Daniel Cohen | Colby College (original) (raw)

Papers by Daniel Cohen

Interdisciplinary Speaker Series on the Ethics of Argumentation, 2022

The character and identity of the arguers are sometimes relevant factors in argument evaluation. ... more The character and identity of the arguers are sometimes relevant factors in argument evaluation. Indeed, the arguments that matter to us are the arguments that we, the arguers, matter to.

Argument ethics on line speaker series, 2020

Power-point slides to accompany "Giving arguments a good name" 2022

AILACT, Vancouver, April 2022, 2022

If we were to take the transcript of a multi-party argument and re-distribute the spoken lines to... more If we were to take the transcript of a multi-party argument and re-distribute the spoken lines to different participants in the argument, would that materially change the quality of the argument as an argument? The logicians and critical thinkers in us may be immediately tempted to say that it cannot: our training makes us wary of any ad hominem argumentation and reminds us that good reasoning is good reasoning regardless of the arguer. However, our inner philosophers of language, epistemologists, and social-political philosophers, being more sensitive to pragmatics, perspectives, and how we are situated, should hesitate: the standpoints that arguers bring to arguments are determinants of what they say and their standing within those arguments can be factors in how they are heard.
I shall argue for several important conclusions that can be drawn from this thought-experiment. First, the critical evaluation of arguments cannot ignore the participant arguers; it matters who is arguing, who is objecting, who is questioning, and who is listening. Second, silent – or silenced! – arguers have to be counted among the participants; it also matters who is not raising objections, not asking questions, and not listening. And third, to accommodate the necessary changes in how we evaluate arguments, we also need to change how we conceptualize arguments; examining the premises and conclusions is not enough, but neither is it sufficient to focus exclusively on the speech-acts of the arguers to the exclusion of their characters and identities.

European Conference on Argumentation, 2022

Although we typically assess arguments with reference to their closure-e.g., whether the inferenc... more Although we typically assess arguments with reference to their closure-e.g., whether the inferences successfully lead to the conclusion, whether interlocutors were successfully persuaded by rational means, or whether the arguers successfully reached resolution-inconclusive arguments are common parts of our cognitive lives and they are not all failures. They can be quite positive. Episodic arguments can make progress towards conclusions they never reach; conclusions will emerge and constantly evolve in ongoing arguments; unfinished arguments improve and strengthen our standpoints; and conclusive or not, argumentation provides its participants with opportunities to gain deeper understanding and greater appreciation of others' positions. Further, since arguments can always be reopened , even apparently conclusive arguments are only defeasibly closed. This includes argument appraisals, which are themselves arguments. In short, inconclusive arguments, like other arguments, are subject to description as logically flawed, cognitively productive, socially destructive, personally satisfying, ethically problematic, and so on. Nevertheless, inconclusive arguments present a challenge to amny cogency tests because in order to render a judgment as to whether the premises are relevant and sufficient for the conclusion, there has to be a conclusion. Not surprisingly, process and procedural approaches to argumentation fare better with inconclusive arguments than productoriented approaches do. Inconclusive arguments can be judged as having been argued well or poorly as far as they go. Still, many of the features that can make them praiseworthy or censurable remain elusive to these approaches because these features accrue to the arguers themselves. In particular, the question as to how well the arguers engaged looms large. Cohen Virtue theories, I argue, are well-situated to fill this gap in argumentation theory.

