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Overview of the science and philosophy of attention. An uncorrected version of the introduction i... more Overview of the science and philosophy of attention. An uncorrected version of the introduction is available below.
Collects recent state of the art papers on the cognitive science and philosophy of attention
Papers by Wayne Wu
The World at Our Fingertips, 2021
Are we aware of peripersonal space as peripersonal? Is there a distinctive way that peripersonal ... more Are we aware of peripersonal space as peripersonal? Is there a distinctive way that peripersonal space is perceptually experienced that differs from the perceptual experience of other parts of space? I explore two ways of thinking about peripersonal experience. A substantial view takes the content of experience of peripersonal space to effectively represent that space as peripersonal while a deflationary view understands peripersonal experience to be constituted by specific sensory-motor links and implicates a distinctive role for attention. In both, there is a distinctive type of peripersonal experience, but only on the substantial view does the perceptual system speak in terms of the peripersonal. By examining the role of attention in peripersonal experience, I argue that we should not endorse a substantive conception of peripersonal experience over a deflationary conception. I explore what a deflationary account of peripersonal experience might be.
New Philosophical Perspectives, 2015
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2010
ABSTRACT
Decomposing the Will, 2013
nput mechanisms approximate the condition often ascribed to reflexes: they are automatically trig... more nput mechanisms approximate the condition often ascribed to reflexes: they are automatically triggered by the stimuli that they apply to…It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that it does not seem to be true for nonperceptual cognitive processes…we have all the leeway in the world as to how we shall represent the objects of thought (Jerry Fodor (1983), p. 54-5). The movement of the natural causality of reason (practical reason in this case) to its conclusion in choice or decision is lived (by some) as action when it is really just reflex; distinctively rational reflex, to be sure, but not in any case a matter of action (Galen Strawson (2003), p. 244).
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2013
Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily inf... more Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitoring mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly, a discussion that systematically contrasts the two models of AVH can generate sharper questions that will lead to new avenues of investigation. In this paper, we provide such a theoretical discussion of the two models, drawing strong contrasts between them. We identify a set of challenges for the self-monitoring account and argue that the spontaneous activation account has much in favor of it and should be the default account. Our theoretical overview leads to new questions and issues regarding the explanation of AVH as a subjective phenomenon and its neural basis. Accordingly, we suggest a set of experimental strategies to dissect the underlying mechanisms of AVH in light of the two competing models.
Mind, 2013
In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not wh... more In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not whether we are zombie agents but to what extent. I argue that current evidence supports only minimal zombie agency. Recent empirical work suggests that unconscious vision guides and controls much of our bodily actions. We are accordingly zombie agents (Koch and Crick 2001). While
Mind & Language, 2014
Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a divisi... more Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a "zombie" stream. In this paper, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature of consciousness. I am grateful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers that led to substantial improvements in the text, to Robert Briscoe who provided helpful comments on an earlier version and to Professor Ruth Campbell for editing that improved clarity.
How are agency and consciousness intertwined? This entry focuses on visually guided bodily action... more How are agency and consciousness intertwined? This entry focuses on visually guided bodily action where visual attention serves as an anchor for visual phenomenology in action. The emphasis is not to denigrate mental actions (see Soteriou, this volume) nor is it due to a coarse visuo-centrism. Rather, much of the detailed empirical work relevant to our topic has been done on vision and the visual guidance of motor movement. I focus on this literature to help us understand conscious intentional agency in an empirically informed way. Against empirical arguments to the contrary, I contend that a common sense picture of consciousness in action is tenable: conscious vision guides action and thus contributes centrally to the phenomenology of visually-guided agency.
Final version of paper published in Rocco Gennaro's handbook on consciousness.
Online/corrected version: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-neuroscience/
This is a forthcoming response to Dicey Jennings and Nanay (2014) Analysis which criticizes my ar... more This is a forthcoming response to Dicey Jennings and Nanay (2014) Analysis which criticizes my arguments that attention is a necessary part of action. I present a succinct version of my argument that the Many-Many Problem is a necessary condition on action, and I locate attention, roughly as James conceived of it, within the structure of action.
Edit: I corrected the earlier version which referred to Carolyn incorrectly as "Dicey Jennings". References should be simply to Jennings.
