Sergio Verdugo | IE University (original) (raw)

Articles by Sergio Verdugo

Forthcoming: Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 26, 2025

Elected constituent assemblies (CAs) have become ubiquitous when total constitutional replacement... more Elected constituent assemblies (CAs) have become ubiquitous when total constitutional replacements are demanded. Nevertheless, the normative justifications of CAs typically appeal to controversial versions of popular sovereignty. Many have taken notes on CAs failing to establish lasting democratic regimes and have suggested specific institutional designs, frequently including extraordinary and specialized unicameral assemblies elected in virtue of proportional electoral formulas and functioning with simple majority rule, subject to an exit referendum. This design is not neutral to its outcome, and more outcome-based reasons must be introduced to the debate. Differentiating short-term sociological legitimacy based on specific electoral preferences and long-term sociological legitimacy based on future self-government can help elucidate the problem. I will show how electoral mechanisms can produce unexpected or adverse results to suggest revisiting the justifications for CAs. Electoral institutions and processes work in highly polarized settings that are unlikely to produce a body that can represent the preferences of the citizens at large. Context-dependent reasons shaped by specific electoral climates can undermine the stability of the citizens' preferences and produce proposals that do not reflect significant agreements among relevant sectors of society. We should then rethink the role of electoral mechanisms in supporting claims for the legitimacy of CAs and their constitutional proposals.

Forthcoming, Rivista di Diritti Comparati, 2024

In the context of the discussion about strengthening democratic regimes while facing the problems... more In the context of the discussion about strengthening democratic regimes while facing the problems of constitutional and democratic erosion, Roberto Gargarella has offered a new regulatory ideal called "The Law As a Conversation Among Equals" to guide the discussion. He suggests placing our efforts of democratic recovery in new, more experimental forms of political participation, such as citizens' assemblies. This essay argues that Gargarella's valuable prescription for the problem may become self-defeating. If the main focus is not on helping the infrastructure of representative democratic regimes recover or heal, the focus on new experimental forms of political participation can even deepen the harm that the political systems are suffering. This is not to say that these new forms of political participation should always be avoided. As I will show, they should be used to complement and not replace representative institutions. I suggest a more modest, narrow, and cautious way to implement those participatory mechanisms. If the infrastructure of democracy is to be recovered, we should not avoid discussing issues such as the functioning of political parties, how fourth-branch institutions can impose limits and slow down processes of erosion while offering opportunities for democratic forces to regroup, and the way citizens access information and participate in the flawed marketplace of ideas.

Law & Ethics of Human Rights - Forthcoming, 2025

Courts often do not play a significant role in constitutional replacement processes. Observers ha... more Courts often do not play a significant role in constitutional replacement processes. Observers have identified exceptions and theorized about the courts' possible functions during and after those processes. However, little has been said about the courts' work taking place before replacement processes occur. This essay shows that courts can help establish the conditions for constitutional change by encouraging the demand for such change. They can do that by fostering the perception that the Constitution has become a tool to help one side of the political struggle win over politically salient constitutional conflicts, thus contributing to the polarization among competing political groups. Observers have reported that backlash against the courts is possible. I claim that a backlash against the Constitution itself is also possible. Encouraging the losers of the constitutional conflict to either attack the court or the constitution is possibly an unintended consequence of judges deciding cases in politically consequential ways. The implication is that strategic judges must balance the need to resolve cases in ways they perceive correct with the longterm acceptance of the Constitution. Still, a collective action problem makes this task difficult to achieve. The essay explores these ideas using different examples and expands on how the Chilean Constitutional Court contributed to building opposition against the Constitution before the Constitutional Convention was convened.

Forthcoming: European Yearbook of Constitutional Law (EYCL)), 2024

Latin America offers a rich and diverse history for discussing what ideas are and should be consi... more Latin America offers a rich and diverse history for discussing what ideas are and should be considered associated with constitutionalism. A particularly influential type is the ius constitutionale commune (ICCLA). Championed by a group of scholars and judges, the ICCLA seeks to identify and promote a version of constitutionalism that emphasizes the protection of human rights understood from an egalitarian perspective, offering a transformative regional project that emphasizes the (final) authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Critics have questioned the possibilities of this normative project, challenged its liberal Europeancentered inspiration, objected that it promotes the judicialization of politics while weakening more compelling versions of democracy, and claimed that it could undermine alternative projects rooted in the idea of constitutional pluralism. This essay argues that the ICCLA provides a means (the judicialization of human rights issues) poorly suited to advance its egalitarian goals fully. Even though some proponents of the ICCLA are aware of this limitation, they have done little to correct it. Some of their ideas can even deepen the problem by distracting from the real causes that prevent social rights expansions and promoting constitutional arrangements that undermine the goal of producing a more responsive political process.

International Journal of Constitutional Law (ICON), 2023

This essay is a rejoinder to the responses made by (1) Lior Barskack, (2) Nicholas Aroney, Erin D... more This essay is a rejoinder to the responses made by (1) Lior Barskack, (2) Nicholas Aroney, Erin Delaney, Stephen Tierney, (3) Christine Bell, (4) Ana Micaela Alterio, (5) Graziella Romeo, and (6) Emilios Christodoulidis. The responses and rejoinder will be published in ICON's "afterword" section.