Injusticias epistémicas: Análisis y contexto, 2022

Hoy por hoy reconocemos como una verdad universal que la argumentación política requiere de un ar... more Hoy por hoy reconocemos como una verdad universal que la argumentación política requiere de un arreglo. El consenso no se extiende a los modos de mejorar la política ni tampoco a los paliativos, pero al menos parte del problema está en cómo pensamos respecto de los argumentos. Si se conciben como secuencias de proposiciones estructuradas inferencialmente o como una serie de actos de habla, entonces las principales preocupaciones de los teóricos de la argumentación se convierten en falacias. Los argumentos son terreno fértil para los programas de investigación y, aunque pueden ser difíciles de evitar y aún más difíciles de enseñar, son, en el fondo, problemas relativamente fáciles de identificar y solucionar. En su mayor parte, son errores inferenciales en la argumentación, más que pecados, delitos o injusticias. Eso los convierte en el resfriado común en una pandemia de patologías argumentativas más graves: comparten algunos síntomas, pero tienen diferentes condiciones subyacentes. La pandemia no se dirige al sistema inferencial; se dirige al sistema comunitario. La concepción pertinente de la argumentación tiene que incluir a quienes argumentan y que participan en complejas interacciones multipartitas. Estos tipos de argumentos pueden ser satisfactorios y valiosos, pero también pueden ser vulnerables a toda la gama de patologías que plagan todos los fenómenos interpersonales, ya sean legales, éticos, sociales, psicológicos o económicos. También están sujetos a patologías, especialmente las propias. Algunos fallos argumentativos pueden caer bajo el ámbito de, digamos, la jurisprudencia o la ética, no obstante, en la medida en que son relevantes para una evaluación de la calidad de un argumento como argumento, la teoría de la argumentación debería tener algo que decir sobre ellos. Esta discusión considerará algunos ejemplos específicos de injusticia argumentativa para identificar de qué maneras puede ocurrir esto y cuál es su importancia para la teoría de la argumentación. Comenzamos con algunos ejemplos de diálogos que son sintácticamente idénticos pero muy diferentes como argumentos. Esto nos permitirá, primero, triangular el concepto relevante de argumento y, luego, aislar algún tipo específico de injusticias argumentativas. Aunque será útil para las etapas iniciales de nuestro análisis referirnos a quienes proponen los argumentos y a su público objetivo, reconocemos que esos roles no están ni predeterminados ni fijos, ni son tampoco exclusivos ni exhaustivos. Son convencionales y fluidos pero estas denominaciones nos ayudarán a distinguir diferentes tipos de silencio y diferentes formas en que los silencios pueden ocurrir en la argumentación. Este ejercicio pone de relieve que, para evaluar la argumentación, no sólo hay que fijarse en lo que se dice, sino también en quién lo dice. Y quién no. Las formas en que los silencios pueden ser constitutivos de la argumentación y determinantes de la calidad de un argumento dependen de los argumentadores silenciosos. Dado que el silencio puede ser incluso más difícil de interpretar que el discurso, un cálculo completo del silencio tendrá que incluir tanto el carácter como la situación social de los argumentadores silenciosos. Los argumentadores virtuosos pueden guardar un silencio virtuoso, pero los argumentadores viciosos pueden crear silencios viciosos tanto en ellos mismos como en los demás participantes de la discusión. El silencio puede ser una ocasión para la injusticia argumental.

Informal Logic

The claim that argumentation has no proper role in either philosophy or education, and especially... more The claim that argumentation has no proper role in either philosophy or education, and especially not in philosophical education, flies in the face of both conventional wisdom and traditional pedagogy. There is, however, something to be said for it because it is really only provocative against a certain philosophical backdrop. Our understanding of the concept "argument" is both reflected by and molded by the specific metaphor that argument-is-war, something with winners and losers, offensive and defensive moments, and an essentially adversarial structure. Such arguments may be suitable for teaching a philosophy, but not for teaching philosophy. Surely, education and philosophy do not need to be conceived as having an adversarial essence-if indeed they are thought to have any essence at all. Accordingly, philosophy and education need more pragmatic goals than even Pierce's idealized notion of truth as the end of inquiry, e.g., the simple furtherance of inquiry. For this...

Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans V. Hansen, 2020

John Stuart Mill situated “logic”, in his broad sense of the term, at the confluence of empiricis... more John Stuart Mill situated “logic”, in his broad sense of the term, at the confluence of empiricist epistemology, utilitarian ethics, and liberal political theory. Thus, he often commented on argumentation, especially as it appears in public forums concerning the body politic. Mill’s theory of argumentation, as reconstructed by Hans V. Hansen, is not comfortably encapsulated in the “market- place of ideas” metaphor, despite the common association, but most resources of contemporary argumentation theories are already pre- sent – along with some virtues of its own. This paper uses Mill’s theory to address two important but often overlooked questions: Why should we argue, when we should? and Why shouldn’t we argue, when we should not?

