Keith R Peterson | Colby College (original) (raw)

Books by Keith R Peterson

Ontology: Laying the Foundations, 2019

Despite an international upsurge of interest in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in... more Despite an international upsurge of interest in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in recent years, his work is still almost completely unknown to the English-language philosophical audience.

In his own era, he was not unknown to those in the English-speaking philosophical landscape with some interest in Continental philosophy. In his 1930 survey of German philosophy , the young Deweyan-Marxist Sidney Hook claimed that Hartmann was "interesting without being oracular, instructive without pedantry, and profound without being obscure," and predicted that he "will soon be greeted as Germany's leading philosopher" (Hook 1930, 156-57). It is no doubt difficult for readers to imagine that someone so completely unknown today might have been considered by anyone to be a "leading philosopher" of the time.

Hartmann was of Baltic German descent and an independent thinker who decisively struck out on his own in his groundbreaking 1921 Grundzüge einer Met-aphysik der Erkenntnis (Basic Features of the Metaphysics of Cognition) where he repudiated the Neo-Kantianism of his former teachers Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp in Marburg. The fact that he wrote enormous systematic works with an analytical style and with a thorough familiarity with the history of philosophy made him not easily classifiable. While he appreciated and appropriated aspects of the phenomenological approach of the early Edmund Husserl and the Munich circle, phenomenology remained for him one important method for philosophy among others, and most definitely not a philosophy that was complete in itself. Although he admired Max Scheler's development of a "material value ethics" and his metaphysical vision, he refused to accept any metaphysics that he saw as basically teleological in orientation, and he held controversially that ethics had to be atheistic. While he respected the techniques and findings of historicists like Wilhelm Dilthey, he refused to accept the relativism that they often imply, and instead upheld the notion of the gradual historical growth of human knowledge.

Ontology: Laying the Foundations, 2019

Title page and Contents

A World not Made for Us: Topics in Critical Environmental Philosophy, 2020

Environmental philosophy has challenged the dominant western culture’s conception of human nature... more Environmental philosophy has challenged the dominant western culture’s conception of human nature through critiques of “anthropocentrism” (human chauvinism). It has annoyed the mainstream with critiques of instrumental rationality and its plea on behalf of the “intrinsic value of nature.” It has irritated nonenvironmentalists and even some environmentalists with its criticism of mechanism or the reductionist scientific worldview and has argued in favor of some form of “ecological worldview.” The critique of anthropocentrism, the intrinsic value of nature, and the ecological worldview are central topics for environmental philosophers, appearing across a wide range of environmentalist writing, from environmental ethics and policy to political ecology, ecocriticism, and metaphysics. As I understand them, these topics have characterized environmental philosophy since its inception in the 1970s.

Editor's Foreword to forthcoming collection of essays, published by Walter de Gruyter, January 2016

Appearing here in English for the first time, this is Schelling's attempt to articulate a complet... more Appearing here in English for the first time, this is Schelling's attempt to articulate a complete philosophy of nature. Written in 1799 and building upon his earlier work, the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature provides the most inclusive exposition of Schelling's philosophy of the natural world. In it he presents a startlingly contemporary model of an expanding and contracting universe; a unified theory of electricity, gravity, magnetism, and chemical forces; and, perhaps most importantly, a conception of nature as a living and organic whole. With Introduction and Notes by the translator, this is also the first translation to be based on the new Schelling critical edition.

Papers by Keith R Peterson

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Ethics & The Environment, 2021

In environmental philosophy, it has often been argued that adopting a new ecological worldview is... more In environmental philosophy, it has often been argued that adopting a new ecological worldview is necessary in order to generate environmentalist social change in response to ecological crisis. I introduce the analytical category of metascientific stance (tacit assumptions about the nature, practices, goals, and place of the sciences in society) in order to discuss the popular model of worldview clash in this article and contrast it with other models of science-environmentalism relation. I argue that its frequent combination with an epistemological holism, often implying antirealism, is entirely at odds with an environmental philosophy that recognizes the real asymmetrical dependence of humankind on the nonhuman. Moreover, it assumes a questionable metaethical relation between worldview and action. I examine three essential tensions in the worldview clash model for environmentalism and argue that because the very idea of a worldview has deep roots in Modernist dualism and anthropocentrism, it is a fundamentally flawed way of framing environmentalist action.

