Jason Kawall | Colgate University (original) (raw)

Papers by Jason Kawall

Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2015

This chapter presents a history of environmental ethics as a distinct academic field, from its ea... more This chapter presents a history of environmental ethics as a distinct academic field, from its early origins in the 1960s to recent, contemporary work. It focuses on the key movements and theories that have shaped—and continue to shape—the development of the field, while noting how these have changed and evolved over time. In addition, while tracing the history of these movements, the chapter attempts to present some of the central issues and topics that have garnered particular attention within the field. Finally, it closes with some tentative thoughts on promising paths for environmental ethicists to explore as our field continues to develop and mature.

Ethics, policy & environment, Jan 2, 2021

ABSTRACT To reliably choose morally sound policies, whether as a society or as an individual, wil... more ABSTRACT To reliably choose morally sound policies, whether as a society or as an individual, will typically require a deep and wide-ranging base of relevant knowledge. In this paper I consider the epistemic demands for morally sound action and policy in the Anthropocene. I argue that these demands are likely to be unsatisfied, leading to a potential downward spiral of ineffective action in the face of worsening conditions; this seems a strong possibility both for individual lives, and for societies as a whole. Given the likely scale of ignorance in the face of rapid, poorly-understood change, the best efforts of future generations to act morally may often be little more than guesses, with a far lower chance of asuccess than in more stable conditions. As moral failures mount, and conditions continue to deteriorate, our epistemic efforts seem likely to be pressured and subject to various biases, leading to further errors and failures. Our ability to live virtuously and to act rightly is likely to be put under severe strain in the Anthropocene. Our approach to ethics will likely need to change to the extent that, for a wide range of cases, we will not know what the right action to perform will be; we will typically be acting without such moral knowledge. The final section of my paper addresses ways in which we might attempt to address or mitigate these worries.

Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 2001

Environmental Ethics, 2008

Victoria Davion is not terribly fond of biocentric individualism, the position that all living th... more Victoria Davion is not terribly fond of biocentric individualism, the position that all living things have at least some intrinsic value insofar as they are living. In her "Itch Scratching, Patio Building, and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited" 1 she takes the position to task, focusing in particular on my paper, "Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue" 2. Davion levels a wide-range of criticisms, and concludes that we would be better off putting biocentric individualism aside to focus on more important issues and positions. In what follows I address the worries raised by Davion; in so doing, I further elaborate and defend the position laid out in my original paper. I focus to some extent on her arguments against biocentric individualism in general, as these are presumably of the widest interest. Still, I also address several of her specific objections to my particular proposal for understanding reverence for life, a proposal which draws upon a background normative theory appealing to hypothetical virtuous ideal observers. Finally, while I defend biocentric individualism, I should stress that I defend a quite modest form of the position, in the sense that I see it as only one, comparatively minor, component of an overall environmental ethic. I do not claim to speak for all those who would embrace the

Erkenntnis, May 1, 2004

Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the react... more Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of duty.

Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, Jun 14, 2009

To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information-about morality, environmental issue... more To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information-about morality, environmental issues, the impacts of our actions and commitments, our options for alternatives, and so on. On the other hand, we are finite beings with limited time and resources. We cannot feasibly investigate all of our options, and all environmental issues (let alone moral issues, more broadly). In this paper I attempt to provide initial steps towards addressing the epistemic demands of environmental virtue. In the first half of the paper I provide rules of thumb with respect to (1) how to prioritize our investigations into various issues, and (2) what kinds of information we should seek with respect to these issues, and the levels of epistemic justification we ought to attain. In the second half of the paper, I turn to a modified virtue ethics, appealing to the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers to provide characterizations of morally justified and morally non-culpable actions. I then apply these latter concepts in assessing agents, their actions and projects (with respect to environmental virtue), in light of their investigative efforts, and given their particular circumstances.

Environmental Ethics, 2003

There have been several recent defenses of biocentric individualism, the position that all living... more There have been several recent defenses of biocentric individualism, the position that all living beings have at least some moral standing, simply insofar as they are alive. I develop a virtuebased version of biocentric individualism, focusing on a virtue of reverence for life. In so doing, I attempt to show that such an approach avoids certain problems that afflict other, rival biocentric individualisms. More broadly, I attempt to show that a virtue-based approach allows us to avoid common objections to biocentric individualism, based on its supposed impracticability (or, on the other hand, its emptiness).

Ratio, Sep 1, 2002

Epistemologists often assume that an agent's epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledg... more Epistemologists often assume that an agent's epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both individualistic and social epistemologists. Candidate virtues include such traits as honesty, integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one's status as an expert), patience, and creativity. We can understand such traits to be epistemic virtues insofar as they tend to produce knowledge-not for the agent alone, but for her community. Recognition of such 'otherregarding epistemic virtues' both broadens the area of inquiry of epistemology, and introduces new standards for the evaluation of epistemic agents.