Argumentation and Advocacy, 2018

If circumstances were always simple and all arguers were always exclusively concerned with cognit... more If circumstances were always simple and all arguers were always exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would probably always be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so in practice the default seems to be adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable, and even mandatoryand also when it is not.

Topoi, 2019

Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reaso... more Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. We are not as reasons-responsive as we like to think. Reasoning and argumentation are, on this view, charades without effect. This paper begins by identifying a range of theoretical responses to the idea that reasoning and argumentation have little casual role in our thoughts and actions, and, consequently, that humans are not the reasons-giving, reasons-responsive agents that we imagine ourselves to be. The responses fall into three categories: challenging the data and their interpretations; making peace with the loss of autonomy that is implied; and seeking ways to expand the causal footprint of reasoning and argumentation, e.g., by developing argumentative virtues. There are indeed possibilities for becoming more rational and more reasons-responsive, so the reports of our demise as the rational animal are greatly exaggerated.

TOPOI, 2021

Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The concept of a devil's advocate-a cooperative arguer ... more Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The concept of a devil's advocate-a cooperative arguer who assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the argument-serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation's goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be adversarial and the different ways that argumentation can be said to be "essentially" adversarial.

Informal Logic, Dec 2, 2013

Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argume... more Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argument that is "fully satisfying" in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an argument's participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context. Résumé: La théorie des vertus d'argumentation fournit le meilleur cadre pour accueillir la notion d'un argument qui est «entièrement satisfaisant» dans un sens solide et intégré. Le processus de l'explication de la notion d'arguments pleinement satisfaisants nécessite l'élargissement du concept des raisonneurs de façon à inclure tous les participants à l'argument, y compris les juges, les jurés et les spectateurs intéressés. Et ceci, à son tour, nécessite l'élargissement du concept d'un argument lui-même à l'ensemble de son contexte.

OSSA, 2020

At the outset ‘mission creep’ is a military phenomenon, denoting uncontrolled and unintended miss... more At the outset ‘mission creep’ is a military phenomenon, denoting uncontrolled and unintended mission development. Even the best-laid plans may become obsolete if they run against the facts on the ground, and mission creep may result. Mission creep also plagues arguments, as when arguments end up in unrelated topics, larger targets, or clusters of topics. Our paper explores possible mutual benefits of applying the resources of argumentation theory and military theory to one another.

International Conference on Logic, Argument, and Critical Thinking, Sanitago, Chile, 2008

The core idea of Virtue Argumentation Theory (VAT) is easily encapsulated: a good argument is one... more The core idea of Virtue Argumentation Theory (VAT) is easily encapsulated: a good argument is one in which arguers argue virtuously. More is involved here than merely the change from an adjective to an adverb! There are significant pedagogical, practical, and theoretical advantages to shifting the focus from the static product of argumentation to its participating agents and their actions.
Two sets of objections to VAT approaches are raised, partially rebutted, and partially incorporated here. The first comes from Alston’s and Kvanvig’s criticisms of Virtue Epistemologies: The project of grounding justification in intellectual virtues cannot work for basic beliefs, the starting point for justifications, because while virtues are relevant for assessing actions, basic beliefs are not genuine actions. And for those beliefs that are actions, virtue theories obscure the difference between the justification an agent has for a belief (i.e., for believing) and the justification that a proposition (i.e., a candidate for belief) has for an agent. Arguments, of course, do consist of actions, and the issue is precisely the justification of agents for their moves within arguments.
The second, from Adler, denies any legitimate role to ethics in argument evaluation. Good arguments, he notes, can result from vicious motives, and well-intentioned arguers may produce flawed arguments. One response, the path of least resistance, is to separate argumentative from ethical virtues, restricting the focus of argumentation theory to the former, so that reference to vicious – “un-virtuous” – motives behind good – “virtuous” – arguments rests on an equivocation. Here, however, the quarry is a more robust concept of good argument. VAT provides a way to disentangle, and then weave together, three central questions: What is a good argument? What is a good arguer? and What is it to argue well?

