Isaac Y Nevo | Ben Gurion University of the Negev (original) (raw)
Papers by Isaac Y Nevo
Open journal of philosophy, 2024
The aim of this paper is to argue against moral dualism in the understanding of the nature of evi... more The aim of this paper is to argue against moral dualism in the understanding of the nature of evil, namely the conception of evil as an independent source of guidance, in opposition to the good, rather than a failure in pursuit of an apparent good. Focusing on moral evil as the intentional infliction of gratuitous pain and suffering by one human being on another, i.e., pain and suffering that are not required by a morally acceptable purpose, I argue against two forms of such dualism. Value dualism divides moral value into antithetical normative principles, good and evil, each with its own guiding power. On this view, evil can intelligibly be pursued for its own sake, rather than a failure of some kind in acting "under the guise of the good." Agent dualism divides human agents, based on character and disposition, into followers of good and followers of evil. On this view, the pursuit of evil can be accounted for in terms of basic character traits and dispositions, not related to more fundamental motives, reasons, or choices. In both versions humanity is divided into two moral classes. I argue that the two forms of moral dualism discussed in this paper fail to render evil perpetrators intelligible in terms of reasons for action. While suggesting, in line with accounts by Arendt (1951, 1963, 1978), Anscombe (1963) and Neiman (2002), a non-dualist account of evil-doing as a dysfunction in the pursuit of intelligible goals, I will go on to criticize dualistic views of both kinds in the work of philosophers such as Velleman (
The Journal of the World Universities Forum, 2008
Contemporary Educational Researches Journal, 2016
Various forms of academic elitism exclude "professional" education, including medicine,... more Various forms of academic elitism exclude "professional" education, including medicine, engineering, and law, from the academic curriculum on grounds of the intrinsic, i.e., non-instrumental value of university education and scholarship.In this paper, I shall explore arguments from J.S. Mill, Cardinal John Newman, and I. Kant to this effect, attempting to clarify what non-instrumental value they find in university education and scholarship, and why it should serve to exclude the professional, and sometimes the scientific and the technological. [1] In Kant’s case, I shall point out more integrative options implicit in his approach. I shall than look at some contemporary resolutions of these issues, namely, the relation of knowledge and university education to economic usefulness, on the one hand, and to a free and democratic society, on the other, in the writings of Philip Kitcher (2011), Jacques Derrida (1983) and Jürgen Habermas (1992).[1] An earlier version of this pape...
Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion, 2000
The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism
Teaching Philosophy, 2006
Ratio, 2004
In this paper I draw on Davidson's work to generate counter examples to his claim that since ... more In this paper I draw on Davidson's work to generate counter examples to his claim that since there are no untranslatable languages there are also no alternative conceptual schemes. I argue that Davidson's argument to that effect is based upon an equivocation.
Israel Journal of Ecology & Evolution, 2011
In this paper, I argue that while scientific knowledge is both an intrinsic and an instrumental g... more In this paper, I argue that while scientific knowledge is both an intrinsic and an instrumental good, good science does not consist in maximizing such knowledge without regard to anything else. Rather, like the good life, or the good society, good science requires a careful weighing and balancing of knowledge as a value and the values of a free society, including the rule of law, the inviolability of human rights, and the constraints of social justice. Science is, and should be, committed to knowledge and truth, but a science committed only to knowledge and truth is a hostage to fortune, and may find itself, at every turn, allied with inhumanity and injustice, ultimately undermining, thereby, the very possibility of a free society and of free inquiry along with it. Various historical cases of morally tainted scientific knowledge are brought up and discussed along these lines.
European Journal of Philosophy, 1997
In this paper, I wish to discuss the Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit's revival of the notion... more In this paper, I wish to discuss the Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit's revival of the notion of "radical evil" in his book On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (2010). Margalit, like Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, sees the historical events of 20th century totalitarianism, specifically, Nazi cruelty and humiliation, as exemplifying an assault on morality itself (by attacking its enabling assumption of a shared humanity). Famously, Arendt withdrew, or complicated, her understanding of Nazi evil in her later notion, in Eichmann in Jerusalem, of the "banality" of evil. Contrary to both Arendt and Margalit, I shall argue that evil is neither radical nor banal. Arendt was right to withdraw the notion of radical evil, and Margalit does not make better sense of it, given the explanatory vacuity of attributing such motives to human agents. Yet, there is nothing banal in the conscious and intentional perpetration of evil, thoughtlessly or otherwise. The myriad ways through which the human pursuit of the good turn into monstrosities are historically, sociologically and psychologically deep and worthy of critical and theoretical reflection.
Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion, 2007
Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2010
The aim of this paper is to highlight an individualist streak in both Davidson’s conception of la... more The aim of this paper is to highlight an individualist streak in both Davidson’s conception of language and Chomsky’s. In the first part of the paper, I argue that in Davidson’s case this individualist streak is a consequence of an excessively strong conception of what the compositional nature of linguistic meaning requires, and I offer a weaker conception of that requirement that can do justice to both the publicity and the compositionality of language. In the second part of the paper, I offer a comparison between Davidson’s position on the unreality of public languages, and Chomsky’s position regarding the epiphenomenal status of “externalized” languages. In Chomsky’s case, as in Davidson’s, languages are individuated in terms of the formal theories that serve to account for their systematic structure, and this assumption rests upon a similarly strong and similarly questionable understanding of what it is to employ finite means in pursuit of an infinite task. The alternative, at w...
British Journal of Social Work, 2011
He teaches a variety of philosophical sub-disciplines, including Analytic Philosophy, American Pr... more He teaches a variety of philosophical sub-disciplines, including Analytic Philosophy, American Pragmatism and Ethics. His most recent books are The Dulling of the Razor's Edge: Analytic Philosophy and Its Development (in Hebrew) and a Hebrew edition of John Rawls's The Law of Peoples, which he edited. Vered Slonim-Nevo is a Professor of Social Work and the David and Dorothy Schwartzman Chair in Community Development at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. She teaches clinical practice and works as a clinician and family therapist. Her area of research includes: immigration, families living in poverty, clinical practice and treatment evaluation.
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 2008
Combining diverse methods in a single study raises a problem: What should be done when the findin... more Combining diverse methods in a single study raises a problem: What should be done when the findings of one method of investigation conflict with those of another? The authors illustrate this problem using an example in which three study phases—quantitative, qualitative, and intervention—are applied. The findings from the quantitative phase did not fit those from the qualitative phase; there were discrepancies within the qualitative phase itself, and the findings from the single-case evaluations of the intervention using standardized scales did not fit the findings derived from self-made scales. The authors explain these inconsistencies by way of the complementary approach: Conflicting findings should be integrated, and consistency is restored by admitting complexity in the phenomenon under investigation.
Open journal of philosophy, 2024
The aim of this paper is to argue against moral dualism in the understanding of the nature of evi... more The aim of this paper is to argue against moral dualism in the understanding of the nature of evil, namely the conception of evil as an independent source of guidance, in opposition to the good, rather than a failure in pursuit of an apparent good. Focusing on moral evil as the intentional infliction of gratuitous pain and suffering by one human being on another, i.e., pain and suffering that are not required by a morally acceptable purpose, I argue against two forms of such dualism. Value dualism divides moral value into antithetical normative principles, good and evil, each with its own guiding power. On this view, evil can intelligibly be pursued for its own sake, rather than a failure of some kind in acting "under the guise of the good." Agent dualism divides human agents, based on character and disposition, into followers of good and followers of evil. On this view, the pursuit of evil can be accounted for in terms of basic character traits and dispositions, not related to more fundamental motives, reasons, or choices. In both versions humanity is divided into two moral classes. I argue that the two forms of moral dualism discussed in this paper fail to render evil perpetrators intelligible in terms of reasons for action. While suggesting, in line with accounts by Arendt (1951, 1963, 1978), Anscombe (1963) and Neiman (2002), a non-dualist account of evil-doing as a dysfunction in the pursuit of intelligible goals, I will go on to criticize dualistic views of both kinds in the work of philosophers such as Velleman (
The Journal of the World Universities Forum, 2008
Contemporary Educational Researches Journal, 2016
Various forms of academic elitism exclude "professional" education, including medicine,... more Various forms of academic elitism exclude "professional" education, including medicine, engineering, and law, from the academic curriculum on grounds of the intrinsic, i.e., non-instrumental value of university education and scholarship.In this paper, I shall explore arguments from J.S. Mill, Cardinal John Newman, and I. Kant to this effect, attempting to clarify what non-instrumental value they find in university education and scholarship, and why it should serve to exclude the professional, and sometimes the scientific and the technological. [1] In Kant’s case, I shall point out more integrative options implicit in his approach. I shall than look at some contemporary resolutions of these issues, namely, the relation of knowledge and university education to economic usefulness, on the one hand, and to a free and democratic society, on the other, in the writings of Philip Kitcher (2011), Jacques Derrida (1983) and Jürgen Habermas (1992).[1] An earlier version of this pape...
Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion, 2000
The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism
Teaching Philosophy, 2006
Ratio, 2004
In this paper I draw on Davidson's work to generate counter examples to his claim that since ... more In this paper I draw on Davidson's work to generate counter examples to his claim that since there are no untranslatable languages there are also no alternative conceptual schemes. I argue that Davidson's argument to that effect is based upon an equivocation.
Israel Journal of Ecology & Evolution, 2011
In this paper, I argue that while scientific knowledge is both an intrinsic and an instrumental g... more In this paper, I argue that while scientific knowledge is both an intrinsic and an instrumental good, good science does not consist in maximizing such knowledge without regard to anything else. Rather, like the good life, or the good society, good science requires a careful weighing and balancing of knowledge as a value and the values of a free society, including the rule of law, the inviolability of human rights, and the constraints of social justice. Science is, and should be, committed to knowledge and truth, but a science committed only to knowledge and truth is a hostage to fortune, and may find itself, at every turn, allied with inhumanity and injustice, ultimately undermining, thereby, the very possibility of a free society and of free inquiry along with it. Various historical cases of morally tainted scientific knowledge are brought up and discussed along these lines.
European Journal of Philosophy, 1997
In this paper, I wish to discuss the Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit's revival of the notion... more In this paper, I wish to discuss the Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit's revival of the notion of "radical evil" in his book On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (2010). Margalit, like Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, sees the historical events of 20th century totalitarianism, specifically, Nazi cruelty and humiliation, as exemplifying an assault on morality itself (by attacking its enabling assumption of a shared humanity). Famously, Arendt withdrew, or complicated, her understanding of Nazi evil in her later notion, in Eichmann in Jerusalem, of the "banality" of evil. Contrary to both Arendt and Margalit, I shall argue that evil is neither radical nor banal. Arendt was right to withdraw the notion of radical evil, and Margalit does not make better sense of it, given the explanatory vacuity of attributing such motives to human agents. Yet, there is nothing banal in the conscious and intentional perpetration of evil, thoughtlessly or otherwise. The myriad ways through which the human pursuit of the good turn into monstrosities are historically, sociologically and psychologically deep and worthy of critical and theoretical reflection.
Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion, 2007
Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2010
The aim of this paper is to highlight an individualist streak in both Davidson’s conception of la... more The aim of this paper is to highlight an individualist streak in both Davidson’s conception of language and Chomsky’s. In the first part of the paper, I argue that in Davidson’s case this individualist streak is a consequence of an excessively strong conception of what the compositional nature of linguistic meaning requires, and I offer a weaker conception of that requirement that can do justice to both the publicity and the compositionality of language. In the second part of the paper, I offer a comparison between Davidson’s position on the unreality of public languages, and Chomsky’s position regarding the epiphenomenal status of “externalized” languages. In Chomsky’s case, as in Davidson’s, languages are individuated in terms of the formal theories that serve to account for their systematic structure, and this assumption rests upon a similarly strong and similarly questionable understanding of what it is to employ finite means in pursuit of an infinite task. The alternative, at w...
British Journal of Social Work, 2011
He teaches a variety of philosophical sub-disciplines, including Analytic Philosophy, American Pr... more He teaches a variety of philosophical sub-disciplines, including Analytic Philosophy, American Pragmatism and Ethics. His most recent books are The Dulling of the Razor's Edge: Analytic Philosophy and Its Development (in Hebrew) and a Hebrew edition of John Rawls's The Law of Peoples, which he edited. Vered Slonim-Nevo is a Professor of Social Work and the David and Dorothy Schwartzman Chair in Community Development at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. She teaches clinical practice and works as a clinician and family therapist. Her area of research includes: immigration, families living in poverty, clinical practice and treatment evaluation.
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 2008
Combining diverse methods in a single study raises a problem: What should be done when the findin... more Combining diverse methods in a single study raises a problem: What should be done when the findings of one method of investigation conflict with those of another? The authors illustrate this problem using an example in which three study phases—quantitative, qualitative, and intervention—are applied. The findings from the quantitative phase did not fit those from the qualitative phase; there were discrepancies within the qualitative phase itself, and the findings from the single-case evaluations of the intervention using standardized scales did not fit the findings derived from self-made scales. The authors explain these inconsistencies by way of the complementary approach: Conflicting findings should be integrated, and consistency is restored by admitting complexity in the phenomenon under investigation.