Jerry L Martin | University of Colorado, Boulder (original) (raw)

Papers by Jerry L Martin

Open Theology, 2018

While traditions give quite different accounts of ultimacy, they do report encounters, experience... more While traditions give quite different accounts of ultimacy, they do report encounters, experiences, and epiphanies that are taken to be of the ultimate and that provide evidence for the nature and availability of the ultimate. Otherwise, it would not be obvious what claim they had to be revelatory or disclosive of the ultimate. Tradition and religious authorities can be appealed to but they derive their validity from the revelations and enlightenments. Epistemically, religions do not just float on air or the stilts of social convention. When the theologian steps beyond the boundaries of received beliefs, the question of marks of ultimacy becomes even more acute. Even the pluralist must ask which religions, and which texts, practices, and iconic figures from those religions, bear the marks of ultimacy. The student of comparative religion need not ask that question, but the theologian must. The foundational revelation and enlightenments, if valid, required recognition of ultimacy. Moses and St. Paul, Mohammed and Buddha and Ramakrishna made judgments about the validity of their experiences, and we in turn make judgments about theirs. As we encounter Jesus or Krishna or the Dao De Ching, we sometimes feel that we ourselves recognize the glimmer of ultimacy there. So there are (at least) two levels of experience here: the original revelation and the theologian encountering it. Both experiences are evidential and need to be weighed epistemically. Theology is not just an intellectual exercise in solving theological puzzles; if it has life blood in it, there is a story to tell. Why is Augustine's Confessions one of the most widely read works in theology? It is an account of one man's journey in looking for and scrutinizing marks of ultimacy. In fact, we too may have an epiphany as dramatic and illuminating in its own way as the revelations we are studying. That is the point of view behind the Call for Papers, and it is sharply and interestingly challenged by Paul Michael Hedges (Encounters with Ultimacy?: Autobiographicl and Critical Perspectives in the Academic Study of Religion). He begins with the "beating heart" of his spiritual and intellectual journey-a dramatic, "un-English" religious experience, somewhat relucantly told. It was, he says, "perhaps the most powerful and intense experience of my life." To describe it, the phrases "unburning fire" and "pure and unconditional impersonal love" come to mind, he says. It was "not something that my conceptual world could really handle," and, when asked about it he claimed to have "felt nothing" and told no one. Hedges reports accounts in various traditions that seemed to be of the same sort of experience. Hedges then explains how he came to doubt the experience, which "could simply have been the release of various chemicals." He doubts whether "mystical" experiences should count as evidence of ultimacy. In fact, he doubts the meaningfulness of experiential terms for academic analysis. In the course of his discussion, Hedges takes up many topics at the cutting edge of discussion, including the ongoing debate over constructivism, Charles Taylor's social imaginary, the importance of the reflexive turn, the

Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 1975

It is only because the solution is possible that the problem exists. So with all transcendental a... more It is only because the solution is possible that the problem exists. So with all transcendental arguments (p. 30).Although P. F. Strawson mentions transcendental arguments only once in Individuals, there is no doubt as to his commitment to transcendental method. This paper will offer a critique of such a method, as it functions in a single context. Strawson gives a transcendental argument to refute scepticism with regard to other minds. We are all familiar with the gist of this argument. The sceptic holds that one can ascribe states of consciousness only to oneself. This assertion obviously implies that one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself. But, Strawson argues, “One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others” (p. 96). In other words, the second assertion implies a third, that one can ascribe states of consciousness to others. The third assertion, though implied by the sceptic's initial assertion, contradicts it. Thus scep...

