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TY - JOUR AU - McClelland, Tom PY - 2017 DA - 2017/03/01 TI - The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky? JO - Topoi SP - 17 EP - 30 VL - 36 IS - 1 AB - Phenomenal consciousness presents a distinctive explanatory problem. Some regard this problem as ‘hard’, which has troubling implications for the science and metaphysics of consciousness. Some regard it as ‘easy’, which ignores the special explanatory difficulties that consciousness offers. Others are unable to decide between these two uncomfortable positions. All three camps assume that the problem of consciousness is either easy or hard. I argue against this disjunction and suggest that the problem may be ‘tricky’—that is, partly easy and partly hard. This possibility emerges when we recognise that consciousness raises two explanatory questions. The Consciousness Question concerns why a subject is conscious rather than unconscious. The Character Question concerns why a conscious subject’s experience has the phenomenology it has rather than some other. I explore the possibility of one or other of these explanatory challenges being hard and the other easy, and consider the dialectical ramifications this has for all sides of the debate. SN - 1572-8749 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9257-4 DO - 10.1007/s11245-014-9257-4 ID - McClelland2017 ER -