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2014
Philosophical Studies, 2013
In his rich and provocative paper, Peter Carruthers announces two related theses:
Mind & Language, 2012
ABSTRACT
Please see the PUBLISHED VERSION in Analysis. This was an earlier draft that I am leaving up as t... more Please see the PUBLISHED VERSION in Analysis. This was an earlier draft that I am leaving up as there are readers of this paper. However, the published version is a better paper.
This is a response to arguments by Jennings and Nanay to my claim that action requires attention. I argue that (a) the purported counterexamples involve attention and (b) that the authors have not correctly interpreted my argument, specifically on the idea that a preset one-one mapping is compatible with a Many-Many Problem. I do mention intentional inaction as one area where a problem might arise for my view.
Overview of the science and philosophy of attention. An uncorrected version of the introduction i... more Overview of the science and philosophy of attention. An uncorrected version of the introduction is available below.
Collects recent state of the art papers on the cognitive science and philosophy of attention
The World at Our Fingertips, 2021
Are we aware of peripersonal space as peripersonal? Is there a distinctive way that peripersonal ... more Are we aware of peripersonal space as peripersonal? Is there a distinctive way that peripersonal space is perceptually experienced that differs from the perceptual experience of other parts of space? I explore two ways of thinking about peripersonal experience. A substantial view takes the content of experience of peripersonal space to effectively represent that space as peripersonal while a deflationary view understands peripersonal experience to be constituted by specific sensory-motor links and implicates a distinctive role for attention. In both, there is a distinctive type of peripersonal experience, but only on the substantial view does the perceptual system speak in terms of the peripersonal. By examining the role of attention in peripersonal experience, I argue that we should not endorse a substantive conception of peripersonal experience over a deflationary conception. I explore what a deflationary account of peripersonal experience might be.
New Philosophical Perspectives, 2015
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2010
ABSTRACT
Decomposing the Will, 2013
nput mechanisms approximate the condition often ascribed to reflexes: they are automatically trig... more nput mechanisms approximate the condition often ascribed to reflexes: they are automatically triggered by the stimuli that they apply to…It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that it does not seem to be true for nonperceptual cognitive processes…we have all the leeway in the world as to how we shall represent the objects of thought (Jerry Fodor (1983), p. 54-5). The movement of the natural causality of reason (practical reason in this case) to its conclusion in choice or decision is lived (by some) as action when it is really just reflex; distinctively rational reflex, to be sure, but not in any case a matter of action (Galen Strawson (2003), p. 244).
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2013
Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily inf... more Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitoring mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly, a discussion that systematically contrasts the two models of AVH can generate sharper questions that will lead to new avenues of investigation. In this paper, we provide such a theoretical discussion of the two models, drawing strong contrasts between them. We identify a set of challenges for the self-monitoring account and argue that the spontaneous activation account has much in favor of it and should be the default account. Our theoretical overview leads to new questions and issues regarding the explanation of AVH as a subjective phenomenon and its neural basis. Accordingly, we suggest a set of experimental strategies to dissect the underlying mechanisms of AVH in light of the two competing models.
Mind, 2013
In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not wh... more In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not whether we are zombie agents but to what extent. I argue that current evidence supports only minimal zombie agency. Recent empirical work suggests that unconscious vision guides and controls much of our bodily actions. We are accordingly zombie agents (Koch and Crick 2001). While
Mind & Language, 2014
Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a divisi... more Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a "zombie" stream. In this paper, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature of consciousness. I am grateful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers that led to substantial improvements in the text, to Robert Briscoe who provided helpful comments on an earlier version and to Professor Ruth Campbell for editing that improved clarity.
How are agency and consciousness intertwined? This entry focuses on visually guided bodily action... more How are agency and consciousness intertwined? This entry focuses on visually guided bodily action where visual attention serves as an anchor for visual phenomenology in action. The emphasis is not to denigrate mental actions (see Soteriou, this volume) nor is it due to a coarse visuo-centrism. Rather, much of the detailed empirical work relevant to our topic has been done on vision and the visual guidance of motor movement. I focus on this literature to help us understand conscious intentional agency in an empirically informed way. Against empirical arguments to the contrary, I contend that a common sense picture of consciousness in action is tenable: conscious vision guides action and thus contributes centrally to the phenomenology of visually-guided agency.
Final version of paper published in Rocco Gennaro's handbook on consciousness.
