John W Patty | University of Chicago (original) (raw)
Papers by John W Patty
Abstract We develop a formal theory of legitimate collective choice. In our theory a policy choic... more Abstract We develop a formal theory of legitimate collective choice. In our theory a policy choice is legitimate if the process through which the final choice was determined is consistent with some principle that can be used to (perhaps partially) rank the potential policy choices. The set of principles in any choice situation is taken to be exogenous, but a decision-making process is defined so as to deal with any nontrivial set of principles.
Abstract In this paper we examine implications of two simple ideas:(1) that beliefs about the fut... more Abstract In this paper we examine implications of two simple ideas:(1) that beliefs about the future are carriers of utility, and (2) that people have some ability to manipulate their own beliefs. We show that simple assumptions about how beliefs enter into utility, and about the ability of humans to directly manipulate their own beliefs, lead to a number of testable predictions concerning dynamic expectation formation. We then show that several of these predictions are, in fact, supported empirically.
Fittingly, this book represents the aggregation of multiple and extended sequences of conversatio... more Fittingly, this book represents the aggregation of multiple and extended sequences of conversations, reactions, and decisions. We owe many people for various combinations of helpful advice, thoughtful criticism, sincere skepticism, and general forbearance.
Information is the lifeblood of executive branch action. Or at least, it is for effective action.... more Information is the lifeblood of executive branch action. Or at least, it is for effective action. At least three of the four virtues of executive action that Alexander Hamilton cited in Federalist 70���unity, activity, secrecy, and dispatch���presuppose information to act. 1 Information is also the bedrock of bureaucratic legitimacy in the United States. Bureaucratization is indisputably one of the most important developments in American government in the last 100 years, and information is its principal justification.
Abstract We develop a formal model of notice and comment rulemaking. An agency investigates a sta... more Abstract We develop a formal model of notice and comment rulemaking. An agency investigates a state of the world with some effort of its choosing, then proposes a policy and may or may not reveal its information about the state. A group, which is biased toward one of the agency's possible choices, then investigates the state as well, and may or may not reveal its information. A reviewing court may uphold or reverse the agency's policy, depending on the proposal made and information revealed.
Abstract In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between thre... more Abstract In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates' and voters' strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to maximize their vote share. Accordingly, the main difficulty with electoral equilibria is multiplicity.
Abstract In this paper, I examine the performance of the estimated preferences of members of the ... more Abstract In this paper, I examine the performance of the estimated preferences of members of the US House of Representatives generated by Poole's Optimal Classification (OC) algorithm. Specifically, I focus on the difference in within sample performance of the estimates as a function of whether the roll call vote was recorded on a day with a recorded vote on the House Journal.
Abstract This paper explores a psychologically motivated model of belief formation in a political... more Abstract This paper explores a psychologically motivated model of belief formation in a political context. Using a retrospective voting framework, we specifically examine the implications of a common inference bias in which voters overweight the effect of an incumbent's unobserved effort on realized outcomes.
This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respec... more This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respect to an unspecified, but unidimensional, ordering of the alternative space. We show that in these environments, any institution that is coalitionally strategy-proof must be dictatorial.
Abstract In hierarchical organizations lower level agents can often censor the information that a... more Abstract In hierarchical organizations lower level agents can often censor the information that a higher level principal has available to make a decision. We present a model of this interaction in which the principal can also access an independent source of unfiltered but lower quality information besides that provided by the agent. This provision of outside information can be thought of as ���stovepiping,��� the transmission of unfiltered information from analysts directly to decision-makers.
In the past decade, political science has witnessed a substantial amount of research using formal... more In the past decade, political science has witnessed a substantial amount of research using formal models to explicate the rationale for and effects of myriad aspects of bureaucratic institutions. Whereas previous waves of formal modeling on bureaucratic structure emphasized bureaucracy as a device for making policy commitments last, more recent formal research has grappled with information asymmetries and more explicitly considered the principal-agent relationship between bureaucracies and political authorities.
Games and Economic Behavior, Jan 1, 2006
American Journal of Political …, Jan 1, 2007
American Journal of Political Science, Jan 1, 2008
Public Choice, Jan 1, 2002
Games and Economic Behavior, Jan 1, 2005
Quarterly Journal of Political …, Jan 1, 2006
Social Choice and Welfare, Jan 1, 2007
Public Choice, Jan 1, 2001
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Jan 1, 2008
Abstract This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justifie... more Abstract This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions supported within a group, I characterize the set of actions that can be justified as well as the arguments that will be used to justify these actions. Of particular interest in the article is the fact that each individual's preferences over different ...
