Jesse D Slavens | Clarkstate Community College (original) (raw)

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Thesis Chapters by Jesse D Slavens

Purity is essential to Kant’s moral philosophy and remains so for many Kantian moral philosophers... more Purity is essential to Kant’s moral philosophy and remains so for many Kantian moral philosophers. For Kant, a pure morality is one ultimately and exclusively grounded in reason, or the elimination of everything empirical and contingent as a moral foundation. The objective of a pure, or a priori, foundation is both practical and theoretical: first, the purity of morality unifies all ancillary laws and moral concepts, giving them a common framework for application; second, the a prioricity of morality establishes its supremacy. These practical and theoretical properties justify Kant’s and Kantianism’s claim of objectivity and universality.
Central to the purity of morality is the Moral Law or, for empirical beings subject to pathological interest and inclination, the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative is literally the legislation of reason and commands with absolute authority. The Categorical Imperative in its various formulations ensures that our principles of action, or maxims, conform to the pure dictates of reason and that our actions respect and promote reason as an end-in-itself. The Categorical Imperative guides our actions by both establishing right-making conditions and setting an end for rational action of incomparable worth: our own humanity.
The purity of Kantian morality provokes the question: “What can be accomplished from a foundation purged of all contingent content?” That is, one may wonder whether a moral theory whose foundation is purged of all particular historical and cultural content can fully answer the specific, complex, and contextually embedded moral questions that confront a moral agent. This is a challenge that has problematized Kant’s moral philosophy and Kantianism from the beginning.
G. W. F. Hegel developed a comprehensive critique of Kant’s moral philosophy in answer to this question. Hegel argued that Kant’s moral philosophy – what he terms Moralität – is empty and cannot provide an immanent doctrine of duty. Kant’s moral philosophy, Hegel argues, is internally inconsistent: the category of Moralität includes the concept of universal and objective duty and welfare; the concept of duty includes the concept of right action; however, from the standpoint of Moralität alone a moral agent cannot determine what his actual duty is. Hegel concludes that Moralität is an incomplete category, and that our practical philosophy must transition dialectically to the more complete category of Ethical Life.
Hegel’s positive position – the transition to Ethical Life – crucially depends on the success of his emptiness critique. The emptiness of Moralität is the problem to which Ethical Life is the answer. The success and even relevance of Hegel’s critique, however, is a matter of continued debate. Kantians reject Hegel’s critique on two fronts: first, that Hegel’s critique amounts to an objection to the Formula of Universal Law only, and this objection that the Formula of Universal Law is an “empty formalism” depends on a misunderstanding of the purpose and function of Kant’s primary formulation; second, Kantians argue that this empty formalism objection – or the “emptiness objection” – is limited to the Formula of Universal Law and that the other formulations of the Categorical Imperative, most notably the Formula of Humanity, are not empty but sufficiently content-full to derive or determine actual duties.
I argue in this dissertation that these rebuttals to Hegel’s emptiness critique are in error: Hegel both understood the proper function of the Formula of Universal Law, and considered all of Moralität to be empty. The failure to recognize the full consequence and extent of Hegel’s critique is, first, a product of focusing too narrowly on Hegel’s contention that the Formula of Universal Law is empty because it is an empty formalism, and not attending to the constellation of supporting arguments in which this objection is situated. By attending to Hegel’s supporting and related arguments I contend, second, that Hegel’s critique is not limited to the Formula of Universal Law, but can be extended to the Formula of Humanity.
The success of my contention will, of course, depend on the separate arguments of each chapter. Nonetheless, these arguments all have in common Hegel’s general contention that Moralität cannot furnish an immanent doctrine of duties unless contingent content is imported: when a determination of derivation or duty works, it works by importing contingent content; when contingent content is not imported, the determination or derivation of duty fails. If this essential contention is tenable, then Moralität alone is empty, and an immanent doctrine of duty requires content which a pure Kantianism cannot provide.