Online/corrected version: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-neuroscience/
This is a forthcoming response to Dicey Jennings and Nanay (2014) Analysis which criticizes my ar... more This is a forthcoming response to Dicey Jennings and Nanay (2014) Analysis which criticizes my arguments that attention is a necessary part of action. I present a succinct version of my argument that the Many-Many Problem is a necessary condition on action, and I locate attention, roughly as James conceived of it, within the structure of action.
Edit: I corrected the earlier version which referred to Carolyn incorrectly as "Dicey Jennings". References should be simply to Jennings.
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2014
Philosophical Studies, 2013
In his rich and provocative paper, Peter Carruthers announces two related theses:
Mind & Language, 2012
ABSTRACT
Please see the PUBLISHED VERSION in Analysis. This was an earlier draft that I am leaving up as t... more Please see the PUBLISHED VERSION in Analysis. This was an earlier draft that I am leaving up as there are readers of this paper. However, the published version is a better paper.
This is a response to arguments by Jennings and Nanay to my claim that action requires attention. I argue that (a) the purported counterexamples involve attention and (b) that the authors have not correctly interpreted my argument, specifically on the idea that a preset one-one mapping is compatible with a Many-Many Problem. I do mention intentional inaction as one area where a problem might arise for my view.
This paper discusses the role semantic content might play in informing computations needed to pro... more This paper discusses the role semantic content might play in informing computations needed to produce visually-guided movement (reach and grasp). We discuss visual computations needed to generate such action and how a case can be made for one type of cognitive penetration between action semantics and visuomotor action computations. Please also see my "Against Division" for more on the visual streams.
Argues that the dorsal stream contributes to conscious visual experience of spatial constancy. Pr... more Argues that the dorsal stream contributes to conscious visual experience of spatial constancy. Provides an explanation of constancy.
We argue that many of the failures of introspection Schwitzgebel discusses are due to inattention... more We argue that many of the failures of introspection Schwitzgebel discusses are due to inattention in introspection.
Presses for a notion of unconscious attention as a counterexample to Prinz's AIR theory. Speculat... more Presses for a notion of unconscious attention as a counterexample to Prinz's AIR theory. Speculates that Prinz would be better served by dropping the focus on attention in favor of modulations tied to working memory.
Attention and the Expansion of Peripersonal Representation after Tool Use
This paper critically examines the idea that our representations of our body expand during tool u... more This paper critically examines the idea that our representations of our body expand during tool use. It focuses on work in human neuropsychology patients inspired by electrophysiological recordings in non-human primates suggesting that somatosensory receptive fields expand with tool use. I argue that the work in crossmodal extinction can be explained without appeal to the expansion of sensory fields. Rather, tool use changes how we attend to the space around us. If this attentional account is correct, it undercuts one way of explaining what it might be to see peripersonal space (the near space around our bodies) *as* peripersonal.
What is attention? What is its role in consciousness? Watzl's book answers these questions with a... more What is attention? What is its role in consciousness? Watzl's book answers these questions with a simple idea: Attention structures the mind. The idea is fleshed out in this ambitious two-part work, the first providing a metaphysics of attention as an activity of ordering the mind in terms of priority, the second providing a conception of attention as organizing consciousness by centering the conscious field. Watzl has thought deeply about these issues, and the results are carefully explicated in this compelling and complex book. It provides the most comprehensive philosophical discussion of the functional and phenomenal aspects of attention currently available in monograph form. The first part presents Watzl's priority structuring view of attention. Chapter 1 argues against reducing attention to neural or computational processes. Rather, attention is a subject-level, mental activity, a process structured by an internal form with two salient features, guidance and priority (Chapters 2 and 3): To attend to O is to be guided to put the mental state representing O at the top of a priority structure. Priority structures are explicated in chapters 4 and 5 and a variety of intuitive claims about attention are analyzed in terms of it. Chapters 6 and 7 unpack guidance in passive and active attention respectively. Watzl argues that " passive " attention is guided by relevant mental states that have imperatival content that the subject should prioritize those very states. This identifies psychological salience. In active attention, guidance is through states tied to executive control. In part two, Watzl shifts to consciousness. Chapter 8 argues that the phenomenal contribution of attention is not reducible to appearances (e.g. representational content) but concerns phenomenal structure, a notion explicated in Chapter 9 in terms of the center and periphery of the conscious field. Chapter 10 then adduces phenomenal salience, the conscious correlate of psychological salience, to explain the flow of consciousness. This aligns phenomenal structure with the metaphysical structure in Part One. An account of awareness of attention as a type of agentive awareness is explored in Chapter 11. Chapter 12 deals with issues of attention as necessary and sufficient for consciousness while the final chapter argues for the provocative thesis that attention is necessary for consciousness because it explains the unity, perspective, and subjectivity of consciousness. There is no consciousness without the phenomenal structure that attention imposes. This chapter is especially thought provoking, but it is a long way to get there, as the book, while engagingly written, is dense and intricate. Fortunately, Watzl's introduction provides road maps for readers who might want to read in a more piecemeal fashion. Watzl's priority structuring account is situated in a venerable strand of work on attention which connects it to agency. We find this connection in William James's well-known characterization of attention: It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought....It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others (James 1890, 403, my emphasis).
