Peter Yeager | Boston University (original) (raw)
Papers by Peter Yeager
Law and Social Inquiry-journal of The American Bar Foundation, Oct 1, 2004
... very thoughtfully takes up a number of challenges that may undermine the promise of RJ ... Br... more ... very thoughtfully takes up a number of challenges that may undermine the promise of RJ ... Braithwaite elaborated on this point in an earlier book with Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts ... and prosecution for those small numbers of chronic offenders who resist the restorative justice option ...
ICPSR Data Holdings, Mar 18, 1984
Contemporary Sociology, Mar 1, 2000
While most believe that white-collar crime is prosecuted only by federal agencies, local prosecut... more While most believe that white-collar crime is prosecuted only by federal agencies, local prosecutors are playing an increasingly important role in the social control of corporate violators. Yet many are reluctant to take legal action at the local level because such cases often entail unique challenges and difficulties. Michael L. Benson and Francis T. Cullen present exhaustive research that combines quantitative data on cases with qualitative information on the procedural and legal constraints facing local enforcement. Drawing on extensive interviews, they investigate how local prosecutors respond to corporate crime (or whether they do at all) within a community context. As watchdogs of community morals, district attorneys and others decide which lawbreakers to pursue, but as elected public servants they may hesitate to indict companies on whose stability the community depends. Factors such as population size, region, crime rate, economic conditions, and legal culture influence a community's attitude toward corporate crime, which, in turn, influences the decision to prosecute. The authors also show that questions concerning jurisdiction, resource allocation, or appropriate punishment may dissuade local prosecutors from pursuing some cases. They address the limitations of the federal government in prosecuting corporate crime and offer suggestions to facilitate more positive action at the local level, including better access to laboratories, more information exchange and networking, and improved training. An insightful work on a too-long neglected aspect of white-collar crime, this is essential reading not only for students of criminal justice and public administration butalso for practitioners who confront these special problems and obstacles every day.
Criminology and public policy, Mar 21, 2016
G iven the high manifest costs of corporate crime-to say nothing of its less apparent ones 1-it s... more G iven the high manifest costs of corporate crime-to say nothing of its less apparent ones 1-it should be surprising how little we know scientifically (hence, confidently) about how best to deter or limit it. As an idea, the concept of deterrence is straightforward: Unwanted behaviors can be reduced in number if the costs of the acts are greater than their benefits, assuming that the decision maker is rational and the costs are imposed reliably and swiftly. And it has long been conventionally thought that corporate crimes should be among the most deterrable offenses because corporations are designed as quintessentially rational organizations built to pursue the highest gains (profits and market share) and to minimize their costs in the pursuit. Moreover, corporate executives should be especially sensitive to punishment threats from fear of losing their high status, income, and reputations. Although corporate behavior is certainly oriented to perceived risks and rewards, it is less sensitive to the law's conventional sanctioning threats than the classic model of deterrence would suggest (Simpson, 2002; Yeager, 2007), a point first detailed by the legal scholar Christopher Stone in his book, Where the Law Ends (1975). In that classic text, he outlined a central irony: The complexities of a corporate organization put more responsibility on the law to limit business crimes than it bears for conventional crimes, 2 while making it more difficult for the law to meet this burden (Yeager, 2016). I shall have more to say about this dynamic in the following pages.
American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 1983
Political Science Quarterly, 2014
Stanford University Press eBooks, Jun 1, 1995
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Social Forces, Dec 1, 1993
Law and Social Inquiry-journal of The American Bar Foundation, Oct 1, 2004
... very thoughtfully takes up a number of challenges that may undermine the promise of RJ ... Br... more ... very thoughtfully takes up a number of challenges that may undermine the promise of RJ ... Braithwaite elaborated on this point in an earlier book with Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts ... and prosecution for those small numbers of chronic offenders who resist the restorative justice option ...
ICPSR Data Holdings, Mar 18, 1984
Contemporary Sociology, Mar 1, 2000
While most believe that white-collar crime is prosecuted only by federal agencies, local prosecut... more While most believe that white-collar crime is prosecuted only by federal agencies, local prosecutors are playing an increasingly important role in the social control of corporate violators. Yet many are reluctant to take legal action at the local level because such cases often entail unique challenges and difficulties. Michael L. Benson and Francis T. Cullen present exhaustive research that combines quantitative data on cases with qualitative information on the procedural and legal constraints facing local enforcement. Drawing on extensive interviews, they investigate how local prosecutors respond to corporate crime (or whether they do at all) within a community context. As watchdogs of community morals, district attorneys and others decide which lawbreakers to pursue, but as elected public servants they may hesitate to indict companies on whose stability the community depends. Factors such as population size, region, crime rate, economic conditions, and legal culture influence a community's attitude toward corporate crime, which, in turn, influences the decision to prosecute. The authors also show that questions concerning jurisdiction, resource allocation, or appropriate punishment may dissuade local prosecutors from pursuing some cases. They address the limitations of the federal government in prosecuting corporate crime and offer suggestions to facilitate more positive action at the local level, including better access to laboratories, more information exchange and networking, and improved training. An insightful work on a too-long neglected aspect of white-collar crime, this is essential reading not only for students of criminal justice and public administration butalso for practitioners who confront these special problems and obstacles every day.
Criminology and public policy, Mar 21, 2016
G iven the high manifest costs of corporate crime-to say nothing of its less apparent ones 1-it s... more G iven the high manifest costs of corporate crime-to say nothing of its less apparent ones 1-it should be surprising how little we know scientifically (hence, confidently) about how best to deter or limit it. As an idea, the concept of deterrence is straightforward: Unwanted behaviors can be reduced in number if the costs of the acts are greater than their benefits, assuming that the decision maker is rational and the costs are imposed reliably and swiftly. And it has long been conventionally thought that corporate crimes should be among the most deterrable offenses because corporations are designed as quintessentially rational organizations built to pursue the highest gains (profits and market share) and to minimize their costs in the pursuit. Moreover, corporate executives should be especially sensitive to punishment threats from fear of losing their high status, income, and reputations. Although corporate behavior is certainly oriented to perceived risks and rewards, it is less sensitive to the law's conventional sanctioning threats than the classic model of deterrence would suggest (Simpson, 2002; Yeager, 2007), a point first detailed by the legal scholar Christopher Stone in his book, Where the Law Ends (1975). In that classic text, he outlined a central irony: The complexities of a corporate organization put more responsibility on the law to limit business crimes than it bears for conventional crimes, 2 while making it more difficult for the law to meet this burden (Yeager, 2016). I shall have more to say about this dynamic in the following pages.
American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 1983
Political Science Quarterly, 2014
Stanford University Press eBooks, Jun 1, 1995
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 25, 1991
Social Forces, Dec 1, 1993