Teaching Documents by Jesse D Slavens

Genuine diversity is essential to philosophy as a discipline and philosophy's role in society. Ou... more Genuine diversity is essential to philosophy as a discipline and philosophy's role in society. Our overriding concern as academics vis-à-vis diversity is the diversity of ideas; and as philosophers, our goal must be to include and promote diverse ideas within a context of rational assessment, critique, and dialectic. Philosophy's great value, in addition to the intrinsic value of knowledge gained and the contemplation of enduring and profound ideas, is the means and framework it provides for the productive dissemination and circulation of diverse ideas. If a pluralistic society is to thrive, philosophy must be practiced. We are not, however, starting from scratch: our liberal society has an illiberal history replete with violence, racism, sexism, and prejudice. This means that our exchange of ideas and the critical dialectic has been, and may in some cases continue to be, both explicitly and implicitly exclusive. As academics and educators, it is our job and responsibility to identify, acknowledge, and rectify this exclusion and to promote inclusion while simultaneously maintaining and respecting the value and ends of philosophy. Just as the absence of diversity can be explicit or implicit, our efforts to promote diversity must use both implicit and explicit means. In concrete terms this means, first, making diversity visible: the voices of underrepresented groups must be represented in our philosophical curriculum. In concrete terms, this means ensuring that minorities and marginalized groups are included in the syllabus. This can be a challenge. For example, in teaching Modern Philosophy, which covers the history of ideas of a very chauvinistic period, diverse primary texts are not easily available. Effort must be made to rectify this paucity by searching out original material (such as M. Atherton's collection of essays by contemporaneous women) or by making sure diverse secondary material is included. Diversity may also be achieved by ensuring that students also see themselves in the subject of philosophy – philosophy will only be seen as relevant, and thus only enthusiastically pursued, if it is related to the diverse lives of our students. Accordingly, even in ostensibly neutral courses like Critical Thinking, as a course instructor I take every effort to ensure that topical and sometimes controversial issues (e.g., the Black Lives Matter movement, transgenderism, implicit bias) are incorporated into the course and discussed openly, critically, and civilly. As an educator, I strive to be attentive to implicit forms of exclusion and work to promote inclusion. I have contributed directly to creating an inclusionary classroom environment by breaking down the " student/ teacher barrier " that can be present in many classrooms. In concrete terms, this means abandoning the lecture format for a more dynamic and cooperative learning process. Since each student's background influences the unique way in which he or she will engage with the material, I provide a range of avenues for participation which includes small group discussion, open format class discussion, as well as group presentations and debate teams. Giving the student options for participation is an important way to ensure he or she is included in the learning process. A key component of an inclusive classroom is group work – which also promotes student-centered learning. A common problem in the classroom, and in Philosophy classes in particular, is that students feel marginalized and sometimes intimidated. Group work enables the student to participate in a smaller and less intimidating context. By creatively engaging students through multiple learning formats I have successfully promoted inclusionary classroom environments that serve as forums in which the diverse voices of students can be heard.

Purity is essential to Kant’s moral philosophy and remains so for many Kantian moral philosophers... more Purity is essential to Kant’s moral philosophy and remains so for many Kantian moral philosophers. For Kant, a pure morality is one ultimately and exclusively grounded in reason, or the elimination of everything empirical and contingent as a moral foundation. The objective of a pure, or a priori, foundation is both practical and theoretical: first, the purity of morality unifies all ancillary laws and moral concepts, giving them a common framework for application; second, the a prioricity of morality establishes its supremacy. These practical and theoretical properties justify Kant’s and Kantianism’s claim of objectivity and universality.
Central to the purity of morality is the Moral Law or, for empirical beings subject to pathological interest and inclination, the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative is literally the legislation of reason and commands with absolute authority. The Categorical Imperative in its various formulations ensures that our principles of action, or maxims, conform to the pure dictates of reason and that our actions respect and promote reason as an end-in-itself. The Categorical Imperative guides our actions by both establishing right-making conditions and setting an end for rational action of incomparable worth: our own humanity.
The purity of Kantian morality provokes the question: “What can be accomplished from a foundation purged of all contingent content?” That is, one may wonder whether a moral theory whose foundation is purged of all particular historical and cultural content can fully answer the specific, complex, and contextually embedded moral questions that confront a moral agent. This is a challenge that has problematized Kant’s moral philosophy and Kantianism from the beginning.
G. W. F. Hegel developed a comprehensive critique of Kant’s moral philosophy in answer to this question. Hegel argued that Kant’s moral philosophy – what he terms Moralität – is empty and cannot provide an immanent doctrine of duty. Kant’s moral philosophy, Hegel argues, is internally inconsistent: the category of Moralität includes the concept of universal and objective duty and welfare; the concept of duty includes the concept of right action; however, from the standpoint of Moralität alone a moral agent cannot determine what his actual duty is. Hegel concludes that Moralität is an incomplete category, and that our practical philosophy must transition dialectically to the more complete category of Ethical Life.
Hegel’s positive position – the transition to Ethical Life – crucially depends on the success of his emptiness critique. The emptiness of Moralität is the problem to which Ethical Life is the answer. The success and even relevance of Hegel’s critique, however, is a matter of continued debate. Kantians reject Hegel’s critique on two fronts: first, that Hegel’s critique amounts to an objection to the Formula of Universal Law only, and this objection that the Formula of Universal Law is an “empty formalism” depends on a misunderstanding of the purpose and function of Kant’s primary formulation; second, Kantians argue that this empty formalism objection – or the “emptiness objection” – is limited to the Formula of Universal Law and that the other formulations of the Categorical Imperative, most notably the Formula of Humanity, are not empty but sufficiently content-full to derive or determine actual duties.
I argue in this dissertation that these rebuttals to Hegel’s emptiness critique are in error: Hegel both understood the proper function of the Formula of Universal Law, and considered all of Moralität to be empty. The failure to recognize the full consequence and extent of Hegel’s critique is, first, a product of focusing too narrowly on Hegel’s contention that the Formula of Universal Law is empty because it is an empty formalism, and not attending to the constellation of supporting arguments in which this objection is situated. By attending to Hegel’s supporting and related arguments I contend, second, that Hegel’s critique is not limited to the Formula of Universal Law, but can be extended to the Formula of Humanity.
The success of my contention will, of course, depend on the separate arguments of each chapter. Nonetheless, these arguments all have in common Hegel’s general contention that Moralität cannot furnish an immanent doctrine of duties unless contingent content is imported: when a determination of derivation or duty works, it works by importing contingent content; when contingent content is not imported, the determination or derivation of duty fails. If this essential contention is tenable, then Moralität alone is empty, and an immanent doctrine of duty requires content which a pure Kantianism cannot provide.