Philosophy, 1974

Professor P. F. Strawson is sometimes credited with having refuted scepticism with regard to know... more Professor P. F. Strawson is sometimes credited with having refuted scepticism with regard to knowledge of other minds. The thesis of this paper is that, in so far as the refutation of this sort of scepticism is its aim, Strawson's argument fails. The sceptic's claim is that one can ascribe states of consciousness only to oneself. Strawson's reply is that 'One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others' (96). 1 His point here is a purely logical one: the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed (o.5n). What distinguishes a predicate from a proper name is precisely that it can, in principle, be applied to a plurality of individuals. But, Strawson argues, 'there is no sense' in talking about ascribing a certain predicate to a plurality of individuals 'unless there is in principle some way of telling' which individuals possess that predicate (102). And there would be no way of telling which individuals possessed that predicate unless there were some way of identifying different subjects of such predicates. Now, states of consciousness are what Strawson calls 'private particulars' (31), which means that they are not observable. Individuals which possessed only private particulars could not be identified, since there would be no public way of identifying such individuals. If private particulars are to be ascribed at all, even to oneself, it must be possible to ascribe them to others as well. If they are to be ascribed to others, it must be possible to ascribe them on the basis of public ways of telling. If we are to ascribe them on the basis of public ways of telling, they must be ascribed to individuals which possess public (corporeal or behavioural) characteristics as well. Some of the public characteristics of such individuals must constitute 'logically adequate criteria' for the ascription of at least some private particulars (102). Therefore, Strawson concludes, it is false that one can ascribe states of consciousness only to oneself. Suppose that we grant, for the sake of argument, that, as a necessary condition of the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself, at least 1 The numbers in parentheses, in this and succeeding references, denote pages

Open Theology, 2016

Transreligious theology is impossible yet inevitable. It is impossible because theology is almost... more Transreligious theology is impossible yet inevitable. It is impossible because theology is almost by definition the articulation of religious truths as held as by particular tradition. It is that tradition that provides the canonical texts, hermeneutical strategies, theological questions, an array of offered answers, and methods for assessing and modifying them. In addition, the tradition provides the full-bodied religious life that its theologies serve. Nevertheless, transreligious theology is inevitable, in the sense of necessary if theology is to reach its goal. For surely the goal of theology is to provide, as best we can, the logos of theos, the fullest articulation of the divine or ultimate reality we can achieve. The exclusivist can avoid transreligious theology, but the more we study various traditions, in a scholarly and spiritually open way, and come to know their adherents and their practices, the more truth about divine reality we find there and, consequently, the more urgent the task of thinking across religious divides. The theology of religions and comparative theology are important steps in this direction. If developed in a way that is sufficiently robust, they might be able to shed light on the divine reality in its wider scope. Those approaches look beyond their traditions, but keep intact sufficient elements to provide compasses and rudders. However, it might be necessary to go further and to consider the total spiritual resources of humankind, every source of revelation and enlightenment and insight anew, without dragging our traditional anchors behind us. Some thinkers – among whom one would certainly number Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, Ramon Panikkar, and Robert Cummings Neville – have begun to explore the divine terrain through a very wide lense indeed. In the United States and Canada, issues of transreligious theology have been the focus of the Theology Without Walls Project, which meets under the auspices of the American Academy of Religion. Hence, some of the papers in this volume refer to this form of transreligious inquiry and cite remarks I have made defining and defending this project. Those presentations can be found online at the Theology Without Walls Forum.1 At this point, transreligious theology should be considered an exploratory program, at best a “research programme” in Imre Lakatos’ sense. That it is necessary – if theology is to live up to its goal of explicating the divine reality as fully as possible – does not ensure that it is achievable. The only way to discover that is to begin the exploration, put the concept itself to the test, explore the most promising precedents, methods, and lines of inquiry, and see what illumination our best efforts can attain. That is exactly what this special issue of Open Theology proposes to do.