How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virt... more How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, but objectivity is itself a bias? We argue that objectivity is indeed a bias but an argumentative virtue nonetheless. Using courtroom argumentation as a case study, we analyze and explain objectivity’s contextually variable value. The conclusions from this study ground a response to recent criticisms from Goddu and Godden regarding the conceptual foundations of virtue-based approaches to argumentation.

It is a virtue of virtue theory approaches to argumentation that they integrate many of the diffe... more It is a virtue of virtue theory approaches to argumentation that they integrate many of the different factors that make arguments good arguments. The insights of virtue argumentation are brought to bear on a variety of versions of the requirement that good arguments must have good premises, concluding that a sincerity condition serves better than truth or assertability conditions, despite apparently counterintuitive consequences for arguments involving heterogeneous coalitions.

Virtue epistemology (VE) was modeled on virtue ethics theories to transfer their ethical insights... more Virtue epistemology (VE) was modeled on virtue ethics theories to transfer their ethical insights to epistemology. VE has had great success: broadening our perspective, providing new answers to traditional questions, and raising exciting new questions. I offer a new argument for VE based on the concept of cognitive achievements, a broader notion than purely epistemic achievements. The argument is then extended to cognitive transformations, especially the cognitive transformations brought about by argumentation.

One result of successful argumentation – able arguers presenting cogent arguments to competent au... more One result of successful argumentation – able arguers presenting cogent arguments to competent audiences – is a transfer of credibility from premises to conclusions. From a purely logical perspective, neither dubious premises nor fallacious inference should lower the credibility of the target conclusion. Nevertheless, some arguments do backfire this way. Dialectical and rhetorical considerations come into play. Three inter-related conclusions emerge from a catalogue of hapless arguers and backfiring arguments. First, there are advantages to paying attention to arguers and their contexts, rather than focusing narrowly on their arguments, in order to understand what can go wrong in argumentation. Traditional fallacy identification, with its exclusive attention to faulty inferences, is inadequate to explain the full range of argumentative failures. Second, the notion of an Ideal Arguer can be defined by contrast with her less than ideal peers to serve as a useful tool in argument evalu...

Interdisciplinary Speaker Series on the Ethics of Argumentation, 2022

Argument ethics on line speaker series, 2020

Power-point slides to accompany "Giving arguments a good name" 2022

AILACT, Vancouver, April 2022, 2022

European Conference on Argumentation, 2022

Injusticias epistémicas: Análisis y contexto, 2022

Informal Logic

Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans V. Hansen, 2020

Argumentation and Advocacy, 2018

Topoi, 2019

TOPOI, 2021

Informal Logic, Dec 2, 2013

OSSA, 2020

International Conference on Logic, Argument, and Critical Thinking, Sanitago, Chile, 2008

Argumentation and Advocacy, 2018

If arguers were exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would be cooperative.... more If arguers were exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so the default is adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable, even mandatory-and also when it is not.

No argument is an island, 2018

ABSTRACT: Argumentation theory often focuses very narrowly on a very narrow conception of argumen... more ABSTRACT: Argumentation theory often focuses very narrowly on a very narrow conception of arguments, but some aspects of argumentation need a broader backdrop than the study of discrete arguments affords. Much of what makes argumentation important occurs before and after arguers engage. This paper examines the category of “inter-argument argumentative virtues” that are characteristic of good arguers when they are preparing for and processing arguments rather than actively arguing.

OSSA, 2016

How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virt... more How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, but objectivity is itself a bias? We argue that objectivity is indeed a bias but an argumentative virtue nonetheless. Using courtroom argumentation as a case study, we analyze and explain objectivity's contextually variable value. The conclusions from this study ground a response to recent criticisms from Goddu and Godden regarding the conceptual foundations of virtue-based approaches to argumentation.

