William Rapaport | SUNY: University at Buffalo (original) (raw)
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Papers by William Rapaport
Cognitive Science, Dec 1, 1986
Minds and Machines, May 25, 2018
Philosophical studies series, 2017
Minds and Machines, Dec 17, 2018
Page 1. (' \ LOGIC: A COMPUTER APPROACH Morton L. Schagrin State University of New York at F... more Page 1. (' \ LOGIC: A COMPUTER APPROACH Morton L. Schagrin State University of New York at Fredonia William J. Rapaport State University of New York at Buffalo Randall R. Dipert State University of New York at Fredonia cl ' ,,~ A1-.a~-Jt~ fK T~~ ~~ ' rJ-t: ~ ~ \J~ ~ ~ ...
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
If qualia are mental, and if the mental is functional, then so are qualia. But, arguably, qualia ... more If qualia are mental, and if the mental is functional, then so are qualia. But, arguably, qualia are not functional. A resolution of this is offered based on a formal similarity between qualia and numbers. Just as certain sets “play the role of” the number 3 in Peano’s axioms, so a certain physical implementation of a color plays the role of, say, red in a (computational) cognitive agent’s “cognitive economy”.
Advances in Multimedia and Interactive Technologies
Computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation; it should be the v... more Computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation; it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. If semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers.
Journal of Artificial General Intelligence, 2020
Minds Mach., 1995
Galbraith, M., Rapaport, W.J. Preface. Mind Mach 5, 513–515 (1995).
Grazer Philosophische studien, 1981
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1982
Studies in Cognitive Systems, 1988
Thought, Language, and Ontology, 1998
International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems, 2012
In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Acti... more In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, the author argues that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. The author also argues that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, the author suggests that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, the author takes issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary.
Cognitive Science, Dec 1, 1986
Minds and Machines, May 25, 2018
Philosophical studies series, 2017
Minds and Machines, Dec 17, 2018
Page 1. (' \ LOGIC: A COMPUTER APPROACH Morton L. Schagrin State University of New York at F... more Page 1. (' \ LOGIC: A COMPUTER APPROACH Morton L. Schagrin State University of New York at Fredonia William J. Rapaport State University of New York at Buffalo Randall R. Dipert State University of New York at Fredonia cl ' ,,~ A1-.a~-Jt~ fK T~~ ~~ ' rJ-t: ~ ~ \J~ ~ ~ ...
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
If qualia are mental, and if the mental is functional, then so are qualia. But, arguably, qualia ... more If qualia are mental, and if the mental is functional, then so are qualia. But, arguably, qualia are not functional. A resolution of this is offered based on a formal similarity between qualia and numbers. Just as certain sets “play the role of” the number 3 in Peano’s axioms, so a certain physical implementation of a color plays the role of, say, red in a (computational) cognitive agent’s “cognitive economy”.
Advances in Multimedia and Interactive Technologies
Computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation; it should be the v... more Computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation; it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. If semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers.
Journal of Artificial General Intelligence, 2020
Minds Mach., 1995
Galbraith, M., Rapaport, W.J. Preface. Mind Mach 5, 513–515 (1995).
Grazer Philosophische studien, 1981
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1982
Studies in Cognitive Systems, 1988
Thought, Language, and Ontology, 1998
International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems, 2012
In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Acti... more In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, the author argues that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. The author also argues that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, the author suggests that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, the author takes issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary.