Daniel Brigham | University of Cambridge (original) (raw)
I'm a Bye-fellow and College Lecturer in Philosophy at Downing College, Cambridge. During 2015-16, I worked on a research project on Propositions and Predication, funded by the Templeton foundation as part of the New Directions in the Study of Mind project in Cambridge.
My research concerns the metaphysics of mind and intentionality. In particular, I'm interested in the nature of propositional attitudes, multiple-reation theories of judgement, and identity theories of truth.
Supervisors: Tim Crane
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Papers by Daniel Brigham
Analysis, 76 (3): 389-391.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
John McDowell has attempted to combine an identity theory of truth, in his hands the view that wh... more John McDowell has attempted to combine an identity theory of truth, in his hands the view that when one thinks truly what one thinks is a fact, with a conception of the world as the totality of facts. In a number of papers, William Fish and Cynthia Macdonald have sought to defend McDowell from the charge that this position is incoherent. I argue that their interesting proposal doesn't work. This is because they cannot account for false thought and, or so it seems, certain cases of true thought as well.
Talks by Daniel Brigham
Analysis, 76 (3): 389-391.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
John McDowell has attempted to combine an identity theory of truth, in his hands the view that wh... more John McDowell has attempted to combine an identity theory of truth, in his hands the view that when one thinks truly what one thinks is a fact, with a conception of the world as the totality of facts. In a number of papers, William Fish and Cynthia Macdonald have sought to defend McDowell from the charge that this position is incoherent. I argue that their interesting proposal doesn't work. This is because they cannot account for false thought and, or so it seems, certain cases of true thought as well.