University of Miami Law Review - Forthcoming, 2023

Largely missing from the extensive discussions of populism and illiberal democracy is the emergin... more Largely missing from the extensive discussions of populism and illiberal democracy is the emerging question of 21st century constitutionalism. Nowadays, it is hard to see relevant constitutional changes without a strong appeal to direct popular political participation. Institutional mechanisms such as referenda, citizens’ assemblies, and constitutional conventions emerge as near universal parts of the canon of every academic and political discussion on how constitutions should be enacted and amended. This article’s aim is to offer a cautionary approach to the way participatory mechanisms can work in constitution-making and to stress the difference between the power to ratify constitutional proposals and the forms of governance that must follow.
Constitutions are necessarily the product of political and historical moments. Ours is a time of populist challenge to the restraining institutions of governance. We show how constitution-making processes taking place under existing political contexts can fail not simply despite the existence of participatory mechanisms but in large part because of them. We identify two types of failures. First, the authoritarian failure, which consists of constitution-making processes that lead to authoritarian outcomes or become part of democratic backsliding or abusive processes. Second, the activation failure, by which constitutions are not passed. This failure is likely to take place when reforms attempt to bypass established, functioning institutional actors, whatever their flaws.
This article will turn to the recent failure of the Chilean constitutional effort (2022) to focus on the historic roles of non-state organizations, most notably political parties, in stabilizing and legitimizing successful democratic governance. The current trend in constitutional formation, reflecting the ascending populist ethos of our times, is to bypass the representative institutions that do exist in favor of a pact between the state and an ill-defined entity known as the people. The tendency of political power without structural checks and balances to lead to autocracy is reasonably well understood. But Chile, together with other recent examples of failed constitutional processes, highlights the risks of activation failure in democratic settings—i.e., contexts in which representative institutions exist and function, though flawed. We will argue that a relevant condition to prevent the activation failure is to use the constitution-making processes as an opportunity to strengthen the political party system by including the existing parties in the process. Success stories of constitution-making have widely shown the advantages that political compromises among rival actors bring in terms of procedural legitimacy—wide acceptance of the constitution’s content—and substantive legitimacy—the inclination of those processes in promoting politically liberal institutions but little has been said about activation failures lacking those features. This article seeks to fill this gap.

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2023

A group of scholars has shown that the theory of constituent power-which seeks to describe and ju... more A group of scholars has shown that the theory of constituent power-which seeks to describe and justify the dismantling of the constitutional order and its replacement for a new constitution-is flawed. The analytical tools of the theory fail to explain how constitution-making processes occur, and it has been subject to normative challenges that question its democratic nature. However, the theory remains a mainstream idea in many countries, and some academics have attempted to defend its democratic nature. I claim that those attempts have rendered the theory meaningless or failed to correct all of its problems. I then raise two objections. First, the constituent power theory cannot be used to justify most-if any-constitution-making processes without an excessive idealization of the founding moment, but we are yet to understand the actual costs of that idealization. Second, redeemers of the theory need to decide on whether the constitution-making process can operate under reasonably well electoral and democratic conditions or not. Ideal conditions are improbable when a crisis pushes for constitutional change. In the unlikely case that these conditions can be met, using an idea of constitutional change as radical as the constituent power theory is not warranted from a normative perspective. I call this conundrum the dilemma of the constituent power redemption.

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2021

The literature on constitutional courts under authoritarian or hybrid regimes typically suggests ... more The literature on constitutional courts under authoritarian or hybrid regimes typically suggests that judges that decide to challenge a regime in high-stakes cases might face political backlashes. For that reason, some comparative constitutional law scholars argue that courts should develop strategies such as judicial avoidance or weak judicial review practices. This article claims that sometimes those strategies are unnecessary, as it is possible for courts, in specific high-stakes scenarios, to preserve or promote democratic values without facing such backlash. If there is a strategy that makes it feasible to reconcile (1) the need to advance a democratization agenda with (2) the necessity of safeguarding judicial independence, judges should prefer this later strategy. For this kind of strategy to be successful, judges need to identify and possibly predict the autocrats' expected costs of disobeying the judicial decision. If the projected costs are high enough, dictators might prefer to obey the ruling.

International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 19, issue 1., 2021

Chile initiated a constitution-making process in late 2019, after the major political parties sig... more Chile initiated a constitution-making process in late 2019, after the major political parties signed an agreement to respond to the massive demonstrations that took over the streets in October of 2019. Dominant trends in Chile and Latin America's constitutional thought typically examine this type of process through the lenses of the constituent power or transformative constitutionalism. The authors of this essay offer a different view. They argue that Chile's constitution-making process, as designed by the multiparty agreement, manifests a double aversion: to avoid the Bolivarian way of constitution-making-including its associated constituent power narrative-and to put an end to the institutional and symbolical legacy of the Pinochet regime. In attempting to stay clear of these two negative models, the authors argue that the rules of the constitution-making process have adopted the main features of the post-sovereign model of constitution-making.

Estudios Públicos, 2021

This essay suggests that the Chilean constitution-making process should not pre-determine the soc... more This essay suggests that the Chilean constitution-making process should not pre-determine the social policies that political institutions should implement to respond to existing social demands. Instead, the authors argue that constitutional designers should aim to guide and facilitate those policies’ approval. The authors’ proposal provides an alternative to adopting a strong model of social rights enforcement by suggesting a ‘weak-strong’ social rights model. The model includes a mandatory ‘by law’ clause, a specific timeframe for adopting legislation, constitutional principles guiding the social policy reforms, and providing for the possibility of a particular form of judicial review.

