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Videos by Susan Songsuk Hahn

Russian Dissident, Pulitzer-Prize Winner, Vladimir Kara-Murza Interviewed at MIT by Susan Hahn ... more Russian Dissident, Pulitzer-Prize Winner, Vladimir Kara-Murza
Interviewed at MIT by Susan Hahn
(50 minutes, 1.32 GB)

First event in "Dissident Speaker Series," launched at MIT on October 25, 201, on the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

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Books, Anthologies by Susan Songsuk Hahn

This book addresses a longstanding, intractable problem in Hegel scholarship: Hegel’s doctrine of... more This book addresses a longstanding, intractable problem in Hegel scholarship: Hegel’s doctrine of contradiction and its application to contexts of value. My aim was to make Hegel’s doctrine of contradiction, once dismissed as heretical, into a plausible one deserving serious consideration. I reject the standard misinterpretations and develop an original line of thinking about contradiction: one that attempts to plausibly motivate Hegel’s claims by linking his theme of contradiction to his neglected Philosophy of Nature in the service of constructing an organically-holistic view of nature and cognition.

This first book reflects some of my main interests in 19th century philosophy: ranging over problems about freedom, agency, and responsibility as they arise in contexts of irresolvable conflicts and incommensurable values.

This latest volume in the Cambridge History of Philosophy series, The Cambridge History of Philos... more This latest volume in the Cambridge History of Philosophy series, The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, brings together 28 leading experts in the field and covers the years 1790–1870. The 28 chapters (provided here in watermarked proof pages to download, 5.9 mb) give a comprehensive survey of the period, organizing the material topically. After a brief editor’s introduction, 3 chapters survey the background of nineteenth-century philosophy; followed by 2 articles on logic and mathematics; 2 on nature and natural science; 4 on mind, language, and culture, including psychology, the human sciences, and aesthetics; 4 on ethics; 3 on religion; 7 on society, including chapters on the French Revolution, the decline of natural right, political economy, and social discontent; and 3 on history, dealing with historical method, speculative theories of history, and the history of philosophy. The essays are framed by an editor’s introduction and a bibliography.

Inquiry, 2006

Proceedings of the third "Kant to Hegel" conference held at Pittsburgh in 2005. Authors: Michael ... more Proceedings of the third "Kant to Hegel" conference held at Pittsburgh in 2005.
Authors: Michael Friedman, Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, Stephen Engstrom, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Rolf-Peter Horstmann

Papers by Susan Songsuk Hahn

Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, 2015

Not all historical varieties of perspectivism are plagued by paradox. Ironically, a method that a... more Not all historical varieties of perspectivism are plagued by paradox. Ironically, a method that at its origins was aimed to resolve conflicts appears later in Nietzsche’s version to generate more inconsistencies and paradoxes than it solves. One distinctive feature of Nietzsche’s version, missing in the original, is his skepticism about norms and values. Yet a preponderance of preferences and valuations – arising at all levels of his thought - would seem to infect his stance of value neutrality. Thus, a paradox arises on his perspectival theory of truth: How can he prefer his own skeptical theory of truth, on which no one perspective should enjoy epistemic privilege over all others - without coming into conflict with his own leveling perspectivism? To deflect the criticism that Nietzsche is mixing up descriptions and evaluations, I relocate the debate to an alternative framework: One unconventional enough to allow his skepticism and naturalism to be in play simultaneously. I argue Nietzsche’s skeptical epistemology can survive self-referential paradoxes about truth and justification, by sidestepping two standard responses (rational and irrational) and embracing self-refutation as part of a wider pattern of self-criticism by anti-systematic, skeptical philosophy. I conclude his skeptical critique of truth leaves room for a naturalized notion of action-guiding beliefs, which fall within the parameters laid down by his theoretical skepticism.

British Journal of Aesthetics, 2013, v. 53, n.4: 379-392

The prevailing view of Hume’s theory of taste, I argue, is in conflict with his skepticism. The d... more The prevailing view of Hume’s theory of taste, I argue, is in conflict with his skepticism. The dominant view locates normative authority in a relationship that certain experts bear to art - making Hume sound more like an idealist than an empiricist with naturalistic leanings. Instead, I read Hume’s aesthetic naturalism against the background of his skeptical commitments. I argue he is a skeptic about taste as the direct outgrowth of his skepticism about cause. I reconstruct Hume’s deduction “that” there is a standard of taste, in a qualified sense not ruled out by his skepticism.

