William Heller | Binghamton University (original) (raw)

Papers by William Heller

Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching, 2009

Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching, 2009

... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDus... more ... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDusky. All have facilitated our work and have earned our thanks. Page 17. Preface xiii We have been fortunate to work with Emily Hue, Asa Johnson, Farideh Koohi-Kamali, and Toby ...

for their very helpful comments and suggestions, and to Robin Best and Rado Iliev for research as... more for their very helpful comments and suggestions, and to Robin Best and Rado Iliev for research assistance and useful discussions. Mershon acknowledges support from NSF grant SES-0339877. Heller acknowledges support from NSF SES-0339920. cw-Prefs-Desiresv1.01a

Party unity is a key feature of the political landscape. The degree of observed unity is an impor... more Party unity is a key feature of the political landscape. The degree of observed unity is an important element of the clarity and strength of party positions, but the critical question of how the preferences of party leaders and backbenchers feed into a common position is largely unasked. We argue that intraparty organization is critical both for party positioning and for the volatility of those positions. Whether and when backbenchers who would like to change their party's position can gain the influence to put their desires into practice depends on how and to whom intraparty structure and process provide opportunities for influence. In this paper, we model the incentives for rank-and-file party members who might like to change their party's position to nonetheless support leadership decisions. Contrary to the expectations generated by veto player theory, our signaling game suggests that changes in the policy content of party labels should be more frequent in political parties with complex leadership structures (i.e., more party members with influence in party decision making). We test our model empirically utilizing party-position data drawn from election manifestos.

This paper examines the how delegation from voters to political representatives, and the relation... more This paper examines the how delegation from voters to political representatives, and the relationships between representatives and their party leaders affects party positions with respect to regulating the externalities from private transactions. We begin with the argument that candidates' relationships with voters, specifically whether election rules push voters to focus primarily on individual candidates or to cast their votes for parties rather than individuals, are an important element of whether party platforms focus on targeting policies for specific constituency groups or for more diffuse, societal benefits. Candidate-centered electoral rules motivate candidates to target policy toward their own constituents, while party-centered rules make it more attractive to tout policy meant to benefit broader constituencies. We formalize our argument, then test it using data on environmental regulation in the US and elsewhere. Environmental regulation is a particularly apt policy area for this study because the immediate benefits from exploiting natural resources accrue to property owners and extracting companies, while costs generally accrue to property owners and to society at large. While the costs to the property owners normally are internalized in the extraction contract, the diffuse costs are externalities that are internalized only to the extent that they are covered by government regulation. We thus expect greater environmental regulation where electoral rules focus voter attention on parties rather than individual candidates.

... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDus... more ... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDusky. All have facilitated our work and have earned our thanks. Page 17. Preface xiii We have been fortunate to work with Emily Hue, Asa Johnson, Farideh Koohi-Kamali, and Toby ...

We approach corruption and, more generally, government quality as an information problem. Neither... more We approach corruption and, more generally, government quality as an information problem. Neither voters nor anyone else can do anything about poor government quality if they do not know about it or cannot identify its source. In our view, information about misgovernance can, for the most part, be forthcoming from political parties. This focuses attention to the conditions under which parties may reveal such information. We argue that their incentive to do so depends on the strength of party competition in the electoral and legislative spheres. Our empirical results based on cross-section sample of up to 128 countries support the proposition that more party competition will strengthen the incentive to reveal observed malfeasance in other parties and consequently act as a deterrent on malfeasance. The positive impact of party competition on government quality is mitigated in the presence of special interests something which is as expected since parties which cater to specific constituencies are less likely to compete among each-other and more likely to collude to the detriment of good government. JEL Codes: H11, D72, D73

Public Choice, 2008

Economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self-i... more Economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self-interested. In divide-the-dollar ultimatum games, participants turn down offers that would make them objectively better off. Similarly, drivers stuck in a traffic jam fume at cars cruising by on the shoulder. Many stuck drivers would punish the moving ones if they could, even at some cost to themselves. Such strategies appear irrational because they make the punisher worse off than accepting the situation or offer. We examine explanations for costly punishment and relax the presumption that punishers themselves prefer cooperation, using evolutionary game theory to show how uncooperative punishers can support cooperation.

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2001

Page 1. 34 JLEO, V17 N1 Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences... more Page 1. 34 JLEO, V17 N1 Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences in Bicameral Parliamentary Systems William B. Heller University of Nebraska-Lincoln Bicameralism in legislatures affects both the legislative process and partisan competition. ...

The Journal of Policy Reform, 1996

European Journal of Political Economy, 2010

The assumption of self-interested behavior makes it difficult to explain cooperation among strang... more The assumption of self-interested behavior makes it difficult to explain cooperation among strangers. Economics experiments and game-theoretic analyses suggest that cooperation can arise from a willingness to punish noncooperative behavior, even at personal cost. Such behavior is often based on the notion that people who punish noncooperators value cooperation in itself. We show, by contrast, that people who like to cheat but also punish other cheaterspeople who are Unpleasant, but who also have a strategic desire to avoid being punished themselvescan form the basis for widespread, even complete cooperation in society. Ultimately, such Unpleasant but strategic types can create conditions where all cooperate even though everyone would prefer to cheat.