International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON), 2019

Some scholars argue that constitutions may include an insurance that aims to protect the politica... more Some scholars argue that constitutions may include an insurance that aims to protect the political rights of prospective electoral losers and prevents a dominant ruling coalition from undermining the competitiveness of the political system. Although some insurance scholars have recently paid more attention to the conditions that make an insurance more likely to be effective, the scholarship seeking to identify the limits of the insurance is still scarce. The literature on courts and democratization may help us to understand those limits by exploring the successful and failed experiences. In this article, I argue that after constitution-makers agree in including an insurance, the incumbent regime may delay its implementation or, if the insurance is implemented, the regime may employ different political and legal strategies to eliminate it. I identify some of these strategies using examples from the Bolivian constitutional system. I argue that the Bolivian 2009 Constitution included an insurance and that the Evo Morales regime eliminated it with the help of the Constitutional Court. Although the insurance theory expects constitutional courts to guarantee an insurance, the Bolivian experience shows that constitutional courts may in fact execute the opposite task, and that after constitution makers negotiate and approve an insurance, the challenge is to secure its implementation and survival.

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2017

Scholars debate about why constitution-makers create constitutional courts, and what the conditio... more Scholars debate about why constitution-makers create constitutional courts, and what the conditions are for making these tribunals politically relevant. This article examines how the understudied Chilean 1970-1973 Constitutional Tribunal has contributed to this discussion. That Tribunal was created in 1970, through an error made by constitution-amenders who believed that someone else was going to be elected president. Although the Tribunal generally benefited the unexpectedly elected president (Allende), it finally lost its relevance because of its refusal to alleviate a significant political conflict. Judicial review theories based on rights and political competition are not applicable to the Chilean case. The separation of powers theory, which claims that constitutional courts develop because of their function in solving inter-branch disputes, partly explains the creation of the Tribunal. However, the Chilean example suggests that that theory does not apply in highly controversial contexts.

Contributions to special issues (symposia) by Sergio Verdugo

Global Constitutionalism, 2023

This introduction to the symposium 'How do Constitution-Making Processes Fail? The Case of Chile'... more This introduction to the symposium 'How do Constitution-Making Processes Fail? The Case of Chile's Constitutional Convention (2021-22)' situates the project in the field of constitution-making, provides context regarding the Chilean case, summarizes some possible explanations for the failure, and describes how each article contributes to the symposium as a whole.

Global Constitutionalism, 2023

Constitutions change in different ways, and some constitutionssuch as the Chilean Constitutioncha... more Constitutions change in different ways, and some constitutionssuch as the Chilean Constitutionchange often. The significant changes to the Chilean Constitution have been frequent and fast, and they have accompanied the failed constitution-making processes of the previous years. Examples include crucial sub-constitutional statutes such as the electoral system regulation and same-sex marriage, political practices challenging the power of the president in the law-making process, constitutional rules such as term limits for legislators, judicial practices such as the enforcement of social rights and the amendment procedures of the Constitution itself. Despite the successful attempts at reforming the Constitution and the failed attempts at replacing it, Chileans are still trying to replace the constitutional document. However, the constitutional framework has become unstable, making it harder to agree on what exactly is wrong with it. This article seeks to open a conversation in the constitutional literature. It argues that constitutions can become moving targets and uses the Chilean case to show the need to theorize more about the moving target problem.

Hague Journal on the Rule of Law , 2021

This essay seeks to contribute to the literature that asks how interim constitutions can become s... more This essay seeks to contribute to the literature that asks how interim constitutions can become self-enforcing norms capable of producing a successful constitution-making process. It uses the Chilean constitution-making process as an example to theorize on how the political narratives associated with the November 2019 Agreement, which sets the framework for constitutional change, can influence its self-enforcing capacity. The authors identify and reconstruct the two prevailing normative theories underlying the Chilean constitution-making process: the evolutive and the revolutionary narratives. These present themselves in both radical and moderate versions. While evolutive ideas emphasize institutional continuity, consensus-building, and an incrementalist approach to constitutional change, revolutionary arguments rely on the constituent power theory and push for a profound social transformation that can break with the past. Even though these narratives are in tension with each other in many respects, they have both influenced the design of the rules of the constitution-making process. The authors claim that the self-enforcing capacity of the interim constitution partly depends on whether, and to what extent, the moderate versions of these narratives succeed or prevail in the political discourse.

Symposium on Constitutional Experiments | ICON, 2021

Constitutional designers establishing a new judicial review mechanism can fail to make that mecha... more Constitutional designers establishing a new judicial review mechanism can fail to make that mechanism a relevant instrument for checking the power of incumbent legislators or presidents. Judges may refuse to exercise their newly established powers, politicians may refuse to obey their rulings, or the judiciary may be packed, among other possible reasons. The causes can be attributed to the existence of a dominant party system, the lack of political competition, problems of institutional design, or judicial culture. This article contributes to the understanding of this problem by exploring the failed constitutional mechanism that Chilean constitutional designers established in 1925. The 1925 Chilean Constitution established the power of judicial review of legislation for the first time in Chile’s history, but the Supreme Court generally avoided to be involved in political battles. Chile had a competitive political system with frequent and regular rotation in power. The literature claims that, under these conditions, we should expect judges to be more independent and empowered, but this is not what happened in the Chilean case. Scholars studying this period of Chilean constitutional history generally associate the passivity of the Supreme Court with a legalistic culture promoting an apolitical and formalistic judicial behavior. This article claims that the narrative of judicial apoliticism served to justify, and perhaps to persuade, the Supreme Court’s choice not to intervene in politics, but more attention needs to be given to the institutional weaknesses of the judiciary of that time and to the possible strategic judicial choice.