Abstract We develop a formal theory of legitimate collective choice. In our theory a policy choic... more Abstract We develop a formal theory of legitimate collective choice. In our theory a policy choice is legitimate if the process through which the final choice was determined is consistent with some principle that can be used to (perhaps partially) rank the potential policy choices. The set of principles in any choice situation is taken to be exogenous, but a decision-making process is defined so as to deal with any nontrivial set of principles.
Abstract In this paper we examine implications of two simple ideas:(1) that beliefs about the fut... more Abstract In this paper we examine implications of two simple ideas:(1) that beliefs about the future are carriers of utility, and (2) that people have some ability to manipulate their own beliefs. We show that simple assumptions about how beliefs enter into utility, and about the ability of humans to directly manipulate their own beliefs, lead to a number of testable predictions concerning dynamic expectation formation. We then show that several of these predictions are, in fact, supported empirically.
Fittingly, this book represents the aggregation of multiple and extended sequences of conversatio... more Fittingly, this book represents the aggregation of multiple and extended sequences of conversations, reactions, and decisions. We owe many people for various combinations of helpful advice, thoughtful criticism, sincere skepticism, and general forbearance.
Information is the lifeblood of executive branch action. Or at least, it is for effective action.... more Information is the lifeblood of executive branch action. Or at least, it is for effective action. At least three of the four virtues of executive action that Alexander Hamilton cited in Federalist 70���unity, activity, secrecy, and dispatch���presuppose information to act. 1 Information is also the bedrock of bureaucratic legitimacy in the United States. Bureaucratization is indisputably one of the most important developments in American government in the last 100 years, and information is its principal justification.
Abstract We develop a formal model of notice and comment rulemaking. An agency investigates a sta... more Abstract We develop a formal model of notice and comment rulemaking. An agency investigates a state of the world with some effort of its choosing, then proposes a policy and may or may not reveal its information about the state. A group, which is biased toward one of the agency's possible choices, then investigates the state as well, and may or may not reveal its information. A reviewing court may uphold or reverse the agency's policy, depending on the proposal made and information revealed.
Abstract In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between thre... more Abstract In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates' and voters' strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to maximize their vote share. Accordingly, the main difficulty with electoral equilibria is multiplicity.
Abstract In this paper, I examine the performance of the estimated preferences of members of the ... more Abstract In this paper, I examine the performance of the estimated preferences of members of the US House of Representatives generated by Poole's Optimal Classification (OC) algorithm. Specifically, I focus on the difference in within sample performance of the estimates as a function of whether the roll call vote was recorded on a day with a recorded vote on the House Journal.
Abstract This paper explores a psychologically motivated model of belief formation in a political... more Abstract This paper explores a psychologically motivated model of belief formation in a political context. Using a retrospective voting framework, we specifically examine the implications of a common inference bias in which voters overweight the effect of an incumbent's unobserved effort on realized outcomes.
This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respec... more This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respect to an unspecified, but unidimensional, ordering of the alternative space. We show that in these environments, any institution that is coalitionally strategy-proof must be dictatorial.
Abstract In hierarchical organizations lower level agents can often censor the information that a... more Abstract In hierarchical organizations lower level agents can often censor the information that a higher level principal has available to make a decision. We present a model of this interaction in which the principal can also access an independent source of unfiltered but lower quality information besides that provided by the agent. This provision of outside information can be thought of as ���stovepiping,��� the transmission of unfiltered information from analysts directly to decision-makers.
In the past decade, political science has witnessed a substantial amount of research using formal... more In the past decade, political science has witnessed a substantial amount of research using formal models to explicate the rationale for and effects of myriad aspects of bureaucratic institutions. Whereas previous waves of formal modeling on bureaucratic structure emphasized bureaucracy as a device for making policy commitments last, more recent formal research has grappled with information asymmetries and more explicitly considered the principal-agent relationship between bureaucracies and political authorities.
Games and Economic Behavior, Jan 1, 2006
American Journal of Political …, Jan 1, 2007
American Journal of Political Science, Jan 1, 2008
Public Choice, Jan 1, 2002
Games and Economic Behavior, Jan 1, 2005
Quarterly Journal of Political …, Jan 1, 2006
Social Choice and Welfare, Jan 1, 2007
Public Choice, Jan 1, 2001
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Jan 1, 2008
Abstract This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justifie... more Abstract This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions supported within a group, I characterize the set of actions that can be justified as well as the arguments that will be used to justify these actions. Of particular interest in the article is the fact that each individual's preferences over different ...