Conversions, in Alasdair MacIntyre's view, allows the convert to understand something she could n... more Conversions, in Alasdair MacIntyre's view, allows the convert to understand
something she could not understand before and to become something she couldnot be before. A conversion comes about, according to psychologist James E. Loder, through a "rupture in the knowing context," as exemplied in casesreported by Miller and C'de Baca in "Quantum Change." The author offers aphenomenological reading of his own conversions to love and belief in God asreported in his book, "God: An Autobiography, as Told by a Philosopher."The examination includes his earlier conversion from belief to non-belief.Is there a "logic" that guides conversion. Not exactly, but there is a heuristics, most fruitful when conceived in relation to what Eric Voegelin
calls "the tension toward the divine."

De Gruyter, 2018

One of the greatest challenges of the spiritual life is discernment. Joan of Arc and her divine ... more One of the greatest challenges of the spiritual life is discernment. Joan of Arc and her divine voices, documented in two trials, provide materials for a case study in discernment. Were her voices really divine? How can we tell?

Continental Philosophy Review, 1973

The human encounter with the Divine Reality is often with a personal God. Using Eric Voegelin’s h... more The human encounter with the Divine Reality is often with a personal God. Using Eric Voegelin’s hermeneutic, the symbol “Person” is rich in implications, some of which are evident in religious texts, some of which is explicated by John Macmurray and Emmanuel Mounier. These implications include involvement with other persons, caring about them and responding to them, and developing in relationship with them. If so, God does have a history, the meaning of which is found, as it is for human persons, in the divine-human encounter.

According to the Buber-Rosenzweig translation, the voice from the burning bush announces itself a... more According to the Buber-Rosenzweig translation, the voice from the burning bush announces itself as “I will be-there howsoever I will be-there.” God is not only being, but being-there, being-present. Nicholas of Cusa spoke of the “omnivoyance” of God and Eric Voegelin placed the divine-human encounter at the center of his phenomenology. But God also appears concretely at particular times and places. In the Hindu concept of darshan, the worshipper sees and is seen by the god present through a consecrated image. Three theophanies are arresting cases of divine encounter – a Catholic priest with a Hindu goddess, Sojourner Truth with Jesus, and an Apinouye chief with a god. To credit these experiences involves a scandal due to their shocking anthropomorphism. But, as Dutch theologian Hendrikus Berthof argues, the anthropomorphic language is precisely apt. It is God’s language, not our own, Karl Barth reminds us. And, Voegelin argues, it is not for us to determine how the divine reality can and cannot present itself. The paper concludes that anthropomorphic language, in fact, fits the natural context and semantic field for these encounters. Our task is not to discount concrete divine presence, but to accept it “howsoever” it is available to us.

Every religion and many philosophies offer a soteriology – its own version of the human predicame... more Every religion and many philosophies offer a soteriology – its own version of the human predicament and its solution. Instead, Voegelin offers a meta-soteriology allowing various worldviews to be assessed by their openness to truth. At the same time, Voegelin rejects generic (Kantian and Husserlian) philosophies of consciousness on the grounds that all experience is personal. This paper argues that, similarly, soteriology cannot be merely generic, as if there were one human predicament and a single solution for everyone. Each of us has her or her own predicament and calling. Tolstoy’s War and Peace and George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda are illuminating in this regard, as is the author’s own encounter with God and subsequent prayerful reading of the scriptures of the world’s religions. Finally, Socrates behavior in the Euthydemus provides a telling example of existential soteriology.

The experience of divine presence is compelling. Yet it immediately confronts the Epistemology o... more The experience of divine presence is compelling. Yet it immediately confronts the Epistemology of Doubt that has dominated modern philosophy since Descartes. Among its many limitations, this tradition is ill-equipped to understand divine self-presentation. But an alternative tradition can be conceived. Drawing on Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore, as well as other thinkers, we can envision an Epistemics of Trust. This is not so much a theory (like those offered by Alston and Plantinga) as a research program, in the sense expounded by Imre Lakatos, that would address a wide range of knowings. It is here applied to two experiences of divine presence, Moses' and the author's own. The analysis illuminates not only the experiences, but the nature of the divine reality presenting itself.