Symposium on “Globalizing Democracy and Distrust", 2021

This essay shows that John Hart Ely’s defense of judicial review, as elaborated in his book, Demo... more This essay shows that John Hart Ely’s defense of judicial review, as elaborated in his book, Democracy and Distrust, has had little influence in Bolivia and Chile. However, that observation does not mean that a theory justifying judicial review when a political market failure is identified, is useless for examining both countries’ judicial decisions. The author argues that an Ely-an procedural approach to judicial review can help justify or reject Chilean and Bolivian rulings—or judicial inactions—if certain conditions are taken into account to adapt Ely’s theory to both jurisdictions

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2019

After the Cold War era, significant constitutional changes took place in Latin America. One disti... more After the Cold War era, significant constitutional changes took place in Latin America. One distinct trend is the neo-Bolivarian constitutionalism, which has taken place in the ALBA countries, including the constitutional replacements of Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009). Many scholars have rightly criticized these constitutional experiments arguing that they have helped to deteriorate a liberal notion of democracy. This essay approaches a question that complements those criticisms from a different perspective: how the ALBA countries have resorted to varied notions of political representation. The authors use the classic work of Pitkin to identify the different sorts of political representation involved in the ALBA constitutional experiments, finding a combination of symbolic and descriptive representation. The former is linked to the figure of the president as a caudillo that centralizes political power, whereas the latter is fostered by both the president and the contents of the new constitutions related to the original peoples. As a result, the empowering purpose of constitutionalism has been preferred over its constraining purpose.

Book chapters (edited volumes) by Sergio Verdugo

Global Canons, 2023

Book chapter in "Global Canons in an Age of Uncertainty: Debating Foundational Texts in Human Rig... more Book chapter in "Global Canons in an Age of Uncertainty: Debating Foundational Texts in Human Rights and Comparative Public Law," edited by Michaela Hailbronner, Sujit Choudhry, and Mattias Kumm, Oxford University Press.

Constitutional Reasoning in Latin America,, 2023

Forthcoming: Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 26, 2025

Forthcoming, Rivista di Diritti Comparati, 2024

Law & Ethics of Human Rights - Forthcoming, 2025

Forthcoming: European Yearbook of Constitutional Law (EYCL)), 2024

International Journal of Constitutional Law (ICON), 2023

University of Miami Law Review - Forthcoming, 2023

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2023

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2021

International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 19, issue 1., 2021

Estudios Públicos, 2021

International Journal of Constitutional Law (I.CON), 2019

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2017

Global Constitutionalism, 2023

Hague Journal on the Rule of Law , 2021

Symposium on Constitutional Experiments | ICON, 2021

Symposium on “Globalizing Democracy and Distrust", 2021

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2019

Global Canons, 2023

Constitutional Reasoning in Latin America,, 2023

Book chapter in "Towering Judges A Comparative Study of Constitutional Judges" (Cambridge University Press), 2021

Contribution to collective volume on "Towering Judges A Comparative Study of Constitutional Judge... more Contribution to collective volume on "Towering Judges
A Comparative Study of Constitutional Judges", edited by Iddo Porat, and
Rehan Abeyratne (Cambridge University Press).

Abstract: The depersonalization of the courts that the civil law tradition encourages makes it less likely that judges in those types of jurisdictions will become towering judges or, at least, it will make their influential jurisprudence anonymous or less visible. By exploring the experience of Eugenio Valenzuela, a Chilean judge that served at the Constitutional Court in the 80s, this Chapter shows that, despite the limitations of the civil law tradition, sometimes it is nonetheless possible to identify a towering judge in a civil law country. The author studies how judge Valenzuela led a group of judges within the Chilean Constitutional Court and succeeded in challenging critical pieces of legislation enacted by the military Junta during the Pinochet dictatorship. By showing how the Valenzuela jurisprudence helped to advance the transition to democracy against the interests of the authoritarian regime, the author claims that founding moments in fragile institutional settings of civil law countries may provide an opportunity for a political towering judge to emerge.

Edited Volume on "Constitutional Change and Transformation in Latin America" (Hart), 2019

This essay justifies the lack of a judicial doctrine restricting constitutional reform with subst... more This essay justifies the lack of a judicial doctrine restricting constitutional reform with substantive limits –as opposed to procedural limits—in Chile. The author examines the recent Chilean constitutional history and the few relevant Constitutional Court decisions, to argue that lacking such a judicial doctrine was desirable because it allowed constitutional amenders to gradually and incrementally democratize the Chilean Constitution. Nevertheless, there may be good reasons for restricting future constitutional reforms if those reforms aim to reverse the democratic achievements of the post-authoritarian era.