Horizon: Studies in Phenomenology, 2019

Was Nicolai Hartmann a phenomenologist? Answering this question has become more important in the ... more Was Nicolai Hartmann a phenomenologist? Answering this question has become more important in the context of debates over new realisms in Continental philosophy. To answer it, the paper highlights five important points. First, Hartmann's own distinction between the phenomenological school of thought and phenomenological method must be preserved. He does not accept the sweeping humanistic opposition between the sciences and phenomenology, and yet (like the phenomenologists) he employs a method that aims to provide a description of phenomena following on a suspension of metaphysical commitments that is directed at their essential structures, with some important qualifications. Secondly, he rejects the phenomenological reduction because it identifies the natural attitude with a metaphysical standpoint and it advocates instead a 'naïve consciousness' free of metaphysical assumptions. Thirdly, his assessment of phenomenology is conditioned by his conception of cognition as a transcendent act. He finds that phenomenology fails to adequately account for the whole phenomenon of cognition, especially its characteristic grasp of something independent of the act. Fourthly, Hartmann grants the irreducibility of phenomena, but holds that they are characteristically unstable, referring to something beyond themselves and forcing us to decide whether what they show is genuine or not. There is thus no infallible intuition of phenomena. Finally, from an epistemological perspective, the concept being-in-itself is merely a counterpart to the concept of the phenomenon, which we do not need for the purposes of ontology. Based on this reassessment, it is concluded that Hartmann employs some form of the phenomenological method but cannot be identified as a phenomenologist.

Axiomathes Special Issue: Nicolai Hartmann: Reality, Modality, and Value, 2017

Some contemporary philosophers have called for a " new realism " in philosophical ontology. Hartm... more Some contemporary philosophers have called for a " new realism " in philosophical ontology. Hartmann's works provide some of the richest resources upon which recent realists might draw for both inspiration and argument. In this brief exploration I touch on some key concepts and arguments from a few of the players in this " ontological turn, " including Meillassoux, Brassier, and Ferraris, and show how many of them were already clearly articulated in Hartmann's works. I'll also describe and comment on Hartmann's arguments concerning the " thing in itself, " which he considers a key " critical " concept of his new ontology. His treatment of this issue demonstrates the sophistication—and, perhaps, superiority—of Hartmann's approach.

Cosmos & History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2010

Ecophilosophers have long argued that addressing the environmental crisis not only demands reasse... more Ecophilosophers have long argued that addressing the environmental crisis not only demands reassessing the ethical aspects of human and nature relations, but also prevailing theories of human nature. Philosophical anthropology has historically taken this as its calling, and its resources may be profitably utilized in the context of ecophilosophy. Distinguishing between conservative and emancipatory naturalism leads to a critical discussion of the Cartesian culture/nature dualism. Marjorie Grene is discussed as a resource in the tradition of philosophical anthropology which enables us to avoid dualistic thinking and espouse an emancipatory naturalism by resisting reductionism and acknowledging the diffuse dependence of human being on natural processes. In order to fully explicate the conditions of human dependence upon nature it becomes necessary to define an appropriate approach to ontology. This critical ontology facilitates a stratified understanding of the place of humans in nature without lapsing into reductivism or post-Kantian constructivism. It provides a sounder basis than either alternative for motivating a many sided ecophilosophical perspective on human being.

