Matthew Boyle | University of Chicago (original) (raw)
Papers by Matthew Boyle
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, 2017
Transparency and reflection
Transparency and Apperception, 2020
Longuenesse on Self and Body
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019
I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again, by Béatrice Longuenesse
Mind, 2018
Transparency and reflection
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of quest... more Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of questions about our own mental states to questions about the non-mental world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. I critically discuss some prominent recent accounts of such transparency, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of the phenomenon, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or ‘non-positional’ self-awareness into reflective, ‘positional’ self-knowledge.
Transparent self-knowledge
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Jun 1, 2011
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2015
Kant famously characterizes our human understanding as a “spontaneous” faculty, but what can this... more Kant famously characterizes our human understanding as a “spontaneous” faculty, but what can this mean? I criticize some recent interpretations of Kant’s claim and suggest that we can only understand what Kant means by “the spontaneity of understanding” if we recognize certain basic differences between how Kant conceived of cognition and how philosophers commonly think of it today. I go on to argue that Kant’s conception of cognition represents an appealing alternative to the unsatisfying options that contemporary ways of thinking seem to force on us.
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, 2010
It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the app... more It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the apparent good.
A venerable philosophical tradition holds that we rational creatures are distinguished by our cap... more A venerable philosophical tradition holds that we rational creatures are distinguished by our capacity for a special sort of mental agency or self-determination: we can "make up" our minds about what to believe. But what sort of activity is this? Many contemporary philosophers accept a Process Theory of this activity, according to which a rational subject exercises her capacity for doxastic self-determination only on certain discrete occasions, when she goes through a process of consciously deliberating about whether P and concludes by "making a judgment," thereby bringing about a change in what she believes. I argue that the Process Theory implies an unacceptable picture of the agency we exercise in judging, and of the relation of such agency to the condition of belief itself. I suggest that the beliefs of a rational creature are themselves "acts of reason," which reflect the capacity for doxastic self-determination in their very nature, not merely in certain facts about how they can originate.
Like all of our powers [Kräfte], the understanding in par tic u lar is bound in its acts [Handlun... more Like all of our powers [Kräfte], the understanding in par tic u lar is bound in its acts [Handlungen] to rules we can investigate. . . . [T]he science that contains these universal and necessary rules is a science merely of the form of our understanding’s cognition or of thinking. . . . Now this science of the necessary laws of the understanding and of reason in general, or, which is the same, of the mere form of thinking, we call logic.
Manuscrito
Sartre's obscure but evocative remarks on bodily awareness have often been cited, but, I argue, t... more Sartre's obscure but evocative remarks on bodily awareness have often been cited, but, I argue, they have rarely been understood. This paper aims to bring the connection between Sartre's views on bodily awareness and his more general distinction between "positional" and "non-positional" consciousness. Sartre's main claim about bodily awareness, I
If the human being had animal drives, he could not have that which we now call reason in him; for... more If the human being had animal drives, he could not have that which we now call reason in him; for precisely these drives would naturally tear his forces so obscurely towards a single point that no free circle of reflection would arise for him… If the human being had animal senses, then he would have no reason; for precisely his senses' strong susceptibility to stimulation, precisely the representations mightily pressing on him through them, would inevitably choke all cold reflectiveness.
Active Belief
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2009
The man who changes his mind, in response to evidence of the truth of a proposition, does not act... more The man who changes his mind, in response to evidence of the truth of a proposition, does not act upon himself; nor does he bring about an effect.- Hampshire (1965, 100)A point of persistent controversy in recent philosophical discussions of belief concerns whether we can exercise some sort of agential control over what we believe. On the one hand, the idea that we have some kind of discretion over what we believe has appealed to philosophers working in several areas. This idea has been invoked, for instance, to characterize the basic difference between rational and non-rational cognition, to account for our epistemic responsibility for what we believe, and to explain how we are able, normally, to say what we presently believe without relying on self-observation or inference. On the other hand, most contemporary philosophers agree that, in one significant sense, what we believe is not up to us: we cannot simply believe “at will,” and, although what we wish were so can influence what...
It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the app... more It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the apparent good.
Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2009
I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption tha... more I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is in an important sense fundamental, since it is intimately connected with the very capacity for rational reflection, and since it must be present in any creature that understands the first-person pronoun. Moreover, I suggest that these thoughts about self-knowledge have a Kantian provenance.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2015
Not so long ago, in the late 20 th century, philosophers of mind generally assumed that we have s... more Not so long ago, in the late 20 th century, philosophers of mind generally assumed that we have some sort of privileged access to, or at any rate some special authority in speaking about, our own mental states. Most did not assume that this privilege extends to every aspect of our mental lives, but most did assume that we are at least in a specially favorable position to know our own thoughts and feelings, on the one hand, and our own standing attitudes such as belief, desire, and intention, on the other. Moreover, late twentieth century philosophers typically assumed that this privilege reflects some difference of principle in the way we can gain knowledge of these topics. The problem was to explain this difference of principle. 2 Times change, however, and there are now a growing number of philosophers who question the datum this tradition set out to explain. Quassim Cassam's Self-Knowledge for Humans (2014) is a particularly direct and pointed contribution to this counteroffensive. 3 Like all of Cassam's work, it contains much careful philosophical argumentation; but it aims to be a book, not just for philosophers, but for any thinking person interested in self-knowledge. The discussion is admirably engaging and down-to-earth throughout. One major aim of the book is to challenge the idea that our mode of awareness of our own attitudes differs in principle from our mode of awareness of the attitudes of others. Cassam grants that we may in fact know more than other people do about our own present beliefs, desires, and intentions, at least when these attitudes concern matters that are not bound up with our self-conception; but he denies that any such de facto asymmetry in how much we know reflects a fundamentally different mode of awareness. I discern the attitudes of other people by a kind of interpretation: I draw inferences from their words, deeds, and other expressive behavior. When I ascribe attitudes to myself, my evidence typically includes more than this, since I have access not only to such outward signs but also to my own inner monologue and whatever images or impressions may accompany it. Nevertheless, Cassam argues, I pass from this evidence to knowledge of my own attitudes by taking a step of the same broadly inferential kind as the one I take in interpreting others. The relevant inferences may occur effortlessly and automatically, and this may give us the impression that we have immediate and noninferential access our own minds; but from an epistemological perspective, attitudinal self-knowledge is no less inferential than knowledge of the attitudes of others.
Volume 2, 2012
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefi... more The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Boyle, Matthew. Forthcoming. Essentially rational animals. In Rethinking epistemology, ed.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, 2017
Transparency and reflection
Transparency and Apperception, 2020
Longuenesse on Self and Body
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019
I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again, by Béatrice Longuenesse
Mind, 2018
Transparency and reflection
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of quest... more Much recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of questions about our own mental states to questions about the non-mental world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. I critically discuss some prominent recent accounts of such transparency, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of the phenomenon, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or ‘non-positional’ self-awareness into reflective, ‘positional’ self-knowledge.
Transparent self-knowledge
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Jun 1, 2011
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2015
Kant famously characterizes our human understanding as a “spontaneous” faculty, but what can this... more Kant famously characterizes our human understanding as a “spontaneous” faculty, but what can this mean? I criticize some recent interpretations of Kant’s claim and suggest that we can only understand what Kant means by “the spontaneity of understanding” if we recognize certain basic differences between how Kant conceived of cognition and how philosophers commonly think of it today. I go on to argue that Kant’s conception of cognition represents an appealing alternative to the unsatisfying options that contemporary ways of thinking seem to force on us.
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, 2010
It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the app... more It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the apparent good.
A venerable philosophical tradition holds that we rational creatures are distinguished by our cap... more A venerable philosophical tradition holds that we rational creatures are distinguished by our capacity for a special sort of mental agency or self-determination: we can "make up" our minds about what to believe. But what sort of activity is this? Many contemporary philosophers accept a Process Theory of this activity, according to which a rational subject exercises her capacity for doxastic self-determination only on certain discrete occasions, when she goes through a process of consciously deliberating about whether P and concludes by "making a judgment," thereby bringing about a change in what she believes. I argue that the Process Theory implies an unacceptable picture of the agency we exercise in judging, and of the relation of such agency to the condition of belief itself. I suggest that the beliefs of a rational creature are themselves "acts of reason," which reflect the capacity for doxastic self-determination in their very nature, not merely in certain facts about how they can originate.
Like all of our powers [Kräfte], the understanding in par tic u lar is bound in its acts [Handlun... more Like all of our powers [Kräfte], the understanding in par tic u lar is bound in its acts [Handlungen] to rules we can investigate. . . . [T]he science that contains these universal and necessary rules is a science merely of the form of our understanding’s cognition or of thinking. . . . Now this science of the necessary laws of the understanding and of reason in general, or, which is the same, of the mere form of thinking, we call logic.
