Lazar Radic | IE University (original) (raw)
Papers by Lazar Radic
The present paper will examine whether the blanket prohibition of disclosure of corporate stateme... more The present paper will examine whether the blanket prohibition of disclosure of corporate statements contained in Article 6(1) of the draft proposal on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union is necessary to safeguard the attractiveness of the Commission's leniency programme or whether it represents an insurmountable burden for claimants that will in the long run severely hamper the private enforcement of EU Competition law (a most unfortunate outcome considering the main objective of the proposed Directive is precisely the opposite). On the one hand, excessive protection of leniency applicants' clemency submissions may lead to useless litigation and ultimately render the private enforcement of competition law in the EU pointless, as claimants are denied (purportedly) essential evidence for building stout damages cases. On the other hand, a more permissive approach towards the disclosure of such information may cripple the public enforcement of Competition
law by discouraging cartelists to come forward in the first place. Given the fact that follow-on claims constitute a lion's share of current actions for antitrust damages brought in the EU, such a result would almost certainly have catastrophic consequences for individuals' right to compensation for the harm caused by infringements of Article
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as recognised by the European Court of Justice in the Courage and Crehan and Manfredi and others judgments. We conclude that the Commission seems to be privileging immunity recipients at the cost of injured parties by imposing remedies that are too far reaching for the protection of the effectiveness of the leniency programmes, especially taking into consideration the lack of conclusive evidence proving that disclosure of corporate statements would discourage potential leniency applicants from collaborating with the competition authorities in the first place. In light of this, we contend that a case-by-case approach such as the one envisaged by the European Court of Justice in Pfleiderer is
more adequate to strike the balance between the injured parties’ right to redress and the effectiveness of the leniency programmes – at least for the time being.
Drafts by Lazar Radic
The recent surge in State aid cases involving football clubs on a European Union (hereinafter “EU... more The recent surge in State aid cases involving football clubs on a European Union (hereinafter “EU”) level1 indicates a clear willingness of the European Commission (“Commission”) to scrutinize a previously overlooked sector under EU State Aid rules. Although the notion that football is subject to EU Law can be traced as far back as 1976, where the European Court of Justice (henceforth “ECJ”) took the view that professional and “semi-professional” football clubs fall within the scope of the Treaty rules2, State aid cases involving football clubs (“football State aid”) arising since then had until very recently been negligible – leading to what some authors have eloquently referred to as a precarious de facto exemption of football clubs from EU State aid rules3.
However, a set of high-profile probes launched in 2013 into a number of measures involving potentially unlawful State aid to some of Europe’s trademark football clubs, such as Spanish behemoth Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (“Real Madrid CF”) and 22 times Dutch Eredivisie winner4 Philips Sport Vereniging (“PSV”), seemed to signal a long overdue about-turn in the Commission’s hitherto unassertive attitude towards football State aid. While it is true that the Commission does not seem to be in a hurry to issue formal Decisions on this cluster of cases, some of which have already been dwelt on for several years5, a trend concerning the Commission’s interpretation of EU State aid rules in cases concerning aid measures perceived by football clubs is slowly starting to emerge – and is set to have far-reaching implications for all actors involved.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of the present work is to answer four key questions:
(a) Which EU rules are applicable to State aid perceived by football clubs?
(b) How are the specific precepts contained therein being applied/interpreted by the Commission, and how are Member States trying to circumvent them?
(c) In applying State aid rules to football, is the Commission stymying socially valuable public expenditure in grassroots football?
(d) Based on the above, but also on the specificity of football, what are the main potential challenges waiting ahead?
Ultimately, the paper intends to paint a clear and comprehensible picture of the current landscape in football State aid in the hopes of informing practitioners and stimulating further academic discussion in this burgeoning field.
For the purpose of greater clarity and accessibility, the present work will be organised as follows. (i) Part one will lay down the legal and factual background to the ensuing discussion. Firstly, it will offer a brief explanation of the rationale and objectives informing EU State aid law. Secondly, it will argue that, in accordance with these objectives, EU intervention in the field of football State aid is not only warranted, but also sorely needed. Thirdly, it will briefly explore the extent to which non-legal (chiefly socio-cultural) elements can act as hurdles to the effective application of EU State aid rules to football. (ii) Parts two and three will constitute the brunt of the present work. Part two will discuss the extent to which the general prohibition of State aid can be applied to measures benefitting football clubs, providing football-specific examples from the Commission’s recent case-law. (iii) Part three will consider the availability of exceptions following a similar structure. (iv) Part four will conclude on the facts unravelled and arguments espoused.