ECA, 2015

Data from neuroscience suggest that, contrary to the conference theme, argumentation and reasonin... more Data from neuroscience suggest that, contrary to the conference theme, argumentation and reasoning are not the main vehicles for our decisions and actions. They are "fifth wheels" on those vehicles: ornate but ineffective appendages whose maintenance costs exceed their contributions. Although the data, their interpretations, and their putative implications all deserve challenge, this paper explores how to accept and incorporate these findings into a coherent view of what we do when we reason.

Topoi, 2016

While deductive validity provides the limiting upper bound for evaluating the strength and qualit... more While deductive validity provides the limiting upper bound for evaluating the strength and quality of inferences, by itself it is an inadequate tool for evaluating arguments, arguing, and argumentation. Similar remarks can be made about rhetorical success and dialectical closure. Then what would count as ideal argumentation? In this paper we introduce the concept of cognitive compathy to point in the direction of one way to answer that question. It is a feature of our argumentation rather than my argument or your argument. In that respect, compathy is like the harmonies achieved by an accomplished choir, the spontaneous coordination of athletic teamwork, or the experience of improvising jazz musicians when they are all in the flow together. It is a characteristic of arguments, not a virtue that can be attributed to individual arguers. It makes argumentation more than just the sum of its individual parts. The concept of cognitive compathy is brought into focus by locating it at the confluence of two lines of thought. First, we work up to the concept of compathy by contrasting it with empathy and sympathy in the context of emotions, which is then transplanted into epistemic, cognitive, and argumentative soil. Second, the concept is analytically linked to ideal argumentation by way of authenticity in communication. In the final section, we explore the extent to which argumentative virtues are conducive to producing compathetic argumentation, but reach the unhappy conclusion that the extra value of compathetic argumentation also transcends the evaluative reach of virtue argumentation theory.

ISSA, 2014

Why do we hold arguers culpable for missing obvious objections against their arguments but not fo... more Why do we hold arguers culpable for missing obvious objections against their arguments but not for missing obvious lines of reasoning for their positions? In both cases, their arguments are not as strong as they could be. Two factors cause this: adversarial models of argumentation and the permeable boundaries separating argumentation, meta-argumentation, and argument evaluation. Strategic considerations and dialectical obligations partially justify the asymmetry; virtue argumentation theory explains when and why it is not justified.

Philosophy and Technology, 2017

Technology has made argumentation rampant. We can argue whenever we want. With social media venue... more Technology has made argumentation rampant. We can argue whenever we want. With social media venues for every interest, we can also argue about whatever we want. To some extent, we can select our opponents and audiences to argue with whomever we want. And we can argue however we want, whether in carefully reasoned, article-length expositions, real-time exchanges, or 140-character polemics.
The concepts of arguing, arguing well, and even being an arguer have evolved with this new multiplicity and diversity; theory needs to catch up to the new reality. Successful strategies for traditional contexts may be counterproductive in new ones; classical argumentative virtues may be liabilities in new situations. There are new complications to the theorist’s standard questions – What is an argument? and Who is an arguer? – while new ones move into the spotlight – Should we argue at all? and If so, why?
Agent-based virtue argumentation theory provides a unifying framework for this radical plurality by coordinated redefinitions of the concepts of good arguers and good arguments. It remains true that good arguers contribute to good arguments, and good arguments satisfy good arguers, but the new diversity strains the old unity. Ironically, a unifying factor is provided by examining those paragons of bad arguers, argument trolls whose contributions to arguments are not very good, not really contributions, and, ultimately, not genuine argumentation.

Informal Logic, 2013

Cogency, 2013

If arguing is a game that philosophers play, then it’s a rigged game. Although many theories of ... more If arguing is a game that philosophers play, then it’s a rigged game. Although many theories of argumentation explicitly connect argumentation with reason, rationality, and knowledge, it contains certain built-in biases against knowledge and towards skepticism. Argumentation’s skeptical biases can be put into three categories: those built into the rules of play, those embedded in the skills for playing, and finally some connected to the decision to play. Three ancient philosophers from different traditions serve exemplifying case studies: the Middle Way Buddhist Nagarjuna, the Greek Pyrrhonian Sextus Empiricus, and the Chinese Taoist Zhuangzi. They have very different argumentation styles and they reach very different kinds of skepticism, but in each case, there is an organic connection between their argumentation and their skepticism: Nagarjuna produced arguments for the Truth of No Truth; Sextus generated strategies for counter-argumentation; while Zhuangzi deftly avoided all direct argumentation - in an implicit argument against arguing. I conclude that Virtue Argumentation Theory, with its focus on arguers and their skills, provides the best lens for understanding the lessons to be learned about argumentation and skepticism from this idiosyncratic trio.

Virtue-based approaches have made substantial contributions to ethics and epistemology. They have... more Virtue-based approaches have made substantial contributions to ethics and epistemology. They have also found application in more unexpected fields, including the study of argument. Virtue Argumentation Theory mandates a shift in focus from acts and objects, or processes and products, to agents. Thus, Virtue Argumentation Theory brings a set of difficult but important new questions into focus, particularly about arguers' conduct in inter-agent transactions. At the same time, Virtue Argumentation Theory also provides new signposts leading to their resolution. Several authors have recently begun to suggest answers to these questions. This special issue consolidates and extends their work.

OSSA, 2011

Calling an argument “merely academic” impugns its seriousness, belittles its substance, dismisses... more Calling an argument “merely academic” impugns its seriousness, belittles its substance, dismisses its importance, and deflates hope of resolution, while ruling out negotiation and compromise. However, “purely academic” argumentation, as an idealized limit case, is a valuable analytical tool for argumentation theorists because while the telos of academic argumentation may be cognitive, it is cognitive in the service of a community, which, in turn, is a community in the service of the cognitive

Cogency, 2010

Arguments are everywhere in philosophy, but almost nowhere do they actually succeed in demonstrat... more Arguments are everywhere in philosophy, but almost nowhere do they actually succeed in demonstrating conclusions, resolving differences, or any of the other things arguments are supposed to do. For Wittgenstein, arguing about philosophical matters was pointless. This conclusion follows immediately from his views on the nature of argument, the nature of philosophy, and argument’s place in philosophy. Even as his views on those subjects changed significantly, the conclusion appeared unchanged. However, since arguments partially define their conclusions, seemingly identical conclusions from different arguments may differ greatly, especially when the arguments are of entirely different kinds. The arguments in the Tractatus and the Investigations are rarely explicit, and sometimes hard even to recognize as arguments. Both works attempt in different ways to help the reader to a deeper understanding of language by way of “more perspicuous representations.” We argue that in both works, these “more perspicuous representations” imply that arguing about philosophical matters is pointless. However, given the significant differences in style and strategy manifested in the two texts, it means very different things to say that a representation is “more perspicuous”. As a consequence, to say that philosophical argumentation is pointless means one thing when said in the context of the Tractatus, and something different when placed in the context of the Philosophical Investigations. In this paper, we will support this view.

OSSA 2009

The Uses of Argument, 2005

One result of successful argumentation-able arguers presenting cogent arguments to competent audi... more One result of successful argumentation-able arguers presenting cogent arguments to competent audiences-is a transfer of credibility from premises to conclusions. From a purely logical perspective, neither dubious premises nor fallacious inference should lower the credibility of the target conclusion. Nevertheless, some arguments do backfire this way. Dialectical and rhetorical considerations come into play. Three interrelated conclusions emerge from a catalogue of hapless arguers and backfiring arguments. First, there are advantages to paying attention to arguers and their contexts, rather than focusing narrowly on their arguments, in order to understand what can go wrong in argumentation. Traditional fallacy identification, with its exclusive attention to faulty inferences, is inadequate to explain the full range of argumentative failures. Second, the notion of an Ideal Arguer can be defined by contrast with her less than ideal peers to serve as a useful tool in argument evaluation. And third, not all of the ways that arguers raise doubts about their conclusions are pathological. On the contrary, some ways that doubts are raised concerning our intended conclusions are an integral part of ideal argumentative practice.