Philosophy in review, Oct 1, 2004

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Mar 1, 2010

There has been much recent interest in questions of value in epistemology (for a thorough overvie... more There has been much recent interest in questions of value in epistemology (for a thorough overview of this work, see Pritchard 2007), and in what follows I argue that epistemologists concerned with the value of true beliefs and knowledge would do well to devote attention to the enduring nature of beliefs, and in particular to the essential role that they play in constituting agents themselves. I begin by considering an analogy commonly drawn by epistemologists between acts in the domain of ethics and beliefs in the domain of epistemology, and argue that it is flawed in important respects. I propose that a better, more fruitful analogue for belief would be desire, or a similarly enduring state of an agent. This revision of a commonly used analogy may be of some value in itself, but I further consider how focusing excessively upon the belief-act analogy (with its implicit emphasis on the process of belief-formation) can lead to flaws or shortcomings in our epistemic value theorizing. Still, this initial work on analogies is intended as a preliminary step, providing an entryway to the more fundamental proposal that we ought to devote greater attention to the enduring nature of beliefs-a nature not captured by the belief-act analogy. I argue that our enduring beliefs help to make us who we are as agents, and it should not be surprising to find significant value to our beliefs arising through this essential, constitutive role. In particular, I argue that enduring, accessible beliefs are crucial to the autonomy, self-control, and authenticity of agents. We would lack effective practical identities without such beliefs. By seeing (i) that the common belief-act analogy can lead us astray by focusing excessively on the moment of belief-formation (rather than on beliefs as enduring states of agents), and (ii) that agents require enduring, accessible beliefs in order to possess effective practical identities, we are

The MIT Press eBooks, Mar 9, 2012

Greed is often thought to be a particularly common and troubling vice in contemporary, market-dri... more Greed is often thought to be a particularly common and troubling vice in contemporary, market-driven societies. 1 The negative effects of greed seem wide-ranging and severe: environmental harms afflicting current generations of humans (and nonhumans), exploitation of workers across the world, weakened communities, a turning away of the greedy themselves from genuine self-improvement and well-being, and, perhaps most important for present purposes, potentially devastating impacts upon future generations. With climate change-largely driven by growing human consumption-future generations face drastically changing ecosystems, massive species loss, radically changing regional climates, extreme weather systems, coastal flooding and erosion, and still further adverse impacts. Moral burdens are being placed on future generations that will need to make difficult, possibly tragic decisions in the face of a radically changed world. Those wealthy by global standards, in particular, may seem to exhibit greed in their ongoing demand for a wide range of goods. They seem to be key drivers of the consumption that is fuelling potentially devastating environmental changes. Yet we might wonder whether the majority of the globally wealthy are, in fact, greedy; after all, the common image of the greedy person is of one who is obsessed with getting more material goods, or of the miser counting his coins. Are we really like this? In what follows I attempt to clarify the nature of the vice of greed, focusing on what can be called "modest greed." Agents who are modestly greedy do not long for material goods or wealth with intense desires. Rather, they have quite modest desires, but ones whose satisfaction they pursue excessively relative to other goods. Modest greed will emerge as a particularly troubling vice for those facing a changing world-one that will require us to reassess our actions, our beliefs, and our understanding of the virtues.

Environmental Ethics, 2006

This is a timely and much-needed collection. In recent years environmental virtue ethics has flou... more This is a timely and much-needed collection. In recent years environmental virtue ethics has flourished, establishing itself as a particularly rich, promising approach within environmental ethics. Indeed, environmental virtue ethics has reached a stage in its development where an assessment of what it has accomplished and its potential for further progress is especially appropriate. This volume, by including both important papers in the (admittedly brief) history of environmental virtue ethics, and several new pieces which illustrate the future directions that environmental virtue ethics may take, helps to satisfy this need. Environmental Virtue Ethics contains thirteen papers-four of them important reprinted papers, nine of them original to this volume-arranged into four sections, plus a brief introduction by Sandler. Part one, "Recognizing Environmental Virtue Ethics" contains two previously published selections: "The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Language" by Louke van Wensveen (from her book, Dirty Virtues), and "Thoreau, Leopold, Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics" by Philip Cafaro. Both pieces illustrate how virtue language has been surprisingly common-yet overlooked-in much environmental literature (including, but not limited to works explicitly addressing environmental ethics). Thus, there are calls to respect nature, to develop humility, to feel compassion for other sentient beings, and so on, even among authors who do not explicitly place themselves in a virtueethical tradition. These pieces demonstrate that environmental virtue ethics has deep roots in environmental discourse-appeals to virtues and exemplary characters are not a mere recent academic fashion. Part two, "Environmental Virtue Ethics Theory" is the longest section of the book, with five papers devoted to more theoretical issues in developing environmental virtue ethics and its place in environmental ethics more broadly. Thomas Hill Jr.'s important 1983 paper, "Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments," develops a strong case that a lack of a noninstrumental appreciation of nature will typically reflect a lack of important traits that are needed in order to be a virtuous person. In particular, Hill focuses on questions of humility and self-acceptance. Holmes Rolston, III's "Environmental Virtue Ethics: Half the Truth but Dangerous as a Whole" charges that environmental virtue ethics cannot provide a complete environmental ethic. In particular, he argues that we must attribute intrinsic value to various features of nature; after all, why should we respect nature unless nature has prior intrinsic value that makes it worthy of