Scripta Philosophia Naturalis, Jun 2012

One significant thinker who developed a philosophy of nature that is both realist and inherently ... more One significant thinker who developed a philosophy of nature that is both realist and inherently pluralistic is the long-neglected 20th century German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann. His nature philosophy is grounded in his “critical ontology” and theory of the “stratified” structure of the real world. This structure reveals the particular place of the human being in the world, from which humans engage in the natural and historical process of learning about the world, socially and scientifically. This view challenges many currently held relativist and post-Kantian epistemologies of the sciences. The point of departure for Hartmann’s philosophy of nature in his ontology and philosophical anthropology is discussed, and the issues of realism and the growth of knowledge in history are brought into relation with some reflections of Miguel Espinoza
on these themes.

Axiomathes , 2012

This is a translation of an early essay by the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). I... more This is a translation of an early essay by the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). In this 1923 essay Hartmann presents many of the fundamental ideas of his new critical ontology. He summarizes some of the main points of
his critique of neo-Kantian epistemology, and provides the point of departure for his new approach in an extensive criticism of the errors of the classical ontological tradition. Some of these errors concern the definition of an ontological category or
principle, and others concern the relations among categories themselves. The outline for the new ontology is sketched through the correctives Hartmann appends to the treatment of each error, prefiguring his mature ontological system.

Axiomathes , 2012

Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in ... more Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in the early twentieth century. Developing a systematic, post-Kantian critical ontology ‘this side’ of idealism and realism, he subverted the widespread impression that philosophy must either exhaust itself in foundationalist epistemology or engage in system-building metaphysical excess. This essay provides an introduction to Hartmann’s approach in light of the recent translation of his early essay ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’ (1923) In it Hartmann criticizes both the pretensions of epistemology as well as the principal errors of classical
ontology, and he proposes a series of correctives that lead to his development of a highly original and elaborate stratified categorial ontology. This introduction explains the most important errors of the ‘old’ ontology, his correctives to them, and further fleshes out these correctives with reference to his mature ontological work.

Environmental Philosophy, 2012

This paper is a preliminary treatment of the categories of agency and dependence in the context o... more This paper is a preliminary treatment of the categories of agency and dependence in the context of ecosystem services discourse. These categories are discussed in terms of critical categorial ontology in order to articulate adequately the nature of humankind’s dependence upon the nonhuman natural world, inadequately captured by ecosystem services discourse. Following Val Plumwood, this essay takes ecosystems services
discourse as an example of one type of failure to discern various forms of agency as well as dependence, and it goes on to define diffuse dependence as the relation that corresponds to the form of agency expressed through ecosystem services.

Appraisal: The Journal of the Society for Post-Critical and Personalist Studies, Re-Appraisal: Max Scheler , 2011

Scheler’s philosophical anthropology and value theory provide rich resources for current disc... more Scheler’s philosophical anthropology and value theory provide rich resources for current discourses in environmental philosophy. It is argued that his pluralist value-ethical framework offers a novel perspective on current debates over the ‘nature of
value and the value of nature’ in contemporary environmental ethics. ‘Bringing values down to earth’ is a characterization of what Scheler calls ‘sublimation:’ the unique place of humans in the cosmos is to actualize values which only they are capable of apprehending. This may be interpreted in a non-anthropocentric way in order to balance environmental views that attempt to minimize the sense of human uniqueness.

Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2010

As the first sustained engagement with these aspects of Kovel’s work, this essay maps out the ter... more As the first sustained engagement with these aspects of Kovel’s work, this essay maps out the terrain and highlights some significant features of the landscape. It also brings Kovel’s value theory into dialogue with the lively debates in environmental ethics about the nature of value and the value of nature. Since Kovel himself claims that an “ecocentric ethic…in defense of intrinsic value” is “the deepest level of the resistance to capital, and the foundation of all others,” I think we have to take this value theory seriously and not treat it as an accidental feature of his thinking. As I understand him, Kovel is not claiming that the values perspective is the only one worth adopting in the analysis of environmental struggles, nor do I so argue here. But if one rejects all values talk, then one is rejecting no small part of Kovel’s perspective. It is the “deepest level of the resistance to capital.” This values discourse is not meant to replace but to complement the analysis of power and of structures of constraint and enablement configured by capitalism as discussed elsewhere in his work. It also does not treat the environmentalist as a moral agent abstracted from concrete social relations, but effectively supplements social scientific accounts of that agency with a values dimension that is indispensable for better understanding our own and others’ motivations, and just as importantly, for envisioning change.