OSSA, 2003

Much of the vocabulary that we use to talk about the cluster of concepts associated with war is c... more Much of the vocabulary that we use to talk about the cluster of concepts associated with war is commonly applied to arguments. Some parts, of course, do not seem to apply so easily, if at all, and that creates problematic distortion. For all its problems, however, there is still much to be gleaned from the argument-is-war paradigm because there are war-concepts that can be but largely have not been deployed in thinking about arguments. Some of them really should be because of the light they can shed on argumentation. In particular, the concepts, principles, and lessons from Just War theory provide a valuable lens for looking at arguments. We can theorize about Just and Unjust Arguments.

Arguing, Communication, and Culture. Vol. 1, 2002

Despite the historical suspicion between analytic, argument-centered views of philosophy and more... more Despite the historical suspicion between analytic, argument-centered views of philosophy and more literary conceptions of what philosophy is all about, arguments and metaphors are more alike than is generally imagined. Four points of contact between them are considered here: (1) the metaphors we use to talk about arguments, (2) the roles for metaphors in arguments, (3) the ways we use metaphors as arguments, and, finally, (4) the possibility of reading arguments as metaphors. Together, these underscore the most important congruence: the conceptual structures that constitute arguments, like those for metaphors, give rise to new ways to understand the world. They generate new meanings, and in so doing, they shape our language and our world.

Metaphilosophy, 1998

Metaphors are odd birds with lives of their own, and no metaphors are odder than philosophical me... more Metaphors are odd birds with lives of their own, and no metaphors are odder than philosophical metaphors. This paper traces the rarest of these rare birds: philosophical theories that can successfully take flight only after their attempts at (merely) grounded truth have failed.

Philosophica, 2002

The discourse of Argumentation Theory, like every other vital philosophical discussion, can appea... more The discourse of Argumentation Theory, like every other vital philosophical discussion, can appear from a distance to be a cacophony of different voices, with every single one speaking at cross-purposes to each and every other. A closer inspection reveals identifiable fault lines running through the field separating some voices from others-the rhetoricians from the dialecticians, for example, and both of them from the logicians-but still not enough organization to make all that noise into a symphony. It would seem a foolish optimism to think that what is necessary is the addition of yet another voice. However, when the voice belongs to Hilary Putnam, philosophically good things happen. Throughout his career, Putnam has repeatedly struck notes that resonate with what others say about argumentation. His insights on commensurability and revisability, his analyses of meaning and rationality, and his articulation of internal realism all bear importantly on the processes of critical reasoning. One good point of entry is provided by the striking harmonic convergence of Putnam's arguments about realism and relativism and the tightly focused debate over the truth-requirement as a criterion in the evaluation of arguments. Putnam, we will argue, defends the importance of a norm of truth distinct from rational acceptability. But he does so while taking our practices of inquiry and argumentation as primary. He offers a defense, from within our practices, of a notion of truth that permanently transcends our practices. §1. The ThreeFold Word: Much of the fragmentation of the fields of Informal Logic and Argumentation Theory is due to the presence of three very different root metaphors for thinking about arguments. 1 One conception of arguments is as proofs, the products of logicians and mathematicians. 2 An argument in that sense is a sequence of sentences with a specifiable inferential structure. Since this model completely ignores any arguers, the argument-as-proof model is of limited help for understanding any actual, embodied arguments. At the other extreme, arguments are thought of as verbal wars, agonistic moments in discourse. Arguments are born of disagreement, so the adversarial 1 For discussions of metaphors for arguments, see Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Ayim 1988, and Cohen 1995.

Informal Logic , 1995

The claim that argumentation has no proper role in either philosophy or education, and especiall... more The claim that argumentation has no proper role in either philosophy or education, and especially not in philosophical education, flies in the face of both conventional wisdom and traditional pedagogy. There is, however, something to said for it because it is really only provocative against a certain philosophical backdrop.
Our understanding of the concept "argument" is both reflected by and molded by the specific metaphor that argument-is-war, something with winners and losers, offensive and defensive moments, and an essentially adversarial structure. Such arguments may be suitable for teaching a philosophy, but not for teaching philosophy. Surely, education and philosophy do not need to be conceived as having an adversarial essence--if indeed they are thought to have any essence at all. Accordingly, philosophy and education need more pragmatic goals than even Pierce's idealized notion of truth as the end of inquiry, e.g., the simple furtherance of inquiry. For this, new metaphors for framing and understanding the concept of argumentation are needed, and some suggestions in that direction will be considered.