Comparative Political Studies, 2014

Comparative Political Studies, 2002

Parties participate in national politics that do not pretend to national presence. The author ask... more Parties participate in national politics that do not pretend to national presence. The author asks whether such parties affect policy outcomes and concludes that they do, albeit in unexpected ways. Basically, nonnational parties influence policy making under certain conditions by trading policy for authority. They help national parties get the policies they want in return for transfers of policy-making authority

Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching, 2009

Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching, 2009

... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDus... more ... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDusky. All have facilitated our work and have earned our thanks. Page 17. Preface xiii We have been fortunate to work with Emily Hue, Asa Johnson, Farideh Koohi-Kamali, and Toby ...

for their very helpful comments and suggestions, and to Robin Best and Rado Iliev for research as... more for their very helpful comments and suggestions, and to Robin Best and Rado Iliev for research assistance and useful discussions. Mershon acknowledges support from NSF grant SES-0339877. Heller acknowledges support from NSF SES-0339920. cw-Prefs-Desiresv1.01a

Party unity is a key feature of the political landscape. The degree of observed unity is an impor... more Party unity is a key feature of the political landscape. The degree of observed unity is an important element of the clarity and strength of party positions, but the critical question of how the preferences of party leaders and backbenchers feed into a common position is largely unasked. We argue that intraparty organization is critical both for party positioning and for the volatility of those positions. Whether and when backbenchers who would like to change their party's position can gain the influence to put their desires into practice depends on how and to whom intraparty structure and process provide opportunities for influence. In this paper, we model the incentives for rank-and-file party members who might like to change their party's position to nonetheless support leadership decisions. Contrary to the expectations generated by veto player theory, our signaling game suggests that changes in the policy content of party labels should be more frequent in political parties with complex leadership structures (i.e., more party members with influence in party decision making). We test our model empirically utilizing party-position data drawn from election manifestos.

This paper examines the how delegation from voters to political representatives, and the relation... more This paper examines the how delegation from voters to political representatives, and the relationships between representatives and their party leaders affects party positions with respect to regulating the externalities from private transactions. We begin with the argument that candidates' relationships with voters, specifically whether election rules push voters to focus primarily on individual candidates or to cast their votes for parties rather than individuals, are an important element of whether party platforms focus on targeting policies for specific constituency groups or for more diffuse, societal benefits. Candidate-centered electoral rules motivate candidates to target policy toward their own constituents, while party-centered rules make it more attractive to tout policy meant to benefit broader constituencies. We formalize our argument, then test it using data on environmental regulation in the US and elsewhere. Environmental regulation is a particularly apt policy area for this study because the immediate benefits from exploiting natural resources accrue to property owners and extracting companies, while costs generally accrue to property owners and to society at large. While the costs to the property owners normally are internalized in the extraction contract, the diffuse costs are externalities that are internalized only to the extent that they are covered by government regulation. We thus expect greater environmental regulation where electoral rules focus voter attention on parties rather than individual candidates.

... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDus... more ... Miriam Hurley, Rado Iliev, Drew Kurlowski, Sam Seeley, Jon Shoup-Mendizabal, and Julie VanDusky. All have facilitated our work and have earned our thanks. Page 17. Preface xiii We have been fortunate to work with Emily Hue, Asa Johnson, Farideh Koohi-Kamali, and Toby ...

We approach corruption and, more generally, government quality as an information problem. Neither... more We approach corruption and, more generally, government quality as an information problem. Neither voters nor anyone else can do anything about poor government quality if they do not know about it or cannot identify its source. In our view, information about misgovernance can, for the most part, be forthcoming from political parties. This focuses attention to the conditions under which parties may reveal such information. We argue that their incentive to do so depends on the strength of party competition in the electoral and legislative spheres. Our empirical results based on cross-section sample of up to 128 countries support the proposition that more party competition will strengthen the incentive to reveal observed malfeasance in other parties and consequently act as a deterrent on malfeasance. The positive impact of party competition on government quality is mitigated in the presence of special interests something which is as expected since parties which cater to specific constituencies are less likely to compete among each-other and more likely to collude to the detriment of good government. JEL Codes: H11, D72, D73

Public Choice, 2008

Economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self-i... more Economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self-interested. In divide-the-dollar ultimatum games, participants turn down offers that would make them objectively better off. Similarly, drivers stuck in a traffic jam fume at cars cruising by on the shoulder. Many stuck drivers would punish the moving ones if they could, even at some cost to themselves. Such strategies appear irrational because they make the punisher worse off than accepting the situation or offer. We examine explanations for costly punishment and relax the presumption that punishers themselves prefer cooperation, using evolutionary game theory to show how uncooperative punishers can support cooperation.

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2001

Page 1. 34 JLEO, V17 N1 Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences... more Page 1. 34 JLEO, V17 N1 Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences in Bicameral Parliamentary Systems William B. Heller University of Nebraska-Lincoln Bicameralism in legislatures affects both the legislative process and partisan competition. ...

The Journal of Policy Reform, 1996

European Journal of Political Economy, 2010

The assumption of self-interested behavior makes it difficult to explain cooperation among strang... more The assumption of self-interested behavior makes it difficult to explain cooperation among strangers. Economics experiments and game-theoretic analyses suggest that cooperation can arise from a willingness to punish noncooperative behavior, even at personal cost. Such behavior is often based on the notion that people who punish noncooperators value cooperation in itself. We show, by contrast, that people who like to cheat but also punish other cheaterspeople who are Unpleasant, but who also have a strategic desire to avoid being punished themselvescan form the basis for widespread, even complete cooperation in society. Ultimately, such Unpleasant but strategic types can create conditions where all cooperate even though everyone would prefer to cheat.

Comparative Political Studies, 2014

Comparative Political Studies, 2002

Parties participate in national politics that do not pretend to national presence. The author ask... more Parties participate in national politics that do not pretend to national presence. The author asks whether such parties affect policy outcomes and concludes that they do, albeit in unexpected ways. Basically, nonnational parties influence policy making under certain conditions by trading policy for authority. They help national parties get the policies they want in return for transfers of policy-making authority