Richard Albert and Joel Colón-Ríos (eds.), "Quasi-Constitutionality and Constitutional Statutes: Forms, Functions, Applications" (Routledge), 2019

The article provides a theoretical framework to identify quasi-constitutional legislation in coun... more The article provides a theoretical framework to identify quasi-constitutional legislation in countries that possess a supreme formal constitution. After elaborating that framework and briefly showing examples from different countries, the article discusses two examples from the Chilean constitutional system: the organic laws and the American Convention of Human Rights (in the way the Chilean domestic system implements it).

International Journal of Constiitutional Law, 2024

Editorial de Sergio Verdugo, editor del International Journal of Constitutional Law

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2022

Quaderni Costituzionali – The Italian Journal of Constitutional Law, 2023

Forthcoming in Quaderni Costituzionali

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 2021

This essay was written as part of a series of responses to Professor Roznai’s article published i... more This essay was written as part of a series of responses to Professor Roznai’s article published in Volume 29, Issue 2 of the Bill of Rights Journal, to continue the academic discussion introduced therein.

Quaderni Costituzionali, 2020

50 Cornell Int'l L.J. Online 39, 2017

This paper comments Richard Albert's Theory of Unconstitutional Constitutions and argues that, un... more This paper comments Richard Albert's Theory of Unconstitutional Constitutions and argues that, under Albert's theory, the ideas of democratic legitimacy and constitutionality are codependent. Then, this article claims that the difference between the unconstitutional amendment and the unconstitutional constitution is one of a kind (and not one of degree), and explores the nature of the "whom question": who can declare that a constitution is unconstitutional?

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2018

Int’l J. Const. L. Blog (ICONnect), 2022

IACL-AIDC Blog, 2021

Tarunabh Khaitan's new article is an important addition to the rare constitutional literature com... more Tarunabh Khaitan's new article is an important addition to the rare constitutional literature combining the key factors that explain the optimal functioning of the political system, i.e., political parties, legislative-executive relations, and electoral rules. As Professor Khaitan states, scholars combining these three dimensions typically use political science or economics approaches. Legal and normative studies in the field tend to be descriptive or practical and do not necessarily combine all the critical factors. In light of the fact that the current literature needs more studies focusing on the normative tradeoffs of the design choices taken in each of the three dimensions, Khaitan's article helps advance the field in the right direction. While the model has limitations, i.e., it is not contextualized, it does not discuss the existing evidence, and there are too many confounding factors to consider in many of the empirical implications that it assumes, Khaitan indicates an awareness of these limitations. Khaitan's article is important not only because of its (modest) prescriptive claim but because it sets a compelling (though challenging) research agenda. Constitutional scholars should see that agenda as an invitation to continue developing this theory, provide empirical evidence, make contextual examinations, and examine alternative design choices.

Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 31, 2020, 2020

VerfBlog, 2019/12/02, 2019

VerfBlog, 2019/11/04, 2019

Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 29, 2019, 2019

Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Dec. 10, 2017, 2017

This comment discusses the decision of the Bolivian "Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional" that ... more This comment discusses the decision of the Bolivian "Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional" that declared the unconstitutionality of the rules limiting reelection. It argues that the Court helped the Evo Morales regime to break the political insurance of the Bolivian 2009 Constitution, which the Bolivian constitutional designers originally introduced to the Constitution as a concession to the political opposition.

Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Mar. 13, 2018

This comment discusses the constitution-making process pursued in Chile by President Bachelet. It... more This comment discusses the constitution-making process pursued in Chile by President Bachelet. It argues that the process failed because of the lack of sufficient political agreements and that the demand for a new Constitution in Chile has been harmed and weakened.

2021 Global Review of Constitutional Law, 2022

Counrty report included in the "2021 Global Review of Constitutional Law," edited by Richard Albe... more Counrty report included in the "2021 Global Review of Constitutional Law," edited by Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna, Simon Drugda and Rocío De Carolis (I·CONnect, Universita Degli Studi di Trieste, Constitutional Studies Program at the University of Texas at Austin)

2020 Global Review of Constitutional Law, 2021

Edited by Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (I·CONnect -- Clough Cen... more Edited by Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (I·CONnect -- Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College)

2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law, 2020

2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law, 2019

Edited by Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (I·CONnect -- Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College), 2018

This paper is a chapter of the "2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law," edited by Richard Albe... more This paper is a chapter of the "2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law," edited by Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (2017, I·CONnect -- Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College). The article summarizes selected 2017 decisions from the Chilean Constitutional Court. The chapter is coauthored by Nicolás Enteiche and Justice Iván Aróstica.

Edited by Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (I·CONnect -- Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College), 2017

This paper is a chapter of the "2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law," edited by Richard Albe... more This paper is a chapter of the "2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law," edited by Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (2017, I·CONnect -- Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College). The article summarizes selected 2016 decisions from the Chilean Constitutional Court.
The article is coauthored by Nicolás Enteiche and Justice Iván Aróstica.