Book Chapters by Keith R Peterson

New Research on the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann, 2016

Despite its apparent straightforwardness, Hartmann’s conception of ontological strata is often mi... more Despite its apparent straightforwardness, Hartmann’s conception of ontological strata is often misunderstood. In particular, it tends to be conflated with mereological conceptions of ontological hierarchy, whether framed as “levels of organization,” layers of “processes,” or “supervenience” of one layer upon another. Here, I explore a new angle in an attempt to differentiate Hartmann’s conception of the stratified structure of the real world from superficially similar conceptions. I conclude that Hartmann’s ontology provides (environmental) philosophers with a productive ontological framework with which to articulate the nature of human dependence on nonhuman natural processes, functions, and entities.

Early Phenomenology, Brian Harding and Michael Kelly, eds., 2014

Epigraph: The world is not a correlate of anything. (Hartmann) Introduction: First scene: 1... more Epigraph: The world is not a correlate of anything. (Hartmann)

Introduction:

First scene: 1922. Nicolai Hartmann, newly occupying Paul Natorp’s chair in philosophy at Marburg, just made known his definitive break with neo-Kantianism in his Foundations for a Metaphysics of Knowledge (1921), and looks ahead to the full development of a new ontology beyond neo-Kantian strictures. Eager to find conversation partners with whom to share in this vision, he has heard good things about Husserl’s young assistant in Freiburg, who wrote a dissertation on Duns Scotus’ doctrine of categories and, like himself, had a keen interest in Aristotle. Hartmann supports the “call” of this young scholar, Martin Heidegger, to Marburg in 1923. Unfortunately, Hartmann’s desire for dialogue was frustrated. There were many reasons for this, one being the simple fact that their biological clocks were not in sync. Heidegger rose early to work and teach, so by evenings he was fatigued and unable to carry on into the night, which was precisely when Hartmann was fanning the flame of his intellect for an all night vigil. Students in Marburg joked that the round-the-clock philosophizing of these two thinkers amounted to a “philosophia perennis.”

Ontology of Nature: Continental Perspectives and Environmental Reorientations, 2017

"Epigraph: Ontology has become such a suspicious and even impertinent enterprise for contempor... more "Epigraph:

Ontology has become such a suspicious and even impertinent enterprise for contemporary philosophy, largely due to the Kantian critique and its impact, that the mere name “ontology” elicits unease—the kind of unease involuntarily evoked by the reemergence of atavisms long overcome. A value judgment is concealed in this reactive emotional response. The question is whether that value judgment is justified. (Hartmann)

Introduction

Despite the recent resurgence of interest in ontology in some circles (of which the current volume is evidence), these words, penned in 1923, could just as much characterize our time as the earlier epistemology-obsessed era in which they were written. This derisive reaction to ontology will be regarded here as a symptom masking a denial. A denial of what? Denial of human asymmetrical diffuse dependence on nonhuman biotic and abiotic nature characterizing the (post)Modern era. This is another way of saying that “environmentalism” bears ontological as well as axiological significance: the significance of environmentalism is nothing less than a definitive challenge to the reigning anthropocentrism of classical western philosophy, and raises specific axiological, ontological, and epistemological questions about our concepts of human nature, of value, and of nature. It has urged acknowledgment of the substantive existential dependence of human life on the nonhuman biotic and abiotic world. Moreover, it casts new light on the thorny debate between idealism and realism, another philosophical problematic supposedly “long overcome.”
"

Ontology: Laying the Foundations, 2019

Despite an international upsurge of interest in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in... more Despite an international upsurge of interest in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in recent years, his work is still almost completely unknown to the English-language philosophical audience.