Conservation Biology, Apr 1, 2004

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2012

in recent discussions of whether our lives are or can be meaningful, appeals are often made to su... more in recent discussions of whether our lives are or can be meaningful, appeals are often made to such things as "a view from nowhere," or "the viewpoint of the universe." in this paper i attempt to make sense of what it might mean for a being to possess such a perspective, and argue that common appeals to such perspectives are inadequately developed; crucially, they do not adequately account for the character of the beings taken to possess these viewpoints. in the second half of the paper i turn to an alternative proposal, one that focuses on the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers in determining the normative statuses of our lives and activities, and argue that it provides a plausible account of meaningfulness.

Ethics, policy & environment, Jan 2, 2018

The Trump administration cancelled US involvement in the Paris Agreement, so, despite projected d... more The Trump administration cancelled US involvement in the Paris Agreement, so, despite projected devastating impacts on human communities, the US still lacks comprehensive national policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This vacuum has provided the space for a surge of promising sustainability and climate action planning efforts at the state and local level. Meanwhile, according to the National Low Income Housing Coalition's (2015) Out of Reach Report, 'there is no state in the US where a minimum wage worker working full time can afford a one-bedroom apartment at the fair market rent'. In recent urban planning efforts, cities like Portland and New York have specifically attempted to integrate progressive policies designed to address affordable housing in sustainability and climate action planning. Policy alternatives exist that can provide win-win scenarios, helping to address climate change while directly improving lives. The US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement was designed to reduce US GHG emissions through local government leadership and action. Over 1000 signatory cities have committed to meaningful GHG emission reduction targets in their respective communities using a range of climate-related policies and plans 1 (US Mayors Conference of Mayors, 2018). Climate policy at the state level has also been created in response to the lack of national policy. At least 30 US states have also created a climate action plan (CAP) of some kind (Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2018). A CAP typically outlines broad policy goals as well as specific programmatic and policy recommendations that will be used as GHG reduction measures. As a representative example, the New York State climate action plan includes the goal to reduce GHG emissions by 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Included in the implementation planning for this goal are programmes aimed explicitly at incentivizing climate policy promulgation at the local government level. Similar to many nationwide models, the Clean Energy Communities Program and the Climate Smart Communities are NY state-local government programmes that support the creation of municipal-based incentives, inducements and mandates designed to: improve energy efficiency standards for new and existing buildings, support renewable energy generation and shift city-scale community planning efforts to promote low-carbon behaviours. In analyses of many common US local sustainability and climate action planning policy tools, Russo and Pattison (2016, 2017) argue that issues of equity were absent from many of these plans, which were dominated by policy emphases

Southern Journal of Philosophy, Mar 1, 2005

Philosophical Studies, Jul 12, 2008

Discussion of the supererogatory in the last half-century has been sparked in large part by J. O.... more Discussion of the supererogatory in the last half-century has been sparked in large part by J. O. Urmson's 1958 article, "Saints and Heroes". 1 Urmson argues that there is a class of actions-the supererogatory-that cannot be adequately accounted for by traditional divisions of actions into the obligatory, the forbidden, and the permissible. He has us consider the actions of a doctor who chooses to travel to a plague-ridden city in order to help combat the crisis, and ease the suffering of those trapped there. It seems too much to demand that all people (or even all doctors) perform such actions-we would not blame other doctors who do not make such extreme sacrifices, and do not take such extreme risks to their own well-being. The doctor's actions thus do not seem to be obligatory. On the other hand, these actions are not simply permissible. It is not as if the doctor were simply choosing to walk to work rather than taking his bicycle. His actions seem morally praiseworthy, and worthy of emulation. Thus, we have an instance of the supererogatory, a morally good action which is neither obligatory, nor merely permissible. A supererogatory action is often described as one that (in some sense) goes beyond duty or what is morally required. Since Urmson's paper, there has been a great deal of discussion of supererogation by both consequentialists and deontologists. Urmson suggests that both theories face difficulties in accounting for the supererogatory, though he does recommend a modified consequentialism as a possible solution. A wide range of responses have been evoked-some suggesting that supererogation is simply an illusion, while others have attempted to account for it within (broadly) traditional consequentialist or deontological frameworks. 2 In the first half of this paper I argue that accounting for the supererogatory is just as problematic for standard virtue theories as it is for their consequentialist and deontological rivals; common formulations of virtue ethics do not yet provide developed accounts of supererogation. In

International Encyclopedia of Ethics