Actualidad Jurídica, 2024

Muchos le atribuyen a Emmanuel Sieyès la primera teorización explí- cita de la idea del poder con... more Muchos le atribuyen a Emmanuel Sieyès la primera teorización explí- cita de la idea del poder constituyente. Su distinción entre poder constituyente y poder constituido, su idea sobre la igualdad política, su influencia durante los debates intelectuales de la Revolución francesa y su aproximación democrática a los procesos constituyentes, han influido en buena parte de Latinoamérica, y Chile no es la excepción. Lamentablemente, y pese a ser muy citado, muchos constitucionalistas chilenos no han sido leales con su pensamiento. La errónea, incompleta o selectiva interpretación de su teoría, ha afectado el modo como hemos conceptualizado y teorizado respecto de los procesos constituyentes que han tenido lugar en los últimos años. Una rectificación se vuelve necesaria. Pese a que la teoría del poder constituyente tiene problemas, probablemente insalvables, la versión genuina de Emmanuel Sieyès es menos problemática que otras que se han ofrecido. Los constitucionalistas que insisten en utilizarla debieran prestar más atención a los modos cómo Sieyès intentó (no siempre con éxito) eludir o enfrentar dichos problemas.

En prensa: capítulo en libro de Editorial Universitas, 2024

Los dos procesos constituyentes fallidos que han tenido lugar en Chile en los últimos años han ge... more Los dos procesos constituyentes fallidos que han tenido lugar en Chile en los últimos años han generado mucho interés en la comunidad académica transnacional. El fracaso de la Convención Constitucional tras el triunfo del “Rechazo” a la propuesta de dicha Convención el año 2022, y el reciente voto “En Contra” de la propuesta constitucional presentada por el Consejo Constitucional el año 2023, ofrecen útiles lecciones para constitucionalistas y políticos con ambiciones de generar cambios constitucionales. No obstante, y sin perjuicio de las valiosas contribuciones académicas inspiradas en ambos procesos , la literatura comparada ha prestado menos atención a los fracasos que han precedido las experiencias de 2022 y 2023 . En este ensayo, argumentaré que los recientes fracasos constituyentes chilenos son parte de una dinámica política que puede rastrearse, al menos, hasta el año 1989. Revisaré brevemente las experiencias de los años 1989, 2005 y 2018 y explicaré en qué sentido ellas también pueden ser consideradas como un fracaso.

Actualidad Jurídica, 2023

In September 2022, Chilean citizens rejected the Constitutional Convention’s proposal to replace ... more In September 2022, Chilean citizens rejected the Constitutional
Convention’s proposal to replace the current Constitution with an “exit plebiscite”.
Some criticisms against the design of the Chilean constitution-making
process focused on whether establishing a referendum was a good idea in the
first place and whether the democratic problems of those instruments could take
place in Chile. As mechanisms of direct democracy do not enjoy much popularity
within part of the specialized literature, the criticisms against the Chilean
referendum could have a persuasive justification. The author argues that the
Chilean referendum fulfilled a relevant role from a democratic perspective. It
stimulated constitution makers to attempt to align the norms they were proposing
with the preferences of the median voter and served the role of punishing
them for not ultimately fulfilling their purpose. The procedural problem of the
Convention was not so much in the design of the voting procedure to confirm
the constitutional proposal, but in those rules of procedure that prevented
constitution makers from revising the norms previously approved that were
going against the preferences of the majority. The citizen’s veto power served
as a check against the work of the Convention. This type of justification is a
persuasive justification for the existence of a referendum in this type of setting.

Actualidad Jurídica, 2022

The literature has offered several criticisms against the constituent power theory, even though t... more The literature has offered several criticisms against the constituent
power theory, even though the theory remains predominant. Although the
democratic and traditional version of the constituent power theory –typically inspired by the ideas of Sieyès and Schmitt– attempts to justify and describe the power to enact a constitution using the authority of the people, in this essay,I argue that that theory can contribute to producing unpopular outcomes that put into question the democratic credentials of constitution-making processes. The essay uses examples from the ongoing Chilean constitution-making process to illustrate how the problem of an unpopular constitution can occur. Inspired by the criticism that Mila Versteeg has formulated against theories such as Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional moments, the author suggests that processes of constitutional change that seek to use the prescriptions of the constituent power theory are not exempt from the risk of generating a sort
of unpopular constituent power.

Anuario de Derecho Público 2021 (Universidad Diego Portales), 2022

Este trabajo comenta las sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional de Chile (TC) que se pronunciaron... more Este trabajo comenta las sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional de Chile (TC) que se pronunciaron sobre la inconstitucionalidad de las reformas constitucionales que incorporaban disposiciones transitorias autorizando el retiro de parte de los fondos previsionales (TC 9.797 y 10.774). Las razones normativas para justificar la doctrina de las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales se expresan con mayor fuerza cuando dicha doctrina se utiliza para proteger los contenidos mínimos de la democracia que las constituciones pueden ayudar a preservar—el constitutional minimum core. Este argumento, sostienen los autores, podría extenderse a aquellos presupuestos jurídicos que hacen posible la estabilización de aquellos procesos políticos que permiten la actividad democrática representativa. Los autores argumentan que los contenidos de las sentencias del TC no van en esa dirección. Aunque la argumentación del TC es confusa y contradictoria, es posible reconstruir el argumento central tomando en consideración ambas sentencias. La ratio decidendi de ambos casos se vincula al modo como el TC percibe la protección del derecho a la seguridad social y no a alguna teoría procedimental de la democracia. Ello hace que el fallo posea débiles justificaciones normativas.