Manuscrito
Sartre's obscure but evocative remarks on bodily awareness have often been cited, but, I argue, t... more Sartre's obscure but evocative remarks on bodily awareness have often been cited, but, I argue, they have rarely been understood. This paper aims to bring the connection between Sartre's views on bodily awareness and his more general distinction between "positional" and "non-positional" consciousness. Sartre's main claim about bodily awareness, I
If the human being had animal drives, he could not have that which we now call reason in him; for... more If the human being had animal drives, he could not have that which we now call reason in him; for precisely these drives would naturally tear his forces so obscurely towards a single point that no free circle of reflection would arise for him… If the human being had animal senses, then he would have no reason; for precisely his senses' strong susceptibility to stimulation, precisely the representations mightily pressing on him through them, would inevitably choke all cold reflectiveness.
Active Belief
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2009
The man who changes his mind, in response to evidence of the truth of a proposition, does not act... more The man who changes his mind, in response to evidence of the truth of a proposition, does not act upon himself; nor does he bring about an effect.- Hampshire (1965, 100)A point of persistent controversy in recent philosophical discussions of belief concerns whether we can exercise some sort of agential control over what we believe. On the one hand, the idea that we have some kind of discretion over what we believe has appealed to philosophers working in several areas. This idea has been invoked, for instance, to characterize the basic difference between rational and non-rational cognition, to account for our epistemic responsibility for what we believe, and to explain how we are able, normally, to say what we presently believe without relying on self-observation or inference. On the other hand, most contemporary philosophers agree that, in one significant sense, what we believe is not up to us: we cannot simply believe “at will,” and, although what we wish were so can influence what...
It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the app... more It is always the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the good or the apparent good.
Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2009
I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption tha... more I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is in an important sense fundamental, since it is intimately connected with the very capacity for rational reflection, and since it must be present in any creature that understands the first-person pronoun. Moreover, I suggest that these thoughts about self-knowledge have a Kantian provenance.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2015
Not so long ago, in the late 20 th century, philosophers of mind generally assumed that we have s... more Not so long ago, in the late 20 th century, philosophers of mind generally assumed that we have some sort of privileged access to, or at any rate some special authority in speaking about, our own mental states. Most did not assume that this privilege extends to every aspect of our mental lives, but most did assume that we are at least in a specially favorable position to know our own thoughts and feelings, on the one hand, and our own standing attitudes such as belief, desire, and intention, on the other. Moreover, late twentieth century philosophers typically assumed that this privilege reflects some difference of principle in the way we can gain knowledge of these topics. The problem was to explain this difference of principle. 2 Times change, however, and there are now a growing number of philosophers who question the datum this tradition set out to explain. Quassim Cassam's Self-Knowledge for Humans (2014) is a particularly direct and pointed contribution to this counteroffensive. 3 Like all of Cassam's work, it contains much careful philosophical argumentation; but it aims to be a book, not just for philosophers, but for any thinking person interested in self-knowledge. The discussion is admirably engaging and down-to-earth throughout. One major aim of the book is to challenge the idea that our mode of awareness of our own attitudes differs in principle from our mode of awareness of the attitudes of others. Cassam grants that we may in fact know more than other people do about our own present beliefs, desires, and intentions, at least when these attitudes concern matters that are not bound up with our self-conception; but he denies that any such de facto asymmetry in how much we know reflects a fundamentally different mode of awareness. I discern the attitudes of other people by a kind of interpretation: I draw inferences from their words, deeds, and other expressive behavior. When I ascribe attitudes to myself, my evidence typically includes more than this, since I have access not only to such outward signs but also to my own inner monologue and whatever images or impressions may accompany it. Nevertheless, Cassam argues, I pass from this evidence to knowledge of my own attitudes by taking a step of the same broadly inferential kind as the one I take in interpreting others. The relevant inferences may occur effortlessly and automatically, and this may give us the impression that we have immediate and noninferential access our own minds; but from an epistemological perspective, attitudinal self-knowledge is no less inferential than knowledge of the attitudes of others.
Volume 2, 2012
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefi... more The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Boyle, Matthew. Forthcoming. Essentially rational animals. In Rethinking epistemology, ed.