The present paper will examine whether the blanket prohibition of disclosure of corporate stateme... more The present paper will examine whether the blanket prohibition of disclosure of corporate statements contained in Article 6(1) of the draft proposal on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union is necessary to safeguard the attractiveness of the Commission's leniency programme or whether it represents an insurmountable burden for claimants that will in the long run severely hamper the private enforcement of EU Competition law (a most unfortunate outcome considering the main objective of the proposed Directive is precisely the opposite). On the one hand, excessive protection of leniency applicants' clemency submissions may lead to useless litigation and ultimately render the private enforcement of competition law in the EU pointless, as claimants are denied (purportedly) essential evidence for building stout damages cases. On the other hand, a more permissive approach towards the disclosure of such information may cripple the public enforcement of Competition
law by discouraging cartelists to come forward in the first place. Given the fact that follow-on claims constitute a lion's share of current actions for antitrust damages brought in the EU, such a result would almost certainly have catastrophic consequences for individuals' right to compensation for the harm caused by infringements of Article
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as recognised by the European Court of Justice in the Courage and Crehan and Manfredi and others judgments. We conclude that the Commission seems to be privileging immunity recipients at the cost of injured parties by imposing remedies that are too far reaching for the protection of the effectiveness of the leniency programmes, especially taking into consideration the lack of conclusive evidence proving that disclosure of corporate statements would discourage potential leniency applicants from collaborating with the competition authorities in the first place. In light of this, we contend that a case-by-case approach such as the one envisaged by the European Court of Justice in Pfleiderer is
more adequate to strike the balance between the injured parties’ right to redress and the effectiveness of the leniency programmes – at least for the time being.
The recent surge in State aid cases involving football clubs on a European Union (hereinafter “EU... more The recent surge in State aid cases involving football clubs on a European Union (hereinafter “EU”) level1 indicates a clear willingness of the European Commission (“Commission”) to scrutinize a previously overlooked sector under EU State Aid rules. Although the notion that football is subject to EU Law can be traced as far back as 1976, where the European Court of Justice (henceforth “ECJ”) took the view that professional and “semi-professional” football clubs fall within the scope of the Treaty rules2, State aid cases involving football clubs (“football State aid”) arising since then had until very recently been negligible – leading to what some authors have eloquently referred to as a precarious de facto exemption of football clubs from EU State aid rules3.
However, a set of high-profile probes launched in 2013 into a number of measures involving potentially unlawful State aid to some of Europe’s trademark football clubs, such as Spanish behemoth Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (“Real Madrid CF”) and 22 times Dutch Eredivisie winner4 Philips Sport Vereniging (“PSV”), seemed to signal a long overdue about-turn in the Commission’s hitherto unassertive attitude towards football State aid. While it is true that the Commission does not seem to be in a hurry to issue formal Decisions on this cluster of cases, some of which have already been dwelt on for several years5, a trend concerning the Commission’s interpretation of EU State aid rules in cases concerning aid measures perceived by football clubs is slowly starting to emerge – and is set to have far-reaching implications for all actors involved.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of the present work is to answer four key questions:
(a) Which EU rules are applicable to State aid perceived by football clubs?
(b) How are the specific precepts contained therein being applied/interpreted by the Commission, and how are Member States trying to circumvent them?
(c) In applying State aid rules to football, is the Commission stymying socially valuable public expenditure in grassroots football?
(d) Based on the above, but also on the specificity of football, what are the main potential challenges waiting ahead?
Ultimately, the paper intends to paint a clear and comprehensible picture of the current landscape in football State aid in the hopes of informing practitioners and stimulating further academic discussion in this burgeoning field.
For the purpose of greater clarity and accessibility, the present work will be organised as follows. (i) Part one will lay down the legal and factual background to the ensuing discussion. Firstly, it will offer a brief explanation of the rationale and objectives informing EU State aid law. Secondly, it will argue that, in accordance with these objectives, EU intervention in the field of football State aid is not only warranted, but also sorely needed. Thirdly, it will briefly explore the extent to which non-legal (chiefly socio-cultural) elements can act as hurdles to the effective application of EU State aid rules to football. (ii) Parts two and three will constitute the brunt of the present work. Part two will discuss the extent to which the general prohibition of State aid can be applied to measures benefitting football clubs, providing football-specific examples from the Commission’s recent case-law. (iii) Part three will consider the availability of exceptions following a similar structure. (iv) Part four will conclude on the facts unravelled and arguments espoused.