Hegel Bulletin (formerly, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain), 2011

Without exception, Hegel’s empty formalism is standardly read as a “devastating objection” to Kan... more Without exception, Hegel’s empty formalism is standardly read as a “devastating objection” to Kant’s ethics in general and to his categorical imperative, in particular. However, if we contextualize empty formalism to Hegel’s logic, it is far from clear that emptiness and formalism is a charge from which Kant needs defending. Alternatively, from the perspective of Hegel’s dialectical logic, we get a very different basis than the dominant interpretation would have it, for revising Kant’s formalist ethics. In the logic, Hegel uses a dialectical strategy, not to reject logical principles, but to revitalize our understanding of them in order to deflect the threat of skepticism. By analogy, empty formalism involves no such wholesale objection to Kant's ethics. Far from dismissing Kant's universal formula as vacuously empty, the real weakness Hegel is pointing to is a paradox about our dualistic understanding of form and content.

International Yearbook of German Idealism (Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus), Band 5 (2007): 331-356, 2007

What does Hegel mean when he says we must regard concepts as "living"? This article links Hegel's... more What does Hegel mean when he says we must regard concepts as "living"? This article links Hegel's claim to interrelated elements in his Logic and Philosophy of Nature, in the service of constructing an organic-holistic conception of cognition and nature. We get a prime example of the sense in which Hegel thinks concepts are living in the opening triad of his larger Logic: in the movement of the concept Being toward Becoming. My naturalistic reading relates Hegel's ideas about life to the presence of contradiction in organic unities. Once contradiction is understood as a living unity of opposites in organisms undergoing change, contradiction is not a sign of error but of life itself. This feature of contradiction places Hegel's logic of organic wholes in some sense beyond the reach of discursive articulation.

CLIO, 24, no. 4 (1995): 355-380

This article was the second chapter of my dissertation, which I wrote with Michael N. Forster. He... more This article was the second chapter of my dissertation, which I wrote with Michael N. Forster. Hegel thinks fundamental changes and radical revisions in ethical thought occur at the difficult transition points, where exposure to contradictory forms of thought bring about radical upheavals and revisions in beliefs: Specifically, the role of moral indeterminacy and irresolvable conflicts for bringing about revision in moral beliefs.

Journal of Value Inquiry, 28 (1994): 151-168

This article was the first chapter of my dissertation, which I wrote with Michael N. Forster. It ... more This article was the first chapter of my dissertation, which I wrote with Michael N. Forster. It was originally published in the Journal of Value Inquiry - a special issue devoted to aesthetic value. It was awarded their first James Wilbur Prize , first place. It was reprinted in Hegel, Vol. II, ed. David Lamb, International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy (1998), pp.385-402. It appears as Ch. 5 in Contradiction in Motion: Hegel’s Organic Concept of Life and Value (Cornell University Press, 2007).

Adoption Matters, eds, Sally Haslanger and Charlotte Witt

I try take some of the idealization out of Harry Frankfurt’s theory of love. In his paper, "Auton... more I try take some of the idealization out of Harry Frankfurt’s theory of love. In his paper, "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love" he raises love to the status of being necessary and unconditional. The idealization in his position is not readily apparent, I argue, because he typically draws on more or less standard cases - his favorite paradigm being love of ones own children. I argue that it’s important that an account of love cover cases falling outside the norm, otherwise, we may miss the extent to which certain well-scripted feelings and normalizing beliefs in the more standard cases are masking the complexities, instabilities, and darker variations of love.

My reconstructive critique is aimed to take some of the abstract purity out of his concept, by stretching its meaning over a wider field, to include nonstandard cases falling outside the norm. This required me to take a somewhat extended detour through some cases of adoption that are of growing interest to anthropologists and philosophers. These cases alert us to a special class of destabilizing features of love, most salient in nonstandard families, but equally present in their mainstream counterparts.

Anthology reviewed in Philosophical Review, October 2006 by Hilde Lindemann.