In his own era, he was not unknown to those in the English-speaking philosophical landscape with some interest in Continental philosophy. In his 1930 survey of German philosophy , the young Deweyan-Marxist Sidney Hook claimed that Hartmann was "interesting without being oracular, instructive without pedantry, and profound without being obscure," and predicted that he "will soon be greeted as Germany's leading philosopher" (Hook 1930, 156-57). It is no doubt difficult for readers to imagine that someone so completely unknown today might have been considered by anyone to be a "leading philosopher" of the time.

Hartmann was of Baltic German descent and an independent thinker who decisively struck out on his own in his groundbreaking 1921 Grundzüge einer Met-aphysik der Erkenntnis (Basic Features of the Metaphysics of Cognition) where he repudiated the Neo-Kantianism of his former teachers Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp in Marburg. The fact that he wrote enormous systematic works with an analytical style and with a thorough familiarity with the history of philosophy made him not easily classifiable. While he appreciated and appropriated aspects of the phenomenological approach of the early Edmund Husserl and the Munich circle, phenomenology remained for him one important method for philosophy among others, and most definitely not a philosophy that was complete in itself. Although he admired Max Scheler's development of a "material value ethics" and his metaphysical vision, he refused to accept any metaphysics that he saw as basically teleological in orientation, and he held controversially that ethics had to be atheistic. While he respected the techniques and findings of historicists like Wilhelm Dilthey, he refused to accept the relativism that they often imply, and instead upheld the notion of the gradual historical growth of human knowledge.

Ontology: Laying the Foundations, 2019

Title page and Contents

A World not Made for Us: Topics in Critical Environmental Philosophy, 2020

Environmental philosophy has challenged the dominant western culture’s conception of human nature... more Environmental philosophy has challenged the dominant western culture’s conception of human nature through critiques of “anthropocentrism” (human chauvinism). It has annoyed the mainstream with critiques of instrumental rationality and its plea on behalf of the “intrinsic value of nature.” It has irritated nonenvironmentalists and even some environmentalists with its criticism of mechanism or the reductionist scientific worldview and has argued in favor of some form of “ecological worldview.” The critique of anthropocentrism, the intrinsic value of nature, and the ecological worldview are central topics for environmental philosophers, appearing across a wide range of environmentalist writing, from environmental ethics and policy to political ecology, ecocriticism, and metaphysics. As I understand them, these topics have characterized environmental philosophy since its inception in the 1970s.

Editor's Foreword to forthcoming collection of essays, published by Walter de Gruyter, January 2016

Appearing here in English for the first time, this is Schelling's attempt to articulate a complet... more Appearing here in English for the first time, this is Schelling's attempt to articulate a complete philosophy of nature. Written in 1799 and building upon his earlier work, the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature provides the most inclusive exposition of Schelling's philosophy of the natural world. In it he presents a startlingly contemporary model of an expanding and contracting universe; a unified theory of electricity, gravity, magnetism, and chemical forces; and, perhaps most importantly, a conception of nature as a living and organic whole. With Introduction and Notes by the translator, this is also the first translation to be based on the new Schelling critical edition.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Ethics & The Environment, 2021

In environmental philosophy, it has often been argued that adopting a new ecological worldview is... more In environmental philosophy, it has often been argued that adopting a new ecological worldview is necessary in order to generate environmentalist social change in response to ecological crisis. I introduce the analytical category of metascientific stance (tacit assumptions about the nature, practices, goals, and place of the sciences in society) in order to discuss the popular model of worldview clash in this article and contrast it with other models of science-environmentalism relation. I argue that its frequent combination with an epistemological holism, often implying antirealism, is entirely at odds with an environmental philosophy that recognizes the real asymmetrical dependence of humankind on the nonhuman. Moreover, it assumes a questionable metaethical relation between worldview and action. I examine three essential tensions in the worldview clash model for environmentalism and argue that because the very idea of a worldview has deep roots in Modernist dualism and anthropocentrism, it is a fundamentally flawed way of framing environmentalist action.

