Eric Pullin | Carthage College (original) (raw)
Articles by Eric Pullin
The Ideological Cold War: The Journals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 2017
From its inception in 1950, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) regarded newly independent In... more From its inception in 1950, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) regarded newly independent India as a key battleground in the cultural Cold War. India's non-alignment particularly attracted the attention of the CCF, which determined to make that nation one of the organisation's highest international programmatic priorities. The Indian government's unwillingness to choose either West or East in the Cold War caused concern in the CCF leadership that Indian intellectuals, artists, and writers might also refuse to take sides. The assumption motivating the CCF in its Paris headquarters was that cultural figures played a central a role in shaping, if not determining, the ideologies and politics of nations. The anti-communist CCF believed that India's 'neutralism' made it advantageous terrain for the activities of communists and fellow travellers. Unless defenders of freedom effectively mobilised cultural forces, India would invariably and inevitably drift away from the 'free world' and towards 'totalitarianism'. In March 1951, the CCF, identifying India as a frontline state in the cultural Cold War, held its second international conference in Bombay in March 1951, after the inaugural gathering in West Berlin in June 1950. The Bombay conference 'was no triumph', but the CCF immediately established an organisational apparatus
The PDF copy posted is a proof. Published in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold Wa... more The PDF copy posted is a proof.
Published in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or within the Blocs?* Sondra Bott, Jussi Hanhimaki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Marc Wyss (London: Routledge, 2016), 52-71.
The article focuses on the role of propaganda and ideology in the emergence of independent post-colonial postures in the Cold War, as well as on domestic political rationales. The Eisenhower initially considered these postures to be a serious threat to Western interests and sought to influence the Bandung Conference of 1955 through propaganda. However, such efforts proved unnecessary and counter-productive, because there was no real unity among the post-colonial nations at the Conference. Nevertheless, the United States employed propaganda as a tool in the ideological Cold War designed to complement diplomatic efforts.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 02684527 2011 559325, Apr 1, 2011
During the 1950s, the United States conducted both overt and covert propaganda activities in Ind... more During the 1950s, the United States conducted both overt and covert
propaganda activities in India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru opposed these
activities as encroachments upon Indian sovereignty. However, domestic opposition
composed primarily of members of the Praja Socialist Party worked closely with US-backed groups, in particular the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, to generate a
political alternative to the ruling Congress party. Although receiving covert money
from the Americans, these Indians did not believe that foreign money determined or
shaped their opinions. On the other hand, their close association with the Americans
undermined their claims to represent a legitimate domestic opposition.
Diplomatic History, 2010
During World War II, the United States resorted to propaganda in colonial India as a supplement, ... more During World War II, the United States resorted to propaganda in colonial India as a supplement, even alternative, to policy, because of British dominance in India. The United States began the war with an appreciation for how propaganda could affect diplomacy, yet failed to develop a strategy for coordinating these activities. The development of an information strategy came not from policymakers in Washington, but from U.S. propaganda officials on the ground in India. U.S. information activities militates against the notion that American propaganda in India during World War II represented a
form of “cultural imperialism.” U.S. propaganda in India operated too haphazardly
to serve imperialist goals. In any case, it remains an open question
whether a more sustained information strategy could have encouraged a more
positive image of the United States in India.
Historiographical Reviews by Eric Pullin
Historiography since 1945, 2013
Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945" Edited by Chistopher R. M... more Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945"
Edited by Chistopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy
Edinburgh University Press, 2013
"Like Aldrich and many of the other contributors in this concerned with the development of CIA historiography," "part, Eric Pullin is in this case, the literature that examines the CIA’s covert sponsorship of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). In a broad, yet meaningful, sweep of the extant literature, Pullin demonstrates how writers have had to overcome ‘routine obstructionism’ by the CIA, which has peremptorily refused to release documents on many aspects of its Cold War ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Pleasingly, argues Pullin, writers have refused to be held hostage to the fragmentary records that have surfaced; rather, they have found information elsewhere."
