Sofia A . Perez | Boston University (original) (raw)
Uploads
Papers by Sofia A . Perez
Current History
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have suffered some of Europe’s worst health outcomes in the CO... more Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have suffered some of Europe’s worst health outcomes in the COVID-19 pandemic. The same countries also bore the brunt of the European sovereign debt crisis a decade earlier, when they were forced to undertake severe budget austerity measures in return for financial support from European institutions. Austerity left their economies and health care systems weakened when the pandemic arrived. Yet they were able to avoid another surge in unemployment, showing that some lessons were learned from the financial crisis.
German Politics, 2021
Explanations of Italy's and Germany's position within the Eurozone commonly focus on trade 'compe... more Explanations of Italy's and Germany's position within the Eurozone commonly focus on trade 'competitiveness,' a concept measured in terms of unit labour costs. This trade-centric view offers a poor explanation for the evolution of the two countries external debt levels following the adoption of the Euro. It also fails to explain the external financial fragility that Italy has repeatedly experienced in the period since 2010. Both outcomes are better explained by dynamics in cross-border financial markets. Monetary union created large incentives for banks in the Eurozone's core states, including Germany, to direct funds to banks in the Eurozone's periphery (those countries whose banks had earlier faced higher currency-related risk premia in obtaining external financing). Domestic policy decisions in Germany further contributed to this outcome. In the period since 2010, the Eurozone's rules-based governance model and the failure of governments to create a common safe asset for banks became a major factor contributing to Italy's financial fragility. It remains to be seen whether Europe's response to the COVID-crisis will mark a watershed, and break these financial markets dynamics.
Italy and Germany, Incompatible Varieties of Europe?, 2022
ABSTRACT Abstract will be provided by author.
South European Society and Politics, 2019
ABSTRACT During the early 2010s, creditor states and EU institutions demanded that the Southern s... more ABSTRACT During the early 2010s, creditor states and EU institutions demanded that the Southern states of the eurozone liberalise their labour markets to facilitate internal devaluation and export-led recoveries. With some variation, the Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian governments complied. This article explains why such a strategy of internal devaluation within the eurozone might fail to produce adequate employment growth to put these countries on stable financial footing. It exploits variation in the timing and intensity of reforms to evaluate the record of the internal devaluation strategy. Our findings suggest that there is no linear relationship between internal devaluation and export-growth. Even where the latter has been impressive, dualism persists and the employment recovery has been weak.
West European Politics, 2019
Abstract The divide in the Eurozone between a small set of core economies with strong internation... more Abstract The divide in the Eurozone between a small set of core economies with strong international financial positions (North) and a set of debtor states that show periodic vulnerability in international financial markets (South) remains a core feature of the area. Our understanding of that schism, however, remains incomplete. Comparative political economists have emphasised differences in labour market institutions – in particular wage setting – to explain the split. This article takes issue with that view, suggesting that the case for a wage-driven explanation of creditor and debtor states’ positions in the Eurozone remains weak. Instead, it emphasises the role of capital flows and the uneven impact these had on domestic demand across Eurozone states both before and after 2008. This macro-economically centred explanation – in which financial, rather than labour market, dynamics play the central role – has important implications for our evaluation of Eurozone reforms.
New Political Economy, 2017
Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in five countries. Brussels: ETUI. Arming... more Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in five countries. Brussels: ETUI. Armingeon K., Guthmann K., Weisstanner D. (2016) 'Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation', West European Politics 39 (4) 628-647.
Current History
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have suffered some of Europe’s worst health outcomes in the CO... more Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have suffered some of Europe’s worst health outcomes in the COVID-19 pandemic. The same countries also bore the brunt of the European sovereign debt crisis a decade earlier, when they were forced to undertake severe budget austerity measures in return for financial support from European institutions. Austerity left their economies and health care systems weakened when the pandemic arrived. Yet they were able to avoid another surge in unemployment, showing that some lessons were learned from the financial crisis.
German Politics, 2021
Explanations of Italy's and Germany's position within the Eurozone commonly focus on trade 'compe... more Explanations of Italy's and Germany's position within the Eurozone commonly focus on trade 'competitiveness,' a concept measured in terms of unit labour costs. This trade-centric view offers a poor explanation for the evolution of the two countries external debt levels following the adoption of the Euro. It also fails to explain the external financial fragility that Italy has repeatedly experienced in the period since 2010. Both outcomes are better explained by dynamics in cross-border financial markets. Monetary union created large incentives for banks in the Eurozone's core states, including Germany, to direct funds to banks in the Eurozone's periphery (those countries whose banks had earlier faced higher currency-related risk premia in obtaining external financing). Domestic policy decisions in Germany further contributed to this outcome. In the period since 2010, the Eurozone's rules-based governance model and the failure of governments to create a common safe asset for banks became a major factor contributing to Italy's financial fragility. It remains to be seen whether Europe's response to the COVID-crisis will mark a watershed, and break these financial markets dynamics.
Italy and Germany, Incompatible Varieties of Europe?, 2022
ABSTRACT Abstract will be provided by author.
South European Society and Politics, 2019
ABSTRACT During the early 2010s, creditor states and EU institutions demanded that the Southern s... more ABSTRACT During the early 2010s, creditor states and EU institutions demanded that the Southern states of the eurozone liberalise their labour markets to facilitate internal devaluation and export-led recoveries. With some variation, the Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian governments complied. This article explains why such a strategy of internal devaluation within the eurozone might fail to produce adequate employment growth to put these countries on stable financial footing. It exploits variation in the timing and intensity of reforms to evaluate the record of the internal devaluation strategy. Our findings suggest that there is no linear relationship between internal devaluation and export-growth. Even where the latter has been impressive, dualism persists and the employment recovery has been weak.
West European Politics, 2019
Abstract The divide in the Eurozone between a small set of core economies with strong internation... more Abstract The divide in the Eurozone between a small set of core economies with strong international financial positions (North) and a set of debtor states that show periodic vulnerability in international financial markets (South) remains a core feature of the area. Our understanding of that schism, however, remains incomplete. Comparative political economists have emphasised differences in labour market institutions – in particular wage setting – to explain the split. This article takes issue with that view, suggesting that the case for a wage-driven explanation of creditor and debtor states’ positions in the Eurozone remains weak. Instead, it emphasises the role of capital flows and the uneven impact these had on domestic demand across Eurozone states both before and after 2008. This macro-economically centred explanation – in which financial, rather than labour market, dynamics play the central role – has important implications for our evaluation of Eurozone reforms.
New Political Economy, 2017
Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in five countries. Brussels: ETUI. Arming... more Balancing protection and investment: structural reforms in five countries. Brussels: ETUI. Armingeon K., Guthmann K., Weisstanner D. (2016) 'Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation', West European Politics 39 (4) 628-647.
Banking on Privilege: The Politics of Spanish Financial Reform, 1997