Horizon: Studies in Phenomenology, 2019

Was Nicolai Hartmann a phenomenologist? Answering this question has become more important in the ... more Was Nicolai Hartmann a phenomenologist? Answering this question has become more important in the context of debates over new realisms in Continental philosophy. To answer it, the paper highlights five important points. First, Hartmann's own distinction between the phenomenological school of thought and phenomenological method must be preserved. He does not accept the sweeping humanistic opposition between the sciences and phenomenology, and yet (like the phenomenologists) he employs a method that aims to provide a description of phenomena following on a suspension of metaphysical commitments that is directed at their essential structures, with some important qualifications. Secondly, he rejects the phenomenological reduction because it identifies the natural attitude with a metaphysical standpoint and it advocates instead a 'naïve consciousness' free of metaphysical assumptions. Thirdly, his assessment of phenomenology is conditioned by his conception of cognition as a transcendent act. He finds that phenomenology fails to adequately account for the whole phenomenon of cognition, especially its characteristic grasp of something independent of the act. Fourthly, Hartmann grants the irreducibility of phenomena, but holds that they are characteristically unstable, referring to something beyond themselves and forcing us to decide whether what they show is genuine or not. There is thus no infallible intuition of phenomena. Finally, from an epistemological perspective, the concept being-in-itself is merely a counterpart to the concept of the phenomenon, which we do not need for the purposes of ontology. Based on this reassessment, it is concluded that Hartmann employs some form of the phenomenological method but cannot be identified as a phenomenologist.

Axiomathes Special Issue: Nicolai Hartmann: Reality, Modality, and Value, 2017

Some contemporary philosophers have called for a " new realism " in philosophical ontology. Hartm... more Some contemporary philosophers have called for a " new realism " in philosophical ontology. Hartmann's works provide some of the richest resources upon which recent realists might draw for both inspiration and argument. In this brief exploration I touch on some key concepts and arguments from a few of the players in this " ontological turn, " including Meillassoux, Brassier, and Ferraris, and show how many of them were already clearly articulated in Hartmann's works. I'll also describe and comment on Hartmann's arguments concerning the " thing in itself, " which he considers a key " critical " concept of his new ontology. His treatment of this issue demonstrates the sophistication—and, perhaps, superiority—of Hartmann's approach.

Cosmos & History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2010

Ecophilosophers have long argued that addressing the environmental crisis not only demands reasse... more Ecophilosophers have long argued that addressing the environmental crisis not only demands reassessing the ethical aspects of human and nature relations, but also prevailing theories of human nature. Philosophical anthropology has historically taken this as its calling, and its resources may be profitably utilized in the context of ecophilosophy. Distinguishing between conservative and emancipatory naturalism leads to a critical discussion of the Cartesian culture/nature dualism. Marjorie Grene is discussed as a resource in the tradition of philosophical anthropology which enables us to avoid dualistic thinking and espouse an emancipatory naturalism by resisting reductionism and acknowledging the diffuse dependence of human being on natural processes. In order to fully explicate the conditions of human dependence upon nature it becomes necessary to define an appropriate approach to ontology. This critical ontology facilitates a stratified understanding of the place of humans in nature without lapsing into reductivism or post-Kantian constructivism. It provides a sounder basis than either alternative for motivating a many sided ecophilosophical perspective on human being.

Scripta Philosophia Naturalis, Jun 2012

One significant thinker who developed a philosophy of nature that is both realist and inherently ... more One significant thinker who developed a philosophy of nature that is both realist and inherently pluralistic is the long-neglected 20th century German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann. His nature philosophy is grounded in his “critical ontology” and theory of the “stratified” structure of the real world. This structure reveals the particular place of the human being in the world, from which humans engage in the natural and historical process of learning about the world, socially and scientifically. This view challenges many currently held relativist and post-Kantian epistemologies of the sciences. The point of departure for Hartmann’s philosophy of nature in his ontology and philosophical anthropology is discussed, and the issues of realism and the growth of knowledge in history are brought into relation with some reflections of Miguel Espinoza
on these themes.