Book Reviews by Eric Pullin
The Ideological Cold War: The Journals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 2017
From its inception in 1950, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) regarded newly independent In... more From its inception in 1950, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) regarded newly independent India as a key battleground in the cultural Cold War. India's non-alignment particularly attracted the attention of the CCF, which determined to make that nation one of the organisation's highest international programmatic priorities. The Indian government's unwillingness to choose either West or East in the Cold War caused concern in the CCF leadership that Indian intellectuals, artists, and writers might also refuse to take sides. The assumption motivating the CCF in its Paris headquarters was that cultural figures played a central a role in shaping, if not determining, the ideologies and politics of nations. The anti-communist CCF believed that India's 'neutralism' made it advantageous terrain for the activities of communists and fellow travellers. Unless defenders of freedom effectively mobilised cultural forces, India would invariably and inevitably drift away from the 'free world' and towards 'totalitarianism'. In March 1951, the CCF, identifying India as a frontline state in the cultural Cold War, held its second international conference in Bombay in March 1951, after the inaugural gathering in West Berlin in June 1950. The Bombay conference 'was no triumph', but the CCF immediately established an organisational apparatus
The PDF copy posted is a proof. Published in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold Wa... more The PDF copy posted is a proof.
Published in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or within the Blocs?* Sondra Bott, Jussi Hanhimaki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Marc Wyss (London: Routledge, 2016), 52-71.
The article focuses on the role of propaganda and ideology in the emergence of independent post-colonial postures in the Cold War, as well as on domestic political rationales. The Eisenhower initially considered these postures to be a serious threat to Western interests and sought to influence the Bandung Conference of 1955 through propaganda. However, such efforts proved unnecessary and counter-productive, because there was no real unity among the post-colonial nations at the Conference. Nevertheless, the United States employed propaganda as a tool in the ideological Cold War designed to complement diplomatic efforts.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 02684527 2011 559325, Apr 1, 2011
During the 1950s, the United States conducted both overt and covert propaganda activities in Ind... more During the 1950s, the United States conducted both overt and covert
propaganda activities in India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru opposed these
activities as encroachments upon Indian sovereignty. However, domestic opposition
composed primarily of members of the Praja Socialist Party worked closely with US-backed groups, in particular the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, to generate a
political alternative to the ruling Congress party. Although receiving covert money
from the Americans, these Indians did not believe that foreign money determined or
shaped their opinions. On the other hand, their close association with the Americans
undermined their claims to represent a legitimate domestic opposition.
Diplomatic History, 2010
During World War II, the United States resorted to propaganda in colonial India as a supplement, ... more During World War II, the United States resorted to propaganda in colonial India as a supplement, even alternative, to policy, because of British dominance in India. The United States began the war with an appreciation for how propaganda could affect diplomacy, yet failed to develop a strategy for coordinating these activities. The development of an information strategy came not from policymakers in Washington, but from U.S. propaganda officials on the ground in India. U.S. information activities militates against the notion that American propaganda in India during World War II represented a
form of “cultural imperialism.” U.S. propaganda in India operated too haphazardly
to serve imperialist goals. In any case, it remains an open question
whether a more sustained information strategy could have encouraged a more
positive image of the United States in India.
Historiography since 1945, 2013
Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945" Edited by Chistopher R. M... more Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945"
Edited by Chistopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy
Edinburgh University Press, 2013
"Like Aldrich and many of the other contributors in this concerned with the development of CIA historiography," "part, Eric Pullin is in this case, the literature that examines the CIA’s covert sponsorship of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). In a broad, yet meaningful, sweep of the extant literature, Pullin demonstrates how writers have had to overcome ‘routine obstructionism’ by the CIA, which has peremptorily refused to release documents on many aspects of its Cold War ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. Pleasingly, argues Pullin, writers have refused to be held hostage to the fragmentary records that have surfaced; rather, they have found information elsewhere."