... more Russia experienced both economic and geopolitical expansion in the 2000s. During this time, the Kremlin and big business worked in tandem to assert Russian influence in post-Soviet space. However, the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 marked a new period that severed the state’s geopolitical strategy and the interests of big capital. While the state continues to engage in open and covert military action, the activity of Russian business abroad has sharply diminished. Relying on David Harvey’s concepts of territorial and capitalist logics of power, the article explores the interplay between political and economic imperialism during Putin’s 20 years in power and situates Russia within today’s global imperialist landscape. I find that the Kremlin’s geopolitical and geoeconomic shift in 2014 can ultimately be explained by the strategic orientation of the country’s leadership, in particular, the deeply ingrained emphasis on security and ‘hard power’. However, the turn away from economic imperialism was also structurally determined by the exhaustion of the country’s economic engine that no longer generates surplus capital in need of a ‘spatial fix’.

Russian Analytical Digest, 2021

Income inequality in Russia is increasingly discussed in academic circles and society at large. H... more Income inequality in Russia is increasingly discussed in academic circles and society at large. However, different data sources produce different estimates of inequality. According to household surveys, income inequality in Russia corresponds to that of European countries. Official Rosstat figures indicate a higher level of inequality closer to that of the United States. Finally, various attempts at augmenting survey data with tax records produce even higher estimates, placing Russia among the world's most unequal nations, such as Brazil and South Africa. Due to the dramatic underrepresentation of the top incomes in the survey data, it is likely that tax-based estimates are the closest to the truth. While it is safe to say that income inequality in Russia is very high, the direction of its change in the last 20 years remains unclear. This issue cannot be resolved without more detailed statistics from the Federal Tax Office over a longer period of time.

Europe-Asia Studies, 2020

The purpose of this article is to place developments in welfare policy since 2012 in the context ... more The purpose of this article is to place developments in welfare policy since 2012 in the context of the different models of welfare restructuring in Russia. We focus on President Vladimir Putin’s Decree No. 597, which set out to raise the salaries of doctors, teachers and other categories of public employees. We find that neoliberalism is deeply embedded in policy practice. Furthermore, in order to examine the local effects of national trends in welfare restructuring since 2012, we present a case study of maternity care services in two Russian regions.

East European Politics, 2020

In the wake of the economic crisis of 2014–2016, the Russian government implemented tough austeri... more In the wake of the economic crisis of 2014–2016, the Russian government implemented tough austerity measures, earning the praise of the International Monetary Fund. However, the spending cuts were unevenly distributed across different welfare programmes, budget levels (i.e. federal and regional) as well as across different Russian regions. The article argues that this distribution is indicative of a consistent strategy of blame avoidance similar to that of the Western democracies. Specifically, the most politically sensitive budget outlays, such as pension spending, were largely protected from cuts, while areas less visible to voters, such as education, were disproportionately affected by austerity measures. Furthermore, the federal centre shifted the burden of austerity to the regions, turning regional governors into scapegoats for the federal policies. Nevertheless, in some instances fiscal considerations trumped political risk, as even cash benefits (apart from pensions) experienced deep cuts. Furthermore, the analysis of the regional spending patterns reveals that some regional governments tried to stimulate the local economy during the crisis. However, this led to even more stringent welfare austerity policies than in other regions.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 2019

The article argues that the Russian authorities downplay the influence of big business on the pol... more The article argues that the Russian authorities downplay the influence of big business on the policymaking process, which remains strong. The sources of business influence lie in the potential for individual and collective lobbying (instrumental power), but also in the state's structural dependence on capital, which forces the authorities to anticipate the investment decisions of capital holders (structural power). The article shows how changes in both the structural and the instrumental power of large firms correspond to major shifts in the country's political economy: the 1998 economic crisis, the turn to dirigiste policies in 2003-2004, and the beginning of the confrontation with the West in 2014. The article concludes that the business elite in Putin's Russia corresponds to Jeffrey Winters and Benjamin Page's definition of "oligarchy" as a narrow group of the super-wealthy that dominates certain policy areas in the context of extreme wealth and income inequality.

International Review of Modern Sociology, 2019

This article traces the evolution of the neoliberal policy paradigm in Putin's Russia. It deals w... more This article traces the evolution of the neoliberal policy paradigm in Putin's Russia. It deals with an apparent paradox: while Putin's rule has always been based on a sharp rhetorical break with the disastrous first decade of Russia's post-Soviet history, he nevertheless continued many of the neoliberal policies of his predecessor, in some areas carrying them out far more consistently than Yeltsin ever could. Despite his crticism of the oligarchs, Putin allowed them to expand their wealth on an unprecedented scale. Since the mid-2000s, the government has increasingly experimented with dirigiste policies, yet this divergence from neoliberalism did not fundamentally threaten the position of the oligarchs. Eventually, the government settled on a combination of neoliberalism and dirigisme that enhances the political stability of the regime at the expense of economic growth. However, lack of growth itself undermines stability, as the unpopular reforms, such as the increase of the retirement age, erode the regime's legitimacy. At the same time, Kremlin's standoff with the West since 2014 puts a serious strain on its relationship with big capital, which is highly integrated into the global economy. These multiple tensions make the future of Russian politics highly uncertain.

Мир России, 2019

В научной литературе преобладает точка зрения, согласно которой российский круп- ный бизнес ... more В научной литературе преобладает точка зрения, согласно которой российский круп- ный бизнес в путинский период оказался полностью подчинен власти, что выражает- ся, в частности, в полном запрете на поддержку оппозиции и принудительном финан- сировании важных для государства проектов. Однако стремительный рост числа российских миллиардеров и их совокупного состояния в 2000–2010-е годы указывает на формирование в России политической и институциональной среды, благоприятной для крупного бизнеса. В настоящей статье утверждается, что картина политическо- го влияния крупных собственников остается неполной без учета таких факторов, как структурная власть бизнеса (зависимость государства от экономических решений, при- нимаемых крупными компаниями), информационная асимметрия между государством и капиталом (преимущество крупных компаний в области информации и экспертизы), а также инструментальная власть бизнеса (формальные и неформальные каналы влияния). Если в 1990-е годы российский крупный бизнес обладал крайне высокой инструменталь- ной, но низкой структурной властью, то в 2000-е и 2010-е годы на первый план выходит именно структурная зависимость государства от капитала: руководство страны прово- дит политику, выгодную крупным собственникам, с целью поддержать уровень инвести- ций и экономического роста. В то же время у крупного бизнеса появляются новые каналы неформального влияния на власть, такие как сближение с бизнесменами из путинского ближнего круга. Согласно собранной в рамках исследования информации из открытых источников, 9 из 96 миллиардеров из российского рейтинга Forbes за 2017 год имеют или имели в прошлом широкие деловые связи с четырьмя близкими к В.В. Путину бизнес- менами. Все эти факторы позволяют российскому крупному бизнесу играть активную, а не подчиненную роль в отношениях с государством.

Versus, 2022

Люк Болтански, Арно Эскер. Обогащение. Критика товара/Пер. с фр. О. Волчек; под науч. ред. С. Фок... more Люк Болтански, Арно Эскер. Обогащение. Критика товара/Пер.
с фр. О. Волчек; под науч. ред. С. Фокина. М.; СПб.: Издательство Института Гайдара; Факультет свободных искусств и наук СПбГУ, 2021. 600 с. (Новое экономическое мышление).

Социология власти, 2018

Рецензия на книги: Streeck W. (2016) How will capitalism end?: Essays on a failing system, London... more Рецензия на книги: Streeck W. (2016) How will capitalism end?: Essays on a failing system, London and New York: Verso; Мейсон П. (2016) Посткапитализм. Путеводитель по нашему будущему, М.: Ад Маргинем; Srnicek N., Williams A. (2015) Inventing the future: Postcapitalism and a world without work, London and New York: Verso

Журнал исследований социальной политики 12(2) 2014