Actualidad Jurídica, 2021

RESUMEN: El modo cómo la futura Constitución chilena debe proteger los derechos sociales, ha gene... more RESUMEN: El modo cómo la futura Constitución chilena debe proteger los derechos sociales, ha generado controversia entre académicos chilenos, quienes suelen discutir, por ejemplo, si ellos son genuinos derechos, si deben someterse al mismo estatuto que los derechos civiles y políticos, y si los mismos deben poseer algún tipo de garantía judicial. Aunque el debate es más complejo, las posiciones se suelen agrupar en dos frentes. Ambos son vulnerables a ata-ques basados, por ejemplo, en diversas concepciones de la democracia, del papel de los jueces, de la necesidad y del modo de producir cambios sociales relevantes. Al mismo tiempo, los constitucionalistas chilenos todavía no han prestado suficiente atención a la posibilidad de diseñar modelos alternativos (diferentes de los modelos tradicionales de tutela judicial) para la protección de los derechos sociales. En este contexto, este ensayo tiene dos objetivos. El primero es descriptivo: sintetizar algunos modelos que el debate político no ha considerado todavía, tomando los casos de Nueva Zelandia, el Reino Unido, Canadá y dos provincias de Australia. El segundo es normativo: sugerir que, tomando estos casos como ejemplos, es posible diseñar un modelo que reduzca las debilidades de las posiciones que, hasta el momento, han sido predominantes en Chile. del Desarrollo. Correo electrónico: sverdugor@udd.cl Agradezco a María Luisa Avilés Aguayo por su colaboración revisando las referencias y el listado bibliográfico incorporado al final de este trabajo.

Actualidad Jurídica, 2020

La literatura ha discutido acerca de las razones por las cuales los constituyentes crean cortes c... more La literatura ha discutido acerca de las razones por las cuales los constituyentes crean cortes constitucionales, y cuáles son las condiciones para que dichas cortes se vuelvan relevantes o influyentes. Este artículo revisa cómo la experiencia del poco estudiado tribunal constitucional chileno que operó entre los años 1971-1973 (TC), puede contribuir esta discusión. El TC fue creado en el año 1970, en parte, debido a un error de cálculo electoral cometido por constituyentes que creían que otro candidato presidencial sería electo. Una vez constituido, el TC generalmente benefició al Presidente que fue sorpresivamente electo (Salvador Allende). Finalmente, el TC perdió su relevancia debido a su negativa a intervenir en un conflicto político-constitucional que fue crucial para los actores políticos de la época. El autor argumenta que las teorías de a revisión judicial basadas en los derechos y en la competencia política no explican el nacimiento y desarrollo de dicho
TC. La teoría de la separación de poderes, que sostiene que las cortes constitucionales surgen debido a la necesidad de resolver conflictos entre fuerzas políticas o instituciones que compiten entre sí, puede parcialmente explicar la razón por la cual TC fue creado. No obstante, el funcionamiento de dicho TC sugiere que esta teoría puede no ser capaz de explicar el empoderamiento de las cortes en contextos altamente controversiales.
Este trabajo es una versión traducida y revisada de un artículo publicado originalmente en inglés: I•CON (2017), Vol. 15 No. 2, 469-494.

Este ensayo distingue la doctrina de las constituciones inconstitucionales (DCI) de la doctrina d... more Este ensayo distingue la doctrina de las constituciones inconstitucionales (DCI) de la doctrina de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional (DRCI). El autor profundiza la primera (que ha recibido menos atención en la literatura) y argumenta que, al igual que DRCI, la DCI también puede cumplir una función alternativa y contradictoria: Por un lado, puede ser útil para contribuir a fortalecer o preservar la competitividad del sistema político y, por otra parte, ella también puede servir para profundizar o justificar procesos de deterioro democrático ('democratic backsliding' o 'democratic erosion'). Para evaluar el uso de la DCI, y entender si ella fortalece o deteriora el sistema democrático, debe prestarse atención a las circunstancias concretas del caso específico. Los ejemplos examinados en este ensayo, sugieren que un elemento relevante para lo anterior consiste en identificar si la DCI se ejerce en contra de los intereses de un Gobierno incumbente, o si ella es utilizada a favor de las aspiraciones políticas del mismo. Este ensayo concluye argumentando que la DCI puede contribuir a preservar la competitidad del sistema democrático cuando dicha doctrina ataca un precepto específico de una constitución, y se dirige contra un Gobierno incumbente.

Derecho y Crítica Social, 2018

Este breve ensayo comenta las causas del fracaso del proyecto de Constitución de Michele Bachelet.

Este trabajo es una respuesta a la crítica del Profesor Fernando Atria a la jurisdicción constitu... more Este trabajo es una respuesta a la crítica del Profesor Fernando Atria a la jurisdicción constitucional, formulada en “La Forma del Derecho” (LFD). LFD sostiene que la idea de jurisdicción constitucional implica una contradicción entre función y estructura, la cual deriva de la inconsistencia entre la justicia constitucional y el concepto de jurisdicción esgrimido por LFD. En este trabajo, sostenemos que LFD ataca una versión específica y controversial del constitucionalismo, utilizando a su vez una perspectiva parcial de la democracia. Por ello, sus conclusiones no deben generalizarse respecto a formas más razonables de reconciliar la tensión entre constitucionalismo y democracia. Además de identificar otras debilidades en la argumentación de LFD, sugerimos que sus conclusiones no deben ser seguidas a la hora de discutir el diseño de nuestro sistema político-constitucional.