Mineness and Introspective Data This paper explored introspective data as used to argue for "ph... more Mineness and Introspective Data
This paper explored introspective data as used to argue for "phenomenal mineness" and takes a deflationary approach in the case of the rubber hand illusion and in discussion of delusion of control.
Takes a very skeptical stance on "mineness/ownership/disownership" as a phenomenal feature of exp... more Takes a very skeptical stance on "mineness/ownership/disownership" as a phenomenal feature of experience, with focus on action. Worries about the conception of introspection that is driving how we deal with introspective reports. Argues that mineness is all in the judgment with focus on delusion of control in schizophrenia.
This is on neural explanations of the content/quality question.
First part of a draft of the SEP entry on this topic, with outline. This is a draft, no doubt nee... more First part of a draft of the SEP entry on this topic, with outline. This is a draft, no doubt needs polishing, etc.
Another discussion of introspection as attention and action, drawing on a empirical account of at... more Another discussion of introspection as attention and action, drawing on a empirical account of attention within the context of introspecting as a selective action.
This is an excerpt from a draft of an SEP entry on the neuroscience of consciousness. It focuses ... more This is an excerpt from a draft of an SEP entry on the neuroscience of consciousness. It focuses on binocular rivalry, but I have included the current introduction (which will certainly be rewritten) and a discussion of two questions regarding consciousness. I think research on BR has been fruitful, but it is not so clear to me that it has been fruitful in understanding consciousness vis-a-vis our two questions even if it is a standard example of detailed consciousness research. So, this is a request for some feedback from those who are interested in the area. Please note that as an SEP entry, it has to be short, so of course, some details are lost (I have opted for more details on research that I think more clearly addressing consciousness).
This is an outline for an entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the Neuroscience of... more This is an outline for an entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the Neuroscience of Consciousness. Giving an overview of relevant work is an impossible task as there is so much of it. The goal here is to be as general as possible but to then delve deeply. Thus, the focus is restricted to two questions which are then unpacked by focus (largely) on mammalian vision (though other forms of consciousness are considered in passing). Obviously many topics left out. This is posted to solicit thoughts about additional topics, but *please consider the frame of the entry via the two questions*. I think clear questions are crucial to imposing transparency on any discussion of consciousness. Of course, do raise other questions that you think important, but do articulate those questions.
I motivate and unpack the attention as selection for action view, as I have developed it.
Continues to press the case on the standard self-monitoring account of AVH in schizophrenia, part... more Continues to press the case on the standard self-monitoring account of AVH in schizophrenia, particularly those that focus on inner speech. Focuses on the explanatory framework that guides work in this area including issues about describing the phenomenology of AVH, the validity of introspective reports, and the mechanisms and principles needed to tie brain to behavior. Again, it is argued that while dominant, the inner speech model is perhaps the least plausible of the models under consideration.
This paper focuses on introspection of perceptual consciousness and attempts to draw on empirical... more This paper focuses on introspection of perceptual consciousness and attempts to draw on empirical work on attention to provide a psychologically realistic model of introspection that is then used to explain certain properties of introspection. A key issue concerns unpacking introspective reliability. I claim that we can fix conditions of introspective reliability as rigorously as any experimental condition in cognitive science. Worries about the use of introspection in philosophy are raised: it is far less rigorous than it needs to be.