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , 1988

Naturalized Epistemology might well have been called “Empiricized Epistemology ” instead because ... more Naturalized Epistemology might well have been called “Empiricized Epistemology ” instead because it had both broadly general epistemological motivations and specifically empiricist motivations. On the one hand, there is the empiricist imperative to naturalism: if rationality could be successfully characterized descriptively rather than normatively, then an empirical basis would ground (or at least provide some parameters for) the theorizing. On the other hand, there is the perennial epistemological problem of skepticism. Naturalized epistemology would, it was hoped, finally provide the answer to the skeptical challenge by seeing knowledge as one more natural phenomenon to be explained by empirical means in the vocabulary of the natural sciences. In practice, this meant breaking out of (or into) the justificatory circle by looking at the causes of knowledge. Menashe Schwed claims that the contemporary movements to naturalize epistemology fail on both counts: first, normativity is so ...

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Soci... more This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been

Erkenntnis, 2008

Argumentation has its own Trinity-Rationality, Universality, and Autonomybut there is no escaping... more Argumentation has its own Trinity-Rationality, Universality, and Autonomybut there is no escaping the suspicion that it might be an unholy trinity. Argumentation is constitutive of rationality. It is universal in that we can argue about anything at all. And argument is autonomous insofar as it establishes its own rules. Individually, these are profoundly important for understanding argumentation. Together they tell us that part of what it is to be rational is to reason about being rational, and therein lies a paradox. Universality means that we can even argue about the principles of argumentation, while autonomy means that there is no further court of appeal for the principles of argument than argument itself. At the same time, rationality demands that we reason about reason-apparently, with No Exit from argument anywhere in sight. But surely it would be the height of irrationality to try to argue about something by first arguing about how to argue, then arguing about how to argue about how to argue, ad infinitum. Rationality also bids us stop. Paul Boghossian's recent book, Fear of Knowledge, has something to say about this problem that is worth listening to. While the primary subject of his book is exactly as the subtitle advertises, the subject of rationality is never far away. What Boghossian offers is an extended argument against some forms of contemporary anti-realism and, by implication, an argument for realism. The intended audience is philosophers with metaphysical and epistemological interests. In the end, however, it could be argumentation theorists who might be most engaged by it and have the most to say about it because while the book is seriously flawed as an argument, it makes a positive contribution when read as a discourse about argument. Let me dispense with the negatives first. The greatest failings of Boghossian's argument are dialectical and rhetorical rather than logical. His readings of Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Rorty, and his other opponents are sometimes so uncharitable as to elicit strong objections from anyone familiar with their work. Even the readers who are sympathetic with Boghossian's own positions will get the feeling that there is much more to be said on behalf of his opponents, and I expect those readers could well be moved to try to defend his opponents! Rather than reinforcing realist inclinations, the dialectical effect is to move the reader closer to the anti-realist camp. Readers' objections cannot be answered, of course, unless they are anticipated, so it is incumbent on the author to make that effort. Boghossian occasionally makes something of an effort, but generally falls short. One example is especially illustrative. In characterizing the relativist position as it applies to the justification of our beliefs, rather than those beliefs directly, he writes: "It is also hard to explain why anyone should care about what follows from a set of propositions that are acknowledged to

Philosophy of Science, 1992

The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1989

The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1990

Philosophy of Science, 1992

Journal of Symbolic Logic, Mar 1, 1990

Review of Metaphysics, 2018

Book Review: The Aftermath of Syllogism: Aristotelian Logical Argument from Avicenna to Hegel, Ma... more Book Review: The Aftermath of Syllogism: Aristotelian Logical Argument from Avicenna to Hegel, Marco Sgarbi and Matteo Cosci, eds.

ABSTRACT: Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of... more ABSTRACT: Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argument that is “fully satisfying ” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context.