Telos, no. 117 (1999): 60-78

I argue that there are two readings of Adorno’s aesthetic theory: pessimistic and optimistic, bot... more I argue that there are two readings of Adorno’s aesthetic theory: pessimistic and optimistic, both of which are based on one-sided interpretations. I try to show that both positions contain unwarranted assumptions and I offer a revisionary account that tries to do justice to the themes of reconciliation and utopia in Adorno’s aesthetics.

Reviews of Works by Susan Songsuk Hahn

CONTRADICTION IN MOTION: Hegel's Organic Concept of Life and Value Cornell University Press, 2007... more CONTRADICTION IN MOTION: Hegel's Organic Concept of Life and Value
Cornell University Press, 2007: 220 pages.

Book reviewed in:

1. European Journal of Philosophy, by Alison Stone. V.18, n.2 (June 2010): 320-324.

2. Philosophical Review, by Allen Speight. Vol. 118, no.4 (2009): 555-558.

3. The Review of Metaphysics, by Christopher Yeoman. Vol. 62, n.3 (Mar 2009): 657-659.

4. Mind, by Sally Sedgwick. Online preview Oct. 27, 2009.

5. Hegel-Studien, by Michela Bordignon. Vol. 43 (2009): 141-146.

6. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, by R. Zambrana, no. 59/60 (2009): 105-110.

7. CLIO, by Tim Brownlee. Vol. 38, n. 2 (2009): 226-231.

8. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, by Richard Velkley
(April 22, 2008) online review: <http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12943>

9. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, by L. De Vos. Vol. 69, no. 4 (2007): 775-776.

Interview Transcripts by Susan Songsuk Hahn

Transcript of live interview with Russian Dissident, Vladimir Kara-Murza On the occasion of laun... more Transcript of live interview with Russian Dissident, Vladimir Kara-Murza
On the occasion of launching Dissident Speaker Series, at MIT, October 25, 2017,
and the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

Courses by Susan Songsuk Hahn

DESCRIPTION This graduate seminar will give a philosophical grounding in the normative concepts t... more DESCRIPTION This graduate seminar will give a philosophical grounding in the normative concepts that guide political theory. We will examine the origin and justification of basic concepts such as freedom and autonomy, equality and social justice, crime and punishment, coercion and authority of the state. We will look for the origins of concepts and principles in two sources: Nature and right (and law). Part I will be devoted to political theorists who ground their political concepts in nature, naturalized norms, and power: Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Nietzsche. We begin with the pessimistic moral psychology lying at the basis of Machiavelli and Hobbes's political writings on power and sovereignty. Among the topics we will examine: What motivates people? Do people naturally tend toward doing evil? Are they unavoidably and inherently selfish and self-interested? Other topics will include autonomy and expressive unity with nature in Rousseau; Rousseau's account of natural inequalities in a state of nature; and his account of how our psychologies in a pre-political state of nature underwent development in the political sphere.

Problems arise, however, from placing natural norms at the basis of political theory. If people are inherently and unavoidably self-interested, as these political theorists think, this will effect the kinds of safeguards and checks that need to be in place to protect people from each other. Their pessimism about human nature results making political life essentially coercive. This paradox that people need to be " forced " to be free will be a continuing theme throughout our discussions. Does the state the right have to coerce humans to do what is right, in accordance with universal principles of right and freedom? Or do these unwanted implications mean we have the wrong psychological profile of human nature?

Next, we look to ways that philosophers have sought to remedy problems arising on the natural approach. By contrast, Part II looks to a rational origin for political principles. We'll examine how Kant, Hegel, and Marx derive their norms out of considerations about right and law. Some basic questions will arise in connection with concerns about freedom, individual freedom, and coercion: What is a person? Does a concept of a person limit what you can do to them? Do persons have intrinsic rights, like dignity, or is this something acquired (earned)? Is their right to live free something they can lose or give up? The transition to right and law raises problems of its own, such as: Is a bias toward rationality detrimental to individualistic self-realization and self-expression? Are authoritative models of the state detrimental to individual freedom?

The late 18th-19th century was one of the most exciting, revolutionary, and difficult periods in ... more The late 18th-19th century was one of the most exciting, revolutionary, and difficult periods in the history of philosophy. Among the prominent philosophers working in the period were Hume, Kant, Goethe, Hegel and the post-Kantian German Idealists. In this course, we explore certain philosophical conceptions of nature, naturalism, and natural philosophy that originated out of reflections on the empirical sciences and scientific methods of the day.