Emma Mateo | Columbia University (original) (raw)
Papers by Emma Mateo
The Journal of power institutions in post-soviet societies
Social Media + Society, 2021
When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their m... more When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their mobilization? Do the same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally representative panel survey in Ukraine ( Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014 ) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014 EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test ...
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-sms-10.1177_2056305121999656 for Mobilization, Mass Perceptions, ... more Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-sms-10.1177_2056305121999656 for Mobilization, Mass Perceptions, and (Dis)information: "New" and "Old" Media Consumption Patterns and Protest by Olga Onuch, Emma Mateo and Julian G. Waller in Social Media + Society
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2022
During moments of nationwide mass mobilization, what distinguishes the towns and cities that rise... more During moments of nationwide mass mobilization, what distinguishes the towns and cities that rise in the first week from those that do not see protest? Taking the case of nationwide protests in Belarus in August 2020, this study employs an original protest event catalogue to investigate what drives mobilization in early-rising localities. I test hypotheses in the protest literature relating to whether pre-existing social networks, or pre-election campaign rallies, influence subsequent protest mobilization. The innovative use of Telegram data demonstrates the platform's value for social scientists studying protest. My results suggest that pre-existing social networks help drive mobilization in localities by facilitating communication, coordination, and engagement prior to protest onset, priming people to be ready when the moment of protest arrives. This article also highlights the impressive scale of nationwide mobilization in Belarus in 2020, and demonstrates that local networks were engaging in widespread opposition activity even before mass mobilization.
Social Media + Society, 2021
When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their m... more When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their mobilization? Do the
same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the
relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these
questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions
of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally
representative panel survey in Ukraine (Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014
EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as
well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe
and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test hypotheses, prominent in current protest literature, related
to the influence of “new” (social media and online news) and “old” media (television) on protest behavior and attitudes.
Making use of the significance of 2014 Ukraine as a testing ground for Russian disinformation tactics, we also specifically test
for consumption of Russian-owned television. Our findings indicate that frequent consumption of “old” media, specifically
Russian-owned television, is significantly associated with both mobilization in and positive perceptions of protest and is a
better predictor of believing “fake news” than consuming “new” media sources.
The Journal of power institutions in post-soviet societies
Social Media + Society, 2021
When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their m... more When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their mobilization? Do the same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally representative panel survey in Ukraine ( Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014 ) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014 EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test ...
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-sms-10.1177_2056305121999656 for Mobilization, Mass Perceptions, ... more Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-sms-10.1177_2056305121999656 for Mobilization, Mass Perceptions, and (Dis)information: "New" and "Old" Media Consumption Patterns and Protest by Olga Onuch, Emma Mateo and Julian G. Waller in Social Media + Society
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2022
During moments of nationwide mass mobilization, what distinguishes the towns and cities that rise... more During moments of nationwide mass mobilization, what distinguishes the towns and cities that rise in the first week from those that do not see protest? Taking the case of nationwide protests in Belarus in August 2020, this study employs an original protest event catalogue to investigate what drives mobilization in early-rising localities. I test hypotheses in the protest literature relating to whether pre-existing social networks, or pre-election campaign rallies, influence subsequent protest mobilization. The innovative use of Telegram data demonstrates the platform's value for social scientists studying protest. My results suggest that pre-existing social networks help drive mobilization in localities by facilitating communication, coordination, and engagement prior to protest onset, priming people to be ready when the moment of protest arrives. This article also highlights the impressive scale of nationwide mobilization in Belarus in 2020, and demonstrates that local networks were engaging in widespread opposition activity even before mass mobilization.
Social Media + Society, 2021
When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their m... more When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their mobilization? Do the
same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the
relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these
questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions
of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally
representative panel survey in Ukraine (Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014
EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as
well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe
and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test hypotheses, prominent in current protest literature, related
to the influence of “new” (social media and online news) and “old” media (television) on protest behavior and attitudes.
Making use of the significance of 2014 Ukraine as a testing ground for Russian disinformation tactics, we also specifically test
for consumption of Russian-owned television. Our findings indicate that frequent consumption of “old” media, specifically
Russian-owned television, is significantly associated with both mobilization in and positive perceptions of protest and is a
better predictor of believing “fake news” than consuming “new” media sources.