Genuine diversity is essential to philosophy as a discipline and philosophy's role in society. Ou... more Genuine diversity is essential to philosophy as a discipline and philosophy's role in society. Our overriding concern as academics vis-à-vis diversity is the diversity of ideas; and as philosophers, our goal must be to include and promote diverse ideas within a context of rational assessment, critique, and dialectic. Philosophy's great value, in addition to the intrinsic value of knowledge gained and the contemplation of enduring and profound ideas, is the means and framework it provides for the productive dissemination and circulation of diverse ideas. If a pluralistic society is to thrive, philosophy must be practiced. We are not, however, starting from scratch: our liberal society has an illiberal history replete with violence, racism, sexism, and prejudice. This means that our exchange of ideas and the critical dialectic has been, and may in some cases continue to be, both explicitly and implicitly exclusive. As academics and educators, it is our job and responsibility to identify, acknowledge, and rectify this exclusion and to promote inclusion while simultaneously maintaining and respecting the value and ends of philosophy. Just as the absence of diversity can be explicit or implicit, our efforts to promote diversity must use both implicit and explicit means. In concrete terms this means, first, making diversity visible: the voices of underrepresented groups must be represented in our philosophical curriculum. In concrete terms, this means ensuring that minorities and marginalized groups are included in the syllabus. This can be a challenge. For example, in teaching Modern Philosophy, which covers the history of ideas of a very chauvinistic period, diverse primary texts are not easily available. Effort must be made to rectify this paucity by searching out original material (such as M. Atherton's collection of essays by contemporaneous women) or by making sure diverse secondary material is included. Diversity may also be achieved by ensuring that students also see themselves in the subject of philosophy – philosophy will only be seen as relevant, and thus only enthusiastically pursued, if it is related to the diverse lives of our students. Accordingly, even in ostensibly neutral courses like Critical Thinking, as a course instructor I take every effort to ensure that topical and sometimes controversial issues (e.g., the Black Lives Matter movement, transgenderism, implicit bias) are incorporated into the course and discussed openly, critically, and civilly. As an educator, I strive to be attentive to implicit forms of exclusion and work to promote inclusion. I have contributed directly to creating an inclusionary classroom environment by breaking down the " student/ teacher barrier " that can be present in many classrooms. In concrete terms, this means abandoning the lecture format for a more dynamic and cooperative learning process. Since each student's background influences the unique way in which he or she will engage with the material, I provide a range of avenues for participation which includes small group discussion, open format class discussion, as well as group presentations and debate teams. Giving the student options for participation is an important way to ensure he or she is included in the learning process. A key component of an inclusive classroom is group work – which also promotes student-centered learning. A common problem in the classroom, and in Philosophy classes in particular, is that students feel marginalized and sometimes intimidated. Group work enables the student to participate in a smaller and less intimidating context. By creatively engaging students through multiple learning formats I have successfully promoted inclusionary classroom environments that serve as forums in which the diverse voices of students can be heard.