junior对《The Strategy of Social Protest》的笔记(3) (original) (raw)

junior

The Strategy of Social Protest

Measuring the success

These outcomes fall into two basic clusters:

  1. one concerned with the fate of the challenging group as an organization
    -- the acceptance of the group by its antagonists as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests
  2. one concerned with the distribution of new advantages to the group's beneficiary
    -- the group's beneficiary gains new advantages during the challenge and its aftermath.
    引自第29页

    Preemption: an incomplete form of full response (p.51). 5 out of 6 preempted groups gained new advantages. There seemed to be no particular desire for acceptance, once gains had been achieved. Preempted groups are usually small in size.

Four indicators of acceptance:

  1. Consultation: invite the members of the group to testify a certain issue (legitimate spokesman of contituency).
  2. Negotiation: antagonist is willing to enter into the negotiations with the group on a continuing basis, not only at the height of a particular crisis.
  3. Formal Recognition
  4. Inclusion: into the organizational structure. Wining an election is considered acceptance but not advantages. A group can be elected but fails to pass any significant legislatio. DQ: If serving in the antagonist's organization requires repudiating membership in the challenging group as a condition of office, it is not coded as acceptance through inclusion.
    Special case:
    a. Acceptance has special meaning for revolutionary groups: it asks not only a nod of recognition from an antagonist but its destruction and replacement.
    Goldstone (1980): the antagonists are not necessarily authorities or majority. They are often unpopular minority like Chinese that the League of Deliverance targeted. Replacement of such unpopular minority is more likely to succeed than replacement of majority or authority.
    b. For some group like LGBT+, their antagonists are not authorities but general publics. They aim at changing values.
    c. Multiple antagonists: each antagonist is seperately coded for a challenging group

Identification of challenging groups

Groups will be identified as the same if and only if:
a. the major goals, purposes and functions of them are the same;
b. the constituency remains the same;
c. the average challenging group member and potential member would agree that the new-name group is essentially the old group
引自第30页
The essential difference between challenging groups and established interest groups lies in how institutionalized a conflict relationship exists between the group and its antagonists.
When this conflict becomes regulated and waged under some standard operating procedures (gain acceptance), the challenge period is over.
引自第31页
2020-09-02 16:00:58 回应

Three Choices of protest strategy

All movements must make a series of choices:

  1. Between single issue demands and multiple demands
  2. Between radical demands and demands that do not attack the legitimacy of present distributions of wealth and power.
  3. Between influencing the elites (or incorporating movement members into the elite) and attempting to replace elites. (Ash, 1972, p.230)
    引自第41页
  4. Displacing the antagonists: through nonviolent means such as elections, or violent means like overthrowning them -> the protests without demanding displacements of the antagonists are more likely to succeed.
    Goldstone (1980): the antagonists are not necessarily authorities or majority. They are often unpopular minority like Chinese that the League of Deliverance targeted. Replacement of such unpopular minority is more likely to succeed than replacement of majority or authority.
  5. Multiple-issue demands: if it gives programmatic attention to distinct subgoals in different institutional spheres. They should recogniz the demands as seperate demands by themselves. -> the protest without raising multiple-issue demands are more likely to succeed
    Keep one's sight low is beneficial...
  6. Group size: positive correlation with Acceptance but not with New Advantages
    2020-09-02 18:12:45 回应

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action
It is often taken for granted that groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests. Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single individuals are often expected to act on behalf of their personal interests.
引自第55页
Albert Hirschman (1970)
He who says public goods says public evils. What is a public good for some may well judged a public evil by others in the same community.
引自第56页
Except under special conditions, the self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common interests -> Even if the common interests speak to him, the self-interested individuals might still choose to free-ride the protest.
Mobilization method:

  1. constraint: sanction
  2. inducement: positive incentives, psychological rewards of commitment, sacrifice yourself to gain satisfaction. Enlarged notion of self -- an identification of self and group interest
  3. persuasion
    Albert Hirschman, 1970, pp. 79 and 81
    Loyalty is at its most functional when it looks most irrational, when loyalty means strong attachment.
    Why is such loyalty so important? Because it can neutralize within certain limits the tendency of the most quality conscious members to be the first to exit. Thus, loyalty, far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful purpose of preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it so often does when there is no barrier to exit.
    引自第60页

Universalistic Goals

Universalistic groups: disparity between their constituency and beneficiary. For most of the challenging group, the consituency is either exclusively or especially affected by the changes that the group seeks. Thus the major beneficiary and the constituency are identical. Yet, for universalistic groups, either everyone will be affected by the changes, the constituency no more or less than others, or some group other than the constituency (e.g. the victims of special injustice) will benefit more than the constituency.
Within Olson's theory, the narrower appeals (to small group loyalties) are equally effective as the broader universalistic appeals.
Gamson's result supports this argument -> Universalistic or nonuniversalistic goals make no difference in success rate.
2020-09-02 18:49:39 回应