Andrew Morgan | Birmingham Southern College (original) (raw)
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Papers by Andrew Morgan
Erkenntnis, 2022
In this paper I survey a range of trolling behaviors and analyze a particular species that stands... more In this paper I survey a range of trolling behaviors and analyze a particular species that stands out. After a brief discussion of some of the inherent challenges in studying internet speech, I describe a few examples of behaviors commonly described as 'trolling' in order to identify what they have in common. I argue that most of these behaviors already have well-researched offline counterparts. In contrast, in the second half of the paper I argue that so-called 'subcultural trolling' calls out for further analysis: it cannot be fully explained using standard tools like insincerity or bullshit, or even using new tools like dogwhistling. Instead, I propose a new species of speech act force. I conclude by highlighting some implications for broader issues in pragmatics and ethics.
In this paper I offer an account of normative thought inspired by Plato’s proposal in the Theaete... more In this paper I offer an account of normative thought inspired by Plato’s proposal in the Theaetetus that judgement is ‘speech spoken…silently.’ After arguing that force conventionalism is the speech act theory best suited for modeling dialogic inner speech, I close the paper by sketching the picture of normative thought that results. Though I defend a particular theory of normative speech elsewhere, the core insights of this paper can be used by other theorists as well. The arguments offered here also serve as an important step forward for the more general program of using social speech to better understand thought.
It feels infelicitous for a speaker to make unqualified aesthetic assertions about objects they h... more It feels infelicitous for a speaker to make unqualified aesthetic assertions about objects they have never experienced. However, for anti-Kantians who believe that aesthetic knowledge may sometimes be acquired by testimony alone, this generates a puzzle. This is because knowledge (whatever its source) is typically considered to be sufficient for a speaker’s assertions to be counted as felicitous. So why are aesthetic assertions different? In this essay I show why Jon Robson’s recent Appreciative Signalling Account fails to solve the problem. I then argue that the problem dissolves once we recognize that aesthetic “assertions” aren’t really assertions after all. According to my own view, the claims of aesthetic speakers are governed by different felicity conditions and hence constitute a distinct type of speech act. This speech act allows speakers to share with one another both their beliefs, and the affective reactions they have experienced in response to particular aesthetic objects.
In this essay I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers (... more In this essay I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers (and thinkers) making normative claims express both cognitive and conative attitudes in virtue of the constitutive norms of the particular speech acts (or mental acts) they perform. This view has four principal virtues: (1) it is consistent with traditional semantic theories, (2) it supports a form of motivational judgment internalism that does justice to externalist intuitions, (3) it illuminates the connection between normative language and normative thought, and (4) it explains how speakers can express different conative states when speaking in different normative domains. In the first section I discuss the theories of Stephen Finlay and David Copp. I show that they each come very close to having it both ways, but ultimately fail. Understanding the shortcomings of these views is instrumental to a clear presentation of my own Hybrid Speech Act theory in section two. In the final section I demonstrate how my view achieves its four advantages.
Erkenntnis, 2022
In this paper I survey a range of trolling behaviors and analyze a particular species that stands... more In this paper I survey a range of trolling behaviors and analyze a particular species that stands out. After a brief discussion of some of the inherent challenges in studying internet speech, I describe a few examples of behaviors commonly described as 'trolling' in order to identify what they have in common. I argue that most of these behaviors already have well-researched offline counterparts. In contrast, in the second half of the paper I argue that so-called 'subcultural trolling' calls out for further analysis: it cannot be fully explained using standard tools like insincerity or bullshit, or even using new tools like dogwhistling. Instead, I propose a new species of speech act force. I conclude by highlighting some implications for broader issues in pragmatics and ethics.
In this paper I offer an account of normative thought inspired by Plato’s proposal in the Theaete... more In this paper I offer an account of normative thought inspired by Plato’s proposal in the Theaetetus that judgement is ‘speech spoken…silently.’ After arguing that force conventionalism is the speech act theory best suited for modeling dialogic inner speech, I close the paper by sketching the picture of normative thought that results. Though I defend a particular theory of normative speech elsewhere, the core insights of this paper can be used by other theorists as well. The arguments offered here also serve as an important step forward for the more general program of using social speech to better understand thought.
It feels infelicitous for a speaker to make unqualified aesthetic assertions about objects they h... more It feels infelicitous for a speaker to make unqualified aesthetic assertions about objects they have never experienced. However, for anti-Kantians who believe that aesthetic knowledge may sometimes be acquired by testimony alone, this generates a puzzle. This is because knowledge (whatever its source) is typically considered to be sufficient for a speaker’s assertions to be counted as felicitous. So why are aesthetic assertions different? In this essay I show why Jon Robson’s recent Appreciative Signalling Account fails to solve the problem. I then argue that the problem dissolves once we recognize that aesthetic “assertions” aren’t really assertions after all. According to my own view, the claims of aesthetic speakers are governed by different felicity conditions and hence constitute a distinct type of speech act. This speech act allows speakers to share with one another both their beliefs, and the affective reactions they have experienced in response to particular aesthetic objects.
In this essay I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers (... more In this essay I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers (and thinkers) making normative claims express both cognitive and conative attitudes in virtue of the constitutive norms of the particular speech acts (or mental acts) they perform. This view has four principal virtues: (1) it is consistent with traditional semantic theories, (2) it supports a form of motivational judgment internalism that does justice to externalist intuitions, (3) it illuminates the connection between normative language and normative thought, and (4) it explains how speakers can express different conative states when speaking in different normative domains. In the first section I discuss the theories of Stephen Finlay and David Copp. I show that they each come very close to having it both ways, but ultimately fail. Understanding the shortcomings of these views is instrumental to a clear presentation of my own Hybrid Speech Act theory in section two. In the final section I demonstrate how my view achieves its four advantages.