Axiomathes , 2012

This is a translation of an early essay by the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). I... more This is a translation of an early essay by the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). In this 1923 essay Hartmann presents many of the fundamental ideas of his new critical ontology. He summarizes some of the main points of
his critique of neo-Kantian epistemology, and provides the point of departure for his new approach in an extensive criticism of the errors of the classical ontological tradition. Some of these errors concern the definition of an ontological category or
principle, and others concern the relations among categories themselves. The outline for the new ontology is sketched through the correctives Hartmann appends to the treatment of each error, prefiguring his mature ontological system.

Axiomathes , 2012

Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in ... more Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in the early twentieth century. Developing a systematic, post-Kantian critical ontology ‘this side’ of idealism and realism, he subverted the widespread impression that philosophy must either exhaust itself in foundationalist epistemology or engage in system-building metaphysical excess. This essay provides an introduction to Hartmann’s approach in light of the recent translation of his early essay ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’ (1923) In it Hartmann criticizes both the pretensions of epistemology as well as the principal errors of classical
ontology, and he proposes a series of correctives that lead to his development of a highly original and elaborate stratified categorial ontology. This introduction explains the most important errors of the ‘old’ ontology, his correctives to them, and further fleshes out these correctives with reference to his mature ontological work.

Environmental Philosophy, 2012

This paper is a preliminary treatment of the categories of agency and dependence in the context o... more This paper is a preliminary treatment of the categories of agency and dependence in the context of ecosystem services discourse. These categories are discussed in terms of critical categorial ontology in order to articulate adequately the nature of humankind’s dependence upon the nonhuman natural world, inadequately captured by ecosystem services discourse. Following Val Plumwood, this essay takes ecosystems services
discourse as an example of one type of failure to discern various forms of agency as well as dependence, and it goes on to define diffuse dependence as the relation that corresponds to the form of agency expressed through ecosystem services.

Appraisal: The Journal of the Society for Post-Critical and Personalist Studies, Re-Appraisal: Max Scheler , 2011

Scheler’s philosophical anthropology and value theory provide rich resources for current disc... more Scheler’s philosophical anthropology and value theory provide rich resources for current discourses in environmental philosophy. It is argued that his pluralist value-ethical framework offers a novel perspective on current debates over the ‘nature of
value and the value of nature’ in contemporary environmental ethics. ‘Bringing values down to earth’ is a characterization of what Scheler calls ‘sublimation:’ the unique place of humans in the cosmos is to actualize values which only they are capable of apprehending. This may be interpreted in a non-anthropocentric way in order to balance environmental views that attempt to minimize the sense of human uniqueness.

Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2010

As the first sustained engagement with these aspects of Kovel’s work, this essay maps out the ter... more As the first sustained engagement with these aspects of Kovel’s work, this essay maps out the terrain and highlights some significant features of the landscape. It also brings Kovel’s value theory into dialogue with the lively debates in environmental ethics about the nature of value and the value of nature. Since Kovel himself claims that an “ecocentric ethic…in defense of intrinsic value” is “the deepest level of the resistance to capital, and the foundation of all others,” I think we have to take this value theory seriously and not treat it as an accidental feature of his thinking. As I understand him, Kovel is not claiming that the values perspective is the only one worth adopting in the analysis of environmental struggles, nor do I so argue here. But if one rejects all values talk, then one is rejecting no small part of Kovel’s perspective. It is the “deepest level of the resistance to capital.” This values discourse is not meant to replace but to complement the analysis of power and of structures of constraint and enablement configured by capitalism as discussed elsewhere in his work. It also does not treat the environmentalist as a moral agent abstracted from concrete social relations, but effectively supplements social scientific accounts of that agency with a values dimension that is indispensable for better understanding our own and others’ motivations, and just as importantly, for envisioning change.