Actualidad Jurídica, 2017

Comentario a la sentencia de la Corte Suprema Argentina de Febrero de 2017. No considera reacción... more Comentario a la sentencia de la Corte Suprema Argentina de Febrero de 2017. No considera reacción posterior de la Corte Interamericana (de Octubre 2017).

Revista Chilena de Derecho, 2016

Se identifican algunos textos de Lastarria, donde sugirió establecer un sistema de control judici... more Se identifican algunos textos de Lastarria, donde sugirió establecer un sistema de control judicial de la ley en el marco de la Constitución chilena de 1833. Luego de revisar la literatura pertinente, se argumenta que la propuesta de Lastarria fue original entre sus pares académicos conocidos, y la más antigua identifi cada hasta ahora. Además, el trabajo sostiene que la propuesta de Lastarria es consistente con el resto de su pensamiento político-constitucional relevante.

Subsidiariedad, Más allá del Estado y del Mercado (IES), 2017

El principio de subsidiariedad es una de las materias más polémicas en el debate constituyente y ... more El principio de subsidiariedad es una de las materias más polémicas en el debate constituyente y político que actualmente experimenta el país. Jurídicamente, el mismo ha sido debatido especialmente a propósito de la libertad económica, del régimen de las empresas públicas o con participación estatal, de la autonomía de establecimientos educacionales y de la garantía del derecho a la protección de la salud frente a las Isapres. Políticamente, la subsidiariedad ha sido puesta en tela de juicio por representar un modelo de sociedad que varios autores repudian. En particular, se lo ha visto como contrario al Estado social de Derechos, al Estado de bienestar, al Estado laico, a la solidaridad y a los derechos sociales. Otros sencillamente niegan su existencia. Por otra parte, los defensores del principio de subsidiariedad ofrecen una perspectiva valórica muy fuerte, asociada a elementos como la familia y el desarrollo de la persona o a las bases económicas que permiten el desarrollo de una sociedad libre.

Sentencias Destacadas 2013, 2014

Este trabajo critica algunos aspectos de la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional recaída en el ... more Este trabajo critica algunos aspectos de la sentencia del Tribunal
Constitucional recaída en el proyecto de ley sobre Televisión Digital. Se argumenta
que la misma descansa en una concepción paternalista que desconfía
del ciudadano y que limita los alcances de nuestra democracia. El concepto de
“pluralismo” y la imposición gratuita de campañas de interés públicos controladas
políticamente, son algunas de las cuestiones donde la sentencia tiene un
concepto débil tanto de la democracia como de la libertad de expresión. En
seguida, el autor examina algunas consecuencias institucionales que tuvieron
lugar a propósito de la tramitación del proyecto de ley respectivo, sugiriendo los
caminos que estima correctos en la solución de los problemas planteados.

SSRN Electronic Journal

Using an original methodology that mixes directional coding and Pritchett's correlations, thi... more Using an original methodology that mixes directional coding and Pritchett's correlations, this paper argues that the Chilean Constitutional Court is becoming more active in exercising its powers against the executive branch. We also argue, however, that any political analysis should proceed with caution. The trend has its origin in a constitutional reform in 2005 that substantially changed the mechanism to appoint the Court’s justices. However, the movement towards judicial activism seems to be related with the decreasing influence of the legalistic culture embodied in the Chilean judiciary and cannot be properly explained with classic attitudinal model.

Revista de Derecho (Valdivia), 2015

Después de la reforma constitucional de 2005, el Tribunal Constitucional chileno se está volviend... more Después de la reforma constitucional de 2005, el Tribunal Constitucional chileno se está volviendo más activo en el ejercicio de sus poderes en contra del Poder Ejecutivo. Ello se explica principalmente debido al enroque que sufrió la composición del Tribunal Constitucional, donde un grupo de jueces provenientes del mundo académico reemplazaron a un grupo de jueces ligados a la carrera judicial. Los jueces chilenos tienen una larga reputación de ser deferentes con el gobierno y de dictar sentencias de manera unánime. Esta actitud, sin embargo, va más allá de la afiliación partidista. Como se muestra en este artículo, los cambios en el comportamiento del Tribunal parecen estar más vinculados a cambios en la cultura jurídica subyacente, que a diferencias en la orientación política de los ministros.

Estudios Constitucionales, 2010

The author criticizes the power of the Constitutional Court to exercise compulsory ex-ante contro... more The author criticizes the power of the Constitutional Court to exercise compulsory ex-ante control of statutes, established in article 93, number 1, of the Chilean Constitution. After clarifying its special juridical nature, he analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of this system of control, using national and foreign bibliography. The existence of a constitutional seal aggravates the disadvantages. Then, he dedicates a section to study the motivation of the judgments generated in this type of control, questioning its value. For such purposes, he makes a theoretical and empirical study of the jurisprudence
of the Chilean Constitutional Court in the last years.

Anuario de Derecho Público (Universidad Diego Portales), 2010

Se critica la idea de someter todos los tratados internacionales al control preventivo y obligato... more Se critica la idea de someter todos los tratados internacionales al control preventivo y obligatorio que ejerce el Tribunal Constitucional. Después de examinar los argumentos que constitucionalistas e internacionalistas chilenos han entregado, el artículo argumenta que dicho control no reemplaza la revisión judicial ex-post.

Las Fuentes Formales del Derecho Público, 2012

Precedente, Cosa Juzgada y Equivalentes Jurisdiccionales en la Litigación Pública, 2013