New Research on the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann, 2016

Despite its apparent straightforwardness, Hartmann’s conception of ontological strata is often mi... more Despite its apparent straightforwardness, Hartmann’s conception of ontological strata is often misunderstood. In particular, it tends to be conflated with mereological conceptions of ontological hierarchy, whether framed as “levels of organization,” layers of “processes,” or “supervenience” of one layer upon another. Here, I explore a new angle in an attempt to differentiate Hartmann’s conception of the stratified structure of the real world from superficially similar conceptions. I conclude that Hartmann’s ontology provides (environmental) philosophers with a productive ontological framework with which to articulate the nature of human dependence on nonhuman natural processes, functions, and entities.

Early Phenomenology, Brian Harding and Michael Kelly, eds., 2014

Epigraph: The world is not a correlate of anything. (Hartmann) Introduction: First scene: 1... more Epigraph: The world is not a correlate of anything. (Hartmann)

Introduction:

First scene: 1922. Nicolai Hartmann, newly occupying Paul Natorp’s chair in philosophy at Marburg, just made known his definitive break with neo-Kantianism in his Foundations for a Metaphysics of Knowledge (1921), and looks ahead to the full development of a new ontology beyond neo-Kantian strictures. Eager to find conversation partners with whom to share in this vision, he has heard good things about Husserl’s young assistant in Freiburg, who wrote a dissertation on Duns Scotus’ doctrine of categories and, like himself, had a keen interest in Aristotle. Hartmann supports the “call” of this young scholar, Martin Heidegger, to Marburg in 1923. Unfortunately, Hartmann’s desire for dialogue was frustrated. There were many reasons for this, one being the simple fact that their biological clocks were not in sync. Heidegger rose early to work and teach, so by evenings he was fatigued and unable to carry on into the night, which was precisely when Hartmann was fanning the flame of his intellect for an all night vigil. Students in Marburg joked that the round-the-clock philosophizing of these two thinkers amounted to a “philosophia perennis.”

Ontology of Nature: Continental Perspectives and Environmental Reorientations, 2017

"Epigraph: Ontology has become such a suspicious and even impertinent enterprise for contempor... more "Epigraph:

Ontology has become such a suspicious and even impertinent enterprise for contemporary philosophy, largely due to the Kantian critique and its impact, that the mere name “ontology” elicits unease—the kind of unease involuntarily evoked by the reemergence of atavisms long overcome. A value judgment is concealed in this reactive emotional response. The question is whether that value judgment is justified. (Hartmann)

Introduction

Despite the recent resurgence of interest in ontology in some circles (of which the current volume is evidence), these words, penned in 1923, could just as much characterize our time as the earlier epistemology-obsessed era in which they were written. This derisive reaction to ontology will be regarded here as a symptom masking a denial. A denial of what? Denial of human asymmetrical diffuse dependence on nonhuman biotic and abiotic nature characterizing the (post)Modern era. This is another way of saying that “environmentalism” bears ontological as well as axiological significance: the significance of environmentalism is nothing less than a definitive challenge to the reigning anthropocentrism of classical western philosophy, and raises specific axiological, ontological, and epistemological questions about our concepts of human nature, of value, and of nature. It has urged acknowledgment of the substantive existential dependence of human life on the nonhuman biotic and abiotic world. Moreover, it casts new light on the thorny debate between idealism and realism, another philosophical problematic supposedly “long overcome.”
"

Axiomathes, 2016

This is a translation of Nicolai Hartmann’s article "Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglic... more This is a translation of Nicolai Hartmann’s article "Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ontologischen Modalitätsproblems," first published in 1937. In this article, Hartmann defends an interpretation of the Megarian conception of possibility, which found its clearest form in Diodorus Cronus’ expression of it and according to which "only what is actual is possible" or "something is possible only if it is actual." Hartmann defends this interpretation against the then dominant Aristotelian conception of possibility, based on the opposition between dynamis and energeia, and according to which there is always an open multiplicity of simultaneous "possibilities," the outcome of which remains undetermined. Since, according to Hartmann, reality suffers no indetermination, the Megarian conception of possibility is an account of real possibility, whereas the Aristotelian one is merely an account of epistemic possibility (Frédéric Tremblay).